**Principles for Delivering Adaptation Finance**

**Introduction**

The mounting pressure to take action on climate change has been matched by a growth in interest in adaptation to climate change risks. This has been matched by a proliferation of adaptation finance initiatives. This briefing proposes a set of principles to help deliver adaptation finance. These principles have been formulated in response to the need for an international Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to provide a comprehensive framework for adaptation finance. The principles are intended to ensure that the 1997 Kyoto Protocol’s provisions on adaptation are not undermined by a lack of coherence in global climate finance.

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__References and Further Reading__


**Credits**

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Hannah Ryder, Zoe Sprigings, Melanie Speight, Yvan Biot, Maria Arce, Kit Vaughan, and others experienced in climate change and adaptation issues contributed to this briefing.

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Principles for Delivering Adaptation Finance

In collating and synthesising relevant literature on adaptation finance, analysts and programme implementers have developed principles for effective delivery of adaptation finance. In this paper, we present four principles that can guide delivery mechanisms for delivering adaptation finance:

1. **Country ownership**: Delivery mechanisms must be flexible and tailored to specific country contexts and be driven by in-country stakeholders and subject to clear accountability. Delivery mechanisms should reflect the understanding local contexts and provide adaptation goods and services that are context-specific and driven by in-country stakeholders.

2. **Mutual accountability**: Delivery mechanisms must be transparent, accountable, and subject to clear accountability. Mechanisms should be designed to be flexible and tailored to specific needs and contexts. For example, ‘off the shelf’ solutions suggest that some states may require capacity building to manage fiduciary risk to improve accountability and transparency. Therefore, programme-based delivery mechanisms should be supported by flexible and tailored delivery mechanisms, which must be taken to protect the country's fiduciary discipline and effective public financial management.

3. **Performance and fragmentation of funding delivery mechanisms**: National and subnational governments may have flexible and tailored delivery mechanisms for implementing adaptation finance, as these mechanisms can be reconfigured to suit local needs and contexts.

4. **Mutual accountability**: Delivery mechanisms at a level must be supported by rigorous and well-documented evidence. Mechanisms that provide for pro-poor state-based conditional support to the poorest and most vulnerable people, in many cases people excluded from accessing state resources and potential learning from pro-poor state-based conditional support, offer a more effective means of encouraging leadership and ownership by key countries than project-based approaches. Furthermore, programme-based funding is shown to be more time consuming and less accountable than project-based approaches. Programme-based approaches are not effective—understanding local costs and formulating local solutions are central to the success of programmes.

In places where the state is not functioning effectively, a blend of delivery mechanisms should be developed. Delivery mechanisms should be designed to ensure fiduciary discipline and effective prioritisation of spending to deliver results in fewer global benefits. Consequently, delivery mechanisms may supplement support to the poorest and most vulnerable countries. In many cases, people excluded from accessing state resources and potential learning from pro-poor state-based conditional support, offer a more effective means of encouraging leadership and ownership by key countries than project-based approaches. Furthermore, programme-based funding is shown to be more time consuming and less accountable than project-based approaches. Programme-based approaches are not effective—understanding local costs and formulating local solutions are central to the success of programmes.

In places where the state is not functioning effectively, a blend of delivery mechanisms should be developed. Delivery mechanisms which promote that programme delivery, rather than programme-based approaches, are scalable and can be reconfigured to suit local needs and contexts. For example, ‘off the shelf’ solutions suggest that some states may require capacity building to manage fiduciary risk to improve accountability and transparency. Therefore, programme-based delivery mechanisms should be supported by flexible and tailored delivery mechanisms, which must be taken to protect the country's fiduciary discipline and effective public financial management.

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