
**Understanding the Political Economy of Low
Carbon and Climate Resilient Development**

Mozambique Case Study Report

**Country Ownership, Stakeholder
Participation and the Political Economy of
Priority-Setting in the Mozambique Pilot
Program for Climate Resilience**

Raul Chambote and Alex Shankland

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Table of Contents

List of Acronyms	3
Introduction.....	1
1. Background: the social, environmental, political and policy context for climate change response in Mozambique	3
1.1 Climate and socioeconomic context.....	3
1.2 Government, politics and donor relations.....	4
1.3 Climate policy context.....	6
2. Process: Mozambique's engagement with the PPCR	8
2.1 Initial engagements.....	8
2.2 PPCR Phase 1	8
3. Conceptualisation: rationales and discourses in Mozambique's PPCR	11
3.1 Global PPCR rationales and discourses.....	11
3.2 Discourses among actors involved with PPCR in Mozambique	11
4. Negotiation: "country ownership" and "stakeholder participation" in PPCR Phase 1...	14
4.1 "Country ownership" 1: choosing a lead Ministry	14
4.2 "Country ownership" 2: Beira and the coastal cities component.....	15
4.3 "Broad Participation"? Civil Society Engagement in PPCR Phase 1	17
4.4 Decision-making criteria	20
5. Actors, interests and power	21
5.1 Existing international engagements with climate change policy in Mozambique.....	21
5.2 Stakeholder analysis	22
5.3 Implementation.....	25
6. Conclusions and Recommendations.....	26
References.....	28
Annex 1.....	31

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List of Acronyms

PPCR	Pilot Program for Climate Resilience
CIF	Climate Investment Funds
SPCR	Strategic Program for Climate Resilience
MDBs	Multilateral Development Banks
GoM	Government of Mozambique
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
ACCRA	Africa Climate Change Resilience Alliance
Frelimo	<i>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique</i> (Mozambique Liberation Front – political party)
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
MDM	<i>Movimento Democrático de Moçambique</i> (Democratic Movement of Mozambique – political party)
WB	World Bank
AAP	Africa Adaptation Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework for Climate Change Convention
PQG	<i>Plano Quinquenal do Governo</i> (Government Five-Year Plan)
PARPA	<i>Plano de Acção para Redução da Pobreza Absoluta</i> (Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty – Poverty Reduction Strategy)
NAPA	National Adaptation Programme of Action
INGC	<i>Instituto Nacional de Gestão das Calamidades</i> (National Institute for Disaster Management)
CENOE	<i>Centro Nacional de Operações de Emergência</i> (National Centre for Emergency Operations)
MINAG	<i>Ministério da Agricultura</i> (Ministry of Agriculture)
MICOA	<i>Ministério para Coordenação de Acção Ambiental</i> (Ministry for the Coordination of Environmental Activities)
MPD	<i>Ministério da Planificação e Desenvolvimento</i> (Ministry of Planning and Development)
IFC	International Finance Corporation
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNAC	<i>União Nacional dos Camponeses</i> (National Union of Peasants)
NGOs	Non Governmental Organizations
CBOs	Community Based Organizations
MOZAL	Mozambique Aluminium
SESIA	Strategic Environmental and Social Impact Assessment
GFDRR	Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction
AfDB	African Development Bank

Introduction

Mozambique has been included in the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR), a flagship component of the Climate Investment Funds (CIF) managed by the World Bank along with other Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs). PPCR's declared aim is to help poor countries to make the strategic investments needed to deal with the challenge of climate change and to "catalyze a transformational shift" that can "strengthen capacities at the national levels to integrate climate resilience into development planning" (CIF 2009a, p. 1). PPCR initiatives are designed to operate in two phases, with Phase 1 consisting of a 3-18 month period of preparatory work culminating in the preparation of a "Strategic Program for Climate Resilience" (SPCR) and Phase 2 consisting of a period of up to five years in which this plan will be implemented through a mix of grant- and loan-funded investments.

This report examines the process of prioritising investments under Phase 1 of the PPCR in Mozambique, which is still under way at the time of writing. It asks to what extent the process to date has demonstrated the "country ownership" and "broad participation" that PPCR claims to promote, in the light of the tensions that exist between different actors' technical, institutional and political priorities.

Institutional publicity materials from the Climate Investment Funds claim that the PPCR process "promotes a participatory approach for development of a broad-based strategy to achieving climate resilience at the national level in the medium and long-term" (CIF 2010: 1). The official CIF guidance stresses the importance of government leadership of design missions "in order to ensure a country-driven process, including broad participation that promotes country ownership of the PPCR program and its implementation as well as partnerships among the government, national stakeholders, and development partners" (CIF 2009b: 4).

However, the PPCR's structure and processes establish a number of tensions between these aspirations and the political, institutional and economic realities and incentives associated with the programme. In particular, this study investigates three key areas of tension:

- between global discourses emphasising technical decision-making and "partnerships among the government, national stakeholders, and development partners" and national decision-making processes driven by party-political calculation and characterised by pervasive mistrust;
- between the logic of a "country-driven process" and the fact that the PPCR gives a key role to the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) in managing the programme and also privileges their existing projects as targets for additional funding; and
- between the spirit of "broad participation" and the overriding goal of rapid disbursement of PPCR funds.

This study was carried out as part of a research project on “Understanding the Political Economy of Low Carbon and Climate Resilient Development”, led by the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) and funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) under the Learning Hub for Low Carbon and Climate Resilient Development. The project aims to “provide empirical analysis of how ideas, power and resources are conceptualised, negotiated and implemented at different scales in international climate change initiatives... [and] inform policy and programming on climate change and development through greater understanding and awareness of the political economy dimensions of climate change interventions” (IDS 2010: 3).

To this end, the project employs a conceptual approach to political economy analysis that goes beyond conventional governance assessment to incorporate the role of ideas and ideology in the conceptualisation of climate policy interventions at both the global and national levels, in addition to analysis of national and subnational negotiation and implementation processes. The Mozambique case study followed this approach by combining different tools including discourse analysis, actor mapping and stakeholder analysis across a range of levels from the local to the global. The study took place between July and October 2010, with additional follow-up work between November 2010 and April 2011 and an update review in June 2011. It included individual and group interviews and stakeholder workshops in Maputo and Beira and face-to-face or telephone interviews with donor agency staff based in the UK and Madagascar, in addition to document analysis and background literature review work.

The report begins with an outline of the key social, environmental, political and policy factors shaping the context in which PPCR is operating in Mozambique. It then provides a brief description of the country’s engagement with the programme to the start of PPCR Phase 1. The next sections follow the overall study framework’s logic of sequentially analysing conceptualisation, negotiation and implementation. Section 3 examines the national and international discourses around climate change and the PPCR process, including broader aspects of “environmentalist” and “developmentalist” ideology as they influence debates in Mozambique. Section 4 examines some key issues in PPCR priority-setting and the (formal and informal) decision-making processes and (explicit and implicit) criteria that have emerged around them during the Phase 1 negotiations, focusing in particular on the themes of ownership and participation highlighted in the initial summary of global PPCR discourse. Section 5 focuses on actors, interests and power in the PPCR priority-setting process, and includes stakeholder analysis for both the national and subnational levels, with the latter focusing particularly on the possible inclusion of the opposition-controlled city of Beira in the coastal cities component of Mozambique’s PPCR. Section 6 presents the study’s overall conclusions and recommendations.

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1. Background: the social, environmental, political and policy context for climate change response in Mozambique

Mozambique is not only one of the world's poorest countries, but also has a level of vulnerability to drought, flood, sea level rise and increased frequency and severity of Tropical cyclones that makes it "one of the most exposed countries in the world to the cumulative effects of disaster risks and climate change" (Environment Working Group 2009: 1). Climate change response in the country is shaped by a number of key institutional, political and policy factors. In this section we review these contextual elements, before going on to describe the country's engagement with the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR).

1.1 Climate and socioeconomic context

Mozambique is situated on the eastern coast of Southern Africa, between latitude 10° 27' and 26° 52' South and longitude 30° 12' and 40° 51' East, with an Indian Ocean coastline of some 2,700 km. The country covers an area of about 799,380 km², of which 786,380 km² is land and 13,000 km² is surface water. The climate of Mozambique is mostly tropical, characterized by two seasons: a cool and dry season from May to September, and a hot and humid season between October and April. The rainfall distribution in the country follows an east-west gradient, with more abundant rainfall along the coast, where the annual average varies between 800 and 1200 mm. The highest rainfall is in the coastal areas around the Central Region cities of Beira and Quelimane, while inland higher altitude areas in the north and central regions receive approximately 1000 mm, and the inland central and southern areas receive about 600 mm of rainfall. The south of Mozambique is generally drier, more so inland than towards the coast, with an average rainfall below 800 mm, decreasing to as little as 300 mm in Pafuri district, Gaza province (Macaringue, 2010).

The 2007 Census estimated Mozambique's population at 20 million inhabitants, with 62% living in rural areas (INE, 2008). The vast majority is still engaged in an essentially agrarian economy, including livestock, forestry and fisheries (Tibana, 1999). Agriculture accounts for 26% of GDP, while the share of industry (manufacturing, mining, construction, electricity and water) in GDP, having declined from 23% to 14% in the period between 1973 and the end of the armed conflict in 1992, has since recovered and reached 23.5% of GDP in 2003 (INE, 2003). This recovery was fuelled mainly by large scale projects such as the Mozambique Aluminium smelter plant in Maputo, which began production in 2000, and the development of the Inhambane natural gas fields by South Africa's SASOL, which began exports by pipeline to South Africa in 2004. Such "mega-investments", along with foreign aid, have fuelled an impressive real GDP growth rate averaging 7.9% per year between 2001 and 2010.

This growth initially seemed to be having an impact on the country's extremely high poverty levels, with official figures showing a fall in the incidence of poverty from 69.4% in 1996-97 to 54.1% in 2002-03 (GoM, 2006). However, this progress may have been exaggerated by measurement issues, and even on the

official measure, thanks to population growth the number of people living in poverty actually rose during the period (Hanlon 2010). The latest figures paint a still starker picture, with poverty rates actually increasing in several areas of the country (Francisco 2010).

Around one third of Mozambique's population is still food insecure, and rural households are exceptionally vulnerable to natural disasters, notably droughts, floods and cyclones. It is estimated that 60% of the population lives in coastal areas, and is therefore highly vulnerable to cyclones and storms. The country's vulnerability to climate change has been attributed to its geographic location, including its long coastline and its position at the confluence of many international rivers flowing into the Indian Ocean (SADC 2000, article 6), as well as the extensive area of its land that lies below sea level, its high temperatures, aridity, infertile soils, many endemic diseases, lack of communications infrastructure, high level of illiteracy, high population growth rate, high levels of absolute poverty and high degree of dependence on natural resources that require predictable rain (Macaringue, 2010).

1.2 Government, politics and donor relations

Mozambique is a unitary state, in which provincial and district administrations are appointed by central government. The country is divided into 10 provinces plus Maputo (the capital city, which has provincial status), with 128 districts, which are in turn divided into administrative posts and localities. There are 43 towns and cities that have the status of municipalities, including the 10 provincial capitals. Unlike the Districts, the municipalities have elected local governments. Mozambique is undergoing a 'decentralization and de-concentration' processes, with responsibilities increasingly delegated to both municipal authorities and districts.

Since the country's independence in 1975, Mozambique has been ruled by one party: the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*, or Frelimo.¹ With power forged in the experience of the ten-year liberation struggle, sustainable external support and a principle of not sharing power, Frelimo has maintained a politically stable government (Machili 1995, p. 389). The party has been able to manage internal political instability while maintaining its claim to legitimacy as a party of liberators, organizers and modernizers (Mazula 1995; Hanlon 1996; Sumich 2005). Significantly, FRELIMO drafted the 1975 Constitution unilaterally, a rare case in the history of liberation movements in Africa where constitutional drafts were generally negotiated with colonial powers (Benoit 1981, p. 13-20). Again, when a new political settlement was needed to respond to the demands of the post-Cold War era and bring an end to the country's long civil war, Frelimo autonomously drafted and approved the 1990 Constitution which introduced multiparty democracy to the country (Santos and Trindade 2003).² This period also demonstrated the party's ability to reform, as Frelimo managed to adjust itself to dramatic politico-economic changes, through the process known as "four

¹ In 1977 FRELIMO ceased to be a movement and legally became a party. In this study we are referring to the role of the Frelimo Party and not to FRELIMO as a liberation movement.

² Manning (2002, p. 19) reports study findings indicating that many people did not want a multiparty system because of fears that it could fuel another armed conflict between political leaders.

shock therapy”, which included the transitions from central planning to a market economy, from emergency aid to economic development assistance, from war to peace and from a socialist single-party system to a democratic multi-party system (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995, p. 3-7).

Frelimo has also acquired a deep reservoir of experience in handling external support, on which it has depended since the 1960s, whether for meeting military objectives, for the reform of the political system and stabilisation or for economic reforms (Rolim et al. 2002). Despite the ideological and geo-strategic challenges of the Cold War, the regime handled the political external influences from the East and the West well, managing to keep friendly ties with governments on both sides (Hanlon and Smart 2008, p. 274). From the conflict and post-conflict emergency period and into the subsequent phase in which investment and economic growth has coexisted with persistent poverty, Mozambique has remained one of the world’s most heavily-aided countries. For the last 25 years around half of the Government Budget has depended on foreign aid, rising to a peak of 60.4% in 2007.³ Between the mid-1990s and 2008 Mozambique received an average of US\$350 million per year in external aid (Hanlon and Smart 2008, p. 269).

Mozambique is thus a “donor darling” whose elite has had to learn to negotiate a permanent situation of “contested sovereignty” (de Renzio and Hanlon 2007). However, the country may be starting on a pathway that finally allows it to move beyond this status, as the opening-up of its natural resources – including massive coal deposits in the central province of Tete and potential oil reserves off the coast of the northern province of Cabo Delgado – begins to provide significant new revenue streams for the government. These resources also help to explain the increased interest in Mozambique from “emerging power donors” including China, India and Brazil (as well as neighbouring South Africa), who Frelimo may see as a potentially less politically demanding source of external support, and thus a preferable alternative to the established (OECD-member) donor community.

Despite the widely-hailed success of the country’s transition from brutal conflict to largely peaceful elections, the political process has recently become a focus of tensions between Frelimo and the established donor community.⁴ Frelimo has won every national poll held since the start of multi-party elections in 1994. In the four general and presidential elections, held in 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009, Frelimo secured both the post of President and a majority of seats in Parliament (De Brito 2009). Although opposition parties made some gains in the first rounds of municipal elections (held in 1998 and 2003), in the November 2008 municipal elections Frelimo won in 42 out of 43 municipalities. In the 2009 general and presidential elections, the treatment of the opposition Democratic Movement of Mozambique (*Movimento Democrático de Moçambique*, MDM) party became a

³ Reported in *Jornal Noticias*, 2nd November, 2007, after the budget revision by Parliament on 1st November 2007.

⁴ The success of electoral processes in Mozambique is generally referred to as the major contribution of aid to the country’s political stabilisation. All parties, and particularly the second main opposition party (the MDM), are funded from overseas sources (Africa Confidential, Fri 15th May 2009, Vol. 50, p. 10; Hanlon 2002).

key point of tension; anti-MDM manipulation of the electoral process was cited as one of the triggers for the temporary withholding of aid in 2010 that became known as the “donor strike” (Chichava 2010).

The MDM’s Presidential candidate was Daviz Simango, who had also been the only politician to defeat both Frelimo and the main opposition party, Renamo, in the 2008 municipal elections. Those elections saw him winning re-election as the mayor of Mozambique’s second largest city, Beira, where he was initially elected in 2003 on a Renamo ticket, before deciding to leave the party and run as an independent when the Renamo leadership tried to stop him from running for re-election. Observers note that the Mayor of Beira represents a unique political phenomenon in Mozambique, as his victory in 2008 represented the first time in the last three decades that a candidate who did not come from a military background had defeated the two most well-established political parties, Frelimo and Renamo. Simango set up the MDM just a few months before the 2009 Presidential elections, and the party failed to overtake either Frelimo or Renamo. Nevertheless, it performed strongly in some key areas (including Maputo), and it was greeted by many political commentators and donor representatives as a significant new force with the potential to “introduce a new way of being and acting to Mozambique’s political scene” (Chichava 2010, p. 5). Since Beira is the principal power base of Daviz Simango and the MDM, this gives a particularly intense political significance to the debate over whether or not to include the city in Mozambique’s PPCR, one of the key issues examined in this report.

1.3 Climate policy context

The policy environment for PPCR in Mozambique is favourable, as evidenced by a range of legislation and the country’s positive response to the UNFCCC process (DFID 2009). Government policies, strategies and other official documents such as laws and funding agreements suggest that there is growing awareness of climate change issues, and some effort to mainstream them not only into the core national development policies but also into local government programmes. Climate change is referred to in core policy documents including both the current Five Year Government Plan (*Plano Quinquenal do Governo*, PQG 2010-2014) and its predecessor, as well as Mozambique’s 2006-2009 PRSP (*Plano de Acção para Redução da Pobreza Absoluta*, PARPA II).⁵

However, climate change is still perceived as a relatively “new” issue, and policy is generally framed as a strictly environmental issue or else in the context of Disaster Risk Reduction, in which the country has already developed significant capacity. This is evident in key documents such as the 2007 National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA), the Institute of Disaster Management (*Instituto Nacional de Gestão das Calamidades*, INGC) Master Plan for 2006-2016 and the 2007/08 Government Strategy for post-flood resettlement. The INGC, the main government coordination unit for humanitarian response, is a key implementing agency for practical mitigation and adaptation interventions through its operational branch, the National Centre for Emergency Operations (*Centro*

⁵ At the time of the research the successor to PARPA II (for the 2011-2014 period) was still being negotiated by the Government of Mozambique and international donors.

Nacional de Operações de Emergência, CENOE). One recent review notes that since the floods in 2000 and 2002 the agency has been playing a stronger and stronger role:

INGC, the main player in this process, has been increasingly moving away from a reactive and logistical role, especially during response to disasters, to a more pro-active role in sustainable development processes. This strategic change is evidenced by the increasing involvement of INGC in initiatives aiming at developing semi-arid and arid areas of the country such as the northern part of Gaza and Inhambane provinces. INGC recently created a specific department to develop and implement activities aimed at the development of dry areas where common staple crops such as maize, beans, and groundnuts cannot be produced. This is a clear move from a disaster response institution to anticipating and sometimes even reducing vulnerability of communities to disasters. (Macaringue 2010: 5)

As this extract illustrates, the INGC is increasingly taking on roles and responsibilities that formally lie with the Ministry of Agriculture (*Ministério da Agricultura*, MINAG) or the Ministry for Coordination of Environmental Actions (*Ministério para Coordenação de Acção Ambiental*, MICOA). Mozambique's climate change response is hampered by a lack of clarity on the roles and responsibilities of different institutions and/or ministries that deal with climate change, with the Ministry for Planning and Development (*Ministério da Planificação e Desenvolvimento*, MPD) and MICOA both tasked with a coordination function and key sector ministries such as MINAG and powerful agencies such as INGC also expected to play leading roles (NAPA 2007, Chambote and Veja 2008). Given this lack of clarity, it is not surprising that despite the broadly favourable policy framework, a recent bilateral agency review concluded that climate change "is not yet fully integrated in policies" (DFID 2009, p. 2). Outside government the coordination problems are even more severe, as networking on climate change policy issues among civil society groups is virtually nonexistent. This is an issue to which we will return in the discussion of civil society participation in the PPCR in Section 4.

Mozambique's international partners also contribute to the lack of clarity, with different donor cluster groups and multilateral agencies attempting to play coordination roles in the climate policy arena, engaging with different government partners and encouraging the formation of multiple 'coordination centres' within the country. The donors' Environment Working Group has acted as a key coordination forum at various times (including the international lobbying effort to ensure Mozambique's inclusion in the PPCR, discussed in Section 2 below). However, the task of coordination seems to be becoming harder as different actors scramble to position themselves in the face of the arrival on the scene of major new climate change-related funding, including the Japanese-funded and UNDP-managed Africa Adaptation Programme, and the PPCR itself.

2. Process: Mozambique's engagement with the PPCR

Although Mozambique was included in the first wave of PPCR countries, at the time of this study the country had not yet completed the first phase of the process. According to the Climate Investment Funds (CIF) guidance, PPCR Phase 1 is a pre-investment phase intended to include “analysis of climate risks, an institutional analysis, knowledge and awareness raising, key capacity building actions, and a consultative planning process to agree on a common vision and strategic approach for climate resilience and to define priority actions and investment needs to implement this approach” (CIF 2009a, p. 5). It is intended to last between 3 and 18 months, and establish the basis on which investments (a mix of loans and grants, up to an initially established limit of USD 100 million per PPCR country) will be made in Phase 2. This section gives an overview of the country's engagement to date, in order to locate the issues of conceptualisation and negotiation discussed in sections 3 and 4.

2.1 Initial engagements

According to key informants interviewed during the research, Mozambique was not on the original list of pilot countries compiled by the CIF's international “Expert Group”, but was included in the PPCR after vigorous lobbying. However, this lobbying was carried out by bilateral aid agencies, not by the Government of Mozambique itself. The agencies argued successfully that unlike the other African countries on the Expert Group's list (Niger and Zambia), Mozambique's climate resilience challenges included not only drought but also flooding, cyclones and sea level rise, and the PPCR would therefore deliver both greater impact and more broadly-applicable learning.

Despite the emphasis on government leadership in the PPCR guidance, Government of Mozambique representatives interviewed during the study overwhelmingly described the initial process as externally-led, with donor agencies identifying the opportunity, setting the timetable and leading the activities. After the government formally accepted the invitation to participate in the PPCR in May 2009, both the initial scoping mission (July 2009) and the full joint mission (November-December 2009) that set in motion the preparation of Mozambique's proposal were planned, designed and led by the World Bank and the African Development Bank (AfDB), the lead Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) for Mozambique's PPCR. The latter mission, in which the MDBs were supported by the UK Department for International Development and the UN Development Programme, effectively determined the content of Mozambique's Phase 1 proposal (see AfDB/WBG/UNDP/DFID 2009). Although the mission was formally under the leadership of MICOA, the proposal itself was actually drafted by World Bank personnel (see GoM 2010).

2.2 PPCR Phase 1

The PPCR is designed to pilot and demonstrate ways to mainstream climate risk and resilience into developing countries' core development policies and planning. It is also meant to be a flexible programme to permit investments on the ground to active tangible results in areas where there is “readiness for implementation” (CIF 2009a). The PPCR Phase 1 proposal that resulted from the mission in November-December 2009 (GoM 2010) clearly demonstrated the importance of the latter aspect. It established that PPCR in Mozambique will be

implemented by the GoM with the collaboration of the AfDB Group, the World Bank Group and with participation from the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and other development partners. However, it clearly showed an intention to align investment with existing MDB projects rather than other sectoral or geographical priorities established by government planning processes, including the NAPA which MICOA had developed in 2007 (cf. PECB 2010, p. 35-36; NAPA 2007, p. V; AfDB et al. 2009, p. 3).

The Phase 1 document proposed to focus investment, capacity building and knowledge activities on: “i) transport and agriculture for mainstreaming climate change into budget and planning at central level, ii) tourism, ports, urban water and forests for the private sector because these sectors appear vulnerable to climate change, iii) agriculture, water management and transport in the Limpopo watershed and the Zambezi valley for the pilot investment in rural areas where the risks are floods and drought and iv) coastal protection and storm water drainage in one coastal town, possibly Beira, for the pilot investment in a coastal city where the main risk is sea inundation” (GoM 2010, p. 10). The indicative Phase 2 activities and costs were summarised in the table which is reproduced below.

Table 1: PPCR proposed Phase 2 components

Components	Indicative Activities	Estimated cost
A. Climate resilient budget and planning at central and local level	Adjusting public investment in the agriculture and transport sectors, MPD and line agency capacity building Building capacity in decentralized planning processes	Some 5 million
B. Climate resilient investments in agriculture, water and roads in 2 rural poles	Control of soil erosion and wildfire, soil conservation, small scale irrigation, water resource management, rural roads, hydromet stations	Zambezi pilot pole: US\$29 million Limpopo pilot pole: US\$40 million
C. Climate resilient investments in one coastal city (Beira or other coastal city)	Coastal erosion control, breakwater, storm water drainage	Some US\$23 million
D. Initiatives for private sector	Awareness, access to finance, demonstrational and pilot solutions, overall enabling environment	Some US\$18 million
E. Project management	project management, reporting monitoring and evaluation	Some US\$5 million

Source – GoM 2010: 11

These activities are intended to meet the following four key expected outcomes for Mozambique’s PPCR:

- a) “integration of inclusive resilience into development plans” through adjusting public investment programs in key sectors such as transport and agriculture, and building the knowledge base for doing so in other sectors;
- b) “increased consensus on approach to climate resilient development” through “learning by doing” and sharing results on the ground in key territorial areas, through enhanced knowledge and by building awareness and stakeholder support for climate resilience in both the private and the public sectors;

- c) “Scaled up finance for climate resilient development” through supporting resilience in selected poles where PPCR funding will significantly increase the funding compared to baseline;
- d) “Improved coordination among stakeholders” through capacity building support to improved inter-government and local government coordination. (GoM 2010, pp. 10-12).

In order to lay the foundations for achieving these outcomes in Phase 2, the Phase 1 proposal outlined a series of activities in line with the CIF guidance that this phase should focus on “analysis of climate risks, an institutional analysis, knowledge and awareness raising, key capacity building actions, and a consultative planning process to agree on a common vision and strategic approach for climate resilience and to define priority actions and investment needs to implement this approach” (CIF 2009a, p. 5). These activities, the prior work on which they would build and their tentative costs were summarised in the table which is reproduced below.

Table 2: PPCR proposed Phase 1 activities: \$1.5 million Total

Tasks	Already done	Activities To be financed during phase 1	Tentative Costs
Analysis of Climate Risks, Impacts and Needs	INGC phase I, Extreme events study and EACC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Analysis of vulnerability in 4 selected private sectors (urban water supply, ports, forestry, tourism) and related public sector institutions : Gaps and needs, priority initiatives and Investments 	300K
Institutional Analysis	African Adaptation Program –AAP- (UNDP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regional institutions mapping and expenditure analysis in the three poles 	240K
Capacity Building and Preparation of the Strategic Program	INGC phase II	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assessment of the 5 years government development plan climate vulnerability Capacity building needs assessment (MPD, key line ministries and other actors) 	75K 75K
Consultation Process and preparation of a SESIA	Technical meeting for the evaluation of the AAP (May 2009) Consultation for the formulation of INGC Phase 2 (June 2009)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PPCR Strategic Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (SESIA) including policy analysis in 2 sectors, assessment of investments in pilot regions and consultation 	150K
Knowledge and Awareness Raising	INGC Phase 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Socio economic analysis and vulnerability assessment in the Limpopo watershed and the Zambezi Valley Vulnerability assessment of coastal cities 	260 K 130K
Definition of priority Action Needs, including Investments	NAPA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Comparison of options for climate resilience investments with preliminary cost and benefits, once decision on districts and town is final 	270K

Source – GoM 2010, p. 14

Following a further mission in April 2010, the Phase 1 proposal was approved by the PPCR subcommittee of the CIF in June 2010. However, the Grant Agreement by which the Government of Mozambique formally consented to the startup of Phase 1 activities was only signed in November 2010, more than half-way through the period initially planned for this phase. This limited still further the scope for carrying out the extensive process of stakeholder consultation envisaged in the CIF guidance, as discussed in Section 3 below.

3. Conceptualisation: rationales and discourses in Mozambique's PPCR

The official CIF programme summary claims that the PPCR process “promotes a participatory approach for development of a broad-based strategy to achieving climate resilience at the national level in the medium and long-term” (CIF 2010, p. 1). This section examines the extent to which the rationales and discourses associated with PPCR at the global level were in evidence among the actors concerned with the programme's development in Mozambique.

3.1 Global PPCR rationales and discourses

PPCR is designed to “catalyze a transformational shift” that can “strengthen capacities at the national levels to integrate climate resilience into development planning” (CIF 2009a, p. 1). The CIF guidance stresses the importance of government leadership of design missions “in order to ensure a country-driven process, including broad participation that promotes country ownership of the PPCR program and its implementation as well as partnerships among the government, national stakeholders, and development partners” (CIF 2009b, p. 4). The PPCR programming document emphasises the need to “conduct regular consultations with relevant stakeholders, identified in a stakeholder analysis, throughout the PPCR process to ensure broad ownership” (CIF 2009a, p. 7).

The rationale for PPCR therefore frames the search for a “transformational shift” towards climate resilience as centring on the issue of national development planning, and on multi-stakeholder engagement in the planning process. The programme's global discourse on how this is to be achieved emphasises two key elements: country ownership and broad-based participation. However, it is less clear how these are to be ensured, especially given the tight timetable for the implementation of such an ambitious programme and the insistence that “PPCR funded actions should, as an overall practice, not be free-standing and should be blended with MDB resources and/or other parallel and co-financing” (CIF 2009a, p. 15). This provides strong incentives to direct resources towards existing MDB-funded programmes – whether or not these resulted from the participatory construction of a “common vision of climate resilience in the medium and long term” (CIF 2009a, p. 2).

3.2 Discourses among actors involved with PPCR in Mozambique

Table 3 below summarises our analysis of the discourses used by key informants during interviews and/or by participants in the workshops organised during the fieldwork. These have been grouped according to whether they refer to framings

of climate change, to the planning and policy process or to broader questions of values and ideology.

Table 3: Discourses, elements and associated actors

Discourse	Elements	Examples of actors using this discourse
<i>Climate change framings</i>		
Technical	Climate change is a complex environmental issue requiring data collection and modelling	MICOA, INGC, some donors
Disasters	Climate change increases the frequency and intensity of disaster risks	INGC, MICOA, government planning documents (PQG, PARPA, NAPA), donors (including DFID, UNDP)
Livelihoods	Climate change exacerbates poverty, intensifies vulnerability / uncertainty for the poor	UNAC (speaking for small farmers), local NGOs and CBOs in Beira
<i>Process</i>		
Managerialist	Instruments must follow established fiduciary standards; funds need to be disbursed quickly; more consultation risks delaying the process	World Bank
Policy dependency	The policy agenda is set by donors' priorities, though government reserves the right to control the political agenda	Government of Mozambique officials (off the record)
Politicisation	Development goals are secondary to party-political goals; Frelimo/the government is intolerant of criticism; no trust exists for consultation	NGOs, some donors and academics
Participation-pessimist	Civil society lacks capacity, is disorganised, is unrepresentative	Government of Mozambique, academics, some NGOs themselves
Action-oriented	Mozambique already has too much planning / too many different plans; what is needed is action that actually makes a difference on the ground	Government of Mozambique officials (off the record), some NGOs
<i>Broader ideology</i>		
Developmentalist	Infrastructure investment as the key to development; natural resource extraction as a sovereign right (regardless of climate impact)	Government of Mozambique, Beira municipal government, some NGOs
Environmentalism	Natural resource	Environmental NGOs:

	preservation; anti-pollution (e.g. campaign against Mozal aluminium smelter)	Centro Terra Viva, Justiça Ambiental, others
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It is evident from the table that while key actors in Mozambique employ many different discourses in relation to climate change and development, and frame the challenges that PPCR seeks to address in different ways, there is little identification with the global PPCR discourses. In particular, none of them frame climate change as a cross-cutting issue (rather than an “environmental issue” or a “disaster risk issue”) that requires an overhaul of national development planning processes. In fact, several of the discourses around the policy and planning process run counter to the global PPCR discourses of “country ownership” and “stakeholder participation”, emphasising the donor-dependency of the policy agenda and the difficulty in establishing an effective dialogue given civil society’s issues of coordination and legitimacy and the lack of trust in the government – and even questioning the value of any investments in planning when the country has already produced so many studies, plans and reports and yet so little seems actually have changed in the lives and livelihoods of the most vulnerable Mozambican citizens.

On the broader ideological front, there is a clearly dominant “developmentalist” approach which has support across government and beyond, including many civil society actors and “rising power” donors such as China, as well as sympathy from established donor agencies with a traditional emphasis on investment for economic growth (including the MDBs, despite the fact that their avowed intention to play a leading role in climate change mitigation and adaptation should incline them more towards helping Mozambique onto a low-carbon development path). This approach links the economic argument for infrastructure investment with the political argument that Mozambique has the sovereign right to exploit its natural resources in whatever way it chooses. Some actors also link this with the moral argument that as a country with a negligible historically-accumulated carbon footprint, Mozambique should not be held back from seeking to resolve its pressing social problems through economic growth by the inconvenient fact that its principal source of future revenue is likely to be the exploitation of its fossil fuel reserves. The civil society actors who voice the most explicit challenge to this ideological standpoint are the Maputo-based environmental NGOs, who during the study period were engaged in a fierce war of words with MICOA over what they saw as the latter’s complicity in allowing the persistence of illegally high pollution emissions from the Mozal aluminium smelter. In a setting with already low levels of trust between government and civil society, this ideological clash raises additional obstacles to establishing “partnerships among the government, national stakeholders, and development partners” in a PPCR process that the government locates firmly within the environmental policy arena, as discussed in the next section.

4. Negotiation: “country ownership” and “stakeholder participation” in PPCR Phase 1

In this section, we analyse some key issues and the (formal and informal) decision-making processes and (explicit and implicit) criteria that have emerged around them during the PPCR Phase 1 negotiations. We focus in particular on the themes of ownership and participation identified in the analysis of global PPCR discourse in Section 3. These themes are analysed in relation to three specific elements of the PPCR process: the choice of lead Government of Mozambique ministry for the programme, the identification of a pilot municipality for the PPCR’s coastal cities component and the experience of civil society organisations in engaging (or finding themselves unable to engage) with PPCR.

4.1 “Country ownership” 1: choosing a lead Ministry

As noted in the previous section, prevailing government discourses in Mozambique frame climate change either as an environmental issue or as one of disaster preparedness. Given the stated intention of building on UNFCCC agreements and the National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA), on which the Environment Ministry (MICOA) had led, the Government of Mozambique made it clear that it wished its inputs to the PPCR process to be coordinated by MICOA. However, this was overruled by the international agencies driving the process (led by the World Bank).

The reasons given for this were both practical and strategic. Practically, the World Bank had already established a management unit in the Planning Ministry (MPD) that was capable of fulfilling its fiduciary requirements and could therefore enable disbursements to begin more rapidly. Strategically, placing the project under the MPD would be more consistent with the overall aims of the PPCR, which seeks to “catalyze a transformational shift” that can “strengthen capacities at the national levels to integrate climate resilience into development planning” (CIF 2009a, p. 1).

Given the government’s continued insistence that MICOA should lead, in the event the PPCR Phase 1 proposal described the option for the MPD as “a transition arrangement for Phase I only to allow for a rapid signature and implementation of the grant” and stated that “the strategic technical oversight role would be assumed by an inter-ministerial council co-chaired by MPD and MICOA” (GoM 2010, p. 14). Following further pressure from the MDBs, the Government of Mozambique responded by designating not one but two focal points: one representative of MICOA and one of the MPD.

Despite its description of the MPD role as a “transition arrangement”, the management plan made no mention of any efforts to develop an alternative implementation unit during the course of Phase 1. Thus, while the issue of which Ministry would ultimately lead was left formally open, it was clearly established that the PPCR money itself would flow through the MDBs’ preferred channel.

At the time of the fieldwork there was an expectation among key informants that the senior specialist who had led for MICOA in the initial discussions would be

recruited into a project implementation unit in the MPD, in order to provide at least an informal MICOA presence at the heart of a PPCR process that would be led by the MPD. However, he was subsequently taken off the PPCR case and transferred outside Maputo by MICOA. Instead of choosing a Technical Coordinator from either MICOA or the MPD, the MDBs hired a (non-Mozambican) consultant to support coordination of inputs to the Phase 2 proposal. In the absence of a formal home for the project implementation unit in either ministry, at the time of writing he was still based “provisionally” in the World Bank office.

4.2 “Country ownership” 2: Beira and the coastal cities component

As summarised in Table 1, the list of priorities identified in Mozambique’s PPCR Phase 1 proposal covers responses to cyclones, drought and flood. It includes investments to support resilience in the face of cyclones in one coastal city, as well as of drought in the Limpopo valley and flooding in the Zambezi valley, in addition to the “climate resilient budget and planning at central and local level” that is supposed to be the programme’s principal *raison d’être*, and work with the private sector (to be led by the World Bank’s private sector financing arm, the IFC) described as “awareness, access to finance, demonstrational and pilot solutions, overall enabling environment” (GoM 2010, p. 11).

While this list covers what are agreed to be the three major categories of climate risk faced by Mozambique, the actual locations of the pilot projects demonstrate the power of MDB preferences in shaping PPCR investments. It rapidly became clear during the case study research that the Limpopo and Zambezi pilots had been chosen primarily because they were the locations of ongoing investments by the MDBs.⁶ This is entirely consistent with the guidance that “PPCR funded actions should, as an overall practice, not be free-standing and should be blended with MDB resources and/or other parallel and co-financing” (CIF 2009a, p. 15). However, it is hard to see any evidence of “country ownership” in this selection. These existing MDB projects had, of course, been agreed with the Government of Mozambique – but not as part of any nationally-directed process designed to strengthen the country’s climate resilience. The Limpopo region is indeed vulnerable to drought and the Zambezi to flooding, but neither was identified in Mozambique’s NAPA as being the most critical area for either category of risk (MICOA 2007).

However, while the locations of the pilots for the drought and flood resilience components of Mozambique’s PPCR Phase 1 proposal seem to reflect MDB priorities rather than national ones, the case of the coastal cities component is much less clear-cut. Mozambique’s NAPA includes protection against coastal erosion as a priority, but does not mention specific risks affecting urban areas in the coastal zone. However, the thorough study of climate-related disaster risks carried out by the INGC did include detailed consideration of the potential impacts on key cities, including Maputo and Beira (INGC 2009, p. 11-12).

⁶ The African Development Bank is supporting irrigated agriculture around the Massingir Dam on a tributary of the Limpopo, and the World Bank is supporting “market-oriented smallholder development” in the Zambezi Valley.

Rather than an existing programme, the MDB interest in the case of the coastal cities component was to use PPCR resources to support a new one: in this case, a proposed World Bank urban infrastructure programme which would have as its preferred focus the city of Beira. However, this interest came up against the reluctance of the Frelimo government to channel resources to a city that is seen as an opposition stronghold – however great its economic significance and however vulnerable it might be to climate change.

Beira is home to a vibrant culture of political contestation that sets it apart from the rest of the country, and was a focal point of Mozambique's long and bitter civil war between 1977 and 1992. The city is also a major and strategically significant port, providing access to the sea for landlocked Zimbabwe and an export route for the massive coal deposits in the Mozambican interior that are currently being opened up by transnational mining companies. With over half a million inhabitants living just a few feet above the level of the Indian Ocean, protected only by decaying sea defences, eroding dunes and a rapidly-disappearing belt of mangroves, Beira is also one of the places in Mozambique that is most critically threatened by sea level rise and the increasing frequency and intensity of cyclones (INGC 2009). This should make it a natural candidate for inclusion in Mozambique's PPCR. However, the decision to allocate several million dollars' worth of international climate change finance to a city controlled by one of the most important opposition leaders was never going to be an easy one for Frelimo, accustomed as the party is to exercising unquestioned control over the levers of political and economic power in Mozambique.

The Aide Memoire which records the conclusions of the initial PPCR Mission to Mozambique clearly proposed "climate resilient coastal, transport and urban infrastructure protection at Beira" (AfDB/WBG/UNDP/DFID 2009, p. 4). However, by the time Mozambique came to submit its Phase 1 proposal, the unequivocal option for Beira had metamorphosed into "climate resilient investments in one coastal city (Beira or other coastal city)" (GoM 2010, p. 11). The document's detailed discussion of the proposed PPCR coastal cities component managed to combine redefining the choice of city as an open multi-option process with signalling a continued preference for Beira:

The PPCR phase 1 preparation grant would support development of climate resilience investment options and an investment plan for the preferred option, together with longer term resilience strategies for the city of Beira. Depending on government priorities other cities may also be selected. (*ibid*, p. 37)

A senior Government of Mozambique representative interviewed during the fieldwork confirmed that Beira was the preferred option, and stated that it would end up receiving the PPCR investments. When asked why, in that case, the Phase 1 proposal did not simply make this clear instead of proposing that an expensive and time-consuming sequence of consultancies and discussions would be undertaken before the preferred option was officially decided, he simply replied "it is political" (key informant interview, Maputo, 15 July 2010).

The government's position of neither confirming nor denying that Beira will receive the funds can be interpreted as a warning to the MDBs and donors that they should not take its acquiescence for granted when party-political issues are at stake. It is widely assumed that Mayor Daviz Simango enjoys the support of a significant proportion of the donor community, contributing to accusations that his party, the MDM, has been "more inclined to look abroad [for guidance] than to Mozambique" (Chichava 2010, p. 14). In the wake of the "donor strike", itself provoked by foreign anger at Frelimo's treatment of the MDM, the government had a powerful incentive to assert "country ownership" of at least this part of the PPCR process.

Significantly, however, it chose to focus on the one PPCR component where the technical case for the identified investment priorities was strong, given the well-documented economic importance and climate vulnerability of Beira. For the drought and flood resilience components, the government ignored the lack of fit between the MDBs' preferred pilot sites and the priority locations identified in its own climate analysis, including the NAPA. It seems that neither the Limpopo nor the Zambezi regions raises party-political issues in the same way that Beira under Daviz Simango does, and therefore that in these cases there was less incentive for the government to invoke the principle of "country ownership".

4.3 "Broad Participation"? Civil Society Engagement in PPCR Phase 1

The PPCR guidance states that Phase 1 should "ensure a socially inclusive process during consultations to provide inputs from a wide range of actors, such as NGOs and other civil society groups, specifically vulnerable groups, academe, and the private sector" (CIF 2009a, p. 6). From the interviews carried out during fieldwork, it became evident that there was no sense among civil society organisations (CSOs) of having been engaged in the PPCR Phase 1 process. This was the case even among those interviewees whose organisations were listed in the PPCR documentation as having been consulted, one of whom insisted "we now know about PPCR because you are interviewing us and not because the Government or the MDBs shared this with CSOs" (interview, Maputo, 27 July 2010).

The lack of consultation was not regarded as surprising; interviewees stated that CSOs rarely have access to processes controlled by the government and MDBs, and the PPCR process was seen as just another illustrative example of this tendency. Where CSOs are invited to engage in consultative fora linked to such processes, they are often left feeling that their attendance is merely to make up the numbers or "provide signatures on an attendance list that legitimates the event" (interview, Maputo, 13 July 2010). There is also a sense of participation fatigue, resulting from a perception that consultations are just a "populist" process of legitimisation of official documents whereby people arrive to find that everything has been already decided. Where CSOs insist on going beyond this legitimisation function they are perceived by the Government as a political opposition, and accused of seeking to undermine its plans or block development projects, as occurred with the confrontation over pollution from the Mozal aluminium smelter during the study period.

CSO interviewees questioned the lack of public consultation on the PPCR process, particularly on the selection criteria for pilot areas as well as the allocation of funds among these areas. However, they described their lack of effective voice in the PPCR Phase 1 process as inevitable, given the weight of the political or socio-economic interests of the agencies leading the process (specifically for the Government of Mozambique in Beira, the country's second most politically important city, the African Development Bank in the Limpopo basin and the World Bank in the Zambezi Valley). They asserted that CSOs in Mozambique needed to learn how to engage with this reality, by understanding the interests involved on the side of the Government and that of the MDBs.

Several interviewees raised the issue of the lack of coordination and clarity on the government side as an obstacle for effective engagement, with one stating that

There is a crisis of leadership in the environment sector... it suffers from it. There is no clarity in this agenda; no clear sign of willingness on the part of the government, if they cannot do it, at least to support CSOs to address the problem; no government strategy of communication about the NAPA and other documents on climate change" (interview, Maputo, 27 July 2010).

However, in individual interviews and workshop discussions in both Maputo and Beira, CSO representatives acknowledged that fragmentation and lack of coordination are problems on the civil society side as well as that of the government, and that the difficulties they face in engaging with climate change policy issues are due to capacity constraints as well as government resistance. One outcome of the project workshops was a commitment from CSO representatives to try to develop civil society climate change policy platforms to engage with PPCR both at the national level and in Sofala Province, where Beira is located. However, developing effective and sustainable civil society networks has proved a challenge in Mozambique, a resource-scarce context where most incentives are for NGOs to compete for donor funding rather than collaborating over strategies for engagement with the government and other powerful actors.

The PPCR guidance emphasises "broad participation", but it generally focuses on the role of such participation in promoting consent and buy-in to a predefined programme, rather than on its potential contribution to shaping the programme itself. However, it does state that "specific attention should be given to ensuring that women, youth, indigenous peoples, local communities and other vulnerable social groups are consulted and their views on solutions to climate risks are considered" (CIF 2009a, p. 6-7). An example of such local "views on solutions to climate risks" was provided by NGO representatives and community members interviewed during our research in Beira, who emphasised the importance of restoring the mangrove forests that play a vital role in stabilising the coastline, as well as in supporting coastal ecosystems and the livelihoods that depend on them.⁷

⁷ Beira's critically vulnerable Praia Nova neighbourhood lost its mangroves during the civil war, when they were cut down by the military to prevent guerrillas from sheltering there, while mangrove forests on the city's outskirts are rapidly being depleted by charcoal-burning.

The PPCR is designed to make use of the technical studies that are currently under way in Beira (funded by the EU and the Japanese government, among others), but these focus overwhelmingly on the physical infrastructure of breakwaters and floodgates, which raises the risk that PPCR will adopt a bias towards heavy engineering solutions. While physical infrastructure investment is clearly necessary in Beira, and has lower transaction costs than would be the case with a dispersed programme of community-based restoration of mangroves and other coastal ecosystems, the former type of investment has other attractions, both for MDBs seeking to make fast and large-scale disbursements and for political elites who wish to control rent-seeking opportunities.

The Mayor of Beira stressed his awareness of the need for engineering interventions to be balanced by mangrove restoration (as well as tree-planting for dune stabilisation), but he did not mention any role for civil society in this process (Daviz Simango interview, Beira, 14 July 2010). Local NGOs and community groups have been developing innovative strategies to protect and restore the mangrove forests, but those interviewed said that the MDB and government actors driving the PPCR process had made no effort to draw on their experience, and no Beira-based CSOs were contacted when the PPCR mission team visited the city.

Although the PPCR Phase 1 proposal included “a strategic environmental and social impact assessment (SESIA) of the overall planned program, including alternatives in the three pilot poles, with consultations at the local level [that will] include CSOs and community groups, local and provincial, public and private stakeholders” (Government of Mozambique 2010, p. 13), MDB representatives interviewed during fieldwork stated that the SESIA was now planned to be a desk-based exercise. This withdrawal of even the limited consultation opportunities built into the proposal suggested that the PPCR Phase 1 process was not likely to provide opportunities for its supposed local beneficiaries and other actors with in-depth local knowledge to contribute to shaping the programme before the Phase 2 investment decisions are made.

When this issue was raised at a project workshop, the World Bank representative leading on the Mozambique PPCR recognised that civil society engagement in the process had been very limited and said he would support efforts by bilateral donors to strengthen this engagement – but insisted that limited participation was an inevitable tradeoff for the rapid disbursement on which many of those same donors had been insisting (Maputo workshop, 14 October 2010).

There is clearly a tension between the aspiration to promote “broad participation” and the MDBs’ internal and external pressures to ensure rapid project preparation, signoff and disbursement of funds. In addition, the study revealed a tension between the two stated PPCR principles of stakeholder participation and country ownership. When donor representatives expressed concern at the lack of civil society participation in Phase 1, MDB representatives insisted that promoting this participation was not their responsibility but the government’s, implying that to insist on broader participation would run counter to the principle of country (understood to mean government) ownership.

After the donor representatives counter-argued that the learning and capacity development dimensions of the PPCR provided a justification for the MDBs, as *de facto* lead agencies for programme design, to play a leading role in promoting participation, the MDB representatives agreed to push for a more proactive approach. Following the appointment of the two Government of Mozambique focal points in April 2011, a series of consultations was indeed launched, and was planned to include multi-stakeholder meetings in Maputo and Beira as well as other potential project sites.

While the study team were unable to accompany these consultation meetings or collect the perspectives of civil society participants, one donor representative commented in an e.mail exchange in early June that “the Consultation process has been useful as it has brought the Government’s attention to the need for involving in practice other sectors such as civil society and the private sector”. PPCR Phase 1 was in its final stages when this consultation exercise was launched, so it seems unlikely that participants were given the opportunity to propose significant changes to investment decisions; this would have disrupted the financial negotiations and technical studies that by this stage were already close to completion, ahead of the Phase 2 proposal submission scheduled for late June 2011 (see Section 5.3 below).

4.4 Decision-making criteria

This section has described a set of processes involving different decision-making criteria, whether explicit or implicit. These may be technical (e.g. climate risk and potential adaptation efficiency), institutional (e.g. fit with existing MDB projects and processes), economic (e.g. potential for linkage with strategic infrastructure investments) or political (e.g. ruling-party reluctance to channel resources to an opposition stronghold).

One set of criteria that seems not to have featured in any of the decision-making processes associated with PPCR is the social impact of the proposed investments. Their potential for supporting more resilient livelihoods for small farmers living with drought or for fishing communities dependent on the productivity of the mangroves around Beira was never mentioned by anyone involved in the PPCR decision-making process. The words “poverty” or “poor” (let alone “gender” and “women”) were absent from the draft terms of reference for the “Strategic Environmental and Social Impact Assessment” included in the Phase 1 proposal, and the word “vulnerable” appeared only in relation to economic sectors, not people. This absence of poverty reduction criteria from the PPCR mirrors the lack of analysis of the links between poverty and climate change in the government’s own plans, including the five-year plan and the PRSP.

This disconnect would seem to strengthen the case for the PPCR, with its commitment to the mainstreaming of resilience into national development planning, as a tool for helping to establish these links between climate and poverty reduction policy. Unfortunately, however, the evidence from the PPCR Phase 1 process thus far is that such links are unlikely to be strengthened by the programme, given the limited scope it has allowed for engagement by those stakeholders who are most closely concerned with the wellbeing of the poor.

Ultimately, this lack of emphasis on the voices and interests of those Mozambican citizens who are most vulnerable to the effects of climate change is a result of the interplay of actors, interests and power in the PPCR process, which is the theme of the next section.

5. Actors, interests and power

The field of climate change policy in Mozambique involves many international as well as domestic actors. This section provides an overview of existing internationally-supported climate change policy initiatives, in order to set the PPCR in context. It goes on to examine the specific constellations of stakeholders and interests around PPCR priority-setting at two levels: the definition of the overall national programme and the specific issue of whether or not to include Beira in the coastal cities component. It concludes by reflecting on what role the power dynamics that have shaped Mozambique's PPCR process thus far are likely to play in the implementation phase.

5.1 Existing international engagements with climate change policy in Mozambique

Key informants consulted during the case study research identified a large number of international actors engaged in supporting the Government of Mozambique on climate change issues. The most influential multilateral actors were identified as AfDB, the Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction (GFDRR), UNDP and the World Bank, while among the bilaterals Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK were seen as the key external actors. In addition, a number of international NGOs are actively engaging with climate change issues in Mozambique, with some, including Save the Children and its partners in the DFID-funded Africa Climate Change Resilience Alliance (ACCRA), attempting to translate this into policy influence.

Several of the initiatives supported by external actors involved data collection and modelling. Because of Mozambique's particular vulnerabilities, the country has been the subject of a range of innovative analytical studies with regard to climate resilience and adaptation. Following the 2000 floods, quite good local awareness has been built of the risks posed by extreme weather events and local programs such as the internationally renowned "living with floods" approach are under way (Sphere Project, 2000). Denmark, GTZ and UNDP funded a study on the impact of climate change on disaster risks in Mozambique (2009). The GFDRR has funded a study on the Economic Vulnerability and Disaster Risk Assessment (2009). The UK, the Netherlands and Switzerland financed a two-year Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change Study which had Mozambique as one of its case studies and included a mapping of agro-ecological zones by vulnerability as well as a review of the vulnerability of the hydropower sector. The World Bank has also financed a Water Resources Strategy and detailed work on the Zambezi basin (2007) and a study on climate risks related to the transport sector (TFESSD).

Other internationally-supported initiatives have moved beyond data collection and analysis into planning, the key field with which PPCR is designed to engage.

INGC and MICOA have recently jointly developed an action plan (called INGC phase II, with a budget of US\$ 4 million) aiming at: formulating a national strategy to respond to climate change; development of a systematic focus on climate change for sectoral policies; revision of the legal framework and secondary legislation to adjust fiscal policies; engagement of the private sector in adaptation to climate change (through provision of guidelines for mandatory adaptation standards and requirements for investors); and raising awareness at national, provincial and district levels. Denmark, UNDP and France have pledged money to finance part of the INGC action plan.

INGC and MICOA are also implementing a USD 3 million “Africa Adaptation Programme (AAP)”, aiming at the institutional strengthening of the Government to manage the climate change agenda, financed by the Japanese Government and managed by UNDP. Denmark is also preparing a new environment project with MICOA which will have a climate change component. INGC has recently prepared a USD 5 million Disaster Risk Management Plan aimed at building policy, strategies, and institutions, identifying, assessing and monitoring risks and reducing underlying risk factors, which will be financed by the GFDRR. DFID is supporting the revision of Mozambique’s NAPA and the development of a national climate change strategy.

The analysis of stakeholders and interests involved in the PPCR should therefore be understood in the context of this already-crowded field of actors and initiatives.

5.2 Stakeholder analysis

In Table 4 below, we present a summary of the principal institutional players involved in the definition of PPCR priorities at the national level, and the interests attributed to each of them by key informants consulted for the study.

Table 4: Stakeholders and interests – national level

Stakeholder	Interests identified by key informants
World Bank	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Direct PPCR money to existing project in Zambezi Valley • Use PPCR money for proposed new coastal cities project • Impose WB management practices (fiduciary requirements, etc.) • Build on links with MPD • Generate fee revenues from managing PPCR funds
African Development Bank	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Direct PPCR money to existing project in Limpopo basin • Support commercial agriculture and heavy irrigation schemes linked to Massingir Dam investment
MICOA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Secure money to support own activities • Play lead role in PPCR, decide resource

	<p>allocation, control implementation unit</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure technical rather than political focus of project
MPD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Control flow of investments • Improve donor coordination • Reduce imposition of WB processes • Speed up disbursements
DFID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthen civil society participation in Mozambique (complementing existing civil society support strategy) • Broaden citizen engagement in delivery of projects • Make WB more accountable for use of money going in from UK • Strengthen engagement with GoM (especially MICOA) • Position DFID as key bilateral donor in climate change in Mozambique
UNDP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthen relationship with MICOA • Promote strategic role of Africa Adaptation Program
UNAC (National Union of Peasants)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support production and produce marketing of small farmers (peasants) • Protect small farmers' land rights
Environmental NGOs (Centro Terra Viva, ABIODES, Justiça Ambiental)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure government compliance with environmental legislation • Promote information sharing • Promote increased consultation over environment policy
Frelimo (ruling party)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure that investments are in line with party priorities

Table 5: Stakeholders and interests – Beira and coastal cities component

Stakeholder	Interests identified by key informants
World Bank	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Include Beira in new coastal cities project
Conselho Municipal da Beira (Beira Municipal Administration)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Access to funds for administration • Access to resources for future election campaigns • Influence criteria for municipalities' access to funds • Increase influence over control and management of Beira port • Promote political profile of mayor • Implement municipal strategic plan emphasising coastal protection, economic opportunities, health, housing

Local governance-oriented NGOs (Plataforma de Governação Local)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote increased consultation before, during and after PPCR implementation • Create regular forum for consultation in Beira • Civil society participation in implementation • Access to funds • Strengthen communication and information sharing within civil society • Increase direct community engagement in activities (from token participation to co-management)
Local environmental NGOs (ADEL)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase awareness of mangrove management model/experience • Participate in PPCR implementation
Port of Beira	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure returns to shareholders (80% owned by investors linked to President Guebuza) • Maintain viability of port as principal export channel for Tete coal
Mining companies (Vale, Riversdale)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure reliable and economic export channel for Tete coal
Railway company (CFM)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deliver on agreement with Vale to export coal via railway to Beira • Avoid having to carry people or their goods in addition to coal
Japanese Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide loans to Beira for coastal protection investment
G19 group of leading donors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support MDM administration in Beira
Engineering and construction companies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Profit from investments in breakwaters, etc.
Timber traders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase access to sources of timber near Beira
Charcoal burners	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Access to mangrove or other sources for charcoal
Fishing communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Preserve mangrove for fish, crab & prawn reproduction

A full stakeholder analysis should provide insights into the forms of and levels of power and influence exercised by different actors in pursuit of their interests in a given negotiation process. However, since Phase 1 of the PPCR is still under way at the time of writing the outcome of this process is not yet known, which makes it hard to draw definitive conclusions on the relative ability of the different actors to deploy the forms of power at their disposal. In particular, the decisions on (a) the inclusion of Beira in the PPCR and (b) the choice of strategy and technology for increasing the city's climate resilience if it is included have yet to be formalised and made public.

5.3 Implementation

As noted above, at the time of writing the PPCR process in Mozambique has yet to conclude its Phase 1. Following a further round of negotiations to ensure the integration of the different components, the final proposal for Phase 2 investments is due to be presented at a PPCR Subcommittee Meeting in Cape Town at the end of June 2011.

The evidence collected during the study suggests that Beira will be included in the Phase 2 proposal, given the weight of both the technical arguments in favour of its inclusion and the economic interests involved (including those of the Frelimo elite), as well as the power of MDB (and donor) preferences in shaping investment patterns in Mozambique. However, it is highly likely that conditions will be imposed by the central government that either limit the scope for Mayor Daviz Simango to control the PPCR investments in Beira, or ensure a mutually advantageous sharing of the political and economic benefits.

On the choice of strategy and technology, both the local administration and the MDBs seem to be open to considering a range of options with broader environmental and livelihood benefits (including mangrove restoration and tree-planting for dune stabilisation). However, these are unlikely to play more than a marginal role, given the weight of the incentives to emphasise heavy engineering solutions and the limited evidence that these actors are seriously committed to involving either communities themselves or local civil society groups with relevant expertise and experience in the PPCR design and decision-making process.

On the question of stakeholder engagement and civil society participation, some progress seems to have occurred since the conclusion of the fieldwork phase of this study and the presentation of the initial findings to a group of civil society and donor agency representatives in Maputo in October 2010. As noted in Section 4.3 above, pressure from bilateral donor representatives on the MDBs has been relayed to the recently-appointed Government of Mozambique focal points, who have launched a series of consultation meetings. At least one donor representative is optimistic that Phase 2 will include greater participation, since this process has increased government awareness of “the need for involving in practice other sectors such as civil society and the private sector”.

Beyond the specific case of Mozambique, there is evidence that the MDBs are responding to criticism of the limited scope within PPCR Phase 1 activities for “broad participation”. The agenda document for the PPCR pilot country meeting that will take place before the Subcommittee Meeting in Cape Town in June 2011 explicitly highlights the need for discussion of “how an active engagement of the civil society could enhance the effectiveness of SPCRs and extend its boundaries”.⁸

⁸ Document available at

http://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/sites/climateinvestmentfunds.org/files/PPCR_program_guide_6_2011_Draft.pdf

6. Conclusions and Recommendations

This study has concluded that there is little evidence that the PPCR Phase 1 process in Mozambique has fulfilled the stated aspiration of the programme to ensure “broad participation that promotes country ownership of the PPCR program and its implementation as well as partnerships among the government, national stakeholders, and development partners” (CIF 2009b: 4).

Our political economy analysis has highlighted a number of factors that have combined to undermine this aspiration’s chances of fulfilment. Some of these factors relate to broader issues of ideology that shape the conceptualisation of the programme. These include the restrictive framing of the key issues to be decided in PPCR Phase 1 as those prioritised by the “managerialist” ideology of the World Bank, and the exclusion from discussion of alternative local resilience strategies by the “developmentalist” ideology that is shared by the Government of Mozambique and many other actors. Other factors relate to the economic, institutional and political incentives that drive decision-making. In the case of Mozambique’s PPCR, these are apparent both in the MDBs’ emphasis on the need to prioritise regions where they have existing investments and in the government’s reluctance to confirm that Phase 2 resources will be allocated to the high-priority but opposition-controlled city of Beira.

In the case of stakeholder participation, ideology and incentives combine. On the ideological side, dominant framings of “climate resilience” as a highly technical issue which needs to be addressed through a combination of large-scale investments, expert analysis and high-level planning interventions militates against the opening up of meaningful space for dialogue with stakeholders who are associated with more experiential knowledge and less capital- and technology-intensive climate resilience strategies – such as the poor and vulnerable Mozambican citizens who are struggling to adapt to climate change, and the local civil society groups who are working with them in sites such as the mangrove forests around Beira. On the incentives side, the drive for rapid disbursement of PPCR funds increases the reluctance of the MDBs to invest in potentially complex and time-consuming consultation processes, while the pervasive lack of trust between government and civil society provides little incentive for either side to invest scarce institutional and political resources in engaging with such processes.

In the light of these findings, we recommend that those responsible for the PPCR process at the international level should make an explicit choice: either the programme should abandon its exaggerated claims to be promoting “country ownership” and “stakeholder participation”, or it should make a meaningful commitment of time and resources to ensuring that these claims can acquire some substance. If they choose the latter option, then clear guidance should be produced and ring-fenced funding should be allocated to ensuring that participation in Phase 2 can genuinely influence the detailed design of PPCR investments, albeit recognising that their sectoral and geographical focus has already been largely determined by a Phase 1 process that – at least in Mozambique – has proved to be rather less than fully participatory and country-owned.

In Mozambique there is evident government reluctance to involve civil society groups – let alone citizens themselves – in decision-making around large-scale investments. In such contexts, bringing the principles of “country ownership” and “stakeholder participation” together will require the PPCR to adopt a broader definition of “country ownership”, rather than allowing it to become conflated with “government control”.

This can be achieved by simultaneously strengthening and reorienting the PPCR’s focus on the national planning process. The programme could provide a vehicle for technical, financial and political support by donors and MDBs for broader engagement in national planning for climate resilience – rather than the current narrow focus on technical capacity building within planning departments such as Mozambique’s MPD. The international actors associated with the PPCR could use their influence to build links between currently disconnected segments (government, private sector, civil society organisations, different groups of citizens) and levels (local, regional, national, international), as well as different government departments. This should include specific support for strengthening communication and coordination among civil society groups, given this study’s findings on the difficulties faced by existing NGO networks and platforms in engaging with grassroots constituencies and then ensuring that information is shared and joint positions are negotiated prior to engagements with government and donor agencies. International actors could also make a greater effort to ensure that PPCR investments are aligned with existing government and joint donor/government planning frameworks, which in Mozambique’s case include the Five-Year Plan (PQG) and the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PARP).

This approach could promote a genuinely “transformational shift” that could “strengthen capacities at the national levels to integrate climate resilience into development planning” (CIF 2009a, p. 1). Because it would involve not only the addition of new technical content for climate resilient development planning but also the adoption of new principles and practices for ensuring broader engagement in the national planning process as a whole, this approach could help to bring about the “transformational shift” that is needed in the quality of responses to the whole range of climate and development challenges that countries such as Mozambique are currently facing.

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Annex 1

List of project workshop participants

Participants in Beira Workshop – 13 th October 2010, Hotel Moçambique			
	Name	Institution	Contacts
1	Amélia Meço	AJULSID	827700097 – ammeco.meco29@gmail.com
2	Herculana José	ADEC	823495322 – herculanasande@yahoo.com.br
3	Artur Raúl Correia	TRIMODER	827765149 – raulcorreia33@yahoo.com.br
4	José Coelho	GTZ-PD Sofala	823900022 – Jorge.coelho@gtz.de
5	Mário Barbito	Partido Renamo	825692950 – mbarbito@gmail.com
6	José Monteiro	FOPROSA	824325865
7	Feliciano Matique	AMACO	823828590 – amacobeira@gmail.com
8	Nazarete Reginaldo	LDH	824031600 – nazaregina@yahoo.com.br
9	Aristides Armando	Plataforma de G. Local	847714182 – aristidesarmando@yahoo.com.br
10	Víctor Nhamue	AEUP	824460015
11	Caetano Santiago	KULIMA	826122199 – caetano.santiago@yahoo.com.br
12	Matilde Baule Cunhaque	MONASO	824112990 – mpechem@yahoo.com.br
13	Michele Ghelli	Cooperação Italiana	823514469
14	Ilda Lourenço	Rádio Moçambique	848230906
15	Ravy Serra	ADEL Sofala	822529070 – ravy@adelaofala.co.mz
16	Américo Nsopela	UniZambeze Sofala	829930822
17	Emerson Damião	AJV - Sofala	825467766 – damiao.emerson@gmail.com
18	Eugénio Armando	G20 Sofala	829195100
19	Ilídio Tinga	AMOPROC	828147332/825712180 – agritinga@yahoo.com.br
20	Francisco Majoi	CMunicipal Beira	845885544
21	Nelito Lucas	Conselho Cristão de M	825855180 – nelitolucas47@hotmail.com
22	Teodoro Cassamo	DPCA/MICOA Sofala	828605370 – teorodorocassamo@yahoo.co.mz
23	Mariana Lumisa Dias	AMODE	823827540
24	Elias António Sitole	AJOCHI	825877230

25	Jeremias Moura	ORAM	847704513 – jeremiasmoura@yahoo.com.br
26	Helena J.A. Alexandre	AMODE	829116871
27	Augusto de Jesus	Conselho Municipal da Beira (CMB)	825506330
28	Mário José G.	CMB/ Direcção do Planeamento Físico	824388940
29	Augusto Paulo	CMB/ Dep. Gestão Ambiental	825812550 – bagigeam@gmail.com
30	Ana Manuel	AMODE	827862920
31	Carlos Neto Ngalo	AMODE	828644340 – nelsonngalo@yahoo.com.br
32	Júlio Alberto Manta	AMODE	829146872
33	José Gundana	AMODE	823878710 gundana@gmail.com
34	Hamid Kylso	ADEL	adelsofala@tdm.co.mz

Participants in Maputo workshop – 14th October 2010, Kaya Kwanga

	Name	Institution	Contacts
1	Artur Matavele	WATERAID	82/84 -3104060 – arturmatavele@wateraid.org
2	Mário Basílio	CARE	82/84-5222834 – mariojorgebasilio@gmail.com/ Mario_b@inam.gov.mz
3	Cláudio João	World Vision	823166840
4	Rita Zacarias	DFID	843001392 r- zacarias@dfid.gov.uk
5	Clara Landeiro	UNDP	820682029 - clara.landeiro@undp.org
6	Juan Lopez	SIDA	829032337 – juan.lopez@yourenvironment.net
7	Ravy Serra	ADEL Sofala	822529070
8	Daviz Simango	CMB	+258 23 329709 - usimango@gmail.com
9	Nazarete Reginaldo	LDH Beira	
10	José Luis Gundana	Plataforma Governação Sofala	
11	Jerónimo Tovela	WFP/ PMA	823185960 – jeronimo.tovela@wfp.org
12	Adelaide Ferreira	Agência Francesa de Desenvolvimento	ferreira@afd.fr
13	Karen Colin de Verdiere	Agência Francesa de Desenvolvimento	
14	Diamantino Nhampossa	UNAC	824904050
15	Carmen Munhequete	UNDP	824859070
16	Aeroplano Francisco	Centro Terra Viva (CTV)	825680230 - franciscoaeroplano@gmail.com
17	Jean-Christophe Carret	World Bank	jccarret@worldbank.org