

# **Report of Study on Drivers of Change for a National Social Protection Scheme in Zambia**

A study undertaken for DFID Zambia

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<b>REPORT OF STUDY ON DRIVERS OF CHANGE FOR A NATIONAL SOCIAL PROTECTION SCHEME IN ZAMBIA .....</b>	<b>1</b>
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .....	3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....	4
I. INTRODUCTION .....	18
<i>Purpose and methodological approach</i> .....	18
<i>Key terms: defining social protection</i> .....	19
<i>Limitations of this study</i> .....	20
II. OVERVIEW OF THE POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT FOR SOCIAL PROTECTION IN ZAMBIA .....	21
<i>Poverty and vulnerability in Zambia</i> .....	21
<i>A brief historical perspective on social protection in Zambia</i> .....	23
<i>Existing social protection instruments in Zambia: focus, target groups and coverage</i> .....	24
<i>The Social Protection Sector Advisory Group and the Social Protection Strategy</i> .....	28
III. THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL PROTECTION IN ZAMBIA: IDENTIFYING THE KEY DRIVERS AND BARRIERS TO SECURING A POLITICAL CONSTITUENCY OF SUPPORT FOR SOCIAL PROTECTION .....	30
<i>Overview and framework</i> .....	30
A. BARRIERS TO CHANGE .....	32
<i>Current understandings of poverty are an obstacle to a social protection strategy</i> .....	32
<i>The structure of the political system constraints policy debates and commitments to reform</i> .....	34
<i>Elite and popular discourses on poverty and vulnerability constrain the development of a social protection strategy</i> .....	36
<i>Fiscal constraints</i> .....	39
B. DRIVERS OF CHANGE .....	41
<i>Donors and the SP-SAG are key drivers for social protection</i> .....	41
<i>Aggregating interests around social protection</i> .....	44
<i>Changing discourses around social protection – demonstration effects from pilot studies</i> .....	45
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS ON BUILDING A POLITICAL CONSTITUENCY FOR SOCIAL PROTECTION IN ZAMBIA .....	46
<i>Strengthening ‘demand’ for social protection</i> .....	46
<i>Strengthening the institutional fit for social protection</i> .....	47
<i>Strengthening policy design, monitoring and evaluation</i> .....	48
<i>Strengthening the civic and political spheres</i> .....	49
APPENDIX ONE. DRIVERS OF CHANGE FOR A NATIONAL SOCIAL PROTECTION SCHEME: TERMS OF REFERENCE .....	51
APPENDIX TWO. LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED .....	55
APPENDIX THREE. DRIVERS (ACTORS) CAPACITY AND POINTS OF INFLUENCE .....	59
APPENDIX FOUR. RESEARCH FRAMEWORK FOR ZAMBIA POLITICS OF SOCIAL PROTECTION/DRIVERS OF CHANGE STUDY (DRAFT) .....	61

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## **List of abbreviations**

ADB	African Development Bank
CCJDP	Catholic Committee for Justice, Development and Peace
CWAC	Community Welfare Assistance Committees
DFID	Department for International Development
DMMU	Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit
GRZ	Government of the Republic of Zambia
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INESOR	Institute for Economic and Social Research (UNZA)
JCTR	Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection
LAZ	Law Association of Zambia
MCDSS	Ministry of Community Development and Social Services
MLSS	Ministry of Labour and Social Security
MMD	Movement for Multiparty Democracy
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoFNP	Ministry of Finance and National Planning
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
NAPSA	National Pensions Scheme Authority
NDP	National Development Plan
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Process
PWAS	Public Welfare Assistance Scheme
SAG	Sector Advisory Group
SP	Social Protection
SP-SAG	Social Protection Sector Advisory Group
SRM	Social Risk Management
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNZA	University of Zambia
VAC	Vulnerability Assessment Committee
WB	World Bank

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## **Executive Summary**

### **I. Introduction**

This paper reports on a study on ‘Drivers of Change for a National Social Protection Scheme’ commissioned by the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) Zambia Office in support of the Government of Zambia’s (GRZ) National Development Plan. The main purpose of the study is to provide guidance on, and support to, the process of building political commitment to support a National Social Protection Scheme in Zambia. The study was carried out from July to September 2005 by a team of four consultants.<sup>1</sup> It involved desk-based review of existing documentation and the preparation of background papers; interviews with over 50 key stakeholders; field visits to four sites to assess the operation of existing social protection instruments; and discussions with DFID advisors.

In terms of its analytical approach, the team combined a ‘drivers of change’ analysis with the framework contributed by recent work on ‘the politics of social protection’ in Africa. The ‘drivers of change’ approach seeks to identify the institutional factors which constrain or facilitate development strategies, as well as reform minded organisations and individuals and the opportunities for strengthening their influence. The ‘politics of social protection’ approach has emerged from combining comparative work on the politics of social protection with a specific analysis of the politics of development in Africa. The ‘politics of social protection’ approach suggests that the key process concerns a move towards securing a ‘political contract’ for social protection, based on a new set of government commitments to its citizenry.

Social protection describes all interventions from public, private, voluntary organisations and social networks, to support communities, households and individuals, in their efforts to prevent, manage, and overcome their vulnerability. It is based on the view that vulnerability, understood as the limited capacity of some communities and households to protect themselves against contingencies threatening their living standards, is a major factor explaining poverty and deprivation. The GRZ is committed to the development of a National Social Protection Strategy as part of the ‘roadmap’ for the preparation of the Fifth National Development Plan.

It is important to note the limitations of this study, not least the limited time allowed to carry out field research. This is the first time that DoC analysis has been applied to social protection, and the first time that the politics of social protection approach has been applied to a ‘real-life’ case. It has been necessary to develop a methodological framework as part of the study itself, and indeed this is one its objectives. Applying the DoC approach to social protection poses some important challenges. The poor and vulnerable rarely have access to effective voice mechanisms and their needs are often ignored within political and policy processes. As a policy framework, social

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<sup>1</sup> The study consultants were Denis Wood from D. Wood Consultants and Investment Limited; Dr. Neo Simutanyi, from the Institute of Social and Economic Research at the University of Zambia; Dr. Sam Hickey from the Institute for Development Policy and Management at the University of Manchester in the UK; and Dr. Armando Barrientos, from the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex in the UK.

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protection is relatively new, and therefore less well understood in policy circles, making it more difficult to gauge attitudes towards it.

## **II. Overview of the political and socio-economic context for social protection in Zambia**

According to calculations by GRZ two in three Zambians have consumption levels below the minimum set by the poverty line. World Bank calculations using the same dataset, but slightly different methodology, suggest one in two Zambians has consumption levels below the poverty line. Poverty gap estimates show that the average consumption of the poor falls short of the minimum by around one fifth of the poverty line. Other indicators confirm the incidence of vulnerability and deprivation. One in four 7 to 13 year olds fails to attend school, and the figures rise to just over one in three for 14 to 18 year olds. One in six 15 to 49 year olds has HIV/AIDS. Just below one in two children aged 5 and under is stunted. Mortality rates for infants reach 9.5 percent and for under fives 16 percent. The indicators confirm that poverty and vulnerability are unacceptably high in Zambia. They also demonstrate the urgency attached to efforts to establish effective social protection, and the extent of the challenge.

Despite an apparent political commitment to developing a comprehensive social security system, policy outcomes have entrenched a strict separation between employment-based social insurance and tax financed social assistance. The impact of economic decline, structural adjustment, and the decline in formal employment has been felt in both branches of social security. The contributor base of the social insurance system has shrunk and this, together with financial underperformance of the pension funds, has generated large deficits. The tax-financed social assistance branch has also been under significant pressure, both from the sustained high levels of poverty, vulnerability, and unemployment on the one hand, and a squeeze on resources, both human and financial.

A recent study on social protection in Zambia examined in some detail 12 key programmes.<sup>2</sup> For our purposes it will be useful to group these according to the responsible agency. Beginning with governmental agencies, the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services manages a portfolio of programmes targeted on the poor and vulnerable. These include the *Food Security Pack* targeting vulnerable small scale farmers for support with farming inputs and capacity building; the *Public Welfare Assistance Scheme* providing in-kind support for the destitute selected by community committees; the *Kalomo Social Cash Transfer Scheme* is a pilot programme under PWAS targeting 1000 households in extreme poverty. The Scheme aims to reduce extreme poverty among the 10 percent poorest households in the pilot region of Kalomo District.<sup>3</sup> The MCDSS also manages the *Micro-Bankers*

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<sup>2</sup> The term programme is used to cover all interventions, some of which could be better described as projects given their limited timescale and objectives.

<sup>3</sup> Evaluations of the Pilot Scheme are very positive and have encouraged further initiatives. There is growing interest in the opportunities for extending cash transfer programmes, both replicating and upscaling these programmes. A CARE partnership agreement with DFID includes two further cash transfer pilots, one each in a rural area (the Kazungula Pilot started in August 2005) and an urban area

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Trust providing loans and financial services to vulnerable persons, and a number of other smaller programmes including the *National Trust for the Disabled*, *Child Care Upgrading Programme*, the *Programme Urban Self-Help*. The Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit coordinates food distribution to districts affected by disasters. The Ministry of Education is responsible for the School Feeding Programme.

Autonomous agencies involved in social protection include the *Public Sector Pension Fund* and the *National Pension Scheme Authority*. These provide employment-based old age, retirement, survivor, and disability pensions for formal sector workers. These are unlikely to reach the poorest and most vulnerable but constitute an important source of protection for the formal labour force in Zambia (around 10 percent of the labour force).

NGOs and Community Organisations also play a part in delivering social protection. *Habitat for Humanity Zambia* is part of a worldwide faith organisation seeking to provide housing loans for those in need. *Street Children Project of Zambia* combines the efforts of an international NGO and the local Red Cross to provide temporary shelters for street children and education, health and nutrition interventions. *SCOPE OVC* operated between 2000-2004 and supported community education and household strengthening interventions targeted on children affected by HIV/AIDS. *CRAIDS* was set up in 2003 to provide community grants to address the impact of HIV/AIDS.

The main features of existing social protection in Zambia are:

- Social protection interventions in Zambia are piecemeal, fragmented, and reactive, with a proliferation of programmes focused on target groups and an emphasis of in-kind forms of support.
- With the exception of employment-based pension funds and PWAS, social protection interventions in Zambia are in the main funded by donors. Funding is insufficient to meet programme objectives.
- Delivery systems have not proved effective in the past, demonstrating weak institutional capacity.
- It is very difficult to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of social protection programmes, they are seldom developed on the back of appropriate research, lack adequate targeting tools, and monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are non-existent.
- Nonetheless, it could be argued that the continuous historical presence of PWAS does point to a residual commitment within the Zambian polity to providing assistance to the poorest households. As with other policy legacies in Africa with somewhat ambiguous colonial roots (e.g. pensions in South Africa and Namibia), existing policy channels for social protection can provide a starting point for national schemes.

There is growing appreciation among stakeholders in Zambia that policies and

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(Chipata). Oxfam has proposed using cash transfers as part of humanitarian relief and food security responses in Western and Southern Provinces of Zambia. Donors are in discussion with GRZ to upscale the cash transfer scheme up to a national programme.

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programmes aimed at poverty reduction have had some successes in assisting specific groups of the poor, but that overall, and to the extent that indicators of their effectiveness are available, these have not made a significant dent on poverty. The progress of the social protection agenda in Zambia to date can be tracked through the creation and activities of a Social Protection Sector Advisory Group (SP-SAG), which exists to formulate a national strategy for social protection within the context of a National Development Plan. Following policy research and consultation, a Draft Social Protection Strategy was produced in April 2005.

The Draft Strategy states that the goal of social protection is to “contribute to the security of all Zambians by ensuring that incapacitated and low capacity households and people have sufficient income security to meet their basic needs, and protection from the worst impacts of risks and shocks” (Social Protection Strategy [2005] p.17). It focuses on six objectives (each with associated targets and implementation strategy):

1. Increase the ability of low capacity households to meet their basic needs
2. Reduce extreme poverty in incapacitated households
3. Reduce the vulnerability and numbers of street children
4. Improve access to health and education for people from incapacitated and low capacity households
5. Reduce the vulnerability of social protection target groups to the violation of their legal rights
6. Strengthen capacity at local and national level to deliver an effective social protection programme

Overall, the SP-SAG process has centred on producing a coherent strategy that is likely to attract donor funding. This has been done quite successfully, and is an approach likely to find favour within MoFNP. However, concerns remain concerning the politics of the process, in terms of both internal and external levels of ownership and commitment. Externally, there have been few efforts as yet to secure wider political buy-in from key stakeholders within government and political and civil society more broadly. The SP-SAG process has so far been a largely influenced by agendas of strong participating institutions, including donors and the UN. Some participants felt that the social protection terminology was hard to grapple with. However, and some differences regarding the overall strategy remain, regarding the advantages of pursuing a ‘narrow’ or ‘broad’ strategy and issues relating to the relative strength of redistribution, insurance, and rights in the overall strategy, the level of ownership within MCDSS is growing.

### **III. The Politics of Social Protection in Zambia: identifying the key drivers and barriers to securing a political constituency of support for social protection**

The analytical approach adopted here seeks to combine the ‘drivers of change’ approach with the findings of recent comparative approach to the politics of social protection in Africa. This involves focusing on both the institutional context of policy change, and the specific institutional, systemic, societal, and global factors involved, with a concern with placing these in the context of the ‘political contract’ existing

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between government and the governed. In the context of social protection, the latter requires attempting to outline shared ‘solidarity values’.

Overall, Zambia presents something of a paradox with regards the politics of social protection. Although the sustained decline of the Zambian economy together with the structural adjustments implemented to address it have led to high levels of poverty and vulnerability that could, in a demand-led political system, produce strong political pressures on the government to strengthen and extend social protection institutions, this has not been the case. Rather, the underlying character of the key political processes, institutions and actors in Zambia makes it very difficult for pro-poor issues to gain sustained representation or (more broadly) for a developmental state to emerge.

Despite this unfavourable environment, social protection has been included within national policy debates. The challenge remains in ensuring that it is nationally owned, embedded in the mainstream of government administration, designed and implemented effectively, committed to and sustained over time – in short, that a political contract for social protection is developed over time.

#### *A. BARRIERS TO CHANGE*

<b>Chart 1. Barriers to raising demand/a political constituency for social protection</b>		
<u>Dimension</u>	<u>Short-term</u> structure dominates	<u>Long-term</u> agency dominates
Knowledge	----- understanding of poverty -----	
Structure	----- political aggregation -----	
Interests	absence of leadership, SP a new issue ----	
Discourse	faith-based interventions -----	
Capacity	weakness of MCDSS ---	
Resources	----- fiscal constraints -----	

*Current understandings of poverty are an obstacle to a social protection strategy*  
At present, there are important gaps in the understanding and sensitivity to poverty and vulnerability among key stakeholders. Current policy discussions on poverty and vulnerability reduction focus to a large extent on a single indicator: the poverty headcount. There is no question that poverty and vulnerability in Zambia are unacceptably high, but the emphasis on the poverty headcount provides in many respects a very limited basis for the development of effective anti-poverty policy. The high measures of poverty incidence contribute to make poverty and vulnerability a large and intractable problem. A lack of sensitivity to the inequality of poverty, and its persistence over time, preclude productive discussion on policy priorities and policy effectiveness.



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The key issue here is that the policy focus on headcount poverty needs to give way to a broader understanding of poverty and vulnerability, one that goes beyond a single focus on the poverty headcount, for the analytical basis for social protection policies to be in place. The consideration of policies that could effectively address poverty and vulnerability will require bringing into the public debate a broader range of poverty measures (poverty gap, poverty persistence or duration), but also vulnerability (the probability that a household will be poor in the near future). There are poverty and vulnerability studies available which take a broader perspective on poverty than the poverty headcount, such as the 2004 Livelihoods Map and Baseline Profiling, and 2005 drought related Needs assessments by the Zambia Vulnerability Assessment Committee, the CSO Poverty Reports and the recent World Bank's Zambia: Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment, but many stakeholders appear not to have assimilated these rather technocratic and narrowly focused outputs.

As a policy framework, social protection emphasises the significant role of hazards and shocks - such as unemployment, sickness, or droughts - in pushing households into poverty, but also the fact that limited access to social protection instruments forces households to adopt dysfunctional livelihood strategies which keep them in poverty. Social protection is not well understood or widely accepted, even among key stakeholders, many of whom struggle with its terminology, its relationship to poverty reduction policy, its scope and instruments. Social protection does not have wide currency among policy makers.

*The structure of the political system constrains policy debates and commitments to reform*

The political system aggregates support around people, and particularly the Presidency, rather than policies or ideological programmes. The President, and his immediate circle of supporters and advisers dominate decision-making in Zambia. The potential for accessing these circles of influence in ways that influence Presidential thinking in pro-poor directions are slight, although could possibly be exploited by heads of multilateral and bilateral aid agencies.

Although the political party-system in Zambia has slowly transformed from being a single-party to a competitive party system since 1991, there is little evidence that this process of political liberalisation has significantly contributed to the deepening of democracy or the institutionalisation of effective and legitimate forms of representation. In addition, there are low levels of intra-elite conflict in Zambia, leaving little incentive for new or alternative elites to forge ground-breaking alliances with poor and marginal social groups.

*The absence of government leadership on social protection reflects the priorities of the political elites in a residual non-developmental state*

Poor economic governance, opaque and unreliable budgeting procedures, and spending priorities not conducive to development, are all strongly and negatively correlated with pro-poor governments. The underlying character of political processes and institutions dominant in Zambia are largely, if not wholly, inimical to those generally associated with nationally-driven social protection programmes in Africa. There is a strong sense in which the state is not the key actor in people's social lives at local level, where church organisations and NGOs are frequently more prevalent.

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Although presidential and ministerial leadership in key ministries (e.g. MCDSS, MoNFP) can play a significant factor in building a constituency for social protection, there are currently no real signs of this happening.

*Elite and popular discourses on poverty and vulnerability constrain the development of a social protection strategy*

Elite and popular discourses on poverty and vulnerability draw a distinction between the ‘deserving’ and the ‘undeserving’ poor. There are perceptions, shared by government and civil society policy makers, that programmes should have a strong bias towards the economically productive sections of the poor – as with the notion of ‘vulnerable but viable’ farmers. If anything, these perceptions privilege those close to the poverty line, with sufficient assets to turn support into direct productive efforts. HIV/AIDS and drought victims are an exception because they are seen as being particularly deserving, regardless of their productive capacity.

There are also discourses around the types of interventions that are desirable. Cash transfers are initially deemed by many as undesirable because of fears that they create dependency, and fuel corruption. Popular discourses seem to favour food related support, food relief and protection, which have long-standing in the context of Zambia. Among the political elites, micro-enterprise development and finance and public works are seen as desirable. These perceptions are not based on evidence or informed public debate over the relative advantages of different policy interventions, they can best be described as faith-based. The fact that consideration of social protection among policy makers is largely unencumbered by evidence does not contribute to garnering support for social protection. However, relatively simple forms of argument and evidence can be successful in dislodging apparently strong opposition to cash transfers.

*Capacity is a significant constraint*

The MCDSS has been slow to assume leadership of this process and is in any case not seen by more powerful ministries as a particularly convincing policy champion in the field of poverty reduction. This stems from a lack of institutional and policy making capacity. In addition, social protection remains a complicated policy agenda to MCDSS staff, and they do not currently feel a strong level of ownership to the strategy. A range of institutional factors will need to be overcome for the MCDSS to provide effective leadership for a Social Protection Strategy. MCDSS has not benefited from the kind of sector support that has strengthened the Ministries of Health or Education, and is yet to undergo the restructuring process which most other parts of government have completed. It has a top-down organisational structure, focused on delivering the resources allocated, and disbursed, by the MoFNP. Its capacity at District level, which is crucial to the implementation of a social protection strategy, is limited. It has few channels through which needs assessment and analysis at the ground level could be aggregated to inform policy making at the national level (contributing to the low ‘demand’ for social protection). There is also very limited capacity for policy analysis and training and professional development within the Ministry, which naturally undermines the confidence needed to assume a strong leadership role in social protection.

More generally, there is little evidence to suggest that the civil service in Zambia has

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the capacity to scale-up pilot projects into national schemes, particularly where success has relied to a significant extent on a building a resource-intensive incentive structure for staff. There is a growing and understandable reluctance within the public sector to break with the general pay structure for particular initiatives, and this area needs further consideration.

#### *Fiscal constraints*

There is a commonly expressed view, especially among government circles, that social protection is not affordable. Given that donors have indicated a commitment to financing a national social protection strategy in the short term, government concerns with affordability apply more strictly to the medium and long term. Moves towards direct budgetary support could help here, although the long-term commitment of key donors to funding social protection in Zambia remains unclear. Resistance to extending social protection reflects a view that the main policy priority is growth, and therefore the expansion of the productive capacity of the Zambian economy. Social protection appears in this context as a net cost, rather than an investment in productive capacity, and therefore as a drag on scarce resources. Concerns over the financial sustainability of a social protection scheme in the longer run also betray a deeper anxiety about the lack of stability in policy processes and financial management.

#### *B. DRIVERS OF CHANGE*

Chart 2. Drivers for raising demand/creating a political constituency for SP		
<u>Dimension</u>	<u>Short-term</u> agency dominates	<u>Long-term</u> structure dominates
Knowledge	SP-SAG/Donors ----- local research capacity --	
Structure	-- policy legacy, elections and constitutional debate -----	
Interests	Civil Society, food crises ---	
Discourse	Pilot schemes-----	
Capacity		
Resources	Donor support (budget cycle) -----	

#### *Donors and the SP–SAG are key drivers for social protection*

Donors exercise a significant level of influence over policy making in Zambia, and, together with civil society organisations, are credited with having shifted GRZ towards a closer focus on poverty issues. The World Bank, ILO, GTZ and DFID have argued for a social protection agenda for some time. The emerging consensus around social protection within the UN family, and a growing realisation that emergency food relief and protection measures have not led to sustainable improvements, suggests other donors will join in pushing for the adoption of a National Social Protection

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Scheme. Donor consensus on social protection will be tested by differing views on its scope ('narrow' versus 'broad' approach to social protection), and over the relative advantages of different social protection instruments (in-kind and cash transfers). The shift towards donor harmonisation should help here, although initial signs that the major agencies will not take up leadership of the SP agenda may reduce its prioritisation within broader policy debates. The capacity of donors to facilitate wider ownership of a social protection strategy is harder to assess.

The SP-SAG constitutes the key agent of change within the current phase of promoting a national Social Protection Scheme. The process of consultation around the Social Protection Strategy provides a key opportunity for tackling some of the obstacles described above, and for ensuring that a wider discussion of social protection facilitates wider ownership. Dissemination of the strategy is essential to get social protection discussed more widely, and attention will need to be paid to the form that this dissemination takes. The next steps for the SP-SAG are therefore crucial to taking full advantage of these opportunities: the appointment of a consultant to develop the Social Protection Strategy into a NDP chapter, consultations and dissemination engaging the Districts and civil society organisations, and ensuring relevant media attention.

However, there remain several constraints to the SP-SAG fulfilling its role as an advocate for social protection amongst GRZ and donors, which will need to be overcome, in particular:

- The low level of 'ownership' of social protection *within* the SP-SAG, particularly amongst GRZ representatives, which is related to a continued lack of certainty concerning the definitional and technical aspects of the agenda;
- The focus to date on the technical rather than political aspects of policy processes;
- The lack of convincing evidence that social protection can work in Zambia;
- A lack of coherence within the existing strategy between the underlying SRM framework and some of the policy initiatives.

*Elections and the constitutional debate provide opportunities for changing structural constraints on social protection*

Presidential elections are scheduled for late 2006. National elections have often been associated with (a) increased spending on social protection and (b) moments at which the contract between state and citizenry are re-drawn around social issues (e.g. education). However, promoting cash-transfers during an election year would be a very high-risk strategy, and would lead to its inevitable politicisation and potentially being discredited over the medium- to long-term. The election is more likely to prove a distraction from serious policy debate. Another potential driver for social protection is the current debate over the Constitution, which constitutes perhaps the only dimension of progressive political debate in Zambia to which it is possible to align the promotion of social protection. One of the several changes proposed by the recent Draft Review Commission was to institutionalise the social and economic rights of Zambians within the Constitution. So far, however, the debate on the Constitutional review has focused almost exclusively on reforms to the political system, and seems to have reached an impasse. In the short term, the annual budget cycle and also the

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MTEF (as it develops) present MCDSS and other stakeholders with an opportunity to formulate social protection policy in budget discussions with the MoFNP.

#### *Aggregating interests around social protection*

Few civil society organisations have prioritised social protection to date, either in terms of advocacy campaigns or service delivery. Although a few international NGOs have expressed an interest in social protection in Zambia (e.g. CARE, OXFAM), they have little experience of policy influence themselves. Although civil society could not generally be described as ‘strong’ in Zambia, certain organisations and movements have recorded some impressive victories, and are able to campaign vociferously on issues of development, democracy and human rights. This suggests that there are a handful of politically active and influential civil society organisations in Zambia that can be mobilised behind a social protection strategy. Faith-based organisations and trades unions are central here. At the local level, community activism has increased in Zambia in recent years. Although this may derive from (a) the increase in local problems requiring community-action, particularly around HIV-AIDs and (b) a disengagement from national politics in the light of growing concerns over problems with the democratic process, there are positive implications here in terms of the politics of delivering social protection, which will rely heavily on such on local level structures. A rider here remains the fact that few community-based organisations include the destitute or poorest of the poor.

A growing realisation that food relief and other emergency aid has not been effective in the past, and has led DFID and other agencies to find ways of replacing food transfers to drought-affected households with more stable and regular transfers – both in kind and cash transfers.<sup>4</sup> The idea is not to entirely replace food with cash, but to adopt a ‘what works best’ approach. Future food crises and droughts will draw attention to the need for effective social protection. There are both risks and opportunities associated with this potential driver of change. Both maize and fertilisers are highly politicised in Zambia, as they are across southern Africa, and the interest groups associated with the relevant subsidies retain a measure of influence. The failure of food and fertiliser targeting may well contribute to undermine any confidence that cash transfers can be targeted more effectively, especially given its greater fungibility. However, the fact that this debate is growing throughout many African countries may suggest that there is sufficient political space to allow room for manoeuvre here in terms of experimentation at least.

#### *Changing discourses around social protection – demonstration effects from pilot studies*

Policy innovations such as the Kalomo Social Cash Transfer Pilot can act as key drivers for a National Social Protection Scheme. The Kalomo Pilot incorporates a number of innovations likely to yield important lessons for the design of social protection interventions. It targets the poorest through community organisations, relies on regular cash transfers, incorporates monitoring and evaluation procedures, and facilitates learning processes at all its different levels. Early evaluations confirm the

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<sup>4</sup> See DFID [2004] Transitioning from relief for predictable food insecurity. A concept note.

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Pilot Scheme is achieving its main objectives, and compares well with alternative instruments used by the MCDSS. However, the lessons from the Pilot are not sufficiently well understood by policy makers in Lusaka, and more widely by NGOs and civil society organisations. The demonstration effects from Pilot projects can be maximised through wider dissemination, although it must be recognised that they offer only a limited basis on which to formulate national policy.

#### *Lifting financial restrictions on social protection*

On going changes in aid modalities and the commitment indicated by key donors make it possible the lifting of financial constraints on the adoption of a national social protection strategy in Zambia. There are indications that a GRZ owned national social protection strategy could rely on multi-stakeholder financial and technical assistance for its inception period, and a five-year phase after that. This initiative constitutes a key driver for change in enabling a supportive financial environment within which discussion of the feasibility of such strategy could be conducted.

### **IV. Recommendations on building a political constituency for social protection in Zambia**

#### *Strengthening 'demand' for social protection*

The study found significant deficits in the understanding of poverty and vulnerability among stakeholders and policy-makers. Informed and independent comment on these issues is essential to embedding a National Social Protection Scheme. The following recommendations are relevant here:

- Find ways of strengthening research capacity and dissemination concerning poverty and vulnerability data and analysis. Developing institutional, as opposed to individual, capacity in this area is a key objective. The focus here should be on vulnerability, poverty dynamics and persistent, severe forms of poverty. Workshops, seminars and also an international conference around the results emerging from the pilot cash-transfers programmes would provide a very good means of raising the national profile of social protection in Zambia. Such events would also prepare the ground for later efforts, such as the distribution of policy-briefings on social protection. More broadly, DFID funded research (e.g. the Chronic Poverty Research Centre) and dissemination capacity (e.g. ID21 at IDS) could be usefully engaged with under this objective.
- Supporting wider consultation and dissemination around the Social Protection Strategy of SP-SAG is urgent. In particular, two-page briefings in accessible language on social protection, its proposed objectives, and instruments would help.
- Briefings produced by policy experts on social protection directed at government officials in a similar format at Ministerial and District level would enhance the chance of finding and encouraging drivers for social protection. These should be timed to coincide with key moments in policy cycles, particularly concerning the formulation of strategic plans and budgeting.
- Efforts to strengthen wider participation in social protection strategy and instruments will be important in ensuring their adoption and sustainability, in

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particular collaboration and participation of stronger Ministries, Education, Health and Labour and Social Security, at central government, Provincial and District levels.

- There is an urgent need to engage the Ministry of Finance more centrally in debates over a national social protection strategy. This could involve commissioning research into the fiscal feasibility of a national social protection scheme in Zambia. There is also a pressing need to make a persuasive argument that social protection can have productive, pro-growth implications.
- The level of donor support for social protection needs to be greatly increased and improved, alongside continued efforts to co-ordinate thinking and action in this field. There is also a need for donors to take a broader view of social protection, and to look for positive synergies with other policy initiatives in the fields of macro-economic reform and growth, 'good governance' and poverty reduction through improved service delivery.

#### *Strengthening the institutional fit for social protection*

- The MCDSS will require extensive support and assistance if it is to be the 'home' Ministry for social protection. Large-scale reform is needed to change its current focus on top down delivery to a responsive, innovative, evidence-based policy Ministry. DFID could look for lessons here from its strategic support for a similar ministry in Uganda.
- Support for capacity building in policy analysis and evaluation and professional development are needed.
- Changes to its structure and focus should be reflected in a change of its mission statement and title.
- However, it is unlikely that, over the short- to medium-term, either MCDSS or other related social ministries (Labour, Children) will be the effective champions of a national social protection strategy. There is therefore an urgent need to mainstream the social protection agenda within the policy priorities and service-delivery work of the key social development sectors (esp. Education and Health) and within the political priorities and budgetary processes of MoFNP.

#### *Strengthening policy design, monitoring and evaluation*

- Dissemination of the Pilot Schemes, not just in terms of impact and outcomes, but also processes and design innovations could give a focus for debate and discussion of a social protection strategy.
- In this context, support and assistance to monitoring and evaluation of social protection programmes will pay considerable dividends.
- Briefings on the effectiveness of alternative instruments and policy options (e.g. cash vs. in kind) directed at government and civil society could facilitate the wider acceptance of cash transfers.

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- Strengthen oversight functions within programmes: concerns over issues of targeting, financial management, and graduation (of programmes as well as beneficiaries) are widely expressed and need to be addressed.
- Given the extent to which the design and type of social protection policy strongly shapes the political support that can be generated and maintained for social protection, there is a need to design social protection programmes and policies with close attention to how they will be understood and interpreted politically. Of particular importance is to that local and national norms of procedural justice are addressed in policy design and monitoring. This applies to forthcoming Pilot Schemes as well as later national schemes.
- The longer-term process of scaling-up cash transfers to a national programme requires further debate and more conclusive evidence concerning what has worked at the level of pilot schemes. This requires a careful, incremental approach, not least to allow for the development of a wider constituency of support. Donors also need to build government confidence by proving that their commitment is over the long-term. There are good reasons to recognise the pressures within Zambian politics to adopt a policy of regional balance in the distribution of pilot projects – this is also technically sensible, particularly given that the South cannot be treated as representative of conditions found elsewhere in Zambia.

#### *Strengthening the civic and political spheres*

- After a closer process of identification, increased support (financial and institution building) should be offered to specified research and advocacy organisations that are capable of generating publicity and pressure for GRZ uptake of social protection policies. Certain key actors should be brought within the current circle of social protection advocates
- Trades unions are increasingly realising the potential of social protection agendas, and could be supported through capacity-building measures (e.g. research and advocacy skills).
- Given the authority and impressive communication networks of the main church bodies in Zambia, DFID could consider liaising directly with them around a shared policy agenda on helping the poorest in society. One ongoing initiative that could be considered particularly relevant concerns the efforts of faith-based organisations to convince political elites to increase their commitment to poverty reduction and to act accordingly.
- Donors should work harder to identify reformist elements within the political elites (e.g. MPs, judges, media owners, business leaders), encourage them to promote debate and action on poverty reduction, and bring certain actors within the current circle of social protection advocates. Initiatives that strengthen the political party system could be particularly beneficial.
- Direct support could be offered to parliament (especially key parliamentary committees) to increase its capacity to scrutinise GRZ around pro-poor expenditures



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and policy-making.

- Donors should consider ways in which they could promote aspects of constitutional reform in Zambia. Although a sensitive activity, the short/medium-term opportunity to secure a commitment to securing a minimum standard of living for Zambian citizens through legally-recognised social and economic rights in a new/revised constitution could prove critical over the long-run, and would constitute a strong move to securing a new political contract for social protection.

Ultimately, a National Social Protection Scheme will be adopted and sustained to the extent that a wider constituency supports it, and remains committed to protecting it over time. Although this wider constituency is not currently mobilised in support for social protection, this study has identified several means by which support for social protection can be strengthened. These include: improving information flows, developing capacity in social protection policy design and development, widening participation around the social protection strategy, supporting the government commitment to social protection within the NDP, strengthening partnerships with donors, government and NGOs over social protection. Securing a contract for social protection in Zambia will require that the current constituency of supporters for social protection move incrementally, securing the confidence of key actors en route.

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## **I. Introduction**

### *Purpose and methodological approach*

1. This paper reports on a study on ‘Drivers of Change for a National Social Protection Scheme’ commissioned by the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) Zambia Office in support of the Government of Zambia’s (GRZ) National Development Plan.<sup>5</sup> The main purpose of the study is to provide guidance on, and support to, the process of building political commitment to support a National Social Protection Scheme in Zambia. It is also expected to inform ongoing work within DFID on extending social protection, and in particular the role of politics in this process.

2. The study was carried out from July to September 2005 by a team of four consultants.<sup>6</sup> It involved desk-based review of existing documentation and the preparation of background papers; interviews with over 50 key stakeholders (see Appendix Two); field visits to four sites to assess the operation of existing social protection instruments; and discussions with DFID advisors.

3. In terms of its analytical approach, the team combined a ‘drivers of change’ analysis with the framework contributed by recent work on ‘the politics of social protection’ in Africa. The ‘drivers of change’ (DoC) approach is grounded in the view that the character of underlying institutions, processes and practices in particular country contexts closely shape the formulation and implementation of anti-poverty and development policies. The ‘drivers of change’ approach seeks to identify the institutional factors which constrain or facilitate development strategies, as well as reform minded organisations and individuals and the opportunities for strengthening their influence.

4. The ‘politics of social protection’ approach (Box 1) emerged from combining comparative international work on the politics of social protection with a specific analysis of the politics of development in Africa.<sup>7</sup> This provided the basis for the research framework used in the field work for this study (Appendix Four). The ‘politics of social protection’ approach converges closely with DoC analysis in many respects. However, in being focused directly on social protection, is at once more specific and broader than DoC analysis. A politics of social protection approach goes beyond understanding the politics of driving change, and also addresses issues of sustainability and the political implications/effects of social protection (e.g. effects on social solidarity, citizenship formation, patron-client politics and regime security). At the same time it acknowledges that a more specific approach is required in order to

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<sup>5</sup> The Terms of Reference for the study are in Appendix One.

<sup>6</sup> The study consultants were Denis Wood from D. Wood Consultants and Investment Limited; Dr. Neo Simutanyi, from the Institute of Social and Economic Research at the University of Zambia; Dr. Sam Hickey from the Institute for Development Policy and Management at the University of Manchester in the UK; and Dr. Armando Barrientos, from the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex in the UK.

<sup>7</sup> Hickey, S. (2005) ‘The politics of social protection in Africa: towards a conceptual framework’. Paper produced for DFID RtVP Policy Division Team.

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examine how politics shape the different *stages* and *forms* of social protection. For example, while either elections and/or the presence of a developmental state might determine the introduction of social protection, its sustainability may be determined by other factors such as political elite support. Importantly, while the *size* of social protection programmes may be determined in relation to budgetary debates where interest groups and veto actors may have an input, the *type* of social protection (e.g. universal or targeted, conditional or not) may derive from more embedded political norms. Particular forms of politics surround the *implementation* of social protection programmes, as in cases where funds are re-directed on the basis of political support rather than the needs of recipients. Finally, it is probable that different types of politics are associated with the different sectors and/or constituencies associated with social protection (e.g. the politics of food security may differ from the politics of pensions). At its broadest, the ‘politics of social protection’ approach suggests that key process concerns a move towards securing a ‘political contract’ for social protection, based on a new set of government commitments to its citizenry.

**Box 1 How politics shapes social protection in Africa: institutional, systemic, societal and global factors: key dimensions**

**Institutional features**

Institutional factors include the political and policy history of polities, and the rules of the political game that prevail therein. For example, colonial legacies shape current social attitudes towards social protection, and also the form that some social protection programmes take; policies themselves also create legacies that shape current and future possibilities for social protection initiatives.

**Systemic factors**

Systemic factors that shape social protection include: political institutions and elections; decentralisation; political elites (attitudes; intra-elite conflict; leadership); politics and power within policy processes; bureaucratic integrity and capacity; fiscal capacity; and institutional location. For example, the political party system shapes the capacity of the regime to deliver on social protection; political elites often define the poorest groups as ‘undeserving’; and the political capacity of social protection advocates within policy processes is often weak.

**Societal factors**

Societal factors: these include social attitudes; civil society pressure; social difference and inequality; level of urbanisation. For example, there is some evidence that a shared sense of vulnerability between poor and non-poor groups can strengthen popular support for social protection

**The global politics of social protection**

Global factors: donor policies and co-ordination around social protection; wider social policy context. For example, are donors offering co-ordinated, appropriately-conceptualised and high-priority assistance on social protection?

*From Hickey (2005)*

*Key terms: defining social protection*

5. Social protection describes all interventions from public, private, voluntary organisations and social networks, to support communities, households and

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individuals, in their efforts to prevent, manage, and overcome their vulnerability.<sup>8</sup> It is based on the view that vulnerability, understood as the limited capacity of some communities and households to protect themselves against contingencies threatening their living standards, is a major factor explaining poverty and deprivation. Vulnerability also explains why some households under-invest in their future, for example in health prevention or schooling, and why they are sometimes forced to adopt behavioural responses detrimental to their long-term interests such as child labour. Vulnerability is also a contributory factor to the political exclusion and subordination experienced by the poor, as in the case of adverse patron-client subordination. Social protection is increasingly acknowledged as an effective policy response to high levels of poverty and vulnerability in developing countries.

6. The GRZ is committed to the development of a National Social Protection Strategy as part of the 'roadmap' for the preparation of the Fifth National Development Plan. Within this 'roadmap' a Social Protection Sector Advisory Group has produced a Draft Social Protection Strategy which, after a process of wider consultation, will be considered for inclusion in the National Development Plan.<sup>9</sup>

#### *Limitations of this study*

7. It is important to note the limitations of this study. Although DFID had previously commissioned a DoC study in Zambia,<sup>10</sup> this is the first time that DoC analysis has been applied to social protection, and the first time that the politics of social protection approach has been applied to a 'real-life' case. It has been necessary to develop a methodological framework as part of the study itself, and indeed this is one its objectives. Applying the DoC approach to social protection poses some important challenges. The poor and vulnerable rarely have access to effective voice mechanisms and their needs are often ignored within political and policy processes. Compared to broad development policy, economic growth for example, with a wide spectrum of potential beneficiaries, it would be expected that the 'drivers of change' for social protection would be harder to identify and that potential constituencies of support would be less visible. As a policy framework, social protection is relatively new, and therefore less well understood in policy circles, making it more difficult to gauge attitudes towards it.<sup>11</sup> This particular study was undertaken within a short period of time. As a result, and although the study team managed to meet over 50 individuals and organisations and make two exploratory field-trips, we were unable to interview all the key stakeholders and it was not possible to carry out as wide a range of advocacy-type activities as originally planned. Our findings should be taken together with these limitations.

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<sup>8</sup> Although the term social protection has been used by the ILO for some time to describe a group of specific welfare programmes including pensions, health insurance, and employment protection provided by governments and employers, social protection has come to include a broader set of programmes supporting poor and vulnerable households (food protection, cash transfers, microfinance, etc.) and a broader set of providers, including voluntary and community networks.

<sup>9</sup> Draft Social Protection Strategy, April 2005, Lusaka.

<sup>10</sup> A 2003 Study on Zambia: Drivers of Pro-poor Change, an Overview by A. Duncan, H. Macmillan and N. Simutanyi, applied this approach to development policy in general.

<sup>11</sup> The relative newness of the social protection agenda in Zambia was frequently revealed during interviews, through uncertainty in the attitude of interviewees to this policy agenda.

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8. The structure of the report is as follows. The next section provides a background to current debates on social protection in Zambia. Section 3 then maps out and prioritises the main drivers, and barriers, of change around social protection. Section 4 discusses the main opportunities and strategies that might be used to promote a political constituency of support for implementing and sustaining a national social protection strategy in Zambia, and makes some recommendations.

## **II. Overview of the political and socio-economic context for social protection in Zambia**

### *Poverty and vulnerability in Zambia*

9. Table 1 below provides a range of poverty and vulnerability indicators for Zambia. Poverty headcount indicators estimated from the 2002/3 Living Conditions Measurement Survey show the very high incidence of poverty in the country. According to calculations by GRZ over two in three Zambians have consumption levels below the minimum poverty line. World Bank calculations using the same dataset, but slightly different methodology, suggest one in two Zambians has consumption levels below the poverty line. The poverty line used for these calculations includes food and non-food components of consumption, but using food consumption only the World Bank estimates that 36 percent of Zambians have consumption levels below the minimum. Poverty gap estimates show that the average consumption of the poor falls short of the minimum by around one fifth of the poverty line.

<b>Table 1 Poverty and Vulnerability Indicators 2000-2003 Zambia</b>				
Indicators		Rural	Urban	All
GRZ poverty headcount (%)		74	52	67
WB poverty headcount (%)		62	45	56
WB indigence headcount (%)		40	28	36
WB Poverty gap (% of poverty line)		23	17	21
School attendance rate (%) ages 7-13				75
School attendance rate (%) ages 14-18				64
HIV/AIDS prevalence rate (%) ages 15-49				16
Stunted, aged 5 and under (%)				47
Infant mortality (per 1000 births)				95
Under 5 mortality ( per 1000 births)				160
Source: WB [2005] Zambia: Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment				

10. Other indicators confirm the incidence of vulnerability and deprivation. One in four 7 to 13 year olds fails to attend school, and the figures rise to just over one in

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three for 14 to 18 year olds. One in six individuals aged 15 to 49 has HIV/AIDS. Just fewer than one in two children aged 5 and under are stunted. Mortality rates for infants reach 9.5 percent and for under fives 16 percent. The indicators confirm that poverty and vulnerability are unacceptably high in Zambia. They also demonstrate the urgency attached to efforts to establish effective social protection, and the extent of the challenge.

11. Vulnerability describes the likelihood that an individual or household will be poor in the future. It reflects their exposure to contingencies that may adversely affect their living standards, but also their resilience. The poor are more vulnerable because they are greatly more exposed to contingencies such as unemployment, ill health, or crime; and have fewer buffers to protect their living standards. Social protection aims to reduce their exposure to contingencies while at the same time strengthening their resilience, through facilitating asset accumulation and reinforcing support mechanisms.

12. The type of livelihood strategies they adopt provides a measure of the vulnerability experienced by the poor. Table 2 below compares the incidence of strategies adopted by the households in the lowest and the highest consumption quintiles.

<b>Table 2. Incidence of coping strategies among poorest and richest income quintiles in Zambia 2002-3</b>		
	Poorest quintile % respondents who mentioned the strategy	Richest quintile % respondents who mentioned the strategy
<i>Dysfunctional strategies</i>		
Reducing number of meals	82	53
Eating sub-ordinary meals	73	41
Eating wild food only	17	3
Sale of assets	17	13
Pulling children out of school	18	4
Reducing other purchases	77	58
<i>Social protection instruments</i>		
Informal borrowing	45	38
Formal borrowing	7	18
Farm piecework	29	5
Other piecework	44	16
Petty trading	27	10
Food for work	11	1
Food relief	7	1
Church charity	7	3
NGO charity	5	1
Family and friends	71	56
Source: WB [2005] Zambia: Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment		

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The high incidence of coping strategies likely to have long-term adverse effects on households is significantly higher among poor than among rich households, and this underlines the importance of vulnerability in explaining poverty traps and persistent poverty. The incidence of coping strategies associated with social protection instruments also provides interesting information. Formal social protection is a more important source of protection among richer households, whereas for poorer households informal sources of protection and the labour market are more prominent. Public programmes are more likely to help poorer households, but cover at best a minority of such households.

*A brief historical perspective on social protection in Zambia*

13. State-led programmes of social protection in Zambia can be dated to the late colonial era, with the Public Welfare Assistance Scheme supporting injured mine-workers and returning soldiers. After independence, social policy was granted a fairly high profile by President Kaunda's government, arguably the most 'developmental' of Zambia's post-independence regimes. First under the Ministry of Housing and Social Development, and later under the Ministry of Community Development and Social Welfare, programmes focused on housing, old age pensions and social assistance. These programmes were financed in the main by surpluses from copper exports and had a strong public sector lead. In 1981, GRZ commissioned a study on the establishment of a welfare state, but the earlier fall in copper prices, and the subsequent sustained decline of the Zambia economy precluded full implementation of its recommendations. The reformist administration that took power in 1991 stated its intention to set up a comprehensive social security system, and asked a joint ILO-WB team to identify policy options. The main recommendations of this team were aimed to strengthen the National Pension Scheme, and, as part of its wider shift to a neo-liberal policy agenda, to enhance the role of private providers. It also recommended strengthening safety nets outside the pension system. In institutional terms, the Ministry of Labour was given responsibility for social insurance (mainly pensions), while the Ministry of Social Services was entrusted with social assistance (safety nets). However, with a gradual reduction in the role for the state – one government minister of the time stated that “the government no longer does things; it facilitates while NGOs do things” – other actors took on increasingly large roles in terms of social service delivery, particularly church-related organisations.

14. Despite an apparent political commitment to developing a comprehensive social security system, policy outcomes have entrenched a strict separation between employment-based social insurance and tax financed social assistance. The impact of economic decline, structural adjustment, and the decline in formal employment has been felt in both branches of social security. The contributor base of the social insurance system has shrunk and this, together with financial underperformance of the pension funds, has generated large deficits. The GRZ response has been to close the public pension fund to new entrants, who are required to join the private pension fund (NAPSA). There is uncertainty over the sustainability of the public pension fund, but its dissolution would involve a constitutional change. In all, social insurance covers around ten percent of the population of working age, and their dependants. The tax-

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financed social assistance branch has also been under significant pressure, both from the sustained high levels of poverty, vulnerability, and unemployment on the one hand, and a squeeze on resources, both human and financial. The approach to safety nets has been very fragmented, piecemeal, and reactive, with a proliferation of programmes in different parts of government, competing with donor and NGO programmes. The virtual absence of monitoring and evaluation makes it impossible to identify the impact and effectiveness of these programmes.

*Existing social protection instruments in Zambia: focus, target groups and coverage*

16. A recent study on social protection in Zambia<sup>12</sup> examined in some detail 12 key programmes.<sup>13</sup> Table 3 below provides summary information, and the text below more detailed discusses, on the programmes. For our purposes it will be useful to group these according to the responsible agency.

<b>Table 3. Summary information on key social protection programmes in Zambia 2002-4<sup>1</sup></b>				
Agency responsible	Programme	Funding	Coverage (households)	Budget <sup>1</sup> (US\$m)
<i>Government Agencies</i>				
MCDSS - PAM	Food Security Pack	GRZ	150,000	12.50
MCDSS - PWAS	Public Welfare Assistance Scheme	GRZ, GTZ, UNICEF, DANIDA	134,092	0.73
MCDSS - GTZ	Kalomo Social Cash Transfer Scheme	GTZ	1,000	0.04
MCDSS	MicroBankers Trust		3,619	0.23
MoE	School Feeding Programme	GRZ, WFP	11,840	0.42
<i>Autonomous Agencies</i>				
Public Sector Pension Fund	Old age, retirement and disability pensions	Employees		
National Pension Scheme Authority	Old age, retirement and disability pensions	Employees		
<i>NGOs and COs</i>				
Habitat for Humanity Zambia	Habitat for Humanity Zambia	NGO		4.0
Zambia Red Cross - Street Kids International Canada	Street Children Project of Zambia	GRZ, Donors	48 children at one time	
SCOPE OVC	SCOPE OVC	USAID	523,166 children	2.0
CRAIDS	Community response to HIV/AIDS (CRAIDS)	GRZ, WB	63 community grants	0.6

12 See RuralNet Associates [2005] 'Social Protection Case Studies. Final Draft Summary Report'.

13 The term programme is used to cover all interventions, some of which could be better described as projects given their limited timescale and objectives.



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<sup>1</sup> Figures are latest available (MoFNP Economic Report 2004; MCDSS The Targeted Food Security Pack – Implementation and Impact 2000-2004; RuralNet Associates [2005] ‘Social Protection Case Studies. Final Draft Summary Report’.

<sup>2</sup> These figures are best read as rough indicators of orders of magnitude. For example, the budget allocated to the Food Security Pack in 2003/4 was K91b (US\$12m), but PAM reports that only K43b (US\$5.9m) was received in that year.

Beginning with governmental agencies, the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services manages a portfolio of programmes targeted on the poor and vulnerable.<sup>14</sup> These include the *Food Security Pack* targeting vulnerable small scale farmers for support with farming inputs and capacity building, this programme is delivered by the Programme against Malnutrition PAM and in 2004 reached 150,000 households at a cost of K91b (US\$12.5m); the *Public Welfare Assistance Scheme* providing in-kind support for the destitute selected by community committees, in 2004 PWAS reached 134,092 beneficiaries at a cost of K5.3b (US\$0.73m). The Scheme has three major components, an education component assisting vulnerable children to attend school; a health component assisting vulnerable households with health care; and a social component assisting with food, blankets, and transport costs for repatriation. The Scheme operates mainly by distributing funding allocations in the form of in-kind support to vulnerable households. The distribution of assistance is done by Social Welfare Officers advised by social welfare committees. This follows from a re-design process initiated in 1997 aimed at strengthening community elements in the operation of the Scheme. A review of the operation of PWAS (MCDSS – Public Welfare Assistance Scheme – Understanding the New PWAS) suggests the re-design has achieved greater operational effectiveness, but also draws attention to significant uncertainty and instability in budget allocations and disbursement, which undermine its role as a safety net.

The *Kalomo Social Cash Transfer Scheme* is a pilot programme targeting 1000 households in extreme poverty. The Scheme aims to reduce extreme poverty among the 10 percent poorest households in the pilot region of Kalomo District. It delivers around US\$7 a month to 1000 households, selected by Welfare Assistance Committees at community, area and district level. The Public Welfare Assistance Scheme assisted by GTZ operates the Scheme launched in May 2004. Evaluations of the Pilot Scheme are very positive and have encouraged further initiatives. A CARE partnership agreement with DFID includes two further cash transfer pilots, one each in a rural area (the Kazungula Pilot started in August 2005) and an urban area (Chipata). Oxfam has proposed using cash transfers as part of humanitarian relief and food security responses in Western and Southern Provinces of Zambia. There is growing interest in the opportunities for extending cash transfer programmes, both replicating and upscaling these programmes. As Box 2 notes, there are several benefits to cash-transfers as opposed to in-kind transfers to poor households. Donors are in discussion with GRZ to upscale the cash transfer scheme up to a national programme. However, the Kalomo project provides only a very limited basis of evidence on which to move forward to discussions of a national scheme.

The MCDSS also manages the *Micro-Bankers Trust* providing loans and financial services to vulnerable persons. In 2004 the Programme reached 3619 individuals at

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14 Ministry of Finance and National Planning [2004] Economic Report 2004, Lusaka.

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the cost of K1.7b (US\$0.23m). In addition the MCDSS is responsible for a number of other smaller programmes including the *National Trust for the Disabled*, *Child Care Upgrading Programme*, the *Programme Urban Self-Help*, and food distribution to districts affected by disasters. The Ministry of Education is responsible for the School Feeding Programme targeting 11,840 beneficiaries in 2003/4 at a cost of US\$422.315.

18. Autonomous agencies involved in social protection include the *Public Sector Pension Fund* and the *National Pension Scheme Authority*. These provide employment-based old age, retirement, survivor, and disability pensions for formal sector workers. These are unlikely to reach the poorest and most vulnerable but constitute an important source of protection for the formal labour force in Zambia (around 10 percent of the labour force).

19. NGOs and Community Organisations also play a part in delivering social protection. *Habitat for Humanity Zambia* is part of a worldwide faith organisation seeking to provide housing loans for those in need, with a budget of US\$4000,000 in 2004. *Street Children Project of Zambia* combines the efforts of an international NGO and the local Red Cross to provide temporary shelters for street children (48 at a time for up to 6 months) and education, health and nutrition interventions. *SCOPE OVC* operated between 2000-2004 and supported community education and household strengthening interventions targeted on children affected by HIV/AIDS, it reached 523,166 children in the time it was in operation at a cost of US\$2m. *CRAIDS* was set up in 2003 to provide community grants to address the impact of HIV/AIDS, in 2003/4 it disbursed 63 grants totalling US\$664,000.

#### **Box 2: Cash versus in-kind transfers to poor households**

In-kind benefits have the advantage of beneficiary households being guaranteed consumption of essential goods and services. They are appealing to the non-poor because they satisfy an observed need and minimise the potential misuse of the support by poor people. The disadvantages of in-kind benefits relate to the effectiveness and desirability of imposing a specific kind of consumption on the poor. Furthermore, in-kind benefits on a large scale will produce significant price and allocation distortions in the economy. In some cases, in-kind benefits may simply be resold. Large programmes will also generate strong incentives for the providers of these goods or services to seek to influence decisions on the programmes to their advantage, even when these are not beneficial to poor people.

Cash benefits have a number of advantages. Beneficiary households know best how to use their resources to improve their living standards. Furthermore, small cash transfers are unlikely to generate large distortions in the economy and will have multiplier effects on the local economy when the money is spent. Compared to in-kind benefits, cash transfer programmes are less demanding in terms of institutional capacity and are more predictable in budgeting terms. The disadvantages of cash transfers relate to concerns regarding money management among poor people, and the extent to which transfers encourage households to change their behaviour in order to access entitlements in ways which are not beneficial to them or society at large.

In Zambia, cash transfers are underused as a social protection instrument. Within the MCDSS, the largest programme is the Food Security Pack, which absorbed K43b in the period January 2003 to March 2004, next is PWAS, which disbursed approximately K5b during 2003. Annualised disbursements under the Pilot Social Cash Transfer Scheme were K0.35b.

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19. This brief review of social protection interventions is not exhaustive, but can demonstrate the main features of current social protection in Zambia:

- Social protection interventions in Zambia are piecemeal, fragmented, and reactive, with a proliferation of programmes focused on target groups and an emphasis of in-kind forms of support.
- With the exception of employment-based pension funds and PWAS, social protection interventions in Zambia are in the main funded by donors. Funding is insufficient to meet programme objectives.
- Delivery systems have not proved effective in the past, demonstrating weak institutional capacity.
- It is very difficult to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of social protection programmes, as they are seldom developed on the back of appropriate research, lack adequate targeting tools, and monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are non-existent (See Box 3 below).
- Nonetheless, it could be argued that the continuous historical presence of PWAS does point to a residual commitment within the Zambian polity to providing assistance to the poorest households. As with other policy legacies in Africa with somewhat ambiguous colonial roots (e.g. pensions in South Africa and Namibia), existing policy channels for social protection can provide a starting point for national schemes.

These factors go some way towards explaining why on Table 2 above, the poorest rely to a large extent on work and on informal social protection networks in coping with financial difficulties. There is growing appreciation among stakeholders in Zambia that policies and programmes aimed at poverty reduction have had some successes in assisting specific groups of the poor, but that overall, and to the extent that indicators of their effectiveness are available, these have not made a significant dent on poverty. The establishment of a Social Protection Sector Advisory Group is a reflection of this.

**Box 3. Why is monitoring and evaluation uncommon in anti-poverty programmes?**

The licensing of pharmaceutical products reflects a concern with ensuring that interventions with far reaching implications for individuals (life or death?) are available only if their benefits and risks have been demonstrated through strict trials. The effectiveness of anti-poverty interventions, in many cases with similar implications, is seldom evaluated. As a consequence, faith-based anti-poverty interventions easily outnumber evidence-based interventions. The gains from improving our knowledge of what works in reducing and preventing poverty are large. Why is monitoring and evaluation so uncommon in developing countries?

In a recent article Lant Pritchett tackles this question. He focuses on the incentives ‘advocates’ (those who design, propose and implement interventions) have for supporting randomised evaluations. He suggests that advocates have few incentives to support strict evaluation of interventions. Advocates are already persuaded that the programmes they support work, and see very little benefit in diverting scarce funding to evaluation exercises. Moreover, these are risky because results may be adverse. Even if results are positive, these may not be sufficient to ensure an increased budget allocation for the programme where the altruism of voters and politicians is low. Organisations with multiple objectives and programmes also have few incentives to push for strict

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### *The Social Protection Sector Advisory Group and the Social Protection Strategy*

20. The progress of the social protection agenda in Zambia to date can be tracked through the creation and activities of a Social Protection Sector Advisory Group (SP-SAG), which exists to formulate a national strategy for social protection within the context of developing a National Development Plan (See Box 4 below). The initial stimuli for establishing the SP-SAG were at least three-fold. The first involved an analysis of Zambia's first PRSP, which showed that it had under-emphasised the particular problems faced by the poorest households. The second came from a meeting in February/March 2003 at which a presentation on the findings from the Kalomo Pilot Social Cash Transfer Scheme led to a discussion on the desirability of a comprehensive social protection strategy for Zambia. The third impetus came from the World Bank's general policy of trying to mainstream social protection within African poverty reduction strategies through a series of international workshops; for example, MCDSS and GTZ officials attended a World Bank Social Protection Seminar in June 2003. However, internal disputes over which ministries were central to the poverty agenda in Zambia meant that neither MCDSS nor MoFNP were initially willing to provide leadership for the SP-SAG that GRZ had sanctioned, thus delaying its formation until December 2003. Once formed, however, the SP-SAG has been one of the most active SAGs involved in the NDP Process, meeting 14 times (to date) for over 40 hours of collective deliberation. The SP-SAG appointed a consultant who presented the case for Social Protection at a retreat in August 2004, which was well attended by high level government officials. The consultant then continued to engage with the SP-SAG – a process that involved 8 further SP-SAG meetings, a further retreat in February 2005 and several written inputs from – in order to produce the draft strategy by April 2005. A smaller group of donors also met in between these meetings to clarify their position, sometimes also meeting with the consultant.

21. The Draft Strategy states that the goal of social protection is to “contribute to the security of all Zambians by ensuring that incapacitated and low capacity households and people have sufficient income security to meet their basic needs, and protection from the worst impacts of risks and shocks” (Social Protection Strategy

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[2005] p.17). It focuses on six objectives (each with associated targets and implementation strategy):

- i. Increase the ability of low capacity households to meet their basic needs
- ii. Reduce extreme poverty in incapacitated households
- iii. Reduce the vulnerability and numbers of street children
- iv. Improve access to health and education for people from incapacitated and low capacity households
- v. Reduce the vulnerability of social protection target groups to the violation of their legal rights
- vi. Strengthen capacity at local and national level to deliver an effective social protection programme

**Box 4: The National Development Plan and the politics of poverty reduction in Zambia**

MoFNP officials see the NDP as being significantly different from the PRSP, which was rushed through for donor deadlines, was not closely related to the resource envelop, and did not make strong links to implementation or to a monitoring and evaluation frameworks. Planners and policy-makers have become keen to show that ‘their’ NDP is an advance on ‘the donor’s’ PRSP, which is intended as a more comprehensive exercise which central idea is “to create new opportunities for growth and distribution”. The NDP is to be constructed from the following three sources:

1. Bottom-up consultations with Districts leading up to the formulation of Strategic District Development Plans.
2. Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs) made up of GRZ, donor and civil society representatives providing ‘expert’ guidance on key sectoral and cross-cutting issues which would form the basis for the NDP chapters.
3. Civil society ‘Shadow Thematic Groups’ to shadow the SAGs and feed in recommendations to MoFNP.

Despite claims from MoFNP that the NDP process has been “very consultative” doubts were expressed by respondents as to how meaningful this consultation has been, either at the level of Districts or national-level civil society. There are also concerns about the lack of research being used to inform these consultations. Members of Parliament were not included in the SAGs. Although there may be some good reasons for not involving Parliament as an institution – some MPs acknowledged that this would compromise the institution’s capacity to comment neutrally on it during the revision phase – this nevertheless reflects a further disconnection between politicians and the poverty agenda in Zambia, that does not augur well for developing a political constituency behind its constituent elements, including social protection.

The Draft Social Protection Strategy seeks to link up existing piecemeal programmes into a coherent strategy. It defines specific target groups: incapacitated and low capacity households and vulnerable children, and appropriate interventions in line with current MCDSS thinking. Some effort has gone into prioritising the poorest of the poor, formulating focused and feasible interventions,<sup>15</sup> and emphasising the relationship existing between these interventions and social protection models such as

<sup>15</sup> Although the budget attached to the Draft is considerably streamlined.

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the World Bank's Social Risk Management.

22. Overall, the SP-SAG process has centred on producing a coherent strategy that is likely to attract donor funding. This has been done quite successfully, and is an approach likely to find favour within MoFNP. However, concerns remain regarding the politics of the process, in terms of both internal and external levels of ownership and commitment. Externally, there have been few efforts as yet by the SP-SAG to secure wider political buy-in from key stakeholders within government (particularly MoFNP) and political and civil society more broadly. There might be a structural issue here, in that the formation of separate SAG for social protection (as opposed to framing social protection as a cross-cutting issue within the NDP process) may have reduced the extent to which the SP agenda has been forced to engage other key sectors (e.g. Education, Health). Donors have been influential in shaping the SP-SAG process, leading to some frustration amongst some SP-SAG members.<sup>16</sup> These frustrations seem to relate to the difficulty of getting to grips with the new and complex terminology of the social protection agenda, but also a sense that a number of participants – from some government and UN donor agencies – would have preferred a wider approach to social protection, incorporating the vulnerable but not-poor and extending to a wider range of instruments (e.g. pension funds). A turning point here seems to have been in Spring 2005, when MCDSS and GTZ members of the SP-SAG attended a World Bank seminar in Tunis on 'Mainstreaming SP in PRSPs'. This event proved to be particularly useful in terms of raising the level of ownership within the MCDSS, especially as the Zambia presentation was voted the best. It might also have proved to be an important moment in achieving some sort of consensus concerning the content of the SPS within the MCDSS. A more objective analysis reveals that the Draft Strategy has blind spots relating to the relative strength of redistribution, insurance, and rights in the overall strategy. Contradictions also exist, particularly concerning the links between the overarching SRM framework and some of the actual policy/programme recommendations – particularly around challenging chronic poverty<sup>17</sup> and the notion of tackling discrimination through legal means. It could be argued that the six dimensions of the strategy relate as closely to the policy concerns of various SP-SAG members, as they do to a coherent reading of the SRM framework or (more importantly) of vulnerability and extreme poverty in Zambia. This may prove to be a politically- if not technically-optimal approach, as it increases the likelihood of funding and institutional support for the Strategy.

### **III. The Politics of Social Protection in Zambia: identifying the key drivers and barriers to securing a political constituency of support for social protection**

#### *Overview and framework*

23. As discussed in the Introduction, the analytical approach adopted here seeks to combine the 'drivers of change' approach with the findings of recent comparative

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<sup>16</sup> This criticism came from both civil society representatives and government officials. Other respondents from the same constituencies felt the process had been sufficiently inclusive.

<sup>17</sup> One SP-SAG member noted that SRM approach is not helpful in getting to grips with the type of poverty that exists in Zambia, where "poverty is deeply embedded and chronic, it is not about shocks and SRM is not necessarily the best way to approach it".

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approach to the politics of social protection in Africa. This involves combining a focus on both the institutional context of policy change - and the specific institutional, systemic, societal, and global factors involved - with a concern with placing these in the context of the 'political contract' existing between government and the governed. In the context of social protection, the latter requires tracing the formation of shared 'solidarity values'. There are implications flowing from this for the examination of the drivers and barriers to change. In the short term, identifying the drivers and barriers for the adoption of a national social protection strategy in Zambia relies on examining the knowledge, interests, discourse, capacity and resources of key stakeholders as defined by current structures. This applies strongly to the analysis of the barriers to change, given that these policy dimensions are a direct reflection of current structures. In terms of the drivers of change, agency factors are important, especially as regards identifying actors and policy spaces where support can pay dividends in moving the social protection agenda forward. In the longer term agency factors are more significant. In the short term, it might be necessary to take as given the knowledge, incentives, and motivations of stakeholders and consider ways in which these can constrain or facilitate social protection policy. This will necessarily involve emphasising 'realpolitik', the politics of the here and now. In the longer term, the potential for demand-led politics and rational-bureaucratic policy processes is a more fertile ground for analysis. This is an important distinction as agency factors are central to changing values and beliefs. At the same time, the margins between short term 'realpolitik' and longer term demand-led politics are wide. Without overplaying this distinction, it could be an effective device for indicating where both short and long term actions might be effective.

24. Overall, Zambia presents something of a paradox with regards the politics of social protection, whereby although the underlying political context seems to be largely inimical to generating a nationally-owned social protection scheme, the narrower sphere of development policy-making may nonetheless offer more fertile grounds within which such an agenda can initially be promoted. The specific factors associated with each (interrelated) arena will be discussed in more depth in the following sections, and are simply stated here. The underlying character of political processes and institutions dominant in Zambia are largely, if not wholly, inimical to those generally associated with nationally-driven social protection programmes in Africa. It is difficult to describe the state as 'developmental', or this regime as 'pro-poor'. The political system in Zambia is highly personalised and relies on patron-client relationships to aggregate support for politicians. Such forms of politics undermine rational-bureaucratic policy processes and are not conducive to stable policy debates and commitments, or 'demand-led' politics. Structural adjustment, the sustained economic crises and related levels of poverty and vulnerability, which could have produced popular pressures for social protection, have in fact undermined the capacity of state and non-state actors to respond adequately to increased poverty and vulnerability. It is not clear whether the government retains public confidence in its ability to protect the most vulnerable groups. It is also questionable whether political elites perceive social protection to be the responsibility of government. The bifurcation in social protection of employment-based versus tax-financed programmes implies that improvements in social protection for those in formal employment can be achieved in isolation from programmes targeting the poor and vulnerable. These factors combine to ensure an unfavourable political environment for a national social

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protection scheme.

25. Despite this unfavourable environment, social protection has been included within national policy debates, largely as a result of the agency-led character of development policy processes in Zambia – particularly concerning schemes that are largely donor-backed. Such schemes are particularly acceptable to political elites if associated with additional aid flows. Changes in aid modalities favouring general budget support provide scope for discussions about social protection initiatives funded by grants rather than loans. GRZ has requested assistance from the World Bank, DFID, GTZ, and other donors to develop a comprehensive social protection strategy as part of the successor to the Poverty Reduction Strategy. The establishment of a Social Protection – Sector Advisory Group provides a significant opportunity to move forward on this, although this process has been undertaken to date with little thought or effort towards developing a wider constituency of support for a national social protection scheme. The interesting issue is whether the inclusion of social protection issues within current policy debates, and movement towards the formulation and adoption of a national social protection strategy can help raise national demand for social protection. The challenge remains in ensuring that it is nationally owned, embedded in the mainstream of government administration, designed and implemented effectively, committed to and sustained over time – in short, that a political contract for social protection is developed over time. The following sections consider in turn the main barriers and the main drivers towards strengthening a political constituency of support for a national social protection strategy in Zambia through.

#### *A. BARRIERS TO CHANGE*

26. Chart 1 below provides summary information on the main barriers to change. These are discussed in more detail in the text that follows.

<b>Chart 1. Barriers to raising demand/a political constituency for social protection</b>		
<u>Dimension</u>	<u>Short-term</u> structure dominates	<u>Long-term</u> agency dominates
Knowledge	----- understanding of poverty -----	
Structure	----- political aggregation -----	
Interests	absence of leadership, SP a new issue ----	
Discourse	faith-based interventions -----	
Capacity	weakness of MCDSS ---	
Resources	----- fiscal constraints -----	



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*Current understandings of poverty are an obstacle to a social protection strategy*

27. At present, there are important gaps in the understanding and sensitivity to poverty and vulnerability among key stakeholders. This is surprising given the emphasis on poverty and poverty reduction in national policy debates, and the more recent availability of poverty and vulnerability assessments. Current policy discussions on poverty and vulnerability reduction focus to a large extent on a single indicator: the poverty headcount. This strengthens a widely shared perception that poverty is widespread in Zambia.<sup>18</sup> There is no question that poverty and vulnerability in Zambia are unacceptably high, but the emphasis on the poverty headcount provides in many respects a very limited basis for the development of effective anti-poverty policy. The high measures of poverty incidence contribute to make poverty and vulnerability a large and intractable problem. A lack of sensitivity to the inequality of poverty, and its persistence over time, preclude productive discussion on policy priorities and policy effectiveness. In a perverse way, the ‘massification’ of poverty weakens the formation of solidarity values, and makes it difficult to argue that interventions targeted at particular groups within the poor.<sup>19</sup> Importantly, there is also a lack of data on either poverty dynamics, or on destitution and chronic poverty, despite their centrality to better understandings of the poorest groups identified (e.g. incapacitated households). The issue of poverty dynamics is particularly important given the importance of debates around ‘graduation’ from poverty in relation to the targeting of policy initiatives.

28. The key issue here is that the policy focus on headcount poverty needs to give way to a broader understanding of poverty and vulnerability, one that goes beyond a single focus on the poverty headcount, for the analytical basis for social protection policies to be in place. The consideration of policies that could effectively address poverty and vulnerability will require bringing into the public debate a broader range of poverty measures (poverty gap, poverty persistence or duration), but also vulnerability (the probability that a household will be poor in the near future). There are poverty and vulnerability studies available which take a broader perspective on poverty than the poverty headcount, such as the 2002/2004 Livelihoods Map and Baseline Profiling, and 2005 drought related Needs assessments done by the Zambia Vulnerability Assessment Committee, the CSO Poverty Reports and the recent World Bank’s Zambia: Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment, but many stakeholders appear not to have assimilated these technocratic and quite narrowly focused outputs. It will be some time before these reports feed into the policy debates, especially as they are directed at a specialist audience. Nonetheless, there are some grounds to suggest that, by including non-poor as well as poor groups in its definitional field, a focus on vulnerability may help generate a broader constituency of support for pro-poor policies.

29. As a policy framework, social protection emphasises the significant role of

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<sup>18</sup> The 2002/3 Living Conditions Measurement Survey asked respondents whether they perceived themselves to be poor. 47 percent of respondents described themselves as very poor; a further 48 percent described themselves as moderately poor; and only 5 percent did not perceive themselves as poor (WB [2005] Zambia - Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment).

<sup>19</sup> As one of our respondents put it: ‘we are too preoccupied with our own poverty to give sufficient attention to the poverty of others’.

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hazards and shocks - such as unemployment, sickness, or droughts - in pushing household into poverty, but also the fact that limited access to social protection instruments forces households to adopt dysfunctional livelihood strategies which keep them in poverty. Social protection is not well understood or widely accepted, even among key stakeholders, many of whom struggle with its terminology, its relationship to poverty reduction policy, its scope and instruments. Social protection does not have wide currency among policy makers, a primary obstacle to generating a wider constituency of support for a national scheme.

*The structure of the political system constraints policy debates and commitments to reform*

30. The political system aggregates support around people not policies, and around State House in particular. The President, and his immediate circle of supporters and advisers dominate decision-making in Zambia. There are at least four circles of influence around the President, made up first of family and one or two key advisers. Beyond these are a number of Ministers and key party officials who are essentially MMD cadres – that is, they provide the President with a sense of the political pressures and requirements in terms of maintaining regime stability at any given time. Further beyond this circle are the ‘technocrats’, those Ministers who have a genuine command of their brief and who make efforts to influence government policy in line with their ministry’s mission. The potential for accessing these circles of influence in ways that influence Presidential thinking in pro-poor directions are slight, although could possibly be exploited by heads of major aid agencies.

31. Although the political party-system in Zambia has slowly transformed from being a single-party to a competitive party system since 1991, there is little evidence that this process of political liberalisation has significantly contributed to the deepening of democracy or the institutionalisation of effective and legitimate forms of representation. Rather, what currently prevails is a party system that can be characterised as “fragmented and lacking institutionalisation”.<sup>20</sup> Although successive attitudinal surveys have revealed that Zambian citizens strongly favour democratic forms of rule – and specifically multi-party elections over single-party rule – there is a deepening sense that citizens consider democratisation in Zambia to have been seriously undermined since the 2001 elections. In a repeat of the problem of late colonial era, many parties are formed too close to elections to develop an organisational base or genuine links to a constituency, and have thus remained reliant on the personality of their leaders and appeals on the basis of patronage rather than ideology or project of social change.

32. The reasons for this current state of partial democratisation, which leaves little room for effective and legitimate forms of representation in general, let alone of the poorest groups, can be directly linked to the following range of factors:<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Rakner, L. and L. Svasand (2004) ‘From dominant to competitive party system: The Zambian experience 1991-2001’, *Party Politics*, 10/1, 49-68. p. 60.

<sup>21</sup> See, for example, Burnell, P. (2002) ‘Parliamentary committees in Zambia’s Third Republic: Partial Reforms; Unfinished Agenda’, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 28/2, 291-313; Burnell, P. (2003) ‘Legislative-executive relations in Zambia: parliamentary reform on the agenda’, *Journal of*

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- (i) Systemic features related to the constitution such as the lack of separation of powers and related lack of countervailing political forces to the presidency; the chronic weakness of parliament; the electoral system; and also the system for choosing candidates;
- (ii) The political economy of reform during the 1990s whereby economic liberalisation decimated the role of economic interest groups in influencing political parties and public policy. Following the (largely opportunistic) coalition of business, unions and academics around the MMD, these linkages were severely undermined in the 1990s as all economic interest groups (agriculture, business, unions) saw their institutional capacity and influence fragment and dissipate. This ruled out a set of relationships that recent research has suggested often lies at the heart of progressive government policies on poverty reduction, namely organic links between political parties and civil society;<sup>22</sup>
- (iii) Institutional and historical factors, whereby the legacy of single-party rule remains influential and neopatrimonial tendencies remain embedded and institutionalised within political and economic governance, and state-society relations more broadly. Under this form of politics, elections are seen primarily as opportunities to secure power in order to maintain access to sources of patronage and rents; elections are fought by parties on the basis of personalities rather than programmatic manifestos; voters vote according to ethno-regional bias rather than issues of national economic interest or ideology; public resources are systematically directed towards factional rather than national interests; and a sense of 'disorder' becomes institutionalised within both politics and policy cycles as a means of enabling leaders to make populist, personalised appeals, rather than work through institutions. None of the existing political parties have expressed a particular interest in the poor and vulnerable. These characteristics of the political system make it very difficult for poverty-related issues to become the sustained priority of political or state action.
- (iv) Finally, and more materially, there are low levels of intra-elite conflict in Zambia, leaving little incentive for new or alternative elites to forge ground-breaking alliances with poor and marginal social groups. Although this may change over time with the emergence of new political leaders and a different political party configuration, it might be possible to catalyse such a process through promoting closer linkages between certain civil society actors and both political parties and elites.

*The absence of government leadership on social protection reflects the priorities of the political elites in a residual non-developmental state*

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*Contemporary African Studies*, 21/1, 47-68; Posner, D. and D. Simon (2002), 'Economic conditions and incumbent support in Africa's new democracies: evidence from Zambia', *Comparative Political Studies*, 35/3: 313-336; Rakner, L. (2003) *Political and economic liberalisation in Zambia: 1991-2001*. (Uppsala), and Rakner and Svasand, op cit. .

<sup>22</sup> Hickey, S. and S. Bracking (2005) 'The politics of poverty reduction: from representation to a politics of justice?', *World Development*, 33/6.

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33. Zambia has arguably not possessed something approaching a developmental state since the 1970s. Poor economic governance, opaque and unreliable budgeting procedures, and spending priorities not conducive to development, are all strongly and negatively correlated with pro-poor governments. Since the 1990s, it has withdrawn from being the dominant actor in social provisioning and basic physical infrastructure, and shows little desire to renew its role in these areas or to take a stronger co-ordinating role concerning the plethora of social programmes. The rejection of the statist model of development under Chiluba appears to have been thoroughgoing. Enjoying a great deal of popularity in his first few years, Chiluba seemed to embed the idea that people will have to tighten their belts. Popular expectations of what the state will provide are low. There is a strong sense in which the state is not the key actor in people's social lives at local level, where church organisations and NGOs are frequently more prevalent. The move towards a PRSP was undoubtedly donor-led, and it would be difficult to depict the current regime as pro-poor. Although presidential and ministerial leadership in key ministries (e.g. MCDSS, MoNFP) can play a significant factor in building a constituency for social protection, there are currently no real signs of this happening.

*Elite and popular discourses on poverty and vulnerability constrain the development of a social protection strategy*

34. Elites and popular discourses on poverty and vulnerability draw a distinction between the 'deserving' and the 'undeserving' poor. This is perhaps not as virulent in Zambia as in other countries (developing and developed), but it is sufficiently strong to frame policy discussions on social protection, and limit progress in important respects. There are popular perceptions about laziness and poor money management among the poor, e.g. men being likely to spend any extra money on alcohol.<sup>23</sup> These undermine a sense of solidarity in society, and colour assumptions on the effectiveness of anti-poverty policy among the elites. There are perceptions, shared by government and civil society policy makers, that programmes should have a strong bias towards the economically productive sections of the poor – as with the notion of 'vulnerable but viable' farmers. These perceptions about different types of poverty are not especially helpful in the context of targeting groups for support. The 'deserving poor' constitute a majority of the population, making it somewhat difficult to narrow down to a group of 'especially deserving poor'. If anything, these perceptions privilege those close to the poverty line, with sufficient assets to turn support into direct productive efforts. HIV/AIDS and drought victims are an exception because they are seen as being particularly deserving, regardless of their productive capacity.

**Box 5. Designing social protection instruments to maximise effectiveness and political support**

To be sustainable, social protection interventions must be shown to be effective in achieving their objectives and at the same time enjoy a measure of political support. Decisions on the design and evaluation of interventions have important implications for both these objectives.

Targeting interventions on the poor and the poorest meets effectiveness criteria, providing that targeting is not too costly or stigmatising. Where resources available for anti-poverty interventions are scarce, altruistic tax-payers are inclined to favour targeting. Targeting can facilitate the sustainability of interventions, but at the risk of future reductions in the relevant budget. A national social protection strategy in a country where donors largely finance social protection interventions but national governments are committed to fund these from domestic resources at a later stage presents a more complex situation. Under the MDGs, donors are committed to

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35. There are also discourses around the types of interventions that are desirable. For some, the idea of extending cash transfers is literally laughable, and it was notable that the strongest (initial) opposition came from an organisation dedicated to promoting the role of the private sector in development, and therefore strong on self-reliance. Cash transfers are also deemed undesirable because of fears that they create dependency, and fuel corruption. Popular discourses seem to favour food related support, food relief and protection, which have long-standing in the context of Zambia. Among the political elites, micro-enterprise development and finance and public works are seen as desirable. These perceptions are not based on evidence or informed public debate over the relative advantages of different policy interventions, they can best be described as faith-based (See Box 5 above). It is striking that even a very brief informed discussion can challenge such prejudices against cash transfers. For example an interviewee who was initially a vociferous opponent of the idea, in favour of food transfers, came to agree that cash was more empowering and less likely to create dependency than food transfers within the space of the interview.

36. There is no track record of evidence-based social protection decision making,

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and monitoring and evaluation of social protection programmes is virtually non-existent. As a consequence, policy decisions and programme design in this area reflect widely shared pre-conceptions regarding social protection interventions. For example, there is a strongly held view that informal networks of support are effective in protecting the vulnerable, especially through transfers from urban to rural areas. There is very little evidence to support this assumption, and indirect evidence contradicting it. Analysis of remittances from the 2002/3 LCMS shows that whereas 21 percent of rural households remitted to other rural households (and 4 percent to other urban households), only 14 percent of urban households remitted to rural households (and 9 percent remitted to other urban households)<sup>24</sup>. While support in bad times is not the only reason for remitting, the pattern of remittances above is not consistent with traditional urban to rural informal social protection. There is also a widely held view that in-kind transfers are more effective than cash transfers in protecting the poor, and that the former are less likely to generate dependency. There is little evidence supporting this view. The fact that consideration of social protection among policy makers is largely unencumbered by evidence does not contribute to garnering support for social protection.

*Capacity is a significant constraint*

37. The MCDSS has been slow to assume leadership of this process and is in any case not seen by more powerful ministries as a particularly convincing policy champion in the field of poverty reduction, particularly following its poorly received poverty plan in the late 1990s. This stems from a lack of institutional and policy making capacity. In addition, social protection remains a complicated policy agenda to MCDSS staff, and they do not currently feel a strong level of ownership to the strategy. This is not necessarily because they are opposed to it, but rather because they do not feel able to defend, if challenged, why these policy areas have been chosen above others. Social Protection is a challenging agenda for a Ministry that has for long focused on top down delivery of public assistance. There have been regular changes of personnel at the Ministerial and Private Secretary levels, which have limited the chances to consolidate support for social protection within MCDSS and further reduced the possibility of Ministerial leadership on key policy agendas.

38. A range of institutional factors will need to be overcome for the MCDSS to provide effective leadership for a Social Protection Strategy. MCDSS is not perceived as a strong Ministry within government; it has not benefited from the kind of sectoral support that has strengthened the Ministries of Health or Education; and it is yet to undergo the restructuring process which most other parts of government have completed under the (problematic) Public Service Capacity Building Project. It has a top-down organisational structure, focused on delivering the resources allocated, and disbursed, by the MoFNP. Although the Ministry certainly has an institutional presence at the District level, which is crucial to the implementation of a social protection strategy, its capacity here is also very limited. It has few channels through which needs assessment and analysis at the ground level could be aggregated to inform policy making at the national level (contributing to the low 'demand' for social protection). There is limited understanding within the Ministry on how to get

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<sup>24</sup> WB [2005] Zambia: Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment

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engagement of other stakeholders on the demand side. There is also very limited capacity for policy analysis and training and professional development within the Ministry, and for policy implementation and evaluation. These weaknesses naturally undermine the confidence needed to assume a strong leadership role in social protection.

More generally, there is little evidence to suggest that the civil service in Zambia has the capacity to scale-up pilot projects into national schemes, particularly where success has relied to a significant extent on a building a resource-intensive incentive structure for staff. There is a growing and understandable reluctance within the public sector to break with the general pay structure for particular initiatives, and this area needs further consideration.

### *Fiscal constraints*

39. There is a commonly expressed view, especially among government circles, that social protection is not affordable. Given that donors have indicated a commitment to financing a national social protection strategy in the short term, government concerns with affordability apply more strictly to the medium and long term. Hence in Chart 1 above, this barrier to change is skewed to the longer term. There are a number of factors explaining the government stance on affordability. In part this is explained by the fact that the problem appears intractable given the spread of poverty and vulnerability. In part this also a factor of assumed government policy priorities. Resistance to extending social protection reflects a view that the main policy priority is growth, and therefore the expansion of the productive capacity of the Zambian economy. Social protection appears in this context as a net cost, rather than an investment in productive capacity, and therefore as a drag on scarce resources. This concern is magnified in the context of aid modalities that involve loans as opposed to grants. It is very likely that governments will be more resistance to social protection initiatives proposed by donors where these would raise already high levels of indebtedness. Concerns over the financial sustainability of a social protection scheme in the longer run also betray a deeper anxiety about the lack of stability in policy processes and financial management. Limited interventions, especially in the case of cash transfers, could quickly spiral into large-scale financial commitments through pressure from wider sections of society. And there is the issue of potential corruption associated with cash transfers, and the extent to which budget allocations will not translate in actual support for the poor. This is the key test of commitment, particularly given the record in Zambia of donors and the government actually allocating only around half of the funds tied to PRSP priorities in 2002 and 2003. As argued in Box 6 below, the financing of a national social protection scheme in Zambia is affordable – the problem is ensuring that it becomes a political priority.

#### **Box 6: Financing an extension of Social Protection in Zambia**

As noted above, donors finance the vast majority of non-employment-based social protection programmes in Zambia, which goes some way to explaining their interest in, and influence over, the development of a social protection strategy for Zambia. The 2005-2007 Medium

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Term Expenditure Framework projects a stable share of domestic government revenues as a proportion of GDP over the period, rising marginally from 18.28 % of GDP in 2004 to 18.30 percent of GDP in 2007. This is in contrast to a projected rise in grants and potential budget support from 4.82 % of GDP in 2004 to 7.6% of GDP in 2007. The main implications from these projections for financing social protection are: (i) an extension of social protection could only be financed domestically via expenditure switching; (ii) an extension of social protection could be financed externally through focusing grants and potential budget support on social protection related programmes. As regard the latter option, it is useful to look at the main grant components. Programme grants are projected to rise from 0.69% of GDP in 2004 to 1.55% in 2007. General Budget support is projected to increase from zero to 1% of GDP in the same period; and Project grants are projected to rise from 4.13% of GDP to 6.05%.

According to World Bank calculations, Latin American countries spend on average between 4 and 5 % of GDP on social protection (including employment-based social protection). Large scale social protection programmes in other developing countries, albeit with lower incidence of poverty, absorb around 1% of GDP. The South African social pension for example absorbs 1.4% of GDP, and the Child Grant around 0.5% of GDP. The largest conditional cash transfer programme in Latin America, Mexico's PROGRESA/OPORTUNIDADES reaching 40% of households, absorbs less than 1% of GDP. Taking 1% of GDP as a benchmark for a targeted poverty reduction programme, the implication is that the rise in external financing in Zambia makes an extension of social protection affordable in the short run.

Getting the politics right is more of a challenge. Achieving consensus around the need to extend social protection within government and the donor community and across them is the main challenge. The projected rise in grant revenue provides a clear opportunity to ease such consensus, but working through the shift in aid modalities to general budget support will need some consideration. The longer-term sustainability of social protection also needs consideration, especially given the volatility of aid flows. Should (and can) poor Zambians rely wholly on developed country taxpayers for their social protection?

Data Source: Ministry of Finance and National Planning [2004] 2005-2007 Medium-Term Expenditure Framework and the 2005 Budget. Green Paper, Republic of Zambia, October.



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## B. DRIVERS OF CHANGE

40. Chart 2 below summarises the information on the main drivers of change in social protection in Zambia. The text that follows discusses these in greater detail.

Chart 2. Drivers for raising demand/creating a political constituency for SP		
<u>Dimension</u>	<u>Short-term</u> agency dominates	<u>Long-term</u> structure dominates
Knowledge	SP-SAG/Donors ----- local research capacity --	
Structure	-- policy legacy, elections and constitutional debate -----	
Interests	Civil Society, food crises ---	
Discourse	Pilot schemes-----	
Capacity		
Resources	Donor support (budget cycle) -----	

41. Donors exercise a significant level of influence over policy making in Zambia, and, together with civil society organisations, are credited with having shifted GRZ focus towards poverty issues. Some donors, particularly the World Bank, ILO, GTZ and DFID, have argued for a social protection agenda for some time. The emerging consensus around social protection within the UN family, and a growing realisation that emergency food relief and protection measures have not led to sustainable improvements, suggests other donors will join in pushing for the adoption of a National Social Protection Scheme. Donor consensus on social protection will be tested by differing views on its scope ('narrow' versus 'broad' approach to social protection), and over the relative advantages of different social protection instruments (in-kind and cash transfers). The degree to which donors are able to influence the social protection strategy adopted by GRZ will depend on the specific aid modalities selected (GTZ and DFID)<sup>25</sup> and the expertise they can offer. Plans concerning donor harmonization around the SP agenda are currently unclear, although the probability that none of the major donors will specifically take up this profile may reduce its visibility, and re-enforce the sense in which social protection remains a low priority. The capacity of donors to facilitate wider ownership of a social protection strategy is harder to assess.

42. The SP-SAG constitutes the key agent of change within the current phase of promoting a national Social Protection Scheme. The process of consultation around the Social Protection Strategy provides a key opportunity for tackling some of the

<sup>25</sup> This refers to the options with budget support for supporting specific types of expenditure (earmarked budgets, target expenditures, etc.) and the term structure of aid commitments.

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obstacles described above, and for ensuring that a wider discussion of social protection facilitates wider ownership. Dissemination of the strategy is essential to get social protection discussed more widely, and attention will need to be paid to the form that this dissemination takes. Dissemination of the social protection strategy and its rationale within the overall government strategy is also overdue. The next steps for the SP-SAG are therefore crucial to taking full advantage of these opportunities: the appointment of a consultant to develop the Social Protection Strategy into a NDP chapter, consultations and dissemination engaging other Sectors, the Districts, civil society organisations and targeted political actors, and ensuring relevant media attention.

43. However, there remain several constraints to the SP-SAG fulfilling its role as an advocate for social protection amongst GRZ and donors, which will need to be overcome, in particular:

- The low level of ‘ownership’ of social protection *within* the SP-SAG, particularly amongst GRZ representatives, which is related to a continued lack of certainty concerning the definitional and technical aspects of the agenda;
- The focus to date on the technical rather than political aspects of policy processes;
- The lack of convincing evidence that social protection can work in Zambia;
- A lack of coherence within the existing strategy, particularly between the underlying SRM framework and some of the policy initiatives.

There is evidence that the SP-SAG is moving in the right direction, particularly after the Tunis event.

44. The next stage is very important because it will allow for wider consultation and dissemination. It is not clear whether the importance of this phase is acknowledged, and there are no plans in place for consultation and dissemination. The ‘Skills Training’ identified for the SP-SAG contained no reference to politically salient issues such as advocacy skills; how to design social protection in ways that can help secure its political support. There is an urgent need for the SP-SAG to shift from technical to activist/advocate mode, while exercising care to ensure that strengthening its advocacy role does not undermine its commitment to evidence-based social protection. It is imperative to ensure that sustained discussion around the time of the drafting of the NDP ensures it retains the main elements of the SP strategy, and that this is continued through to the key stages of budgetary allocations and disbursements. Having mainstreamed SP into the NDP, a key future challenge is to embed a commitment to SP within the MTEF process.

*Elections and the constitutional debate provide (some) opportunities for changing structural constraints on social protection*

45. Presidential elections are scheduled for late 2006. National elections have often been associated with (a) increased spending on social protection and (b) moments at which the contract between state and citizenry are re-drawn around social issues. It is possible that the forthcoming elections will generate a significant debate on poverty and poverty reduction that could involve genuine policy commitments.

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Although election give-aways on social protection in Zambia have been limited (e.g. PWAS figures in 1996 and 2001), free basic education was introduced immediately after the 2002 elections as a result of opposition pressure during the campaign. However, promoting cash-transfers during an election year would be a very high-risk strategy, and would lead to its inevitable politicisation and potentially being discredited over the medium- to long-term. Zambia is not out of the woods in terms of HIPC, and any financial resources that can be mobilised are likely to be pumped into the party machine to maintain power rather than through expenditure on social protection.<sup>26</sup> Finally, there is little sense in which the current crop of political leaders possess the vision or sense of national destiny to use the election to re-draw the social contract around a long-term commitment to social protection.

46. Another potential driver for social protection is the current debate over the Constitution, which (aside from certain elements of civil society) constitutes perhaps the only dimension of progressive political debate in Zambia to which it is possible to align the promotion of social protection. One of the several changes proposed by the recent Draft Review Commission was to institutionalise the social and economic rights of Zambians within the Constitution, a procedure which would require a referendum. This opens the possibility of a national debate on a 'right to a minimum standard of living', which could underpin a social protection strategy. So far, however, the debate on the Constitutional review has focused almost exclusively on reforms to the political system, and seems to have reached an impasse.

47. In the short term, the annual budget cycle presents MCDSS and other stakeholders with an opportunity to formulate social protection policy in budget discussions with the MoFNP. MCDSS has to make a pitch on resources based on innovative proposals which fit within MoFNP overall criteria (economic growth and strengthening of productive base) and government objectives. A case can be made that social protection meets this criteria and can be effective in poverty and vulnerability reduction.

**Box 7: Social protection makes good economic sense: some key questions and possible answers**

Is social protection sustainable after donors first funding tranche ends?

*– It should be possible to demonstrate that social protection is sustainable in the medium term on the basis of a reliable costing of the social protection strategy, and DFID has already proposed to SP-SAG to commission work on this. In addition, it is important to produce reliable estimates of the large costs of not having social protection, e.g. estimates of the longer-term costs of malnutrition, or the cost of disability affected life years, of the costs of missing years of schooling for poor children.*

To what extent should Zambia, given its level of development, exercise a preference for social protection with direct impact on productive capacity, e.g. income generation/microcredit/public works, rather than income redistribution?

<sup>26</sup> Pensions may become slightly more politicised before the election. However union leaders suggested that few public sector workers see this as the key issue at present, with current wage levels being their main concern.

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*– It should be possible to estimate the growth effects of cash transfers from KPP and elsewhere, and of second order effects on the local economy of cash injections and the relative ineffectiveness of preferred alternatives, e.g. Food Relief*

Are cash transfers the right instrument at this time, given a low level of popular and elite support for them?

*– Need to work on dissemination of evidence on cash transfers, but also keep options open for other complementary instruments, e.g. public works or food security, and the feasibility of introducing conditional forms of transfers.*

Is optimal targeting is feasible or desirable in a low-income country where poverty is widespread?

*– Targeting is a complex issue in countries with a high incidence of poverty, but the extent of poverty also matters and it is both feasible and desirable to target resources on the very poor. This is an investment because the poorest commonly include large households with many children. Targeting has not been systematically adopted in existing social protection programmes, nonetheless it should be possible to accumulate evidence on targeting and incidence among existing programmes and especially the results from testing community targeting of KPP. These show that targeting is feasible, and that by encouraging transparency in selecting beneficiaries it is possible to reduce leakages and corruption.*

### *Aggregating interests around social protection*

48. Few civil society organisations have prioritised social protection to date, in terms of either advocacy campaigns or service delivery. Although a few international NGOs have expressed an interest in social protection in Zambia (e.g. CARE, OXFAM), they have little experience of policy influence themselves. Social protection was only belatedly included as a subject area for the civil society shadow thematic groups within the NDP process. Few policy researchers, academics or journalists comment regularly on social protection issues. There are glaring weaknesses in poverty research capacity in Zambia, with no more than a handful of researchers actively working on this area. However, there is genuine potential for civil society actors to become key members of a political constituency for social protection. Although civil society could not generally be described as ‘strong’ in Zambia, certain organisations and movements have recorded some impressive victories (e.g. the shift to multi-party rule in 1990-1, the third term issue in 2000-1, the inclusion of poverty within the budget in 1996), and are able to campaign vociferously on issues of development, democracy and human rights. This suggests that there are a handful of politically active and influential civil society organisations in Zambia that can be mobilised behind a social protection strategy. Some of these are faith-based organisations, such as JCTR, while others derive their inspiration from a pro-democracy, pro-human rights perspective, such as Women for Change. The strongest civil society advocates for social protection could come from the most influential ones: JCTR, PAM, CCJDP, Oasis Forum and the unions.<sup>27</sup> Importantly, some trade

<sup>27</sup> The Oasis Forum initiative to stop Chiluba’s bid for a third-term has been described as a “massive,

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unions – historically one of the key forces for democratisation in Zambia – could also form an influential vanguard in promoting social protection. Unions are increasingly accepting the need to extend their concerns to representing the informal sector, particularly in terms of debates over pensions.

49. At the local level, community activism has increased in Zambia in recent years (see Afrobarometer research). Although this may derive from (a) the increase in local problems requiring community-action, particularly around HIV-AIDs and (b) a disengagement from national politics in the light of growing concerns over problems with the democratic process, there are positive implications here in terms of the politics of delivering social protection, which will rely heavily on such on local level structures. A rider here remains the fact that few community-based organisations include the destitute or poorest of the poor. More broadly, visits to PWAS operations in one Copperbelt district suggested that there are constituencies who feel a sense of ownership of the PWAS (e.g. the blind), and which could form a local vanguard within the broader political constituency for social protection.

50. A growing realisation that food relief and other emergency aid has not been effective in the past, and has led DFID and other agencies to find ways of replacing food transfers to drought-affected households with more stable and regular transfers – both in kind and cash transfers.<sup>28</sup> The idea is not to entirely replace food with cash, but to adopt a ‘what works best’ approach. This idea appears to be gaining wider currency – for example, the 2005 VAC discussed the need for extra cash in drought affected areas. In this context, future food crises and droughts will draw attention to the need for effective social protection. In political terms, there are 700,000 smallholders in Zambia, a significant proportion of whom might be at risk from the predicted drought. This makes them a politically and economically significant group, particularly in a run-up to an election. GRZ has acknowledged this and two major agricultural interventions – Fertilizer Subsidies and Food Starter Packs – have targeted this group of ‘vulnerable but viable farmers’.<sup>29</sup> There are both risks and opportunities associated with this potential driver of change. Both maize and fertilisers are highly politicised in Zambia, as they are across southern Africa, and the interests groups associated with the relevant subsidies retain a measure of influence. The failure of food and fertiliser targeting may well contribute to undermine any confidence that cash transfers can be targeted more effectively, especially given its greater fungibility. However, the fact that this debate is growing throughout many African countries may suggest that there is sufficient political space to allow room for manoeuvre here in terms of experimentation at least.

*Changing discourses around social protection – demonstration effects from pilot studies*

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and well-coordinated response from the Zambian public...indicating that Zambian civil society exhibited a degree of strength, national reach and organizational capacity” (Rakner and Svasand 2004: 53).

<sup>28</sup> See DFID [2004] Transitioning from relief for predictable food insecurity. A concept note.

<sup>29</sup> The DMMU, which runs these programmes from within the Office of the Vice-Presidency, may have political capital, although its failure to secure separate SAG suggests this is limited.

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51. Policy innovations such as the Kalomo Social Cash Transfer Pilot can act as key drivers for a National Social Protection Scheme. The Kalomo Pilot incorporates a number of innovations likely to yield important lessons for the design of social protection interventions. It targets the poorest through community organisations, relies on regular cash transfers, incorporates monitoring and evaluation procedures, and facilitates learning processes at all its different levels. Early evaluations confirm the Pilot Scheme is achieving its main objectives, and compares well with alternative instruments used by the MCDSS. However, the lessons from the Pilot are not sufficiently well understood by policy makers in Lusaka, and more widely by NGOs and civil society organisations. In fact, the majority of the visitors to the Kalomo Pilot are from overseas, and to date no official from the MoFNP and other key Ministries has visited. The roll-on of the Kazungula Pilot, and the work associated with the Chipata Pilot should add to a strong body of evidence on the effectiveness of cash transfers in Zambia, although it is essential that the latter project is designed in ways that allow valid results to be gathered swiftly. The demonstration effects from Pilot projects can be maximised through wider dissemination.

#### *Lifting financial restrictions on social protection*

52. On going changes in aid modalities and the commitment indicated by key donors make it possible the lifting of financial constraints on the adoption of a national social protection strategy in Zambia. There are indications that a GRZ owned national social protection strategy could rely on multi-stakeholder financial and technical assistance for its inception period, and a five year phase after that. This initiative constitutes a key driver for change in enabling a supportive financial environment within which discussion of the feasibility of such strategy could be conducted.

## **IV. Recommendations on building a political constituency for social protection in Zambia**

### *Strengthening 'demand' for social protection*

- The study found significant deficits in the understanding of poverty and vulnerability among stakeholders and policy-makers. Informed and independent comment on these issues is essential to embedding a National Social Protection Scheme. The following recommendations are relevant here:
- Find ways of strengthening research capacity and dissemination concerning poverty and vulnerability data and analysis. Appendix Three suggests that developing institutional, as opposed to individual, capacity in this area is a key objective. The focus here should be on vulnerability, poverty dynamics and persistent, severe forms of poverty. Data and analysis in this area will need to be disaggregated by gender. If the social protection strategy is to engage with issues of rights and discrimination, as outlined in the draft strategy, then further research will also be required on these issues in the Zambian context. There is also a pressing need to make a persuasive argument that social protection can have productive, pro-growth implications.

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- DFID is in a strong position to act on these suggestions, through its existing funding and links to both research centres such as the Chronic Poverty Research Centre, and research dissemination agencies such as ID21 at IDS, which can be a short term and inexpensive dissemination channel. However, the key emphasis needs to be on disseminating findings within Zambia, which calls for a series of workshops and seminars, and also a major regional/international conference based around the results emerging from the existing cash-transfer pilots. In the longer-term, there is a pressing need to develop institutional research capacity within Zambia around poverty and social protection issues. The establishment in Uganda of a ‘Social Protection Fund’ for such activities by the World Bank and DFID could provide a useful model here.
- Supporting wider consultation and dissemination around the Social Protection Strategy of SP-SAG is urgent. In particular, two-page briefings in accessible language on SP, its proposed objectives, and instruments would help, as would a workshop/seminar.
- Briefings produced by policy experts on SP directed at government officials in a similar format at Ministerial and District level, and also throughout civil and political society, would enhance the chance of finding and encouraging drivers for social protection. These should be timed to coincide with key moments in policy cycles, particularly concerning the formulation of strategic plans and budgeting.
- Efforts to strengthen wider participation in social protection strategy and instruments will be important in ensuring their adoption and sustainability, in particular collaboration and participation of stronger Ministries, Education, Health and Labour and Social Security, at central government, Provincial and District levels.
- There is an urgent need to engage the Ministry of Finance more centrally in debates over a national social protection strategy. This will involve commissioning research into the fiscal feasibility of a national social protection scheme in Zambia, and seeking to mainstream social protection into the MTEF process.
- The level of donor support for social protection needs to be greatly increased and improved, alongside continued efforts to co-ordinate thinking and action in this field. There is also a need for donors to take a broader view of social protection, and to look for positive synergies with other policy initiatives in the fields of macro-economic reform, ‘good governance’ and poverty reduction through improved service delivery. Given the evidence that developmental (rather than downsized, neoliberal) states are essential to effective forms of social protection, donors should seek ways of increasing rather than reducing the role of the state in economic and social development in Zambia. For example, pilot cash transfer schemes should work directly with and through rather than around state structures.

#### *Strengthening the institutional fit for social protection*

- The MCDSS will require extensive support and assistance if it is to be the ‘home’ Ministry for social protection. Large scale reform is needed to change its current focus on top down delivery to a responsive, innovative, evidence-based policy

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Ministry. In particular:

- Support for capacity building in policy analysis and evaluation and professional development are needed.
- Changes to its structure and focus should be reflected in a change of its mission statement and title.
- However, it is unlikely that, over the short- to medium-term, either MCDSS or other related social ministries (Labour, Children) will be the effective champions of a national social protection strategy. There is therefore an urgent need to mainstream the social protection agenda within the policy priorities and service-delivery work of the key social development sectors (esp. Education and Health) and within the political priorities and budgetary processes of MoFNP.

*Strengthening policy design, monitoring and evaluation*

- Dissemination of the Pilot Schemes, not just in terms of impact and outcomes, but also processes and design innovations can give a focus for debate and discussion of a social protection strategy.
- In this context, support and assistance to monitoring and evaluation of social protection programmes will pay considerable dividends. One factor to focus on here would be the gendered allocation of benefits from SP-resources within households.
- Briefings on the effectiveness of alternative instruments and policy options (e.g. cash vs. in kind) directed at government and civil society should facilitate the wider acceptance of cash transfers.
- Strengthen oversight functions within programmes: concerns over issues of targeting, financial management, and graduation (of programmes as well as beneficiaries) are widely expressed and need to be addressed.
- Given the extent to which the design and type of social protection policy strongly shapes the political support that can be generated and maintained for social protection, there is a need to design social protection programmes and policies with close attention to how they will be understood and interpreted politically. Of particular importance is to that local and national norms of procedural justice are addressed in policy design and monitoring. This applies to forthcoming Pilot Schemes as well as later national schemes.
- The longer-term process of scaling-up cash transfers to a national programme requires further debate and more conclusive evidence concerning what has worked at the level of pilot schemes. This requires a careful, incremental approach, not least to allow for the development of a wider constituency of support. Donors also need to build government confidence by proving that their commitment is over the long-term. There are good reasons to recognise the pressures within Zambian politics to adopt a policy of regional balance in the distribution of pilot projects – this is also technically



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sensible, particularly given that the South cannot be treated as representative of conditions found elsewhere in Zambia.

#### *Strengthening the civic and political spheres*

- Certain sympathetic, committed and influential civil society actors should be identified and brought within the current circle of SP advocates. This could be as regular partners in meetings and discussions and/or around specific tasks (e.g. commissioning JCTR and LAZ to work on the case for establishing social protection as a right in relation to constitutional debates; work with unions concerning extending support to the informal sectors). However, in working with civil society actors, donors need to be aware that moves towards DBS, although positive in many respects, is likely to worsen relationships between donors and several civil society organisations. Many CSOs perceive DBS to be a vote of confidence in a regime that they are heavily critical of in terms of its poverty-focus and approach to democratisation and governance.

- After a closer process of identification, increased support (financial and institution building) should be offered to specified research and advocacy organisations that are capable of generating publicity and pressure for GRZ uptake of social protection policies. The most persuasive advocates may be those that combine local-level knowledge of how the poor live with national level advocacy activities.

- Trades unions are increasingly realising the potential of social protection agendas, and could be supported through capacity-building measures (e.g. research and advocacy skills).

- Given the authority, influence, resources (human and financial) and impressive communication networks of the main church bodies in Zambia, DFID could consider liaising directly with them around a shared policy agenda on helping the poorest in society. One ongoing initiative that could be considered particularly relevant concerns the efforts of faith-based organisations to convince political elites to increase their commitment to poverty reduction and to act accordingly.

- Donors should work harder to identify reformist elements within the political elites (e.g. MPs, judges, media owners, business leaders), encourage them to promote debate and action on poverty reduction, and also bring them within the circle of advocates for social protection (e.g. through invites to seminars, circulation of briefings, encouragement to place questions on this issue etc). Initiatives that strengthen the political party system could be particularly beneficial over the long-term.

- Direct support could be offered to parliament (especially key parliamentary committees) to increase its capacity to scrutinise GRZ around pro-poor expenditures and policy-making.

- Donors should consider ways in which they could promote aspects of constitutional reform in Zambia. Although a sensitive activity, the short/medium-term

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opportunity to secure a commitment to securing a minimum standard of living for Zambian citizens through legally-recognised social and economic rights in a new/revised constitution could prove critical over the long-run, and would constitute a strong move to securing a new political contract for social protection.

Ultimately, a National Social Protection Scheme will be adopted and sustained to the extent that a wider constituency supports it, and remains committed to protecting it over time. Although this wider constituency is not currently mobilised in support for social protection, this study has identified several means by which support for social protection can be strengthened: improving information flows, developing capacity in social protection policy design and development, widening participation around the social protection strategy, supporting the government commitment to social protection within the NDP, strengthening partnerships with donors, government and NGOs over social protection. Securing a contract for social protection in Zambia will require that the current constituency of supporters for social protection move incrementally, securing the confidence of key actors en route.

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## **Appendix One. Drivers of Change for a National Social Protection Scheme**

### **Terms of Reference**

#### **Background**

The role of social protection in development is being increasingly recognised and prioritised. In Zambia, Social Protection Schemes exist in a number of forms. The Public Welfare Assistance Scheme (PWAS) has been in existence in one form or another since the 1950's, there is a National Pensions Scheme and distribution of Food Security Packs to 'vulnerable but viable' farmers. A recent assessment of these schemes found that targeting is fragmented and funding insufficient and inconsistent (RuralNet, Feb 2005).

GRZ is demonstrating its commitment to addressing this by developing a National Social Protection Strategy. This strategy has suggested the need for direct transfers to reduce poverty in incapacitated households and that one form of transfer could be cash. A GTZ supported pilot project of such a scheme is providing encouraging results.

Opportunities exist for furthering the agenda on Social Protection through key ongoing planning processes. GRZ has recently released its 'Roadmap' for the preparation of:

- The National Long Term Vision (NLTV) 2030
- Fifth National Development Plan (NDP) 2006-2011
- District Strategic Plans

The roadmap sets out an ambitious programme of training, consultations, data collection and analysis and development of District Strategic Plans (by June 2005) culminating in the launch of the NLTV and NDP in November 2005. The timeframe allows integration of the NLTV and NDP priorities into the MTEF for 2006-8 and the annual budget for 2006.

Despite progress and opportunities, there remain barriers. These include, but are not limited to: poor budgeting and allocation to the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services (MCDSS); weak capacity at all levels including Districts; little national experience of cash transfers as a means of social protection; a poor harvest and upcoming elections potentially diverting attention away from issues of long term protection.

#### **Drivers of Change**

DFID would like to support the GRZ's efforts to improve Social Protection. A key challenge will be identifying and harnessing 'drivers for change' - a constituency of support. Early theoretical work in the field has identified that 'the relationship between politics and social protection emerge as significant, multi-dimensional and complex, with causal flows in each direction'<sup>30</sup>.

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<sup>30</sup> 'Thinking about the politics of social protection in Africa: towards a conceptual and theoretical approach', Hickey 2004, p3

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The proposed study is intended to provide guidance on and support to the process of building political commitment to support a National Social Protection Scheme. This will require an understanding of the political economy and socio economic context and identification of innovative forces, strategies and interventions to support a national social assistance scheme. Particular recommendations will be made on engaging with the ongoing NDP development process. (Given the timeframe for this process, these will be required prior to the main report, based on an initial assessment).

The study will inform other ongoing work within DFID regarding social protection schemes and in particular the influence of and on political processes. A framework developed to investigate these relationships is elaborated in Annex A.

The process of undertaking the study is in itself a going to be an information (if not and advocacy) tool. This must be recognised and capitalised upon, particular with respect to ongoing processes.

### **The consultancy**

#### **Goal**

An appropriate government owned national Social Assistance Scheme

#### **Purpose**

To build a constituency for change in favour of a government owned national Social Assistance Scheme

#### **Outputs**

- An understanding of key influencers: people, processes and institutions
- Recommendations on how to influence them, in particular
  - the ongoing NDP Roadmap process
  - longer term advocacy and influencing agenda
- An initial awareness (advocacy) amongst key stakeholders of cash based social protection schemes
- An assessment of and recommendations for further work by DFID, both in Zambia and centrally

### **Timeframe**

<b><u>Deliverable</u></b>	<b><u>Timescale</u></b>
<u>Draft workplan</u> including list of proposed interviews <u>for comment and approval</u>	1 week
<u>Progress reports/meetings (2 pages max)</u>	2 weekly
Recommendations on engaging in NDP roadmap	May 2005
<u>Draft Report for comment (max. 20 pages plus annexes)</u>	June 2005
<u>Final Report</u> of findings and recommendations	July 2005

The main report will be produced in a format appropriate for general circulation, with

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a separate annex for DFID Zambia programming purposes. The main report should address the following issues:

### **1. Overview of the Political and socio-economic context**

- Is the political and socio-economic context favourable to supporting a NSPS?
- Is there political commitment/resistance? What drives this?
- What are the key policy and budgeting processes which could have an influence on achieving a NSPS, both formal and informal
- Who is excluded/included in these and why?
- Effectiveness of existing/past Social Protection schemes (resources transferred, target groups, numbers reached)
- GRZ commitment to social protection programmes (past and present) including PWAS, food security packs etc and changes in this (financial commitment (budget analysis), people targeted, reasons for engagement/withdrawal)
- Donor commitment/resistance to social protection. Appropriateness of funding mechanisms.
- Political incentives and costs to supporting social assistance

### **2. Identification and prioritisation of prime drivers (and barriers) to achieving change**

- Main institutional, systematic, societal, global impediments/drivers (see Annex A for further description)
- Key actors/forces (both for and against) in government, civil society and donors. Who stands to gain and who stands to lose from a NSAS?
- Overview of the views of key actors to different forms of social assistance schemes and cash transfers in particular (key arguments both for and against). What target groups have political support/resistance?
- What Incentives/disincentives do they have to support/oppose change?
- Who are the most influential in forming policy?
- What is their capacity for influencing and implementing a NSAS?

### **3. Recommendations on how forces for change can be supported**

- Through what mechanisms is change occurring?
- What type (e.g. economic, moral/ethical, political, impact on poverty) and source of argument/evidence has greatest influence with opinion formers and decision makers?
- What resources (human, technical, financial) are needed?
- What role can DFID play in supporting change?

### **4. Assessment of proposed framework of analysis and recommendations for future work by DFID**

#### **Methodology**

- Initial briefing by DFID
- Desk Study of key documents
- Interviews with key stakeholders (local, national, international). These should

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include PS/DPS, Deputy/Minister and HoP for MoFNP, MCDSS, MYSCD, MoE, MoF and MLSS.

- Visiting field sites
- Regular debriefing and planning sessions with DFID, including review of ToR's if necessary

### **Team Competencies**

The consultancy team must demonstrate a thorough understanding of:

#### **1. Social Protection Schemes**

- latest thinking and policy developments including targeting approaches (beneficiaries), forms of transfers
- likely cost of a national cash based programme
- knowledge of safety nets in Zambia (especially the GTZ pilot cash transfer scheme) would be an advantage

#### **2. The Zambian Context**

- Poverty in Zambia
- Relevant national policy documents and dialogues
- Government structures from national to local levels
- Public Sector Reform and De-centralisation processes
- National budget processes and expenditure patterns
- Decision making processes
- Key donor priorities
- Key stakeholders that forms opinions
- Policy development processes and local political constraints to policy implementation

#### **3. The Approach**

- Drivers of change
- Stakeholder analysis
- Institutional analysis
- Political analysis

The team must also demonstrate good analytical skills and access to politicians and senior civil servants.

### **Reporting**

Project officer Denise Avery, lead advisor Kelley Toole.

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## **Appendix Two. List of persons interviewed**

NAME	DESIGNATION	ORGANISATION	ADDRESS	CONTACT DETAILS
Bruce Lwason-McDowal	Social Adviser	DFID	P.O. Box 50050 Lusaka	<a href="http://www.dfid.gov.uk">www.dfid.gov.uk</a>
Kelly Toole	Vulnerability and Food Security Advisor	DFID	P.O. Box 50050 Lusaka	<a href="http://www.dfid.gov.uk">www.dfid.gov.uk</a>
Audrey Mwendapole	Programme Officer Health	Embassy of Sweden	P.O. Box 50264 Lusaka	<a href="mailto:audrey.mwendapole@sida.se">audrey.mwendapole@sida.se</a>
Muwemwe Muweme		JCTR	P.O. Box 37774 Lusaka	<a href="mailto:socialjctr@zamnet.zm">socialjctr@zamnet.zm</a>
Sam Mulafulafu		Catholic Centre for Justice Development and Peace	P.O.Box 31965 Lusaka	<a href="http://www.ccjdp.org.zm">www.ccjdp.org.zm</a>
Rueben Chongo	Programme Coordinator Livelihoods			<a href="mailto:mchongo@zec.org.zm">mchongo@zec.org.zm</a>
Fr.Pete Henriot	Director	JCTR	P.O. Box 37774 Lusaka	<a href="mailto:socialjctr@zamnet.zm">socialjctr@zamnet.zm</a>
James Mulungushi	Director of Planning	Ministry of Finance and National Planning	P.O. Box 50062 Lusaka	<a href="mailto:jmulungushi@yahoo.co.uk">jmulungushi@yahoo.co.uk</a>
Ed Mwale	Operations Coordinator	Zambia Social Investment Fund	P.O. Box 31559 Lusaka	<a href="mailto:ed@zamsif.org.zm">ed@zamsif.org.zm</a>
Sydney Chama	Programme Officer, Field Operations			
Gabriel Fernandez	Section Head Child	United Nations Children's Fund	P.O. Box 33610 Lusaka	<a href="mailto:gnfernandez@unicef.org">gnfernandez@unicef.org</a>
Gerard Lucius	First Secretary Political Affairs	Royal Netherlands Embassy	P.O. Box 31905 Lusaka	<a href="mailto:lus@minbuza.nl">lus@minbuza.nl</a>
Marriet Schuurman	First Secretary Economics			<a href="mailto:marriet.schuurman@minbuza.nl">marriet.schuurman@minbuza.nl</a>
Frank van Dixhoorn	Director	Development Services and Initiatives		<a href="mailto:frank@dsi.org.zm">frank@dsi.org.zm</a>
Mary Kalunga	Field Coordinator Danida	Southern Africa Limited		
Beston	Field Coordinator			
Jorg Goldberg	Technical Advisor	German Technical Cooperation	Private Bag RW37X Lusaka	<a href="mailto:socsec@zamnet.zm">socsec@zamnet.zm</a>
Esther				

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William Mweemba	Chairman	Law Association of Zambia		
Fr. Joe Komakoma	Secretary General	Zambia Episcopal Conference	P.O. Box 31965 Lusaka	<a href="mailto:jkomakoma@zec.org.zm">jkomakoma@zec.org.zm</a>
T. Nchinga	Vice President	Federation of Free Trade Unions of Zambia		
Lumba Siyanga	Acting Director	Women for Change	P.O.Box 33102 Lusaka	<a href="mailto:wfc@zamnet.zm">wfc@zamnet.zm</a>
M. Cheta	Director Corporate Planning and Development	National Pensions Scheme Authority	P.O.Box 51275 Lusaka	<a href="mailto:chetam@napsa.co.zm">chetam@napsa.co.zm</a>
Joe Kaunda	Managing Editor	The Post Newspaper	Private/Bag E352 Lusaka	<a href="mailto:joekaunda@hotmail.com">joekaunda@hotmail.com</a>
Joyce Nonde	President	Federation of Free Trade Unions of Zambia		
Leonard Hikaumba	President	Zambia Congress Of Trade Unions	P.O.Box 20652 Lusaka	<a href="mailto:zctusap@coppernet.zm">zctusap@coppernet.zm</a>
Davies Chingoni	1 <sup>st</sup> Vice President	Zambia Congress Of Trade Unions	P.O.Box 20652 Lusaka	<a href="mailto:zctu@zamnet.zm">zctu@zamnet.zm</a>
Ian Mkandawire	Deputy Secretary General Finance and Business Administration	Zambia Congress Of Trade Unions	P.O.Box 20652 Lusaka	<a href="mailto:zctu@zamnet.zm">zctu@zamnet.zm</a>
Ric Goodman	Country Programme Manager	Oxfam	P.O.Box 35624 Lusaka	<a href="mailto:rgoodman@oxfam.org.uk">rgoodman@oxfam.org.uk</a>
##	Chair of the Civil Society Shadow Group on Employment and SP			
Fred Zulu	Economist	JCTR		
Chris Murgatroyd	Governance Adviser	DFID Zambia	P.O. Box 50050 Lusaka	
Juan Jose Villa Chacon	Attache Social Sectors and Civil Society	European Union	P.O.Box 34871 Lusaka	<a href="mailto:Juan.villa-chacon@cec.eu.int">Juan.villa-chacon@cec.eu.int</a>
Dr. Jorg Goldberg	Technical Advisor	German Technical Cooperation MCDSS	Private Bag RW37X Lusaka	<a href="mailto:socsec@zamnet.zm">socsec@zamnet.zm</a>
Esther Schuring	Junior Expert	German Technical Cooperation	Private Bag RW 37X Lusaka	<a href="mailto:esther.schuering@gtz.de">esther.schuering@gtz.de</a>
T.K. Phiri	Executive	Public Service		



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	Director	Pension Fund		
Richard Mwiinga	Operations Manager	Public Service Pension Fund		
Doris Mutuna	Deputy Director Planning	MCDSS		
Gregory Mwanza	Planning Officer	MCDSS		
Musonda Cheta	Director Corporate Planning and Development	National Pension Scheme Authority	P.O.Box 51275 Lusaka	<a href="mailto:chetam@napsa.co.zm">chetam@napsa.co.zm</a>
Helen Mbao		World Bank		
D. Mulenga	National Coordinator	Office of the Vice President Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit		
Yande P. Mwape	Head, Research and Planning	Office of the Vice President Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit		
Mr. Chisenda	Director Tax and Revenue	Ministry of Finance and National Development	P.O. Box 50062 Lusaka	Phone: 255055

**Interviews done by Neo Simutany (joint interviews already in above list)**

1. Hon. Emmanuel Hachipuka, MP - chair parliamentary committee on ?
2. Hon. Given Lubinda, MP
4. Ms Chibiya – Manager, PWAS Management Unit, MCDSS
5. Mr Mulenga Chisupa – Deputy Director, Social Security, MLSS
6. Mr James Mulungushi, Director, Planning, MFNP
7. Mr. D. Mulenga, Director, DMMU, Office of the Vice President
8. Ms. Y. Mwape, DMMU, Office of the Vice President
9. Mr. Amos Malupenga – Editor, Post Newspapers
10. Mr. Anthony Mukwita – chairperson, politics & parliament, MISA.
11. Mr Teza Nchinga – Vice President Federation of Free Trade Unions (FFTUZ)
12. Mr. Sam Lungu – National Executive Secretary, FFTU
13. Mr. Dennis Zulu – Programme Officer, ILO
14. Mr Sam Mulafulafu – Director, CCJP
15. Mr. Ngande Mwanajiti – Executive Director, Afronet
16. Ms Lucy Muyoyeta – Chairperson, NGOCC
17. Mr. Lee Habasonda – Executive Director, SACCORD
19. Mr. Juan José Villa Chacón - Attaché, Social Sectors and Civil Society, European Union
20. Mr. Frank van Dixhoorn – Director, DSI
21. Mr. Oliver Kalabo – Permanent Secretary, Cabinet Office
22. Mr. J. Goldberg – GTZ/MCDSS Technical Advisor Social Safety Net Project
23. Esther Schüring – GTZ/MCDSS, Social Safety Net Project
24. Prof. Vekantashi Seshamani – Economics Department, University of Zambia
25. Dr. Gilbert Mudenda – Development Consultant, Lusaka

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26. Fr. Pete Henriot – Director, JCTR

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### **Appendix Three. Drivers (actors) capacity and points of influence**

Drivers (actors) actual to potential	Motivation	Resources	Sensitivity to incentives	Capacity for change
Donors	Poverty reduction Disbursement SP increasingly seen as an innovative and effective poverty reduction and development policy framework	Grants, Loans, Technical support	Disbursement capacity is a strong incentive	Good, increasing consensus on SP as the way forward, and within SP acknowledgement of the important role of cash transfers (cts)
MCDSS	Mission statement Maintaining good relationships with political leadership and line ministries (especially MoFNP) Securing employment and livelihoods	Budget allocations, but disbursement is not reliable (actual budgets are a fraction of allocations, arrive late, and are unreliable) Network of District Welfare Officers Community Welfare Assistance Cttes	Pay incentives strong Pressure from CWACs and beneficiaries at the local level	Good but large and significant changes are required, some internal pressure for change, but will need to be supported from outside Ministry restructuring is planned, creating uncertainty Lack of clear priorities or strategy Limited influence over and coordination with Health, Education and Labour Ministries Low capacity for research and policy analysis No capacity for staff training and professional development A change of title if move to SP is needed e.g. Ministry for Social/Human Development?
INGOs CARE OXFAM	Aid delivery Strong pro-poor orientation	Donor funding, technical operational capacity	Heavily dependent on donor funding	Strong on operational capacity but less so in advocacy, because of limited local roots
and NGOs WfC PAM	Large number of NGOs focused on single issues, and led by strong personalities Many are v. sensitive to govt agenda Dongos (donor),	Mainly Lusaka based Varied degree of support Govt or donor funding Few have operational capacity	Dependent on donor or govt funding Highly sensitive to govt's and donors' agendas and funding support	Few NGOs can play a role in SP advocacy, and fewer still have service delivery capacity (PAM) Lack of coordination is a problem in mobilising NGOs. Institutions for

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	Congos (business and commercial), Pangos (politicians), Quangos (parastatals)			coordination exist but are not active at present
CSOs, especially faith-CSOs  JCTR CCJPD ZEC	Give voice to the needs and aspirations of the poor and disadvantaged Advocacy on social justice, poverty and inequality Inform political and policy debates Ensure accountability of public and semi-public agencies	Limited research capacity Access to media and elites Communications network with local faith based groups Assertiveness	Low, set their own course but external resources influence what they are able to do; a dialogue on SP is needed	Stress on systemic change may be an issue in their willingness to advocate SP e.g. interview notes with CCJPD: “...since the core poor are increasing...it will be difficult for the govt to support and sustain an income support programme...other challenges a CT would have to take note of ... (i) service delivery structures pose great difficulties and cts will not reach the poor... (ii) it is more than likely that the money will be divided between the MPs and VIPs in the areas concerned...”
Academic and Policy Research INESOR Institute for Policy Studies	Building personal reputation Degree of influence with key policy stakeholders	Insufficient resources Restricted to donor and government commissioned research Well informed of developments and debates nationally and internationally Less than 10 high reputation researchers	Some very sensitive to donors and government, but high reputation researchers have independence Highly motivated by sustaining and developing own reputation	Good, but urgent need to expand the numbers of researchers on poverty and vulnerability It is important to develop institutional, as opposed to individuals' capacity. Institutional research more likely to be independent, specialised and critical

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#### **Appendix Four. Research framework for Zambia Politics of Social Protection/Drivers of Change Study (SH Draft 9/7/2005)**

This draft research framework derives from both the Drivers of Change approach and the *Politics of Social Protection in Africa* paper. Gaining insights into these questions will allow the Team to understand the linkages between politics and social protection in Zambia, to identify the key constraints and opportunities concerning drivers of change for social protection, and to work towards devising an advocacy strategy around a national social protection scheme in Zambia. The data for answering these questions may come from primary or secondary sources, and the table identifies the best sources for this data and the team member/s responsible for collecting the data. The final column is for inputting the data as and when it is collected. The research team will be able to pull out questions from this overall framework for specific interviews as appropriate.

It should be stressed that (a) we do not necessarily need exhaustive answers to each and every question and (b) these questions are not the only ones that we will want to ask. Interviewers are encouraged to use their own judgement and, in particular, to follow-up relevant and significant leads as and when they arise.

#### **Key**

PD: policy documents

SS: secondary sources

KI: key informants

<b>Theme/related questions</b>	<b>Source/s</b>
<b>1. General overview: poverty, politics and social protection in Zambia</b>	
<i>1.1 Poverty in Zambia</i>	
1.1.1 What is the current level and trajectory of poverty in Zambia?	WB/UNDP reports
1.1.2 How is poverty distributed between different regions and social groups?	WB/UNDP reports
1.1.3 What are the key causes of poverty in Zambia?	WB/UNDP reports, SS
1.1.4 What are the key dimensions of vulnerability in Zambia?	WB/UNDP reports, SS
1.1.5 What are the key characteristics and correlates of poverty in Zambia?	WB/UNDP reports, SS
1.1.6 What are generally considered to be the most pressing poverty-related issues in Zambia, now and over the short-medium term? (e.g. food security, HIV-AIDS etc.).	WB/UNDP reports, SS, media
<i>1.2 Contemporary politics in Zambia</i> (NB: most of the politics is covered below)	
1.2.1 What are the key issues on the political agenda in Zambia, now and over the short-medium term?	KI, media
1.2.2 To what extent could the state in Zambia be described as	SS

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‘developmental’?	
1.2.3 To what extent is the current regime committed to poverty reduction?	KI, SS
1.2.4 Which socio-political forces could be described as being pro-poor?	KI, DFID study, SS
<i>1.3 Social protection in Zambia</i>	
1.3.1 Describe the current level, type (e.g. universal/targeted; cash transfer/public works; social assistance/social insurance), focus (e.g. sector/group/region), purpose (e.g. nets, ropes, trampolines), and mode of delivery of social protection policies and projects in Zambia.	MCDSS, RuralNet
1.3.2 What proportion of the overall national budget is currently accorded to social protection policies and projects in Zambia?	MoFNP
1.3.3 How (if at all) do these interventions relate to each other?	KI, MCDSS
1.3.4 Which agencies are responsible for delivering them? Who does what? Is there an inter-ministerial/intersectoral co-ordinating body?	KI, MCDSS
1.3.5 Which actors (if any) are currently promoting social protection in Zambia?	KI, MCDSS
1.3.6 To what extent have these policies succeeded/failed in their objectives? Offer explanations.	MCDSS, RuralNet
1.3.7 How well-known are these policies and how are they generally regarded, both within national policy circles and the general public? What level of political commitment has been associated with them? Is it possible to distinguish different levels of political support for different (types of) programme?	KI
1.3.8 To what extent and in what ways have these policies been affected by politics? e.g. were they introduced at election times? What arguments were made for and against them, and by which stakeholders?	KI
1.3.9 Are these schemes/programmes seen by beneficiaries as an entitlement or a handout?	KI, Kalomo field trip
1.3.10 Have these policies had any political impact? (e.g. ensured regime stability, increased levels of solidarity, consolidated patronage processes etc.).	KI
1.3.11 What are the key policy lessons to take forward regarding the conception of, substance, type, level, institutional location and political feasibility of future social protection policies in Zambia?	KI, RuralNet
<b>2. Institutional dimensions</b>	
2.1 Is there a history (colonial and post-colonial) of social protection-related policies in Zambia? Are there any existing policy channels that could be used to deliver new programmes?	SS, KI

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2.2 What is the underlying logic concerning the distribution of public resources in Zambia? (e.g. needs/rights-based; patronage).	SS, KI
2.3 What are the formal social service delivery structures, rules and processes?	SS, KI
2.4 What level of 'corruption' is associated with (a) policy processes and (b) service delivery?	SS, KI
<b>3. Systemic dimensions</b>	
<i>3.1 Political competition</i>	
3.1.1 Briefly describe the electoral system in Zambia.	SS
3.1.2 To what extent and in what ways have previous elections been associated with pro-poor policy-making and increased pro-poor expenditures in Zambia?	SS, KI
3.1.3 Has poverty reduction historically been an election issue in Zambia?	SS, KI
3.1.4 What are likely to be the key issues for the forthcoming (2006) election?	SS, KI, media
3.1.5 Who are likely to be the key candidates/political parties in this election?	SS, KI, media
<i>3.2 Political party system/political parties</i>	
3.2.1 How many political parties are there in Zambia?	SS
3.2.2 How easy/difficult is it to form/register a political party?	SS
3.2.3 What level of party political loyalty exists? Is there frequent movement between parties?	SS
3.2.4 What is the political sociology of the main parties? From where do they derive their power base (e.g. region, sector, class, ethnicity etc.)?	SS, KI
3.2.5 Are the main parties dominated by a programmatic approach or more personality-driven?	SS, KI
3.2.6 Can any of the parties be termed 'pro-poor'?	SS, KI
3.2.7 What is the level and character of the linkages between the main parties and civil society organisations/interest groups?	SS, KI
3.2.8 Is it possible to identify pro-poor parliamentarians?	KI
3.2.9 Is there any potential for cross-party coalitions?	SS, KI
3.2.10 Are there any relevant parliamentary committees/chairs of that could be engaged?	KI
<i>3.3 Political elites</i>	
3.3.1 Characterise and evaluate the level of intra-elite conflict in Zambia. e.g. what are the types of issue that political elites in Zambia struggle over?	SS, KI
3.3.2 Is this conflict between elites institutionalised (e.g. within the political party system) or not?	SS, KI
3.3.3 Is there a new/emerging elite that is threatening the existing elite? To what extent do political elites feel pressured	KI

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to extend their support base to new social groups?	
<i>3.4 Political discourse</i>	
3.4.1 To what extent and in what ways are poverty issues and poverty reduction part of mainstream political discourse in Zambia?	SS, KI
3.4.2 Is poverty understood as being primarily caused by residual (e.g. the problem is that people are/have been ‘left out’ of development processes in Zambia) or relational factors (e.g. the problem is the terms on which poor people are/have been incorporated into development processes)?	KI
3.4.3 Explore the same question for ‘development’ – e.g. is development rather than poverty reduction seen as an important political goal?	KI
3.4.4 What is seen as the primary aim/purpose of development in Zambia? e.g. what ideologies of development prevail (e.g. neoliberal/statist; income-based/human-development, people-centred)?	SS, KI
3.4.5 In what terms is the poverty debate conducted in Zambia at the national level?	KI, media
3.4.6 How are the poor and different groups thereof/poor regions depicted in political discourse?	KI, media
3.4.7 Are some poor people being seen as ‘deserving’ while others are seen as ‘undeserving’? Explore in depth.	KI, media
3.4.8 Are there any pro-poor/progressive dimensions within Zambia’s political discourse? e.g. is there a nationalist desire to see development? Do elites see poverty as a security issue?	KI, media
<i>3.5 Poverty knowledge</i>	
3.5.1 What are the key sources of knowledge on poverty in Zambia? (e.g. HHS, PPA, policy research, success stories).	PD, KI
3.5.2 Is there any data on vulnerability?	PD, KI
3.5.3 Are there any panel datasets? Is it possible to discuss long-term/chronic poverty?	PD, KI
3.5.4 Is there good quality data on issues of social and regional inequality?	PD, KI
3.5.5 Which actors control and use these different forms of knowledge?	KI
<i>3.6 Poverty policy in Zambia</i>	
3.6.1 What is the current focus and status of poverty-reduction policies in Zambia?	PD, KI, SS
3.6.2 Briefly evaluate the character and success/failure of the recent PRSP.	PD, KI, SS
<i>3.7 Policy processes</i>	
3.7.1 What characterises policy processes in Zambia? E.g. how ‘rational’, inclusive, and predictable are they?	SS, KI



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3.7.2 Through what channels and within which spaces is it possible to influence public policy processes in Zambia?	SS, KI
3.7.3 What are the key policy processes through which poverty reduction is negotiated? This should include an extended description and analysis of the National Development Planning process.	SS, KI, PD
3.7.4 Who are the key players/actors within Zambia's poverty reduction policy processes?	SS, KI
3.7.5 Is it possible to identify different groupings/competing tendencies within these processes? E.g. is there a finance ministry vs. civil society tendency?	KI
3.7.6 What is the respective capacities of these different actors? Specifically, what is the capacity of actors most likely to support social protection?	KI
3.7.7 What are the key terms of debate within these processes? E.g. how is poverty represented; how are the debates framed in relation to wider questions of national importance etc.	KI, PD
3.7.8 What forms of poverty knowledge are used to inform these debates? What are the most 'politically persuasive' forms of knowledge (e.g. statistics, donor-led policy research, 'stories')?	KI, PD
3.7.9 Which (if any) poverty-related policies enjoys the highest levels of political and public support?	KI
<i>3.8 Institutional location and capacity</i>	
3.8.1 What is the capacity of public agencies with (current and future) responsibility for designing, promoting and delivering social protection?	SS, KI
3.8.2 Which public agencies could be said to have an appropriate organisational culture for taking a lead on social protection policies?	KI
3.8.3 What capacity do public and non-governmental agencies have to target social protection at vulnerable groups? e.g. what level of information is available on different vulnerable groups at the local level?	SS, KI
<i>3.9 Decentralisation</i>	
3.9.1 What is the current level and type of decentralisation in Zambia?	PD, SS, KI
3.9.2 What (if any) plans are there for decentralisation policy in Zambia in the short-medium term?	PD, SS, KI
3.9.3 How accountable and effective is local government considered to be in Zambia?	SS, KI
3.9.4 To what extent are processes of elite capture prevalent in relation to local government interventions?	SS, KI
3.9.5 Are local elites likely to be any more or less pro-poor than their national counterparts?	SS, KI

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<i>3.10.1 Political economy</i>	
3.10.1 How financially feasible is a national protection scheme in Zambia?	KI, PD
3.10.2 What are the key budgetary processes which could have an influence on achieving a NSPS?	KI, PD
3.10.3 Which political, economic and societal actors stand to gain/lose from a national social protection strategy in Zambia?	KI
<b>4. Societal dimensions</b>	
<i>4.1 Public attitudes</i>	
4.1.1 What do most Zambians view as the key causes of poverty in Zambia?	Afrobarometer
4.1.2 What role do Zambians perceive for the state with regards development? Is it expected that the state will play a role in delivering key public goods? (e.g. health, education, housing, social security etc.).	Afrobarometer
4.1.3 What elements of 'due process'/'procedural justice' are considered to be important to Zambians in terms of access to public policy/goods? (e.g. is there likely to be pressure for conditions to be attached to cash transfers?).	Afrobarometer
<i>4.2 Civil society</i>	
4.2.1 Briefly characterise civil society in Zambia, in terms of state-civil society relations; the types and character of organisations (e.g. their capacity, range, depth and legitimacy).	SS, KI
4.2.2 Which are the key policy advocacy CSOs in Zambia?	SS, KI
4.2.3 Which CSOs have the most influence over poverty reduction policies in Zambia?	SS, KI
4.2.4 Which if any CSOs have or are currently promoting social protection in Zambia? Which have the potential to do so? Provide details.	KI
4.2.5 Which CSOS can claim to be the most legitimate representatives of the most vulnerable groups?	SS, KI
4.2.6 How (if at all) do the most vulnerable groups seek to represent themselves in Zambia (e.g. is there a disability movement)?	SS, KI
4.2.7 What capacity do CSOs have to be involved in the design, delivery and/or monitoring and evaluation of social protection in Zambia?	SS, KI
<i>4.3 Inequality</i>	
4.3.1 Describe/explain the current level, character and trajectory of social and regional inequality in Zambia?	SS
4.3.2 Is there a shared sense of vulnerability between poor and non/middle-poor groups?	SS, KI
4.3.3 Are there/have there been any political coalitions	SS, KI

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between poor and non/middle-poor groups in Zambia?	
4.3.4 To what extent and in what ways are horizontal (as well as vertical) inequalities important in Zambia?	SS, KI
<i>4.4 Urbanisation</i>	
4.4.1 Describe/explain the current level, character and trajectory of urbanisation in Zambia.	SS, KI
4.4.2 What are the politics of urban-rural relations in Zambia?	SS, KI
4.4.3 Is there a clear differentiation regarding the political status and orientation of urban and rural dwellers in Zambia?	SS, KI
<b>5. Global dimensions</b>	
<i>5.1 General</i>	
5.1.1 Who are the key donors in Zambia, and what is the degree of donor harmonisation?	SS, KI, PD
5.1.2 What is the current character of donor-state relations in Zambia? (e.g. conditionality; hierarchy between donors).	SS, KI
5.1.3 What proportion of the national budget is supplied by donors?	PD
5.1.4 What are the key funding modalities used by donors? How advanced is direct budget support?	SS, KI, PD
<i>5.2 Donors and social protection</i>	
5.2.1 Evaluate the importance that donors give to social protection in relation to their overall agenda for development in Zambia (e.g. in relation to growth, good governance, general poverty reduction through basic service delivery).	PD, KI
5.2.2 Which (if any) donor agencies are actively promoting social protection in Zambia? Provide details.	PD, KI
5.2.3 How is social protection defined and conceptualised by key donors in Zambia?	PD, KI
5.2.4 What is the degree of donor harmony around social protection issues?	PD, KI
5.2.5 What is the approach of donors towards the notion of a 'developmental state' in Zambia?	PD, KI
5.2.6 How do the key donors approach social policy?	PD, KI
<b>6. Is there a political contract for social protection in Zambia?</b>	
6.1 Characterise the nature of the contract between state and citizens in Zambia. e.g. are there any areas of public policy that the state could be said to be accountable for over the long-run? E.g. food security, education etc.	SS, KI
6.2 If so, how and when was this contract forged?	SS, KI
6.3 What aspects of public goods and public policy do Zambian citizens feel entitled to claim? (e.g. urbanites and food in the 1980s).	SS, KI
6.4 Is there a sense in which Zambian society/the Zambian	SS, KI

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state is involved in a nation-building project?	
6.5 What level of national solidarity could be said to exist in Zambia?	SS, KI