
Olaf Bachmann

April 2011
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IDS Research Report 67

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Cover photo: © Sven Torfinn/Panos
Photo caption: Juba, South Sudan. Painters paint the word Peace on a wall as they chat to a man who lost his leg during the civil war.
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Summary

External support is essential to the development of the African Standby Force (ASF), an African-led mechanism for crisis management and peace consolidation in Africa. This research paper examines external support to the ASF by several bilateral and multinational contributors, assessing its strengths and limits, and attempts to measure the significance of the support to the aspired outcome.

The starting point of the study is an analysis of the fast-evolving ASF project, which has gone through many phases of definition and redefinition since it was conceived in the late 1990s. The ASF, it is argued, is a ‘moving target’, due to the inability of African stakeholders to settle on a clear concept, setting themselves ever more ambitious goals at every stage. Partners simultaneously suffer from, and contribute to this state of affairs. Whilst coordination efforts are undertaken, partners’ support too often still responds to national (for bilateral donors) or institutional interests (for multilateral ones), each partner using the leeway created by the conceptual ambiguities of the ASF to press its own priorities. Given the overwhelming role of partners in the conceptual maturation of the ASF, and the impact of their funding decisions, this is turn exacerbates the confusion about the true direction of its development. Said differently, the ASF is burdened by the lack of political, conceptual, and financial ownership on the side of the recipients, who are also its main stakeholders. The result is at best an ambiguous partnership, and at worst a waste of human resources, financial means and political capital.

Attempting to differentiate between degrees of ‘ownership’, the study concludes that it is only if AU member states make a conscious effort to increase their political, conceptual and especially, financial, stake in the ASF that they will credibly demonstrate that it is not an entirely foreign-mastered project, but a real ‘African solution to African problems’.

Keywords: regional security; ASF; APSA; donors; ownership.

Olaf Bachmann is a PhD student at the Department of War Studies, King’s College, London. He is based in Libreville, Gabon, in Central Africa. This paper is based on his MA ‘War in the Modern World’ dissertation. It was subsequently revised and updated for publication at the invitation of IDS. Directly converging with IDS’s interest in exploring the international dynamics of conflict, peace and development, Mr Bachmann’s research naturally fits into IDS series. The present paper was conceived in consultation with Dr David K. Leonard (Professorial Fellow in Governance, IDS), and Dr Niagalé Bagayoko (Head of Peacekeeping and Peace Consolidation at the International Organisation of La Francophonie and former Fellow, IDS). Christopher Vanja provided valuable suggestions for improving and updating the earlier version. Further comments are welcome and can be sent to olaf.2.bachmann@kcl.ac.uk.
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<th>Full Name</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Auswärtiges Amt (German Foreign Office)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCORD</td>
<td>African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, Durban, South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACDS</td>
<td>African Chiefs of Defence Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOTA</td>
<td>African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACPP</td>
<td>Africa Conflict Prevention Pool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRI</td>
<td>Africa Crisis Response Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACSRS</td>
<td>African Centre for Strategic Research Studies, Abuju, Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFDEM</td>
<td>African Civilian Standby Roster for Humanitarian and Peace Building Missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>US Africa Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMIB</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMU</td>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APF</td>
<td>African Peace Facility</td>
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<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<tr>
<td>APSTA</td>
<td>African Peace Support Trainers Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU-CA</td>
<td>Constitutive Act of the African Union</td>
</tr>
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<td>BMATT</td>
<td>British Military Advisory and Training Teams (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMI</td>
<td>Bundesministerium für Inneres (German Home Secretariat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMVg</td>
<td>Bundesministerium für Verteidigung (German MOD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMZ</td>
<td>Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (German Development Ministry)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPST</td>
<td>British Peace Support Team (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C³IS</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communication and Information Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCTCRPA</td>
<td>Cairo Centre for Training in Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa, Cairo, Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEOMP</td>
<td>Centre d’Entraînement pour les Opérations de Maintien de la Paix, Lomé, Togo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-military cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Communications and information systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMD</td>
<td>Conflict Management Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoESPU</td>
<td>Centre of Excellence for Stability Police Units</td>
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<tr>
<td>COPAX</td>
<td>ECCAS Peace and Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Policy Framework on the Civilian Dimension</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPADD</td>
<td>Centre de Formation au Déminage Humanitaire, Ouidah, Benin</td>
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<td>CPX</td>
<td>Command post exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSID</td>
<td>Collège Supérieur Interarmées de Défense, Yaoundé, Cameroon</td>
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<tr>
<td>DATS</td>
<td>Danish Advisory and Training Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCMD</td>
<td>Direction de la Coopération Militaire et de Défense (France)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCSD</td>
<td>Direction de la Coopération de Sécurité et de Défense (France)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament/Demobilisation/Reintegration</td>
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<td>DFAIT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIO</td>
<td>Départements de formation opérationnels</td>
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<tr>
<td>DITF</td>
<td>Darfur Integrated Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DND</td>
<td>Department of National Defence (Canada)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EADS</td>
<td>European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>EASBRICOM</td>
<td>East African Regional Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EASBRIG</td>
<td>East African Standby Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EASS</td>
<td>École d’application des Services de Santé</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOBRIG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Brigade</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMICI</td>
<td>ECOWAS Monitoring Operation in Côte d'Ivoire</td>
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<td>ECOMIL</td>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>West African States Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEML</td>
<td>École d'État Major de Libreville, Libreville, Gabon</td>
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<tr>
<td>EFOFAC</td>
<td>Escuela de Formación de Oficiales de las Fuerzas Armadas de Cooperación</td>
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<td>EGT</td>
<td>École du Genie et des Travaux, Brazzaville, Congo</td>
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<td>EIFORCES</td>
<td>École Internationale des Forces de Sécurité, Awaé, Cameroon</td>
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<td>EMP</td>
<td>École pour le Maintien de la Paix, Bamako, Mali</td>
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<td>ENVR</td>
<td>École Nationale à Vocation Régionale</td>
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<tr>
<td>FARDC</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the DRC</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>FFD</td>
<td>Forces françaises à Djibouti</td>
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<tr>
<td>FFG</td>
<td>Forces françaises au Gabon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOMAC</td>
<td>Force Multinationale en Afrique Centrale</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOMUC</td>
<td>Force Multinationale de la CEMAC</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPU</td>
<td>Formed Police Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTX</td>
<td>Field training exercise</td>
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<td>G8</td>
<td>Group of Eight</td>
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<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit (Germany)</td>
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<td>GPOI</td>
<td>Global Peace Operations Initiative (USA)</td>
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<td>GPOP</td>
<td>Global Peace Operations Program (Canada)</td>
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<td>GtZ</td>
<td>Gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit (Association for technical Cooperation) (Germany)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority for Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILEA</td>
<td>International Law Enforcement Academy (Gaborone, Botswana)</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMATC</td>
<td>International Mine Action Training Centre (Nairobi, Kenya)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPA</td>
<td>International Peace Academy, now IPI</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPSTC</td>
<td>International Peace Support Training Centre (Karen, Kenya)</td>
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<td>ISS</td>
<td>Institute for Security Studies (South Africa)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAIPTC</td>
<td>Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (Accra, Ghana)</td>
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<td>LECIA</td>
<td>Legon Centre for International Affairs (Accra, Ghana)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MICOPAX</td>
<td>Mission de consolidation de la paix en Centrafrique</td>
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<tr>
<td>MILOBs</td>
<td>Military observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINURCAT</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic</td>
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<td>MISAB</td>
<td>Mission de surveillance des accords de Bangui</td>
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<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSC</td>
<td>Military Staff Committee</td>
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<td>MTAP</td>
<td>Military Training and Assistance Program (Canada)</td>
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<td>NASBRIG</td>
<td>North African Standby Brigade</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for African Development</td>
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<td>NUPI</td>
<td>Norwegian Institute of International Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official development aid</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>OIF</td>
<td>Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie</td>
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<td>ONUB</td>
<td>Opérations des Nations Unies au Burundi</td>
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<td>PF</td>
<td>Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and Military Staff Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLANELM</td>
<td>Planning Element</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMTC</td>
<td>Peace Mission Training Centre, Pretoria, South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council of the African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace support operation</td>
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<td>PSOD</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPTC</td>
<td>Pearson Peacekeeping Training Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTC</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Training Centres</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDC</td>
<td>Rapid deployment capacity</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional Economic Community</td>
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<td>RECAMP</td>
<td>Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix</td>
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<td>RIP</td>
<td>Regional Indicative Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>RM</td>
<td>Regional Mechanism</td>
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<td>RPA</td>
<td>Rwanda Peace Academy, Kigali, Rwanda</td>
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<td>RPTC</td>
<td>Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (Harare, Zimbabwe)</td>
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<td>SADCBRIG</td>
<td>SADC Brigade</td>
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<td>SHIRBRIG</td>
<td>Standby High Readiness Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>SML</td>
<td>Senior Mission Leaders</td>
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<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard operating procedures</td>
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<td>SPMC</td>
<td>Strategic Planning Management Unit</td>
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<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop-contributing countries</td>
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<td>TIP</td>
<td>Training for Peace (Norway)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>UNPST</td>
<td>UN Peace Support Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSOA</td>
<td>United Nations Support Office for AMISOM</td>
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Executive summary

The end of the Cold War sent shock waves not only across Europe, but also across Africa. After the events in Rwanda and the international community’s indecisiveness and incoherence in approaching the crisis in Somalia in 1994, African leaders realised that they had to take things into their own hands if they did not want the continent to sink into chaos. The drive for an ‘African renaissance’, spearheaded by a small vanguard of African leaders, was marked by the search for ‘African solutions to African problems’. Nowhere was this truer than in the peace and security field, where the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) was conceived, with the African Standby Force (ASF) as the flagship project at its core.

Similarly to its twin project in the economic field, NEPAD (New Partnership for African Development), the ASF attracted the immediate interest of many bilateral and multilateral partners.

The birth and evolution of the ASF

In truth, the ASF was worked out by the African Chiefs of Defence as early as the late 1990s, but it found its true political impetus in the African Union’s Constitutive Act (2000), which gave the new Union the right to intervene in a member state in grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. The ASF was later earmarked as one of the major tools at the hands of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) created in 2002 as the Union’s standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts.

Strongly influenced by the Rwandan and Somali traumas, the initial concept of the ASF was that of a quick reaction capacity that would enable Africans to respond swiftly to a crisis unhampered by the heavy political and institutional burdens typical of the United Nations, but with the UN taking over after six months or so to assume the tasks of stabilisation and peace consolidation. The concept was later refined and broken down into six scenarios comprising: (i) observation and monitoring missions; (ii) preventive deployments in the case of rising political tensions; (iii) humanitarian assistance missions; (iv) traditional peacekeeping operations; (v) peace support in a non-permissive environment; and (vi) forceful intervention in a member state in grave circumstances.

The ASF was to be based on standby arrangements with the continent’s five sub-regions, each providing a brigade-sized contribution. From day one it was decided that the brigades would be multidimensional, including military, police and civilian components. However, the first ‘ASF Roadmap’ spelling out the stages of development of the ASF to 2010 reflect the strong military slant of the initial design, worked out mainly by the military establishments of the member states and supported by the mainly military establishments of international partners.

As the AU gained field experience with its first field mission, AMIS (African
Union Mission in Sudan), more and more diversified partners gained interest, and the UN experience of multidimensional operations looked more and more relevant, the necessity to rebalance the original concept appeared more and more obvious. Thus, the 2nd Roadmap, adopted in July 2008, mandated accelerated work on the civilian and police dimensions. At the same time, it set out a considerable burden of the task to be accomplished over the next two years, including: further work on headquarter capacity both at the AU and in the regions; decision-making and mandate issues; logistics depots; strategic lift; the rapid deployment capacity (RDC); and a variety of specific but nonetheless important domains such as medical and legal issues. It was already clear, although unsaid at the time, that the full operationalisation of the ASF by 2010, as foreseen in Roadmap I, could not be achieved.

A major exercise held in October 2010 with the help of partners, ‘Amani Africa’, confirms what the observation of AU field operations such as AMIS and the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) have demonstrated:

- Although strategic HQs have been established, the AU and the regions lack mission planning capacity, and in particular the capacity to plan across dimensions;
- The police and civilian components of the ASF remain significantly weaker than their military counterparts;
- Communications and interoperability between military, police, and civilians in the field remain low;
- Administrative, financial and human resources management capacity remain too weak compared to the task at hand;
- African missions remain heavily dependent on external support for the entire range of their logistics needs, from strategic deployment to field logistics, as well as for their CIS (communications and information systems) needs;
- A situation of quasi-total financial dependence on external donors characterises African capacity-building efforts as well as operations.

An awareness of those shortcomings, even before ‘Amani Africa’, had yielded its results, and led African actors and partners to set a new deadline, in 2015, for the full operationalisation of the ASF in draft Roadmap III produced in 2010. At the same time, the new Roadmap, which has yet to be endorsed, does not disallow very ambitious targets, such as the standing of a Rapid Deployment Capacity by end 2012.

### The ASF: A ‘moving target’

It is clear, however, from recent conceptual work and recent and ongoing operations that the AU’s and RECs’ aims are now pitched at the upper end of the scale of scenarios developed in the original Roadmap. An upward trend is visible in three directions:
• from the ‘fire brigade’ type of operation carried out by an agile, relatively unsophisticated ASF nipping the crisis in the bud before the UN takes over, to scenarios where Africans themselves assume peace consolidation tasks over the long run;

• from mainly military to multidimensional missions endowed with the whole range of civilian and police components;

• from low-risk deployments in relatively peaceful context to operations in environments with a high level of ‘spoilers’.

The Rapid Deployment Capacity, which has now been placed upfront in the list of priorities, combines quick reaction and multidimensionality, blurring the picture further and/or setting the target even higher. Adding to the level of complexity, new tasks have appeared on the list of possible ASF commitments, including disaster relief and naval operations.

No open debate, however, has been carried out on those evolving assumptions, their political underpinnings or feasibility requirements. The ASF, therefore, is a moving target, built on non-addressed issues and high expectations. This is probably why draft Roadmap III identifies the need to review the six original scenarios underpinning the ASF as part of a more current ‘ASF vision’.

**Donor response**

From the birth of the ASF project, bilateral donors have been very responsive. In truth it was with a sigh of relief that large Western nations saw African countries taking more direct responsibility for their own security as the costs of UN operations on the continent were reaching staggering levels, African conflicts looked as intractable as ever, and Western interests shifted more and more toward the Middle East and South Asia. As of 2002, for four years in a row, Africa was a key item on the agenda of the G8. Multilateral donors followed suit, with a real ‘breakthrough’ in support represented by the launch of the EU African Peace Facility (APF) in 2004, which provided much relief to the cash-strapped AU and regional communities.

International partners’ support responds to a variety of interests. While bilateral donors are more clearly motivated by national security interests, multilateral partners respond to a more institutional approach underpinned by an ambiguous concept of ‘partnership’, although the financial and political interests of their member states are never far behind.

**Bilateral donors**

**United States**

Although the US has repeatedly been accused of turning its back on Africa, it is one of the major providers of PSO (peace support operation) support to the continent. The disastrous mission to Somalia and the Rwandan crisis in 1994 powerfully contributed to convincing Washington of the necessity to enable the
Africans to help themselves. The constant rise in the UN peacekeeping budget, of which the US pays 26 per cent, was an additional incentive.

Besides its capacity-building initiative, the US has also given significant in-kind support, mainly in the form of logistics and technical assistance, to African-led PSOs since AMIS. For example, it supported rotation of troops to AMISOM and it has made major contributions to the field logistics, equipment, and mobility of UN and AU peacekeepers.

**Canada**

Canada has long been supporting African peacekeepers on a bilateral basis. Its support is more broadly based than that of the US, encompassing military, police (via the well-known Pearson Centre) and, more and more, civilians (via the Réseau francophone des opérations de paix). In the recent past, it has been the driving force in a political effort to put African peace and security on the agenda of the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) and is one of the major sponsors of an increasingly large number of activities undertaken by the OIF to support PSO training. Canada is also a major supporter of African-led PSOs, providing logistics, training, equipment and financial support at levels equivalent to those of the US and close to those of the EU to operations such as AMIS and UNAMID (United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur).

**France**

Even more clearly than the US, France has striven to adapt its military presence in Africa, inherited from colonialism, to the parameters of the APSA. From bilateral, its cooperation has become increasingly multilateral since the early 2000s, focusing on the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) (primarily ECOWAS, subsequently ECCAS), and later the AU. France has also been attempting to ‘Europeanise’ its support to the ASF, transferring its well-known RECAMP programme (Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix) to European level (RECAMP served to develop the original Amani Africa exercise concept), and second by attracting EU and partner support to specific training centres on its priority list. Like Washington’s, Paris’s cooperation is more developed on the military side, but it tends to include more technical assistance at HQs, in addition to staff and units training. Similarly to the US and Canada, France is an important provider of operational and logistics support to African TCCs (troop-contributing countries), focusing on francophone countries.

**United Kingdom**

Like other donors, but at a slightly earlier stage, the UK has reshaped its peace and security assistance to Africa to match continental developments. The UK pioneered the ‘whole of government approach’, connecting all national efforts into a single cross-departmental strategy financed and implemented through an Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP). The ACPP finances a wide array of activities. Among them is the presence of conflict and PSO advisers with the
AU and the RECs, and key staff in major training institutions. PSO and other advisers in carefully selected positions have enabled the UK to exercise a major influence on the conceptual development of the ASF over the past few years. Much of the British support also goes into training, with a concentration on the Karen Centre in Kenya in the recent past and a move out of the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra, which received the bulk of London’s attention in earlier years.

Germany

Germany’s engagement in African peace and security issues is on the rise, resulting from a mixture of public pressure to increase development aid and pragmatic considerations linked to the burden represented by Berlin’s 9 per cent contribution to the UN peacekeeping budget and EU’s budget supporting Africa (24 per cent). In contrast with most national donors, German support squarely targets regional and sub-regional organisations, including the AU, the RECs, and training centres. Thematically, Germany’s involvement focuses on police and civilian capacity-building, but it also includes important contributions to various activities in conflict prevention and institutional consolidation. Most of the assistance is channelled via the former German GtZ, Gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit, now GIZ, Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit.

Denmark

Similarly to Germany, Denmark conceives itself as a loyal, disinterested partner, willing to support Africa’s own aims. However, it has stronger conceptual convictions inspired by a long-lasting involvement with the UN. Denmark’s management of its peace and security policy, like that of other donors, has been adjusted to match APSA developments. The Danish Task Force Africa, established at the Ministry of Defence, is tasked with coordinating all Danish defence efforts in support of APSA with other Nordic countries, the UK and the US.

Norway

Norwegian support to the ASF is delivered mostly through the Training for Peace (TfP) programme. TfP is a civilian capacity-building scheme launched in 1995. It has two components – an operational training one, addressing police and civilian experts participating in ongoing PSOs, and a normative one, supporting the UN, the AU and the RECs via policy advice and research. TfP is a financially modest programme compared to those of other donors. However, by targeting early a little-trodden domain of expertise, and underpinning training and policy advice with research, TfP has achieved effects much beyond some of the better-endowed programmes.

Italy

Italy’s contribution to African PSOs revolves around the training of Formed
Police Units (FPUs), directly stemming from its own PSO experience in the Balkans. Italy hosts the Centre of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU), created in Vincenza in 2004 with US support. In July 2008, Italy rebranded its till then little known support for African PSOs the ‘Italian African Peace Facility’ and increased financial contribution significantly. Most of this contribution, however, is channelled to AMISOM, reflecting Italy’s traditional interests on the continent.

Japan

Japan’s interest in building capacity for African PSOs is directly related to its share of the UN peacekeeping budget (17 per cent), and partly to its interest in keeping the surroundings of the African continent safe for trade. Japan supports training at regional training centres in the non-military field. It is also one of the few donors to direct resources to the AU Peace Fund (covering, for example, salaries of AU liaison offices at AMISOM).

Multilateral donors

European Union

The EU has to be considered as an actor in its own right, separate from its member states. This is particularly so since the creation of the African Peace Facility (APF) in 2004, which made the European Commission a major enabler of the ASF. The APF has provided the AU and the RECs with a fairly sizeable, predictable and so far irreplaceable source of funding for African PSOs. It has also placed the EU in a leading role in AU and REC capacity development at HQ levels via the financing of numerous technical assistance missions.

The EU is committed to pursuing its support. €300 million have been earmarked for the APF over the period 2008–13, of which €65 million will go to capacity-building, and €200 million to PSOs. This is in addition to EU support via so-called Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs), which earmark an ever growing share of funding to peace and security.

United Nations

The United Nations (UN) is not a ‘donor’, but an important provider of technical assistance and source of conceptual inspiration for the AU. The UN strongly influenced the initial ASF concept, based on the assumption of a prompt transition between African and UN missions, and its experience of complex, multidimensional PSOs, has imposed itself on the basis of hard AU experience in Darfur and Somalia.

The UN high-level political commitment made at the World Summit in 2005 to deploy a ten-year capacity-building plan to support the AU in the fields of ‘training, military, police, logistics, finance, and communication’ has given the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations the leeway needed to export its standards and concepts with lasting impact on the AU and the RECs.
Donor support balance sheet

Donor support can be measured in terms of coherence and in terms of impact.

Coherence

The lack of clarity in the assumptions underpinning the ASF largely explains the discrepancies and lack of coherence in donor support. As long as all assumptions remain potentially valid, and none has clear authority over the others, each donor remains free to ‘pick and choose’ among the components of the ASF that best match its national or institutional preferences or habits. This makes donor coordination even more vital, but such coordination remains ever a challenge as: (a) donor coordination is time and effort consuming; (b) each donor is motivated by its own national or institutional interests; (c) there is a degree of competition among donors, primarily for reasons of political visibility on the international scene and before home constituents.

Donor coordination from the AU/RECs themselves remains subject to two constraints: (a) with less coordinated donors, African institutions have more leeway to request overlapping funding; (b) neither the AU nor the RECs have the capacity to coordinate donors – they are mostly overwhelmed by the number and variety of donor approaches.

The consequence is gaps, overlaps and, in the case of military training or equipment, problems of inter-operability in the field.

Impact

Passing judgement on impact is extremely difficult, as much of the institutional capacity-building work is very recent and the depth of experience yet insufficient for a collective assessment of the performance of AU and RECs staff. What can be said is that lasting shortcomings in numbers, especially at the AU, despite donors’ readiness to finance posts, remain an important constraint. A more positive indicator is conceptual development, where donors’ support has allowed the AU/RECs to make substantial progress over time. A key question mark remains over the effectiveness and relevance of units and troops training. This is an issue with which donors have struggled for a number of years, and which is reputedly difficult to document. Scattered evidence provides a highly mixed picture.

African ownership balance sheet

International donors and African recipients share a common objective: lessening Africa’s dependence on international action or inaction, and increasing its capacity to react quickly and appropriately to prevent conflict escalation and eventually establish lasting peace. ‘Ownership’ has thus been the mantra of donors’ programmes, together with the motto of ‘partnership’. Distinguishing various levels of ‘ownership’, the balance sheet on the African side looks as follows:
‘Ideological ownership’, as measured by the reiteration of high-level statements endorsing the common ASF goals since the early 2000s, can be considered as achieved;

The picture is mixed as regards ‘political ownership’, defined as the willingness of African states to participate in actual ASF operations: whilst Africa has demonstrated its determination to undertake PSOs, the level of participation of various states has remained uneven;

‘Sociological ownership’, as a kind of emotional adhesion to the ASF project and personal commitment to contribute to it, is shared by small groups of specialists working on the ASF at AU and RECs HQs, but hardly to be perceived in national institutions;

‘Technical ownership’, characterised by the understanding, acceptance and ability to implement ASF concepts, can be described as poor, to the extent that work on the ASF has largely been led by military establishments, and remains little understood by other relevant agencies or ministries, or by AU and RECs services outside those directly responsible;

‘Financial ownership’, remains but a distant objective: the lack of autonomous financing is the Achilles’ heel of the ASF.

**Conclusion**

There is no alternative to helping Africans help themselves. Neither is there peacekeeping on the cheap, whether for the Africans, who will sooner or later have to take the lead, nor for external partners, who will pursue their supportive role for the foreseeable future. It is only by proactively assuming political, conceptual and financial ownership that AU member states will credibly demonstrate that the ASF is not an entirely foreign-mastered project and that the solutions they bring to African problems are truly ‘African’.
1 Introduction

The end of the Cold War sent shock waves not only across Europe, but also across Africa. After the events in Rwanda and the international community’s indecisiveness and incoherence in approaching the crisis in Somalia in 1994, African leaders realised that they had to take things into their own hands if they did not want the continent to sink into chaos. The drive for an ‘African renaissance’, spearheaded by a small vanguard of African leaders, was marked by the search for ‘African solutions to African problems’. Nowhere was this truer than in the peace and security field, where the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) was conceived, with the African Standby Force (ASF) as the flagship project at its core.

Similarly to its twin project in the economic field, NEPAD (New Partnership for African Development), the ASF attracted the immediate interest of many bilateral and multilateral partners. In truth it was with a sigh of relief that large Western nations saw African countries taking more direct responsibility for their own security as the costs of UN operations on the continent were reaching staggering levels. African conflicts looked as intractable as ever, and Western interests shifted more and more toward the Middle East and South Asia.

Great hopes were immediately invested in the ASF project. As the ‘Framework Document’ and the first ‘Roadmap’ were adopted in 2003–2005, it was foreseen that, with the combined efforts of the African Union (AU), the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the partners, the ASF would reach full operational status by 2010. As the deadline approached, however, it was obvious to all that results had remained below expectations: drawing lessons from the major Command Post Exercise ‘Amani Africa’, in early 2011, ‘ASF Roadmap III’ moved the operationalisation target to 2015.

Why did this gap between expectations and results arise? Did the partners fail in delivering effective support? Or were the Africans themselves not up to the task? Could it even be that the ASF concept was not as sound and stable as it appeared in the first place?

Such are the questions which this report aims to disentangle, focusing on external support initiatives to the ASF by several bilateral and multinational contributors, their strengths and potential deficiencies, and the significance of the support to the desired outcome. This, however, cannot be done without an examination of Africa’s own efforts, shortcomings and progress.

Following a brief methodological Section 2, Section 3 of the report therefore reviews the history and rationale for the ASF, as it emerged from the desire to generate responses to African conflicts, and describes the rapid evolution of the concept in recent years. Building on a brief review of lessons learned from past and current African peace support operations (PSOs) in Section 4, Section 5 attempts to take stock of the development of the ASF across its different components (headquarters (HQ) capacity, units training, logistics, funding, etc.), providing a mixed picture of shortcomings and achievements. Chapter 6 draws on those experimental findings, analysing the lower-than-expected
results as a consequence of the ambiguity of the ASF project, which remains – at this point, a ‘moving target’ subject to many interpretations. Chapter 7 offers an extensive review of donor support with the aim of assessing the impact and cohesion of the contribution of nine national and two multinational external actors. As it demonstrates, the balance sheet can only be judged reservedly as positive, as the ambiguities remaining around the goal pursued leave every contributor free to pick and choose, compounding the natural bias of its national or institutional interests. On that basis, it is possible to draw a conclusion on the further aim, ‘African ownership’, which both Africans and donors claim to share. Distinguishing between different levels of ownership, Section 8 concludes that the Achilles’ heel of the ASF remains, as ever, the lack of ‘financial ownership’: as long as Africa is unable to muster a minimal basis for the autonomous financing of the ASF, its aspiration to set up an African-led mechanism for crisis management and peace consolidation in Africa will remain but a distant objective.

2 Methodology

Donors surveyed in this study include nine of the largest providers of official development aid (ODA), as well as the EU, a major provider of ODA in its own right, and the UN, because of its specific role. Although most of the support for the ASF does not qualify as ODA, its major providers are also the major ODA donors (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 2007).

Collecting information for the present study was not an easy task. First, as will be demonstrated below, the ASF is a constantly evolving project, with new decisions, new concepts and new experiences emerging every day. Second, there is no single definition of what qualifies as ‘support for the ASF’. For some, institutional support to the AU in the field of human resources or communications management, for example, which is not ASF-dedicated but will make the Force easier to manage at the strategic level, is considered support to the ASF; for others it is not. To make the subject manageable, the decision was made to abide by the choice of individual donors or recipients in each particular case.

Third, even if there is agreement on what qualifies as ‘support for the ASF’, channels by which money or technical assistance is provided are numerous, even for a single donor. For large ones, like the European Union (EU), it is hardly possible to find one single person who possesses a comprehensive view in the entire institution. This is why the choice was made to concentrate on the most important programmes, in financial volume and duration. Fourth it is impossible, at any given time, to obtain a complete picture encompassing programmes signed, funds committed, actual expenditure, etc. even for a single donor, and even less for a combination of donors as programme durations are widely different. Systematic comparisons across donors would not be meaningful. This is why findings in Section 7 have been presented in a donor-by-donor fashion. This lack of comparability across donors cannot be compensated for by inquiries with African beneficiaries as both the AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) – which are the most important
recipients – have still underdeveloped reporting procedures. This explains why most of the information collected comes from donor, rather than African sources.

In order to overcome those limitations affecting access to sources of information, desk research was combined with semi-directive interviews with key actors involved in developing or supporting the ASF. Interviews were thus carried out at the EU and her permanent member states’ representations in Brussels, in Addis Ababa with AU and United Nations (UN) staff and representatives of various donors, and in Libreville – the seat of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), where this author is based – for additional insights into one of the RECs. Interviews produced a wealth of information, both factual and in terms of how various actors assess progress. They were also an important channel to access a vast area of recent ‘grey literature’ on the ASF, as many documents remain work in progress, or have not been published or widely distributed.

3 The African Standby Force: rationale and history

3.1 African solutions to African problems

Soon after the end of the Cold War in 1989, it must have been clear to African leaders that their countries had lost their strategic value as allies in the great ideological confrontation. When the Security Council failed to authorise UN intervention in Rwanda in 1994, letting the most horrible genocide unfold before the world’s eyes, the proof of the international community’s neglect was unmistakable. The subsequent indecisiveness of the United States (US) and its incoherence in approaching the crisis in Somalia was a further indicator of the declining reliability of Western policy – at a time when Russia itself was in disarray and China not yet the alternative anchor it would later become. African leaders realised that they had to take things into their own hands if they did not want the continent to sink into chaos.

The end of the Cold War had a powerful impact on Africa in another way. With the ‘end of history’, as Francis Fukuyama proclaimed it, it became clear that the status quo in African political and economic orders was no longer tenable (Fukuyama 1992). African leaders had no choice but to adapt to what seemed at the time to be the single model: democracy on the political front, free market in production and trade. The faith of many in and outside Africa that change was possible was reinforced by the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa and credibly demonstrated by the policies of successive South African leaders, Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki.

1 Interview, EU Commission official, Addis Ababa (all interviews in Addis Ababa in April 2009, otherwise dated).
With the mood prevailing that Africa was rife for change and actually aspiring to it, it was possible for a small vanguard of African leaders to spearhead a drive for an ‘African renaissance’ marked by the overhauling of old institutions and the launch of bold new initiatives, and to initialise a revolution in values (Meredith 2006: 680). The new millennium thus opened with the decision of African leaders to replace the unwieldy Organisation of African Unity (OAU) with the AU and to launch the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) to boost a radical drive to lift the continent out of poverty. The new institutions were to be underpinned by a radical change in political standards. All of a sudden, sovereignty seemed no longer to be an absolute, but could be mitigated by innovations such as the African Peer Review Mechanism of NEPAD and even more, the recognition, in the AU’s Constitutive Act (AU-CA) of the ‘right of the Union to intervene in a Member State… in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’ (AU 2000, article 4(h)). The Rwanda trauma, it seemed, was finding a responsible African answer in setting a ‘responsibility to protect’ above the preservation of traditional sovereignty so dear to African states. It is in this context that a new African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), with an African Standby Force (ASF) as its core piece, was conceived.²

3.2 The African Peace and Security Architecture

If the political impetus for the development of the ASF was carried by the early 2000s winds of change, its basic conceptual and technical underpinnings were already present in the recommendations of the 2nd meeting of the African Chiefs of Defence Staff (ACDS) in Harare in 1997. That meeting recommended that the OAU (at the time) should endow itself with a capacity for early response to crisis escalation – before the UN could intervene and whilst political efforts were made to obtain UN engagement – and foresaw that such a capacity could be based on standby arrangements with the continent’s five sub-regions, each providing a brigade-sized contribution (AU 2003). The meeting also identified the generic requirements of such a force: HQ capacity, standard operating procedures (SOPs), logistics, training, force generation capacity, and funding.

Work to implement the vision of the ACDS, however, could only begin in earnest once the creation of the AU had laid the political conditions. A first step was the adoption of the ‘Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union’ (PSC Protocol), in July 2002 (AU 2002). With that Protocol, Africa endowed itself for the first time with ‘a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts’ (Art. 2.1) via a Council of 15 periodically elected member states. The PSC, the core piece of the APSA, should be supported by the AU Commission, a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, a Special Fund and the ASF (Art. 2.2).

²  Group discussion at UN Peace Support Team to the AU under Chatham House rules, Addis Ababa, further on referred to as UN Peace Support Team ‘UNPST, group discussion’.
3.3 The African Standby Force

As a political document, the PSC Protocol did not go into the detail of what the ASF should look like. Importantly, however, it did specify that the Force ‘shall be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components in their countries of origin’ (Art. 13.1) and it made clear that the ASF should enable the AU to respond to a wide range of contingencies from observation and monitoring missions, to preventive deployments, humanitarian assistance missions, peace-building operations, and forceful intervention in a member state in grave circumstances. No political limitations were set a priori on what the ASF should be called to accomplish.

3.3.1 Policy framework and Roadmap I

Once the political framework had been set, it was left to the ‘technicians’ to develop the ASF concept. Those technicians, for the most part, were military officers, and this was reflected in the direction originally taken by the ASF.

Key documents in the conceptual development of the ASF are the Policy Framework (PF) adopted by the 3rd ACDS in May 2003 (AU 2003), and the Roadmap of 2005 (Roadmap I), intended to specify the calendar for the development of the various components of the Force.

The conceptual target, as described in the PF and Roadmap, is set by six scenarios, which the ASF should gradually be able to master. The scenarios, and their respective deployment timeframe, are as shown in Table 3.1.

Given the scope of the effort required, the PF and Roadmap divided the sequencing of ASF operationalisation in two phases. According to the PF, by June 2005, the AU was to have an HQ capacity to manage scenarios 1 and 2 and a reinforcement system to manage scenario 3 operations, whilst the regions should have strategic and brigade-level HQs, as well as reinforcement capacity to manage scenario 4 missions. By the same date the AU should set up standby rosters of 300–500 military observers (MILOBs) and about 240 individual police officers, as well as a standby system with at least two company-level formed police units (FPUs). An AU civilian roster including experts in administration; human rights; humanitarian issues; governance; disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR); and reconstruction, was also foreseen for the same date (AU 2003, Sections 3 and 5). The Roadmap shifted the goal slightly (to June 2006) for some components (AU 2005: paras. 7, 16, 17) but also made clear that civilians were not a phase I priority (AU 2005; Draft 2010 African Union-Vision quoted in AU 2008i: 4).

At the end of phase II, or by June 2010, the PF and Roadmap agreed that the AU should have HQ capacity to handle complex multidisciplinary PSOs in difficult environments (scenario 5), whilst the RECs should have improved on their capacity to deploy scenario 4 missions, in particular their rapid deployment capability (AU 2003; AU 2005: para. 3). Requirements for further work in a number of areas were identified and a series of workshops mandated on: (1) Doctrine; (2) SOPs; (3) Command, Control, Communication and Information Systems (C3IS); (4) Logistics; (5) Training and Evaluation (AU 2005: Annex B).
Table 3.1 ASF mission scenarios

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Deployment timeframe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>AU/Regional military advice to a political mission.</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>AU/Regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission.</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Standalone AU/Regional observer mission.</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>AU/Regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions (and peace-building).</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>AU Peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions, including those involving low-level spoilers.</td>
<td>90 days with the military component deploying in 30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>AU Emergency intervention, for instance in the case of genocide, when no other help is available.</td>
<td>14 days in two waves</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: African Union (2003: para. 1.6); African Union (2005); Aneme (2008: 1–21).

It was stated in the 1997 ACDS recommendations and reiterated in the PF and Roadmap that the ASF doctrine, planning procedures, SOPs and training standards should be based on those of the UN (AU 2003: Annex A; AU 2005: Section VIII).

3.3.2 Recent developments

Whilst the basic concepts underpinning the ASF stand, a number of incremental changes have led to important inflexions in its practical implementation in the recent past. Important building blocks have been the 2006 Policy Framework on the Civilian Dimension (CP Framework), which also includes police (AU 2006a), and some of the doctrinal work done in the context of the Workshops mandated by Roadmap I. Both the CP Framework and Chapter 7 of the ASF Doctrine are directly inspired from UN work to develop guidance for integrated missions and an Integrated Mission Planning Process (United Nations 2006a, 2006b). A trend away from the exclusive focus on the military dimension toward increasing attention to the multidimensional character of the ASF, both at the strategic and operational levels, thus became clear (De Coning 2007).

As a result, the 2nd meeting of African Defence Ministers in March 2008 pledged to ‘ensure that the civilian and police/gendarmerie components of the ASF receive an appropriate degree of attention in order to guarantee a balance in the development of the different components’ (AU 2008c).

On the back of that ministerial meeting ‘Roadmap II’ was adopted in July 2008 setting out the tasks to be accomplished during the short two years up to the deadline for full ASF operationalisation. Those included further work on HQ capacity, decision-making and mandate issues, logistics depots, strategic lift,
the rapid deployment capacity (RDC), and accelerated efforts to develop the civilian and police dimensions (AU 2008g).

Efforts were indeed undertaken between late 2008 and early 2010 to speed up the conceptual development, set standards and identify practical solutions on the police and civilian dimensions (AU 2010b), on the RDC, and on some specific areas such as health, logistics, and legal requirements. Preparation for the ‘Amani-Africa’ 2010 command post exercise (CPX) created an additional incentive to accelerate work on the police and civilian dimensions: the so-called ‘Carana scenario’ underpinning the exercise is a full-blown ‘scenario 4+’ type of operation; in other words, a complex PSO including stabilisation and peace consolidation (Amani-Africa Cycle 2009a, 2009b).

Crowning a series of field training exercises (FTX) conducted at the regional level, ‘Amani Africa’ was an important milestone in taking stock of achievements in building the ASF. The Amani CPX was meant to test the planning, command, control, and communication capability of AU and REC staff and the AU’s decision-making process at the politico-strategic level.

Originally intended as an ASF certification exercise, ‘Amani Africa’ was de facto gradually reengineered as a step in a longer process because it appeared in the course of its preparation over 2008 and 2009 that the ASF 2010 target was too ambitious. Indeed, the conclusion of the exercise evaluation report that the ASF was not yet operational, missing key capacity in the planning and conduct of PSOs at strategic and operational HQ levels, was a surprise to none (AU 2010b). Taking stock at its December 2010 meeting, the ministerial-level Specialised Committee on Defence, Safety, and Security ‘[exhorted] the commission... to fill the gaps identified in the “Amani Africa” exercise evaluation report’ (AU 2010a: para. 7, author’s translation). At the same meeting the ministers formulated recommendations for the finalisation of Roadmap III, explicitly setting a new deadline of 2015 for the full operationalisation of the ASF (AU 2010a: paras. 5b, 7t).

### 3.4 Donor response

Western responses to pre-2000 African initiatives to undertake PSOs were reserved as there were no ‘good’ models to support, although bilateral assistance was provided on the basis of traditional loyalties (Sections 4 and 7). Matters evolved quickly, however, on the basis of the new African commitments enshrined in the AU-CA, NEPAD and the PSC Protocol.

As of 2002, for four years in a row, Africa was a key item on the agenda of the G8 (g8italia2009 2009). Thus in Kananaskis (Canada) in 2002, G8 leaders adopted the ‘Africa Action Plan’ as a collective response to the NEPAD initiative. The Plan included the provision of technical and financial assistance to African countries and regional organisations to help them develop conflict prevention capacities. At Evian (France) in 2003, G8 members reinforced their

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3 For details see Section 5.1.
support, but targeted it more directly towards African military capacity-building. A year later, at Sea Island (USA) the G8 expanded on this commitment, including pledges to support the development of logistical and transportation arrangements, police training and the training of 75,000 troops worldwide – whereby it was unclear what proportion of the total would be African (Powell 2005: 25ff).

Moving beyond traditional units and officer training, partners also began engaging at the time in massive technical assistance efforts to support the conceptual development of the ASF and to underpin African capacity-building via comprehensive research and training programmes carried out in a range of Peacekeeping Training Centres (PTCs). It was when, for example, the five core ASF conceptual workshops underpinning the ASF were held, and when partners resolutely threw their weight behind the birth and growth of the West African Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC).

Once it became clear that the Africans were willing to engage in difficult crisis management in the field, donor support to operations also became more readily available. A real ‘breakthrough’ in material support was represented by the launch of the EU African Peace Facility (APF) in 2004, from funds earlier earmarked for development aid. The second round of the APF, covering the period 2008–2013, was later endorsed by the 10th European Development Fund, again proving major financial support. Other donors, such as Canada and the US, would also be forthcoming (Section 7).

4 Lessons learned from African PSOs

There is a wide literature covering lessons learned from African PSOs since they were first initiated by ECOMOG, the ECOWAS force, in the early 1990s. For some, ECOWAS operations ‘eloquently demonstrated that African states can maintain peace and security on their continent’ (Ero 1999: 55–74). However, the bulk of the literature bearing on ECOWAS and subsequent operations from the AU and other sub-regional organisations, demonstrates that African PSOs have been beset by recurrent problems linked to insufficient strategic and operational management and coordination, poor logistics, lack of funding, breakdowns of conduct and discipline, and occasional political quarrels about their legitimacy (Aboagye 2004, 2008; Aning 1999: 75–96; Aning 2004: 533–42; Berman 2002a; Berman 2002b; Berman 2003: 199–214; Berman 2004: 27–32; Berman and Sams 2000; Boshoff 2003a: 41–4; Boshoff 2003b; Cilliers 1999; Daniel 2008; Franke 2006; Guicherd 2007; Howe 1996; Ford details, see Sections 5.1 and 5.3 respectively.

5 Salim Ahmed Salim, quoted by Ero.

The twin weaknesses of lack of funding and poor logistical capacity characterise every single African PSO, with two possible outcomes: either the planned operation has to be scaled down, or it can only be undertaken with massive assistance from international partners. During its first ECOMOG operation in Liberia (1990), for instance, ECOWAS could not honour agreements to support the troops after the first month (Berman and Sams 2000: 106; Pitts 1999). Consequently some troop-contributing countries (TCCs) had to bring their contingents home prematurely (Olonisakin 1997: 363). Basically, ‘[t]here was no logistic capacity… except for what external partners could provide’ (Malan 2008: 93).

In 2003, ECOWAS’s ECOMIG deployment (Côte d’Ivoire), which was supposed to anticipate a UN deployment, was hampered by financial difficulties that delayed the operation for two months. It took another three months to set up a force HQ that still lacked vehicles and appropriate rooms. Even more importantly, ECOWAS proved unable to raise more than 1,500 of the 2,386 authorised troops, leading to the UN Security Council decision to authorise France to deploy a 4,000-strong troop force (Operation Licorne), which took over the lion’s share of patrolling the ceasefire line (Gberie and Addo 2004). The €15 million funding for one year of ECOMIG was raised from France and minor contributions from eight other European countries.

A fairly similar situation has been encountered elsewhere. Although described as ‘the first operation wholly initiated, planned and executed by AU members’ (Murithi 2007: 75), AMIB, the AU mission in Burundi, ‘would have been virtually impossible to establish’ without the scale and flexibility of external support (US$12 million from the US and UK combined) (Aboagye 2004: 13; Cilliers 2005; Mackie et al. 2006: 10). Like in the Western African PSOs, funding problems hindered force generation and the mission remained much below its approved strength (Boshoff 2003a: 44ff). The follow-up UN mission, ONUB, with considerably more staff, and an annual budget of about US$330 million, was ‘significantly beyond Africa’s resources’ (Aboagye 2004: 13; Cilliers 2005).

Operations undertaken in Central Africa fared even less well. In 1997 MISAB in the Central African Republic (CAR), an _ad hoc_ operation authorised by a group of francophone states, was entirely dependent on France, which organised the deployment of all forces, provided logistics and paid for all food and allowances, fuel, and housing (Landsberg 1999: 46; Feitz 2002: 109ff). The same year a Stabilisation Force for the Republic of Congo never materialised because no country emerged ‘able and willing to assure the command and control or [had] the ability to generate the necessary financing’ (Berman and Sams 1998; Kofi Annan quoted by Berman and Sams 2000: 230). It is only in 2002 that the Central Africans were able to undertake an autonomous

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6 2,700 out of the authorised strength of 3,335.
operation, FOMUC, with heavy support from the French, and then the EU (FOMUC 2008).

Conduct and discipline issues seriously marred the reputation of ECOMOG in the early years. In ECOMOG’s first Liberia mission, Nigerian troops became ‘notorious for... human rights abuses’ and theft (Ero 1999: 55–74), neutralising the otherwise positive effects of the operation. This was unfortunately repeated with widespread stealing, indiscriminate violence against alleged rebels and civilians, and trade in ‘blood diamonds’ by ECOMOG soldiers in Sierra Leone (Ero 1999: 65). Occurrences of troop misbehaviour seem to have been much less frequent in subsequent African PSOs – presumably the result of combined efforts by TCCs and donors to stress troop discipline and ethics in training programmes – although they have not disappeared entirely.7

Political partisanship, a burden that affected many African actual or would-be PSOs, and had repercussions in the field (such as Nigerian peacekeepers taking sides between warring factions in Liberia and Sierra Leone) (Berman and Sams 2000: 106ff, 178), has largely disappeared, as the AU and RECs have become stronger and PSOs are increasingly led by institutions rather than regional hegemons. The development of AU and sub-regional conflict resolution mechanisms has undoubtedly played a role (Berman 2002a: 34; Shearer 1999). However, it has not eliminated all temptations of political interference (Meyer 2009: 163–6).8

Some 15 years after Africans began to undertake their first PSOs, the balance of strengths and weaknesses is well-established. An assessment of AMIS, the AU mission in Sudan some two years into its deployment, summarises common shortcomings: insufficient planning before and during the mission; lack of communication and interoperability between military, police, and civilians; weaknesses in administrative, financial and human resources management; absence of a functioning CIMIC9 capable to handle contacts with the political environment; absence of reliable logistical support and the ability to handle logistics; and finally, total dependence on external donors in terms of funding and technical advice (Guicherd 2007).

It is toward the mitigation of those weaknesses that African and partner efforts are directed.

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7 Chadian troops in CAR have been accused of rape, for example (interview, technical assistant, Libreville, May 2009).

8 For instance, it is well known that the Chadian troops of MICOPAX in the CAR are not neutral.

9 Part of the military structure handling relations with civilians – civil-military cooperation.
5 The current state of the ASF

Much headway has been made in the development of the ASF since the first Roadmap (2005). Three years later, in mid-2008, Roadmap II contained a table assessing achievements. An update compiled by this author in December 2010 is presented below (updated boxes in *italics*):

Table 5.1 **ASF achievements end of 2010**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Achievements</th>
<th>The five regional brigades</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EASBRIG</strong> East Africa</td>
<td><strong>FOMAC</strong> Central Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framework Documents</td>
<td>Done</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
<td>Done</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning elements</td>
<td>Done</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade HQs</td>
<td>Done</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pledged Units</td>
<td><strong>MoU on troop allocation pending,</strong> 5,500 troops pledged by member states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Components</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centres of Excellence</td>
<td>Done</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standby Rosters</td>
<td>Delegated to AFDEM²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1) Not identical with the MoU on the establishment of the ASF (see row two of this table);
2) African Civilian Standby Roster for Humanitarian and Peace Building Missions.

This table, however, requires a number of comments.
5.1 Conceptual developments

Thanks to a series of continental workshops held in 2005 and 2006, the basic common conceptual core of the ASF doctrine, SOPs, C³IS, logistics, training and evaluation has been established, and was later endorsed by African Defence Ministers (AU 2008c).

However, because these documents were drafted at a time when the civilian and police dimensions were still underdeveloped (AU 2008b, 2008i, 2009c), further adjustments were undertaken – for the civilian component – during workshops in Kampala in July 2008 and Dar es Salaam in July 2009 (AU 2009f, 2010b: para. VIII 2–5). Not only was it decided that both the AU and each REC should establish a civilian PLANELM (planning element) of four staff, but it was also agreed that the civilian components should number approximately 60 staff, thus requiring the development of a civilian standby roster of approximately three hundred civilian specialists. The police component was further developed at a series of joint workshops of the AU/RECs Police PLANELMs (Algiers, October 2008; Gaborone, July 2009; Nairobi, March 2010) (AU 2008j). This led to a significant overhaul, and extension, of the concept. Whereas the police component had originally been developed as a civilian element of the ASF (AU 2006a), it eventually evolved into a two-pronged structure including both individual police (240 per brigade) and Formed Police Units (two company-level units per brigade). As the latter are mostly paramilitary in character (gendarmerie), the Police SOPs are surprisingly detailed with regard to the use of firearms (including 80 AK47 assault guns, and 10 pump action guns) for a standard police component.

Concurrently, the Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) has moved into focus, with the ambitious goal of achieving two independent, multidimensional RDC units of 2,500 men/women each on readiness at any given time by 2012 (AU 2009e, 2010b ‘Key RDC Features’: para. 16).

To frame the ASF development in the continental context, a protocol of agreement setting out respective responsibilities and consultation mechanisms between the AU and the RECs has been signed in January 2008 (AU 2007, 2008h), but its implementation, in particular in crisis situations involving actual deployment, requires further political discussions as there is no well-oiled consultation process between the PSC and the sub-regional crisis management mechanisms. The lack of a Memorandum of Understanding on the earmarking of units to serve at the AU’s request was highlighted by the Amani evaluation report (AU 2010b: para. 24a).

10 It was decided in the Dar es Salaam workshop that the establishment of the civilian roster would be externalised for three years until responsibility was transferred back to the AU and RECs (AU 2010b: para. VIII (2–5)).
11 As proposed by the FSF Police Harmonisation Workshop Addis Ababa 11–13 February 2009.
12 APSTA (African Peace Support Trainers Association) (undated), Appendix B.
Table 5.2 Rapid Deployment Capability readiness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Standby</th>
<th>Out of cycle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Jan–Jun</td>
<td>SASF¹</td>
<td>EASF</td>
<td>NASF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CASF</td>
<td>ESF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul–Dec</td>
<td>NASF²</td>
<td>SASF</td>
<td>ESF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EASF</td>
<td>CASF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Jan–Jun</td>
<td>ESF³</td>
<td>NASF</td>
<td>CASF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SASF</td>
<td>EASF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul–Dec</td>
<td>CASF⁴</td>
<td>EASF</td>
<td>EASF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NASF</td>
<td>SASF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Jan–Jun</td>
<td>EASF⁵</td>
<td>CASF</td>
<td>SASF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>NASF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul–Dec</td>
<td>SASF</td>
<td>EASF</td>
<td>NASF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CASF</td>
<td>ESF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AU (2010b)
Notes: (1) SADC (Southern African Development Community) Brigade; (2) North African Brigade; (3) Ecowas Brigade; (4) Central African Brigade; (5) East African Brigade

5.2 Headquarters capacity

The ASF Policy Framework foresaw the establishment of a 15-staff planning element (PLANELM) at the AU and each of the RECs (Institute for Security Studies 2004: 4). This was accomplished as foreseen during phase I of the Roadmap, and PLANELMs are now in place at the AU and in all RECs or Regional Mechanisms (RMs), or, as in the case of NASBRIG, in preparation. The requirement for brigade HQs was fulfilled with the exception of two brigades, SADCBRIG and FOMAC, which deliberately decided against them for a variety of reasons, including high costs (Institute for Security Studies 2004: 6).

The setting up of PLANELMs required the overcoming of a number of institutional and political difficulties, such as in the East African region, where the development of EASBRIG was disjointed from the existing REC (Intergovernmental Authority for Development – IGAD) and entrusted to an ad hoc Coordination Mechanism (EASBRIGCOM) in March 2007 (EASBRIGCOM 2009). Both EASBRIGCOM and the already existing EASBRIG PLANELM are located in Karen, Kenya, whereas the brigade HQ and its logistic base will be located in Addis Ababa. Even more difficult political problems have hindered the development of NASBRIG as Morocco’s absence from the AU makes it

13 For the Amani cycle see www.amaniafricacycle.org.
impossible for the North African REC, the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), to serve as framework for a continental project, and Egypt, a major military power, is not a member of the AMU. As a result, only in December 2008 did the Northern African Chiefs of Defence Staff agree to set up a brigade, which will be headquartered in Cairo, whereas the secretariat of the regional mechanism will go to Tripoli.14

The question remains open whether those PLANELMs/brigade HQs have the capacity to carry out the planning, command and control of operations, since the quality and quantity of staff remains insufficient almost everywhere. A 15-member PLANELM may be reasonable for a REC for the purpose of capacity-building, especially if it is doubled by a brigade HQ, but it is certainly insufficient for the AU, which has to be the conceptual and organisational driving force for continental capacity-building efforts and has undertaken two extremely challenging missions, AMIS and AMISOM, over the same period. In practice, operational pressures on long-term planning and development fell victim to operational necessities as staff became overstretched once the decision to set up the ASF was endorsed in the Policy Framework (Ramsbotham et al. 2005a: 334). With a much lighter burden, ECCAS, the only REC currently leading a PSO, is finding it similarly difficult both to manage its capacity-development programme and discharge its operational duties.15

Lack of staff to plan and oversee operations explains why the management of AMIS in 2004 could not be entrusted to the AU’s Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD), but required the establishment of an ad hoc structure, the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF), which operated only with significant technical (and financial) assistance from the UN and major donors (AU 2004b; Klingebiel 2006: 53, 65). Likewise, it is the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) in Nairobi that does much of the work of managing AMISOM. At this point neither the AU nor the RECs are appropriately staffed to develop the ASF as a multinational tool. The AU PSOD only recently hired three police staff, and ECCAS has only two officers and EASBRIG only one officer in charge of developing the police component.16 The latter was the first REC to hire an expert to manage the Civilian Component in 2008,17 with the AU following, and ECCAS had only one full-time, and one part-time person by October 2009. The heavy dominance of the military at HQ level was one of the issues raised by the Amani evaluation report as deserving urgent corrective action (AU 2010b, ‘Amani Evaluation Report’: para. 17). More globally, the exercise highlighted the many shortcomings the AU and REGs would have to remedy in order to efficiently carry out the planning and conduct of any operation. Extensions of the Amani cycle (an ‘Amani two’, and ‘Amani three’) were suggested (AU 2010b, ‘Draft Roadmap III, Introduction’: para. 2).

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15 Interview, French military adviser, Libreville, June 2009.
16 Telephone interview, UK security adviser, Addis Ababa.
17 Email exchange with Head of Research IPSTC, Karen, June 2009.
Lack of staff at the POSD is not a money issue, as funds have been made available by donors. The EU had already agreed in 2004 to finance 40 positions at the PSOD. By the end of 2008, only 11 positions had been filled (Africa and Europe in Partnership 2009: 6). In 2007, the EU further agreed to finance a ‘Strategic Planning Management Unit’ (SPMC) via another budget line, the Stability Instrument. The SPMC would represent a boost of 34 additional staff dedicated to the management of AMISOM (AMISOM 2009). However, by April 2009 only five staff had been recruited. Hiring problems at the AU have long been pinpointed (High Level Panel 2007: para. 129–45), but they seem difficult to overcome for a combination of reasons ranging from political bias, through heavily centralised decision-making, to lack of technical capacity to manage human resources, to competition with better-paying UN agencies (High Level Panel 2007: para. 129–45). The post of Head of the ASF at the AU has remained vacant since the death of General Hassan in 2006. However, the position of High Representative for the Operationalisation of the ASF was created in late 2010 but this seems to have responded to a political, rather than technical requirement (AU 2010a: para. 7w).

HQ shortcomings are aggravated by the fact that not enough attention is being paid to administrative and financial management capacity. This hinders the ability of the AU and the RECs to absorb donations for capacity-building, but becomes a serious handicap for the management of operations and donor support to these operations. Donors consequently seek ways around this: for example, the US mainly provides contributions in kind, directly or via third parties; EU support for FOMUC and later MICOPAX is managed by a financial cell entrusted to the French military in Bangui; and Japan prefers to pay a 13 per cent administrative fee to the UN to manage its support to the AU, as this is considered less risky.

5.3 Training centres

Peacekeeping training centres (PTCs) have been established or developed in Africa since the mid-1990s, largely thanks to massive donors’ financial and technical assistance. The United Kingdom, France, Germany, Denmark and, more recently, Canada, have been major sponsors. Some of those centres, such as the well-known Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra, have been created specifically to serve the needs of the ASF; others are national institutions being rededicated or expanded for the same purpose (several French-sponsored training institutions becoming ‘Écoles Nationales à Vocation Régionale’ (ENVR); British-sponsored IPSTC in Kenya, or the Nigerian War College (ACSRS) etc.). Africa is therefore now endowed

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18 Interview, PSOD official, Addis Ababa.
19 The position was allocated to General Konaté of Guinea, perhaps to help boast the ASF politically but also as a reward for his deft handling of the political transition in his country.
20 Interview, French military adviser, Libreville, June 2009.
21 Interview, senior Japanese civil servant, Addis Ababa.
with a wide network of PTCs, the curricula of which encompass in principle the whole breadth of skills necessary to plan and run the ASF (Isturiz 2005: 78, 83).

With this range of PTCs, Africa theoretically has the potential to build the military and civilian staff required to operate the ASF both at HQs and in the field. This potential, however, is not fully realised as PTCs are a patchwork rather than a coherent network. Too often the curricula offered remain the ‘pet projects’ of various donors, who support them according to their national interests and preferences, rather than being oriented by a coherent AU or REC training plan. The inconsistency of the programmes tends to be greater in regions where PTCs have been in existence longer than the AU/REC staff. This is particularly the case in ECOWAS, where KAIPTC has been a ‘favourite’ of several donors for some time (UK, Germany) and the EMP Koulikoro/Bamako school in Mali, which has received much attention from the French and Canadians. As donors’ priorities evolve and coordination between them is low, the level of overall coherence between PTCs stalls. In West Africa the original agreement, largely at US, UK and French instigation, that there would be a ‘division of labour’ among the EMP Koulikoro/Bamako, KAIPTC and ACSRS respectively to assume tactical, operational and strategic training (Guillard 2007), has largely become moot. As the EMP Bamako has been adding operational level, and civilian component and police training to its curriculum, its course offers today differentiate it from that of KAIPTC mainly via the language of delivery – French (although EMP Bamako has also started introducing courses in English). Given the dearth of French-speaking peacekeepers around the world this is nevertheless a valuable contribution.

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Table 5.3 Training centres

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Curricula</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>Training centres per region</th>
<th>East</th>
<th>West</th>
<th>Central</th>
<th>South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>CCTCRPA</td>
<td>IPSTC</td>
<td>ACSRS</td>
<td>CSID</td>
<td>RPTC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>IPSTC</td>
<td>KAIPTC</td>
<td>EML</td>
<td>PMTC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical</td>
<td>EMP</td>
<td>EMP</td>
<td>EFOFAC</td>
<td>RPTC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>IPSTC+RPA</td>
<td>KAIPTC</td>
<td>EIFORES</td>
<td>ILEA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>IPCS</td>
<td>LECIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ACCORD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EGT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicine</td>
<td></td>
<td>CEOMP</td>
<td>EASS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De-mining</td>
<td>IMATC</td>
<td>CPADD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22 Compiled from various sources; see Acronyms.

23 Interview, EU Commission official, Addis Ababa.

24 Interview, French military official, Addis Ababa.
Efforts are underway at the AU, with the intellectual support of the African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA) and the political and financial backing of some donors, to try to instil coherence into the PTC’s programmes, so that they better serve ASF training needs. A joint training programming session is held in principle on a yearly basis with all the RECs under AU auspices (AU 2008f). Joint EU/AU, and Pearson Centre/University of Toronto expert missions toured the continent in April and May 2009 in order to better tailor future support for the PTCs to the needs of the AU and the RECs. This led, in the case of the EU, to the decision to support financially a number of PTCs assessed to be particularly suitable for ASF needs (AU/EU 2010). Whether these efforts will also increase Africa’s ownership of ASF training remains debatable. Deprived of autonomous African funding, lacking leadership and members’ commitment, and poorly accepted in some regions (for example Central Africa), APSTA has proved unable to provide the expected conceptual leadership (AU-PSOD 2010). Meanwhile the intellectual input of the AU and RECs in setting up PTC programmes remains limited and the PTCs mostly externally financed.

5.4 Units identification and preparedness

According to the table annexed to Roadmap II (see introduction, Section 5), all RECs have identified the units that must compose their regional brigade. Of the 6,500 personnel that must constitute ECOBRIG, 6,200 have already been confirmed by member states; they are reportedly ready, deployable within 90 days and capable to sustain 90 days of operation (Data in this section from AU 2008e; also Kinzel 2008). A planned RDC of about 2,770 soldiers – as part of the brigade – deployable within 14 days is not yet operational, as work on the RDC generally only started gathering pace in April 2009 (AU 2009d). A tiny number of police will be included in the brigade – the result of much lobbying from Canada. EASBRIG, like ECOBRIG a favourite of international donors, has made much headway recently despite the early difficulties linked to its institutional anchoring. The brigade will have 5,500 military and civilian personnel and include a police component of 48 officers (Levine 2008: 23–6). EASBRIG, SADCBRIG and ECOBRIG conducted their command post and field exercises in 2009 (Dersso 2010: 13ff). The decision to create the SADCBRIG, including a police component, was made in 2004 and units were pledged by August 2007. ECCAS has been catching up rapidly since 2007: member states have identified the units composing FOMAC, which should have 4,800
personnel; more recently FPUs have also been earmarked by Angola, Cameroon, Gabon, Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Chad. Some operational experience was gained during the small-scale operation MICOPAX in the CAR, and the command post and field training exercise ‘Kwanza’ in 2010. Evaluations of ASF field exercises were, according to press releases, generally a success (Le Phare 2010; for SADC see Mandrup 2009; for EASBRIG see AFRICOM 2009b). Because of its late start described above, NASBRIG is not yet reality. However, according to a competent observer, if ‘the North Africans decide today to set up a brigade they will quickly succeed because they have the most professional and best equipped forces in Africa’.30

Countries pledging troops and officers are a mark of political commitment. It is not yet a guarantee of force effectiveness. Western trainers have often confirmed the heavy task they face in providing African units with the most basic training in discipline, and even marksmanship before they can think of transforming a unit into peacekeepers.31 There is also the question of the collective performance of the African military. Apart from a few nations (Nigeria, Angola, South Africa, Ethiopia, and nowadays, Rwanda) African armed forces do not have the capacity to perform complex military operations (Meinken 2005: 6; Schmidt 2007: 1050). Few have the experience of warfare against other nations’ armies and apart from Angola, none has ever succeeded in overcoming internal armed resistance (Kinzel 2008; Meinken 2005: 5; Clayton 2001: 51–68). The current example of the FARDC’s (Armed Forces of the DRC) inability to neutralise the FDLR (Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda) Hutu forces in eastern Congo is a patent example. The overall challenge was perceptively noted by Jakkie Cilliers who remarked in 1999 that it was from soldiers ‘ill-equipped, poorly trained by international peacekeeping standards, poorly led, often elitist, prone to intervention in the domestic political affairs of their country’, that the ASF will be made (Cilliers 1999: 133–53). Still, there has been some progress in the professionalisation of African armies. If acceptance for service in a UN operation is taken as a standard, as many as 18 sub-Saharan countries qualified in early 2011 (compared to 12 in mid-2001), providing a total of more than 21,500 UN peacekeepers.32

African police do not fare better than the military. A 2000 survey by the Ghanaian Government found out that ‘police were among the least trusted, least effective, and most corrupt of government institutions’ (Werlin 2005: 521). More recent findings from other countries confirm the picture (Swain 2009). Indeed, the police themselves in sub-Saharan countries perceive their role as being ‘a means of coercion’.33 This is a poor base on which to build a police force whose primary mission will be to restore human security in a post-conflict

30 Interview, French military official, Addis Ababa.
31 Interviews with several Western military personnel.
32 With the major contributors being: Benin (878 troops), Burkina (803 troops), Benin (2,274 troops), Ghana (2,569 troops), Kenya (801 troops), Nigeria (4,888 troops), Rwanda (3,490 troops), Senegal (1,532 troops), South Africa (2,006 troops), Togo (516 troops), Zambia (552 troops); www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml.
environment. The fact that in a number of African countries (in particular those with a French and Belgian colonial background) the police and the military are trained and equipped alike, does not improve the situation (ECCAS-CEEAC 2009: 17).

This task, however, is not impossible. Advisers involved in police PSO training have observed the enormous positive potential resulting from such training and deployment in terms of lifting standards of policing to internationally acceptable levels. Training, inclusion in a structured environment, and decent pay seem to be the combined keys to this success.

### 5.5 Logistics

As lessons from past African PSOs have demonstrated, African armies have notoriously weak logistics capabilities. A 1997 US government study concluded that five out of 20 African armies had none at all; another eight had logistics networks that could not even support company-level units beyond their barracks, and six (small) states had limited battalion-level capabilities to perform within their home state (Neethling 1999: 39). Exceptions to this pattern are basically limited to Egypt, Nigeria, Angola and South Africa (see International Institute for Strategic Studies 2009; DFI International 1997: Annex G: 413–58) – although in South Africa, the loss of trained staff and heavy decommissioning of material during the 1994 transition of the South African Defence Force to the South African National Defence Force took its toll. This lack of logistic capability directly results from the fact that most African armies have not been set up to confront external threats, but rather to deal with internal stability concerns. It also reflects the reality that most African states relied upon foreign intervention to protect their sovereignty and external security during two or three post-independence decades – including at times against their own national armies.

The lack of national logistics reflects on the capability of the ASF (Dersso 2009). A few of the brigades do have some lift capacity: SADCBRIG, thanks to the South African military, can offer helicopters and aerial transport. FOMAC can rely on one Ilushin 76 from Angola, one Hercules C130 each from Gabon and Cameroon, and a unit of three helicopters (ECCAS-CEEAC 2008: Art. 1, 4). NASBRIG has at least a helicopter squadron. Overall, the AU still has to...
develop a Strategic Lift concept, but not much headway seems to have been made in that direction (AU 2009b).

Regarding basic mission logistics needs, the AU and RECs have launched work into logistics depots as a way to overcome their well-known shortcomings. This effort, however, does not seem to have gone much beyond studies to identify the appropriate locations of the depots (AU 2010a: para. 7p)\(^3\) and initial drafts of their contents and costs (AU 2008e). Following protracted studies and political discussions, the decision to create a continental depot in Douala, Cameroon, was finally approved by the defence and security ministers in December 2010 (AU 2009b: para. 7; AU 2010b: para. V.1).

5.6 Funding

As progress is being made in a variety of areas, there is increasing awareness in AU and REC circles that the lack of funding remains a major obstacle to progress and, even more, to African ownership. In January 2008, senior officials from the AU and RECs underlined the severity of the predicament: ‘Examining the constraints weighing on our efforts, we have noted that funding is one of the greatest difficulties confronting the AU and Regional Mechanisms. Our organisations rely almost exclusively on resources provided by our partners’ (AU 2008h: 4).

Echoing this concern, the African Defence and Security Ministers appealed in March 2008 to African states to contribute more significantly to financing the activities undertaken by the AU and RECs for peace and security (AU 2008c: para. IX.1), an appeal they reiterated in December 2010 (AU 2010a).

Meanwhile, solutions involving the international community on a more permanent basis are being sought. In March 2009, a high-level commission (the so-called ‘Prodi Panel’) mandated by the Security Council proposed to extend the benefits of UN-assessed funding to the AU, and to create a multi-donor trust fund to support long-term tasks like capacity-building, conflict prevention and institution building (Prodi 2008). The proposal to use UN-assessed funding has not been accepted, but ad hoc solutions involving an ever greater technical and financial contribution from external sources are more and more implemented: UNAMID and AMISOM are examples. AMISOM’s is funded by the UN, the USA, the United Kingdom, Kenya, Italy, the EU, Sweden, China and the League of Arab States (United Nations 2009b; Hull and Svensson 2008). MICOPAX, the ECCAS mission in the CAR, is receives 50 per cent of its financing from the EU, and 30 per cent from France.

\(^{31}\) Douala for ECCAS; Gaborone for SADCBRIG; Hastings for ECOBRIG; and ‘Ethiopia’ for EASBRIG.

\(^{32}\) Interview, Western military adviser, Libreville, June 2009.

\(^{33}\) Author’s translation.

\(^{34}\) The budget for 1 May 2007 to 30 June 2009 amounted to some US$77.79 million. Proposed commitment authority for 1 July to 31 December 2009 amounted to US$185.67 million.
In this context, it is extremely difficult to see how the contemplated RDC can become reality. Taking the EU battle groups (1,500 personnel each) as a benchmark can help measure the scope of the problem: Sweden, for its part, had calculated the costs for a six-month standby period at €38 million, and for a deployment period of its battle group at €168 million (Lindstrom 2007: 24). With 2,500 personnel an RDC would be even more costly.

5.7 Summary

In sum, many of the weaknesses of former African PSOs have been, or are being addressed. PLANELMs are in place or being established in all RECs and the AU. The PSOD is being reinforced so that PSOs can be prepared and led in a more organised fashion. Agreements have been signed and crisis management mechanisms put in place, hopefully making ad hoc PSOs with debatable political legitimacy a thing of the past. A network of PTCs is being beefed up. Brigade units and staff are being identified – albeit with greater progress in the military than in the police and civilian fields. On the other hand, brigade operational capacity remains largely untested and could yet be frustrated by many difficulties, including lack of appropriate logistics and officer skills. Political decision-making procedures, strategic management, and operational capabilities lag behind, as ever more developments point to an increasingly complex concept of the ASF. Funding remains an entirely unresolved problem.

6 The ASF: A moving target

As the efforts just described demonstrate, the ASF is slowly becoming reality. It is clear, however, from recent conceptual work and recent and ongoing operations (AMIS, AMISOM, MICOPAX) that the AU’s and RECs’ aims are now pitched at the upper end of the scale of scenarios developed in the original Roadmap. An upward trend is visible in three directions:

- from the ‘fire brigade’ type of operation carried out by an agile, relatively unsophisticated ASF nipping the crisis in the bud before the UN takes over, to scenarios where Africans themselves assume peace consolidation tasks over the long run;
- from mainly military to multidimensional missions endowed with the whole range of civilian and police components;
- from low-risk deployments in relatively peaceful contexts to operations in environments with a high level of ‘spoilers’.

Recent developments confuse the picture further, rather than clarify it. Thus, the RDC concept, which has now been placed upfront in the list of priorities, combines quick reaction and multidimensionality. New tasks have also appeared on the list of possible ASF commitments, including disaster relief and naval operations (AU 2010b, ‘Draft ASF Roadmap III’: para. c4). On the other hand, operations like UNAMID and AMISOM tend to confirm the conclusion of a recent study by a leading expert that
if an ASF mission is to have a durable impact for the establishment of peace and stability in the host country, it will have to be deployed for a period of not less than five years, which is the average length of a mission.

(Dersso 2010: 8)

A large operation of the size of MONUSCO in the DRC could easily bind the whole ASF for years, leaving no operational reserves for a second ASF mission.

No open debate, however, has been carried out on those evolving assumptions, their political underpinnings or feasibility requirements. The ASF, therefore, is a moving target, ‘built on a swamp of non-addressed issues and high expectations’, as a veteran observer and player puts it. This is probably why draft Roadmap III identifies the need to review the six original scenarios underpinning the ASF as part of a more current ‘ASF vision’ (AU 2010b: para. 10b).

This gradual and unspoken shift in assumptions has two main consequences for donor support. First, it leads to misunderstandings, between Africans and partners, among the partners themselves, and sometimes within the services of a single nation. For example, whilst EU representatives argue that multidimensionality is a demand from the African side of the partnership, at least some PSOD representatives see pressure from Western partners behind the drive for multidimensionality. Some German voices are recorded as saying that the ASF remains a ‘mostly military project’, although the Germans are one of the main sources of assistance to the police component of the ASF! A representative of Japan interviewed in Addis Ababa expressed the view that the ASF should be a ‘fire brigade’ in times of crisis, although Japan itself cannot directly support the ASF military build-up. Overall, though, partners are wary of taking normative positions as this is perceived as too delicate politically. It is only a minority of independent analysts who dare state clearly that ASF ambitions may be beyond Africa’s means, at least in the short term (Guicherd 2007: 21–3; Klingebiel 2006: 54). At most, partners may point to the difficulty of integrating civilian, police and military components in African PSOs, even if this would theoretically produce better results.

The lack of clarity in assumptions, secondly, largely explains the discrepancies and lack of coherence in donor support. As long as all assumptions remain potentially valid, and none has clear authority over the others, each donor remains free to ‘pick and choose’ among the components of the ASF that best match its national preferences or habits. The result is a not always coherent

45 Interview, senior AU official, Addis Ababa.
46 Interview, German military adviser, Addis Ababa.
47 Group discussion at the German Permanent Representation to the EU, Brussels (thereafter referred to as ‘German position’).
48 Interview, senior civil servant, Japanese Embassy, Addis Ababa.
49 Telephone interview, UK civil servant, Addis Ababa, March 2009.
whole, as was illustrated in the patterns of donor support to PTCs (Section 5.3). Another consequence is that it is extremely difficult to assess the effectiveness of donor support, as there are no clear benchmarks, or the hierarchy among those benchmarks is debatable. The question whether the RDC of a brigade should be ranked higher or lower than its multidimensional character, for example, has only been averted by declaring the RDCs multidimensional units. Whether this is conceptually sound and/or practically feasible, however, has never been addressed.

Besides its inherent complexity, the increased level of ASF ambition has an immediate consequence: costs. As Africans seem to be gearing more and more towards leading operations of the same complexity as UN missions and with no limits in duration or degree of difficulty, the issue of funding their efforts assumes heightened significance.

7 External support

Providers of financial and technical support to the ASF have a variety of interests. One cannot but detect: in the French, UK and Belgian approaches remnants of their colonial legacies; in the Japanese, the country’s economic interests; in the Canadian, the influences of the Commonwealth and francophone countries; in the German a degree of ‘guilt complex’ mixed with angst about potential African immigration (Klingebiel 2005: 12).50

For clarity of presentation, it is useful to distinguish bilateral and multinational donors. While the former are more clearly motivated by national security interests, the latter respond to a more institutional approach underpinned by an ambiguous concept of ‘partnership’, although the financial and political interests of their member states are never far behind.

7.1 Bilateral donors

7.1.1 United States

Although the US has repeatedly been accused of turning its back on Africa, it is one of the major providers of PSO support to the continent. The disastrous mission to Somalia and the Rwandan crisis in 1994 powerfully contributed to convincing Washington of the necessity to enable the Africans to help themselves (Franke 2007). The constant rise in the UN peacekeeping budget, of which the US pays 26 per cent, was an additional incentive (Cilliers 2005; United States General Accounting Office 2002).

US support to African capacity-building for PSOs has developed in three stages. In broad terms, it has evolved from bilateral to increasingly multilateral support strategies, and from a focus on ‘train and equip’ programmes to

50 Interview, Official of the Irish Permanent Representation to the EU.
training programmes only. Extensive logistical and technical assistance is also provided in kind to operations (African PSOs or the contribution of African troops to UN operations) and is facilitated by the US maintenance of various equipment storages around the continent. The US does not provide direct financial support for operations.


ACRI aimed to train 12,000 soldiers from selected countries (AFRICOM 2009a; Carafano and Gardiner 2003), with each training cycle including a complete range of modules (aggregated from Berman and Sams 2000: 275; Globalsecurity 2009). From 1996 until 2002 9,000 troops were trained in total: Benin, Kenya, Malawi, Mali and Senegal received full battalion-level training over a three-year cycle, and Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Uganda completed at least one or two modules. All soldiers were equipped with uniforms, boots, personal gear, and even eyeglasses where necessary (Berman and Sams 2000: 273).

Like ACRI, ACOTA remained a bilateral programme, the most significant difference between them being perhaps a stronger emphasis on train-the-trainer arrangements, and the fact that ACOTA units would be trained and equipped for offensive military operations (AFRICOM 2009a; Bah and Aning 2008: 121).

In accordance with G8 commitments, GPOI marked a reorientation of US assistance towards APSA and ASF goals. GPOI provides multinational training in PSO skills, supports the development of regional HQs, and provides technical assistance to improve regional interoperability (Franke 2007). The ambition of the programme was to train 50,000 troops in Africa and 15,000 elsewhere until 2010, with US$500 million of its US$650 million budget going to Africa (Peace Operations Factsheet 2005). US assistance has concentrated primarily on ECOBRIG (following its long-standing relations with many countries in West Africa), and more recently, EASBRIG, whereas a presidential authorisation to work with ECCAS was issued but the implementing agreement has not yet been signed (White House 2009). Assistance to the AU proper began in 2006.

52 See www.africom.mil/. Following an initially extremely cold reaction to its initiative from the great majority of African states, the US resolved to establish the AFRICOM HQ at Stuttgart, Germany, at least on a temporary basis.
Besides its capacity-building initiative, the US has also given significant in kind support, mainly in the form of logistics and technical assistance, to African-led PSOs since AMIS. For example, it supported a major rotation of Ugandan troops to AMISOM in March 2010 (AFRICOM 2010) and it has made major contributions to the field logistics, equipment, and mobility of UN and AU peacekeepers (US State Department 2009; Kaufman 2008).

### 7.1.2 Canada

Canada’s support to the APSA is more broadly based than that of the US, both at source and on the recipients’ side. Canada has a ‘whole of government approach’ involving the Department of National Defence through its Military Training and Assistance Program (MTAP), the Foreign Office (DFAIT) with a Global Peace Operations Program (GPOP), and the Development Agency (CIDA) supporting institutional build-up in the peace and security sector.56 Support goes to the continental, sub-regional, and national levels, with a stronger focus on the former two and, as far as the RECs are concerned, to West and East Africa, although Canada began supporting ECCAS on a small scale in early 2009. Like the US, Canada provides support both for capacity-building and for operations.

Its approach differs substantially from that of the US. Whereas Washington’s focus is mainly on military aspects, Canada concentrates heavily on police training and development (via GPOP), the development of the AU’s and RECs’ capacity to handle multidimensional deployments (via GPOP and CIDA), and more recently, the training of civilians (Bernier 2008). Canada’s more multilaterally oriented approach is also demonstrated by its support to the UN Peace Support Team (PST) in Addis Ababa (aggregated from Berman and Sams 2000: 275; Globalsecurity 2009).

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54 Interview, US military representative, Libreville, February 2009.
55 Data aggregated from Globalsecurity (2009); US AFRICOM (2009c); Serafino (2007); Franke (2007).
56 Email exchange with Canadian official, Ottawa, March 2009.
A major Canadian channel for the implementation of various support programmes is the prestigious Pearson Peacekeeping Training Centre (PPTC), which not only develops curricula for existing training centres and training programmes (KAIPTC, EMP Bamako, IPSTC), but also proactively helps foster the non-military components of the ASF through support to the joint Norwegian/ACCORD ‘Training for Peace’ (TfP) programme (see below, Section 7.1.7). Currently, the PPTC is active in peacekeeping training at the national level in 16 countries in West and Central Africa, the Maghreb and South Africa (AU 2008f: Annex E). Additionally, Canada is one of the major sponsors of an increasingly large number of activities undertaken by the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie to support PSO training. In francophone parts of Africa, Canada’s support is mostly channelled through another Canadian sub-contractor, the Réseau francophone de recherche sur les opérations de paix (ROP). 57

Canada also invests a substantial amount of money in direct support to African PSOs and African peacekeepers. Its support to AMIS is estimated at €106.5 million between 2004 and 2006 (AU 2008f: Annex E). In 2008, Canada allocated €16.6 million to deploy up to 50 Canadian personnel to UNAMID and UNMIS (United Nations Mission in the Sudan) in order to increase the professional expertise of (mainly African) UN peacekeeping troops in the Sudan, and renewed its loan of over 100 armoured personnel carriers to UNAMID (ViveLeCanada 2008). A €25.54 million equipment and training package for UNAMID over 2006–2007 made Canada ‘the second-largest voluntary financial supporter’ after the USA (Bernier 2008).

In one way, Canada’s approach may be starting to resemble that of the US, as Ottawa is looking for an ‘exit strategy’ from the provision of salaries and direct money transfers. For example, in 2009 Canada was about to introduce schemes by which the proportion of salaries it pays for expert positions at the AU will gradually decrease each year until they reach zero. Funds dedicated to activities will not be affected. 58

7.1.3 France

Even more clearly than the US, France has striven to adapt its military presence in Africa, inherited from colonialism, to the parameters of the APSA. Initially bilateral, its cooperation has become increasingly multilateral since the early 2000s, focusing on the RECs (primarily ECOWAS, subsequently ECCAS, more recently EASBRIG), and the AU. French support to the ASF is delivered via two channels: the Ministry of Defence, which manages French forces permanently deployed in Africa, 59 and the Direction de la Coopération de

57 See www.operationspaix.net.
58 Interview, Canadian civil servant, Addis Ababa.
59 French bases should in the future be limited to Libreville, Gabon, Djibouti and Réunion, following the restructuring announced in 2010. However, France maintains a fairly important residual presence in West Africa under various guises (Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, etc.).
Sécurité et de Défense (DCSD), a structure meant to combine the technical assistance efforts of the MoD and the Ministry of the Interior from within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. French forces provide mostly tactical and pre-deployment training, occasionally also supporting HQ staff development.

Recently, this effort has been officially presented as aiming to support APSA. Despite this change of perspective, and despite the rebaptism of the former Direction de la Coopération Militaire et de Défense (DCMD) into DCSD, like Washington’s, Paris’s support remains more developed on the military side and its relevance to PSOs is not always clear (see Section 7.3), and it has yet to fully adapt to the multidimensional character of the ASF. Another similarity to the US is the tendency to decrease equipment support and concentrate on training ‘train-the-trainer’ activities that are deemed longer-lasting and cost less. Like the US and Canada, France is otherwise a major provider of logistics support (strategic transport and basic logistics) to African troops participating in African and UN-led missions.

France’s flagship programme to support African PSO capacity development has been the RECAMP programme (Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix). RECAMP has been a comprehensive programme, aimed at training PSO capacity across all levels – strategic, operational and tactical, through a series of events culminating in a field training exercise (FTX) (Ramsbotham et al. 2005b: 19ff; Berman 2002b: 7). From 1998 to 2006, France led five RECAMP cycles, marked by gradual efforts to match the APSA framework, to broaden the circles of participants and to ‘Europeanise’ the programme. RECAMP 1 (1998) and 2 (2000) were purely French-led exercises, involving, respectively, eight West African countries, plus the UK and the US, and seven Central African countries, plus eight outside partners. RECAMP 3, in 2001, was for the first time conceived as a partnership with an REC – SADC, and saw the involvement of 25 states, of which 16 were African. The pattern continued with RECAMP 4, carried out in cooperation with ECOWAS, which culminated in an FTX in Benin in 2004 involving 12 African countries, 13 other TCCs, and eight observers. RECAMP 5 began symbolically in Addis Ababa, at the AU headquarters, in June 2005 and ended with an FTX in Cameroon in 2006 led in cooperation with ECCAS, involving 10 of its member states and observers from 17 Western states (data aggregated from EMA 2009; Cameroon Tribune 2006; Berman 2002b).

RECAMP 6 marked the end of the cycle as a French project. Following protracted domestic negotiations and discussions with European partners (Guicherd 2006a: 20), RECAMP was folded into an EU project, and has served as the basis for the ‘Amani-Africa’ exercise in 2010, with France playing the role of the ‘Framework Nation’ (Amani-Africa Cycle 2008).

Meanwhile, France’s bilateral presence remains strong, but efforts are underway to re-tailor it to the APSA. Over the past few years, Paris has been

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60 Presentation by representative of the French Forces in Gabon (FFG) at the first meeting of training services in the ECCAS region, Libreville, 8–10 February 2011.

61 Interview, French military official, Libreville, June 2009.
systematically installing military advisers to the RECs (ECOWAS, ECCAS since 2006, EASBRIG in progress, offered to SADC but it has not responded yet) and to the AU. French forces permanently stationed in various African locations work in close relationship with the RECs via Détachements de formation opérationnels (DIO):62 For example, the French Forces in Gabon (FFG) work with ECCAS, the FFD in Djibouti cooperate with EASBRIG, and the troops in La Réunion stand ready to work with SADC. France has had a strong working relationship with ECOWAS since its support to ECOMICI; the link has remained via Operation Licorne in Côte d’Ivoire and the 23rd Marines Battalion garrisoned at Cap Vert (Senegal). Moreover, France’s presence at PTCs via funding and staff is strong and relatively broad-ranging. In all, the French state contributes to 14 African PTCs in domains ranging from general officer training and military medical training, to engineer, pilot and police training, with EMP Bamako being its flagship project.63 Akin to its move on the exercise side, France has been attempting to ‘europeanise’ its support to training centres by attracting EU and partner support to some PTCs on its priority list.64 The outcome of these efforts, however, remains unclear.

Finally, France is an important provider of operational and logistics support to African TCCs. For example, in May 2009, the French assumed the transportation of the Togolese contingent of MINURCAT (United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic) in CAR/Chad. In CAR itself, the logistics of MICOPAX, the ECCAS PSO, is largely provided by France, which thus finances approximately 30 per cent of the operation (aggregated from Berman and Sams 2000: 275; Globalsecurity 2009). France holds equipment ready to support African peacekeeping battalions at depots in Dakar, Djibouti, and Libreville (data aggregated from Ramsbotham et al. 2005b: 19ff; Berman 2002a: 38; Berman 2002b: 9). The French close bilateral military cooperation with a number of African states offers opportunities to support numerous activities. The preparation for the Central Brigade’s field training ‘Kwanza’ in Angola in May–June 2010 owes much to this relationship, although the French were not involved in the exercise itself.

7.1.4 United Kingdom

Like other donors, but at a slightly earlier stage, the UK has reshaped its peace and security assistance to Africa to match continental developments. The UK pioneered the ‘whole of government approach’, connecting the efforts of the Department for International Development (DFID), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence into a single cross-departmental strategy financed and implemented through an Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP). The ACPP maximises the effect of the conflict prevention policies of each of the three departments. It also enables the UK to

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62 Interview, French military official, Libreville, June 2009.
63 Interview, French military representative, Paris, March 2009.
64 For example Eiforces/Awaé, and EGT/Brazzaville.
match more closely the different components of the ASF and ensure greater coherence in the support between its military, police and civilian components.

‘Direct UK investment’ in African peace-related projects has been higher than £110 million annually for nearly a decade.

The ACPP finances a wide array of activities. Among them is the presence of conflict and PSO advisers with the AU and the RECs (ECOWAS, IGAD and now EASBRIGCOM) and key staff in major training institutions. For example, in the mid-2000s the UK had a twelve-person British Peace Support Team (BPST) located at IPSTC Karen (Kenya) (UK National Archive (undated); Ramsbotham et al. 2005a: 336). It was also one of the major forces behind the growth of KAIPTC, where it deployed four staff members, including the Executive Director and the Resource Director for several years, until it withdrew in 2010. Thanks to its conflict and military advisers deployed to Addis Ababa, the UK has been behind much of the conceptual development of the ASF over the past few years. The UK is therefore achieving maximum influence with relatively small numbers of advisers placed in key positions across the continent.

The UK’s principal training tools are the BPSTs, which tend to focus on officer or specialist training, and the British Military Advisory and Training Teams (BMATT), involved in both officer and tactical training. BMATT evolved from a conventional military scheme to a PSO support programme. Via BPST and BMATT, the UK differentiates itself from other donors by training large numbers of sub-Saharan military officers in Africa itself, rather than at its own military staff colleges (Berman 2002b: 15ff).

Apart from IPSTC, BPST trainers are present at the IMATC in Nairobi and in South Africa, where they help build the SADC brigade. At IMATC, BPST staff had trained 700 personnel in humanitarian de-mining and 2000 people in mine awareness just one year after opening in February 2005 (UK National Archive (undated)). BMATT trainers can be stationed permanently at key locations or deliver training upon demand in other countries. An important BMATT group, BMATT-WA, is based in Accra, working both with the Ghanaian Command and

### Table 7.2 ACPP budget allocations 2002-2010

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Varies annually based on 7.45% of total UN peacekeeping costs in Africa


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65 Telephone interview, civil servant, MOD London, April 2009.

66 Interview, senior British military official, Addis Ababa, April 2009.
Staff College and KAIPTC, delivering both standard and PSO pre-deployment training (Berman 2002b: 15ff). In the past few years, BMATT has delivered training to a total of 20 countries (UK National Archive (undated)); ‘train-the-trainer’ courses were aimed at teaching international standards for civilian police (Ramsbotham et al. 2005b: 23–6). Overall, the UK has trained around 14,000 African peacekeepers since 2001 (DFID 2010: 4).

Beyond training, the ACPP also directly supports African PSOs, either in kind or via financial contributions. When AMIB was launched (in May 2004), the ACPP provided pre-deployment training (through the BPST) and financed the transport of 2,600 soldiers from South Africa, Ethiopia, and Mozambique to Burundi for a total of £5.7 million. As AMIB was re-hatted as ONUB (Opérations des Nations Unies au Burundi) in June 2004 the mission continued to receive funding from the ACPP (DFID 2004: 10). The ACPP also shouldered the running costs of the second ECOWAS operation in Liberia, providing £400,000 to the Nigerian forces. Later, the UK provided £3.5 million in support to the Ghanaian contingent of ECOMICI, including transport, communications, and running costs, plus another £500,000 to ECOWAS to cover the running costs of ECOMICI until it was re-hatted as UNOCI (United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire) in April 2004 (DFID 2004: 10). By September 2005, the UK had given £32 million in support to AMIS, including 600 vehicles, diverse equipment, and airlifting of Nigerian troops (UK National Archive (undated)).

Added to a variety of post-conflict programmes, these efforts have represented a considerable expense for the UK for a number of years. A degree of impatience is detectable in conversations with British officials, who are beginning to suggest that the UK may not be willing to pursue its support at current levels in the absence of greater African efforts.

### 7.1.5 Germany

Although Germany’s priorities in relation to PSOs lie in Afghanistan and the Balkans, its engagement in African peace and security issues is on the rise, resulting from a mixture of public pressure to increase development aid and pragmatic considerations linked to the burden represented by Berlin’s contribution to the UN peacekeeping budget (9 per cent, or €325 million in 2008) and EU’s budget supporting Africa (24 per cent to the original EU APF of €440 million, and 20.5 per cent of the next tranche of €300 million).

Four different ministries are involved in German security policy toward Africa: the Foreign Office (AA), the Defence Ministry (BMVg), the German Development Ministry (BMZ), and the Home Secretariat (BMI). In practice,
much of the support has been delivered through the development assistance technical service, the GtZ (Gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit), now GIZ (Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit).71

In contrast with most national donors, who have traditionally had a mainly bilateral approach, German support squarely targets regional and sub-regional organisations, including the AU, the RECs and training centres. Like that of most major donors, its effort has been geographically concentrated in West and East Africa – ECOBRIG and EASBRIG, and PTCs serving those sub-regions72 – with strong support also being provided to and through the AU. Thematically, Germany’s involvement is closer to Canada’s, focusing on police and civilian capacity-building but it is also more broadly based, including important contributions to various activities in conflict prevention and institutional consolidation. This support may cover heavy construction costs (for example, Germany is spending €20 million on the construction of a new building for the AU’s Peace and Security Department; it paid for most of the construction costs of KAIPTC; and it shouldered an important part of the construction costs of EMP Bamako),73 or various institutional and capacity-building costs (driving and language skills at the AU, a new PSOD document management system, and general management training at ECOWAS).74

Via the GtZ/GIZ (for activities financed by the AA and the BMZ) and the BMVg, Germany is also involved in more ‘classical’ types of activity, such as policy advice, conceptual development and training. For example, the BMZ finances consultants to the ECOWAS peace and security department, focusing on the civilian component of the brigade, and it has deployed senior staff to work on course management at the KAIPTC in Accra. Further, Germany supports police training at EMP Bamako and at the Karen PTC.75 At Karen, the then GtZ also developed curricula for DDR, gender, CIMIC, and human rights training. However, this project has ended because of the disappointingly low interest of African actors in taking over these responsibilities.76 Consequently, Germany will not reduce its overall support but has redirected it toward neighbouring EASBRIGCOM, where it will continue working on the police and civilian components of the ASF in East Africa.77 Meanwhile support to SADC remains ‘on ice’ because of the problematic political environment in Zimbabwe.

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71 The GIZ is the result of a merger of the Gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit (GtZ) with the other major German development service, Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst (DED), and Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung (Invent), a non-profit organisation in the field of advanced training (January 2011).

72 German position.

73 GtZ.

74 GtZ.

75 On KAIPTC: GtZ; on Bamako: Bundesregierung (2007).

76 GtZ.

77 GtZ.
However, programmes are reportedly finalised, ready to be revived at the first opportunity.78

7.16 Denmark

Similarly to Germany, Denmark conceives of itself as a loyal, disinterested partner, willing to support Africa’s own aims, but it has stronger conceptual convictions inspired by a long-lasting involvement with the UN.79

Denmark’s management of its peace and security policy, like that of other donors, has been adjusted to match APSA developments. Until 2004–2005, long-term engagement was carried out by the Ministries of Development and Foreign Affairs, with the Defence Ministry providing *ad hoc* mission support. Then the latter two ministries decided on a new ‘comprehensive approach’ reminiscent of that of Canada and the UK. As part of this new approach a Danish Advisory and Training Staff (DATS) has since been carrying out support activities to the AU and, at the regional level, to EASBRIG.

In parallel and up to November 2008, a major instrument of Danish support to the ASF was the multinational standby readiness brigade for UN operations (SHIRBRIG), especially in the context of the development of PLANELMs and operational support to PSOs in Ethiopia, Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire, and most recently MINURCAT (SHIRBRIG 2009).80 However, as it appeared that the AU had little interest in the SHIRBRIG model, SHIRBRIG was folded and a new ‘Task Force Africa’ was established by the Defence Ministry, concentrating on EASBRIG.81 Task Force Africa builds on the experiences of both DATS and SHIRBRIG in providing support to EASBRIGCOM. In addition, it is tasked with coordinating all Danish defence efforts in support of the APSA with other Nordic countries, the UK and the US. Money originally earmarked for SHIRBRIG has been redirected to support police training in eastern Africa.82

Recent testimonies suggest that Denmark’s support for the APSA is for the long haul: Copenhagen will reportedly step up its engagement from 2010 on, with the deployment of up to 15 officers and civilian experts in support of, primarily, EASBRIG and the AU HQ.83

78 GtZ.
79 Email exchange with Danish military analyst, Copenhagen, Feb 2009.
80 SHIRBRIG’s mandate was to provide the UN with a non-standing multinational high-readiness brigade based on the UN Standby Arrangement System. In 2007, 16 American and European states were cooperating within the SHIRBRIG framework, following an initiative by Denmark. Two African states, Egypt and Senegal, had sent observers.
81 Interview, Danish senior military adviser, Addis Ababa.
83 Email exchange with Danish academic, Copenhagen, February 2009.
7.17 Norway

Norwegian support to the ASF is delivered mostly through the Training for Peace (TfP) programme. TfP is a civilian capacity-building scheme launched in 1995 by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and three training and research institutions – the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in South Africa, and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI).

TfP has two components. One provides operational training to police and civilian experts participating in ongoing PSOs. ACCORD, for example, trained units for pre-deployment to AMISOM, and for the exercises of EASBRIG, and SADCBRIG (ACCORD 2009; Tjønneland and Albertyn 2010). With KAIPTC joining TfP in 2004, various capacity-building courses have been offered to ECOBRIG, including police training for UNAMID. In addition to its formal partners, TfP cooperates closely with EASBRICOM, the AU PSOD, and AFDEM, an organisation that manages a database of all TfP graduates. Overall, it is estimated that about 8,600 civilians and police have been trained via TfP between 1995 and 2007 at an expense of some US$12 million (Training for Peace 2009).

TfP’s second component is its normative work, which supports the UN, the AU and the RECs via policy advice and research. A lot of the current conceptual work on the civilian dimension of the ASF, for instance, is done by ACCORD through TfP.

With a budget on the increase, but representing a little less than €8.9 million over 2008–2010, two thirds of which is paid by Norway, TfP remains a modest programme compared to those of other donors. However, by targeting early a little-trodden domain of expertise, and underpinning training and policy advice with research, TfP has achieved effects much beyond some of the better-endowed programmes.

7.18 Italy

Italy’s contribution to African PSOs revolves around the training of Formed Police Units (FPUs), directly stemming from its own PSO experience in the Balkans, where the carabinieri played a key role in managing security during sensitive post-conflict phases. Italy hosts the Centre of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU), created in Vincenza in 2004 with US support, on the back of the commitments of the G8 Sea Island Summit (CoESPU 2009). CoESPU’s main partner in Africa has been ECOWAS, and police from Cameroon, Nigeria, Mali and Burkina Faso have participated in train-the-trainer education at Vincenza (AFRICOM 2009a).

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84 This section is mainly based on an email exchange with a senior civil servant, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, April 2009.

85 The African Civilian Standby Roster for Humanitarian and Peace Building Missions.
More recently, Italy has decided to broaden its involvement in African peace and security issues and give it a higher profile. In July 2008, it rebranded its till then little-known support for African PSOs, the ‘Italian African Peace Facility’, and increased its contribution from €9 million a year to €40 million (including €10 million funding for AMISOM) (African Press Organization 2008). In February 2008 CoESPU began expanding its activities through Africa by hosting the annual meeting of Police Commissioners and Senior Police Advisers of the continent. In January 2010 Italy and the AU reinforced their commitment to cooperation, but no further funding was allocated (African Press Organization 2008; Walta Information Centre 2010).

7.1.9 Japan

Japan’s interest in building capacity for African PSOs is directly related to its share of the UN peacekeeping budget, which is 17 per cent (US$1.15 billion in 2007) (Ramsbotham et al. 2005b: 19; UN 2009a). Japan’s involvement is also partly linked to its interest in keeping the surroundings of the African continent safe for trade (25,000 ships with Japanese goods pass the Horn of Africa annually).

A main difficulty encountered by Japan in its support to the ASF is posed by its Constitution, which does not condone military support or engagement abroad. Formally, all activities supported, like workshops or conferences, must facilitate ‘capacity-building’, not ‘military planning’. Even supporting logistics depots containing military equipment would not be possible. Japan may, however, support training at PTCs in the non-military field. It did so in Cairo (CCTCRPA) throughout 2009 and 2010, Bamako (EMP), Karen (IPSTC), and Kigali (RPA) and is currently considering support to the police school at Awaé in Cameroon. Another way for Japan to circumvent its constitutional difficulties has been to direct resources towards the AU Peace Fund, which covers salaries of AU liaison officers at AMISOM in Kenya and Mogadishu.

7.2 Multilateral donors

7.2.1 European Union

The EU has to be considered as an actor in its own right, separate from its member states. This is particularly so since the creation of the African Peace Facility (APF) in 2004, and the ‘EU Strategy for Africa’ in 2005 enabled the European Commission to become the driving force behind a common policy to support the AU and, more specifically, the APSA and the ASF (European Commission 2008; European Union 2005).

The EU and Africa (as represented by the AU) intend to present themselves as partners, in a relationship of equals moving away from traditional donor-
beneficiary relations and involving the definition of joint strategic goals, a political dialogue, cooperation in areas such as climate change, or science, as well as development assistance. This common aim was enshrined in a ‘Joint Africa-EU Strategic Partnership’ sealed at a summit in Lisbon in December 2007, which superseded the two-year-old EU Strategy for Africa (African Union/European Union 2007). This partnership is also one of the three pillars of the APF, the other two being the principles of African ownership and solidarity (the latter as monies were diverted from development aid towards peace and security).

The APF has allowed the EU – and especially the Commission – to have a large impact on the development and performance of the ASF since 2004. First, it has created a fairly sizeable, predictable source of funding for African operations, without which several AU and REC engagements could not have been undertaken. Second, it has placed the EU in a leading role in AU and REC capacity development at HQ levels. The EU, as of itself, however, does not have the capacity (in terms of human resources) or the will to participate in conceptual work and does not influence the substance of ASF developments as much as other donors do.

As it filled a major gap in African needs, the APF had even more ‘success’ than anticipated, even though the funds cannot be used to finance military equipment. Initially, €200 million was budgeted for support to PSOs, in a total APF budget of €250 million. Because of the ever growing needs of AMIS, however, the EU had to make three successive replenishments over 2006–2008, amounting to €150 million. Additional contributions totalling €40 million came from eight EU member states, so that total APF funding under the 9th European Development Fund (EDF) (2004–2009) was €440 million. Of that sum, over €305 went to AMIS, €53.2 million to FOMUC/MICOPAX, €35.5 million to AMISOM, and €8.5 million to the AU missions in the Comoros (Africa and Europe in Partnership 2009: 3, 5).

In contrast to the rapid disbursements for operational purposes, absorption by the AU and RECs of the smaller €35 million capacity-building component of the APF under the 9th EDF has been disappointing. That component is supposed to support institutional development at the AU and the RECs, including recruitment, training and equipment of the early warning systems and the PLANELMs, conceptual development, and some field training. By March 2010, close to the original June 2010 closing date of the programme, hardly more than 40 per cent of the budget had been spent. This is largely due to the weakness in administrative and financial management of the AU/RECs discussed above, as well as to insufficient programme implementation capacity. Partly as a result of this underspending, the APF 9th EDF was extended by ten months to terminate in April 2011.

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87 The joint strategy was confirmed and updated at a summit in Addis Ababa in November 2010.
88 Interview, ECCAS technical assistant, Libreville, December 2010.
Regardless of current difficulties, the EU is committed to pursuing its support. €300 million has been earmarked for the APF under the 10th EDF (2008–13) (African Union/European Union 2009; Africa and Europe in Partnership 2009: 6), of which €65 million will go to capacity-building, and €200 million to PSOs. This is an addition to EU support via the so-called Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs), where the share of funding allocated to peace and security increases steadily (for instance, the EU will allocate €120 million to ECOVAS for capacity-building under the 10th EDF RIP, and €15 million to ECCAS) (Guicherd 2007: 21–3; Klingebiel 2006: 54).

7.2.2 United Nations

The United Nations (UN) is not a ‘donor’ – like the AU, it relies on the contributions of member states and various other organisations to finance its activities. Nor is it ‘external’, in the sense that it is the all-encompassing body under which regional organisations like the AU operate (according to Chapter VIII of the UN Charter). It is, however, a set of institutions and agencies that possess the know-how and occasional funding (from various donors) to assist the AU and the RECs in developing their capacity and carrying out their operations. UN member states agree to this assistance for diverse reasons – some in the hope of fostering African ownership, others of bringing down their contribution to the UN peacekeeping budget. Such was the logic behind the commitment made by the World Summit in 2005 to deploy a ten-year capacity-building plan in favour of Africa (United Nations 2005b: para. 93; AU 2006c).

The implementation of that plan was slow in coming though, largely because it involved protracted inter-agency discussions at the UN, which led to the UN Development Programme (UNDP) ceding ground to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in supporting AU capacity-building. DPKO came to the fore as a consequence of the de facto already strong advisory role it had played in supporting the DITF of AMIS, and of its in-depth intellectual involvement in the conceptual development of the ASF through the 2005–2006 workshops (see Section 5.1). Officially launched in November 2006, the ten-year plan did not have much substance until the DPKO-led PST was firmly on the ground in Addis Ababa in January 2007. The PST has been tasked with supporting the AU in the fields of ‘training, military, police, logistics, finance, and communication’ (UN 2008b: 5). By bringing the UN closer to the AU, the PST presence has reinforced the trend for ASF concepts and standards to more and more closely resemble those of the UN. This trend, however, is also inherent in the development of joint missions, such as UNAMID, or the in-built

89 Another reason for the postponement was the poor results of audits on past instalments of the APF (operations and capacity-building), which the EU wanted to see clarified before pursuing new commitments.
90 Plus €15m for early response mechanisms, €7m for auditing etc., and €13m for contingencies.
91 UNPST, group discussion.
92 Interview, UN official, Addis Ababa.
UN support to the AU in the management of AMISOM. In either case – capacity-building or the management of operations – the risk of UN staff substituting itself to AU staff exists (UN 2008a: para. 3.9). Other providers of technical assistance encounter the same dilemma.

7.3 Assessing donor support

Assessing donor support accurately and comprehensively is beyond the scope of the present study. It is, however, possible to formulate some observations in regards to two important criteria in any assessment: coherence and impact.

Coherence is important as it conditions the quality of the outcomes and, to some extent, the effectiveness of the support (scattered efforts lead to a waste of human and financial resources). Coherence can be considered here in regard to the aim pursued, the complementariness of the specific programmes carried out by donors, and coordination efforts on the part of the AU/RECs.

Difficulties in coherence relating to aims have already been highlighted: the still evolving character of the ASF makes it difficult for donors to target their support appropriately and leads to discrepancies among them (Section 6). This makes donor coordination even more vital, but such coordination remains ever a challenge (Ramsbotham et al. 2005a: 334). First, donor coordination is difficult because it carries transaction costs. In other words, it is time-and effort-consuming. Second, as described above, each donor is motivated by its own national interests. Real coordination would require a readiness to adapt national programmes, which most donors do not have the flexibility to do for a variety of political and bureaucratic reasons. Third, there is a degree of competition among donors, primarily for reasons of political visibility on the international scene and before home constituents. The consequence is gaps, overlaps, and, in the case of military training or equipment, problems of interoperability in the field (Guicherd 2006b: 4).

Efforts have been made, however, over the past few years to improve donor coordination, in which some countries, like Britain and Norway, have proved more committed than others. Britain has largely led the way in donor coordination, both at the strategic level and in Addis Ababa. Thus, the UK initiated the ‘G8 Clearinghouse’ process in preparation for the 2005 Gleneagles Summit. Clearinghouse meetings, however, at least seven of which have taken place so far, have produced only limited effects. This can be illustrated by an anecdote: the meeting in San Remo in April 2009 decided to create a homepage to facilitate information exchanges (G8 2009); none of the 60 or so

93 German position.
94 Interview, AU Commission representative, Addis Ababa.
95 Email exchange, senior civil servant, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, April 2009.
96 Interview, Japanese senior civil servant, Addis Ababa.
97 www.g8africaclearinghouse.org.
experts present was aware that a similar decision had already been taken at the first meeting in Washington (October 2004), but that the page had remained stillborn. Whether the resurrection of the plan at San Remo will be more successful remains to be seen.

In Addis Ababa two donor coordination groups have been created, one focusing on PSOs and another on capacity-building. The UK took the lead during the first year (2007), organising fairly frequent meetings. Attendance would generally be high. As the US took over, the pace dropped and, with it, the participation. Consultation meetings have reportedly restarted successfully since the UK resumed responsibility in 2009. This example demonstrates how donor coordination remains, to a large extent, an ad hoc process, left to the goodwill, interest, discipline, and agenda of the donors. Focused bilateral cooperation, for example between Germany and Canada in the police area, is easier and more effective.

Donor coordination should ideally come from the AU/RECs themselves. Such coordination, however, remains subject to two constraints. One is institutional/political: with less coordinated donors, African institutions have more leeway to request overlapping funding. Another is administrative: neither the AU nor the RECs have the capacity to coordinate donors. The AU/PSOD for its part is overwhelmed by the number and variety of donor approaches (Mackie et al. 2006: 75).

Efforts are underway, on both the AU/RECs and donor sides, to remedy this problem. ECOWAS, for example, has created a financial management unit to coordinate contributions from both member states and donors to its Peace Fund. At the AU, the arrival of Jean Ping as new Chair of the Commission has given new momentum to donor coordination: in February 2009 the AU signed an agreement with a group of 26 bilateral partners on a new standardised reporting format. This should relieve much pressure on the AU administration.

Passing judgement on the second assessment criterion, impact, is even more difficult than on coherence. Much of the institutional capacity-building work is very recent and the depth of experience insufficient for a collective assessment of the performance of AU and REC staff. Lasting shortcomings in numbers, especially at the AU, despite donors’ readiness to finance posts, remain an important constraint. A more positive indicator is conceptual development, where donors’ support has allowed the AU/RECs to make substantial progress over recent decades.

98 Interview, Canadian official, Addis Ababa
99 Interview, UN official, Addis Ababa.
100 Email exchange with Canadian official, Ottawa, March 2009.
101 Interview, senior EU official, Brussels.
102 Interview, senior AU official, Addis Ababa.
103 Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, USA (AU 2009a).
A key question mark continues remains over the effectiveness and relevance of training. This is an issue with which donors have struggled for a number of years, and which is reputedly difficult to document. Scattered evidence provides a mixed picture (United States General Accounting Office 2008: 46ff; Ramsbotham et al. 2005b: 11).

Regarding training relevance, it has to be recognised, first, that some activities called PSO capacity-building actually do so only according to the most liberal definition. For example, the jungle training offered by the French Marine Infantry in Libreville in 2008 for selected ECCAS troops would hardly seem to qualify (Revue Frères d’Armes 2009).

Defining what qualifies as a ‘trained soldier’ is another difficulty. For instance, full ACOTA training is premised on the completion of a training cycle including three successive steps. Gabon participated in the programme without ever sending a coherent battalion; at the end of the cycle, no ‘unit’ was trained but about 1,800 Gabonese soldiers had had some peacekeeping instruction. Actually, it is a recurrent (although never officially addressed) observation of Western advisers that African military establishments often show little interest in the content of the training, their main concern being a high turnover of soldiers and officers sent to courses where they are paid, housed, and fed.

One also has to consider that all training has a relatively short ‘best before date’. Given the fact that normal battalion rotations anywhere entail a change of personnel of approximately 70 per cent every two years, training effects are bound to be short-lived unless soldiers are deployed rapidly, all the more so since ‘follow up training is rarely provided’.

Despite all these hurdles, there is evidence that units trained by partners have indeed participated in PSOs in fairly large numbers. ACRI-trained units from Mali and Ghana served in Sierra Leone, units from Benin in Guinea-Bissau, and a Senegalese battalion in the CAR. ACOTA-trained soldiers served in PSOs in Burundi, Darfur, the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire and Somalia (US AFRICOM 2009; Sierra Leone News 2009), and of the 17 African GPOI partners that had received training by 2007, 12 had deployed troops to PSOs at least once (Serafino 2007). RECAMP-trained troops from many francophone African countries have deployed to African and UN PSOs (for example, Senegal with AMIS and UNAMID, Togo with MINURCAT) and all troops deployed to FOMUC/MICOPAX in the CAR receive pre-deployment training from the French. An excellent success story in capacity-building is the deployment of the first Sierra Leonean peacekeepers with UNAMID in December 2009, the

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106 Interviews, French, British and American military representatives, March–April 2009.
107 Interview, senior EU Council adviser, Brussels.
108 Interview, ECCAS representative, Addis Ababa.
109 Interview, French military adviser, Libreville, June 2009.
result of patient efforts by the UK to transform groups that were basically armed gangs into a professional, capable force (US AFRICOM 2009). By December 2010 Sierra Leone had contributed 312 peacekeepers worldwide (UN 2010). Conversely, some countries like Botswana, whose armed forces have participated in several PSO training cycles, have never been deployed,¹¹⁰ and a programme like TIP estimates that only one fourth of the individuals it has trained have actually taken part in an operation (Training for Peace 2009).

These mixed results have led most donors to increasingly emphasise the ‘train-the-trainer’ concept, and some (like the UK) to concentrate on officers, whose impact may be longer-lasting. Current efforts to focus assistance on ‘Centres of excellence’ are also intended to increase the coherence among training programmes, reinforce the linkage between training provided and the needs of the AU/RECs, and strengthen the capacity to follow up trained alumni. Meanwhile, donors’ increasing emphasis on training, at the expense of logistical and equipment support, is creating tensions with African recipients (Ramsbotham et al. 2005b: 3ff; Guicherd 2006b: 3; Klingebiel 2005: 15).

8 African ownership

International donors and African recipients share a common objective: lessening Africa’s dependence on uncertain international responses to conflict situations on the continent and increasing its capacity to react quickly, appropriately and in a manner that nips conflicts in the bud and establishes lasting peace.

‘Ownership’ is the mantra of donors’ programmes, jointly with the motto of ‘partnership’. A few comments on ‘ownership’ therefore seem appropriate, and it appears useful analytically to distinguish several levels.

At the ‘macro’ level, there is a kind of ownership that can be described as ‘ideological’. ‘Ideological ownership’ characterises the strength of high-level statements endorsing the goals of the APSA and the ASF and their main features. This can be considered as achieved since the early 2000s, as documented in Section 3. At a somewhat lower level, there is a ‘political ownership’, which we shall define as the willingness of African states to participate in actual operations. On that front, the picture is mixed. Whilst Africa has demonstrated its determination to undertake missions such as the early ECOWAS operations in West Africa, and later AMIS or AMISOM, the level of participation of various states is quite uneven. For example, after three years of operation, AMISOM still relies on two states only (Uganda and Burundi). Countries like Nigeria, Ghana or Senegal are known to prefer sending troops to UN missions, where they are better catered for, than to AU missions.¹¹¹

¹¹¹ Interview, senior British representative, Addis Ababa. Available data confirms this: whilst African countries had approximately 21,000 peacekeepers in UN operations in January 2011, they had barely 9,000 troops under AU or REC banners.
There is, next, a kind of ‘sociological ownership’ which describes the appropriation by certain groups working on the ASF. Many observers working closely with the AU and the RECs note that this sociological ownership exists among the small group of people whose daily occupation it is to develop the ASF. However, they have difficulty observing it in African countries at the national level.

A fourth aspect is ‘technical ownership’, which can be characterised by the understanding and acceptance of ASF concepts by PLANELMs, larger AU and REC HQs, and the relevant ministries and agencies of member states. In that respect, ownership can be described as poor to the extent that work on the ASF has largely been led by military establishments, with very little participation of police and civilian experts and relevant ministries. The understanding of the ASF as a multidimensional tool is not yet widely shared, whether by Africans or donor establishments.

Finally, but no less importantly, there is ‘financial ownership’. At that level, as demonstrated above (Sections 5.6, and 7), ownership remains a distant objective. Lack of autonomous financing remains the Achilles’ heel of the ASF.

9 Conclusions

There is no alternative to helping Africans help themselves. Neither is there peacekeeping on the cheap, whether for Africans, who will sooner or later have to take the lead, nor for external partners, who will pursue their supportive role for the foreseeable future.

Lessons drawn from PSOs in Africa are being gradually applied in new capacity development, but efforts will have to be further streamlined and better coordinated to improve results. For these efforts to be sustainable, the balance between external support and African contributions needs to shift away soon from the former toward the latter. It is only by proactively assuming political, conceptual and financial ownership that AU member states will credibly demonstrate that the ASF is not an entirely foreign-mastered project but that the solutions they bring to African problems are truly ‘African’.

112  German position.

113  Interview, senior ECCAS official, Libreville, June 2009.
## Annex: List of African Peacekeeping Training Centres

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACCORD</td>
<td>African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, Durban/South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACSRS</td>
<td>African Centre for Strategic Research Studies (National War College), Abuja/Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEOMP</td>
<td>Centre d'Entraînement pour les Opérations de Maintien de la Paix, Lomé/Togo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCTCRPA</td>
<td>Cairo Centre for Training in Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa, Cairo/Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPADD</td>
<td>Centre de Formation au Déminage Humanitaire, Ouidah/Benin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSID</td>
<td>Collège Supérieur Interarmées de Défense, Yaoundé/Cameroon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EASS</td>
<td>Ecole d’application des Services de Santé</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEML</td>
<td>Ecole d’état Major de Libreville, Libreville/Gabon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGT</td>
<td>Ecole du Génie et des Travaux Marien Ngouabi, Brazzaville/Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIFORCES</td>
<td>Ecole Internationale des Forces de Sécurité, Awaé/Cameroon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMP</td>
<td>Ecole pour le Maintien de la Paix Beye, Bamako/Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILEA</td>
<td>International Law Enforcement Academy, Gaborone/Botswana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMATC</td>
<td>International Mine Action Training Centre, Nairobi/Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPSTC</td>
<td>International Peace Support Training Centre, Karen/Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPCS</td>
<td>Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania</td>
</tr>
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<td>KAIPTC</td>
<td>Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Accra/Ghana</td>
</tr>
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<td>LECIA</td>
<td>Legon Centre for International Affairs, Accra/Ghana</td>
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<td>PMTC</td>
<td>Peace Mission Training Centre, Pretoria/South Africa</td>
</tr>
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<td>RPA</td>
<td>Rwanda Peace Academy, Kigali/Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPTC</td>
<td>Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre, Harare/Zimbabwe - reopened in 2007/questionable operability</td>
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