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How Can We Stop Violence Becoming a Viable Political Strategy?

NPA Guerillas in the Philippines by Keith Bacongo21 September 2009

Monday 21 September marks the United Nations annual International Day of Peace. It is a global opportunity for individuals, communities, nations and governments to highlight efforts to end conflict and promote peace.

Thousands of people are killed by violent conflict every year, and a great many others are killed by the spread of disease and disruption of livelihood strategies associated with conflict. The problem of violence and its effects on poor people's wellbeing is gaining increasing attention in the development agenda, and was a central aspect of DFID's latest White Paper.

The most fundamental issue that policymakers and researchers face when working on these problems is how non-peaceful ways of living and governing become viable strategies for those who engage in them. In recent years, cross-country, macro-level studies have provided some important insights, but their findings tell us little about the individual behaviour underlying these general trends. Micro-level analysis - at the level of individuals and groups - is vital to understand the mechanisms that make violence possible.

MICROCON is a five-year research programme coordinated by IDS, comprising 30 different projects. These have been investigating micro-level conflict processes for the past two and a half years, and at this mid-way point a number of preliminary findings are emerging on the eruption of violence.

Underlying causes of violent mobilisation

A number of factors can affect poor people's ability to provide for themselves and their families, which in turn increases the risk of conflict. Developing countries are highly dependent on rain-fed agriculture, and when rains stop there are smaller harvests, which can lead to malnutrition. However, MICROCON's research finds that ‘rain shocks' also increase the risk of conflict (though they do not necessarily cause it). The same is true of ‘price shocks', when the price of agricultural goods suddenly shifts.

Another important factor is inequalities between culturally formed groups - ‘horizontal inequalities' (HIs). These inequalities can be multi-dimensional and can encompass economic, social and political aspects, and are a significant factor in promoting violent mobilisation.

Triggers and paths of mobilisation

The underlying causes need some kind of rallying point for violence to emerge. This is often provided by discourses about identity. These can range from the cynical manipulation of ethnic identity by politicians such as in Rwanda and Côte d'Ivoire, to the narrative of global Islamism espoused by Al Qaeda.

MICROCON research on the actual dynamics of mobilisation reveals that there is a variety and combination of motives in each conflict - it is not possible to just talk about one that applies across conflicts. There are differences between leaders and followers; and also between individual motives and group motives. There are differences across conflicts, and causal factors also change over the course of conflicts.

Development and security

However, there are a number of useful, basic development policies that can be used to combat these risk factors. In the case of rain shocks and price shocks, governments could provide insurance in the form of compensation for those affected. People working in development should also promote policies to reduce the many aspects of horizontal inequality, such as educational, employment and cultural policies; and power-sharing arrangements - with the objective of building inclusive societies.

A note of caution should be given, however: current policy debates about development and security often give the impression that security is the major goal, and development is just a way of ‘winning hearts and minds'. MICROCON's observations suggest that development should be a priority in itself, rather than just a part of a counterinsurgency doctrine. Security is an important priority for poor people; this does not just mean counter-insurgency but also the protection of vulnerable populations. This is directly linked to the attitudes of security services.

Policymakers often lack the necessary information to make important policy decisions to prevent violence. These vital, micro-level pictures of what is driving individual behaviour are very difficult to come by in conflict areas. Only with better diagnostic tools will we be able to assess potentially violent situations, and find ways to be more creative in how we gather information. These are challenges that MICROCON will be taking up in the next two and a half years.

Image: NPA Guerillas in the Philippines © Keith Bacongo


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