Towards strengthening state-citizen relationship in fragile states and environments: the role of cash transfer programmes

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by

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Abstract
The paper is organised into four main sections. Section One presents the introduction, research questions and methodology as well as the limitations of the study. Section Two presents the conceptual definitions of fragility, social protection and state-citizen relationship. It goes on to examine three key debates regarding cash transfers. It also presents a conceptual framework with regards to the role of cash transfers in fragile states. Section Three is the kernel of the study which contains attributes of fragility in each country and the impact they have on citizens using the case of older people and their families to illustrate the challenges they face in fragile contexts. The section also compares the similarities and differences of existing social protection mechanisms in each country. It then proceeds to examine the impact of cash transfers on state-citizen relationship in Sierra Leone and northern Kenya. Finally, Section Four concludes by presenting two emerging issues – programme design and ownership - and their implication for state-citizen relationship. It ends by identifying areas for future research.
1.1 Introduction

In recent years there has been a considerable amount of interest in fragile states and environments. This is partly as a result of the security threat such states pose to wider global peace and security and partly as a result of concerns for the protection of human rights and wellbeing of people living in these states. The need to focus on human development in fragile states cannot be over emphasised because they constitute a significant proportion of the world’s most vulnerable and chronically poor people. HelpAge International’s interest in fragile states and environments is informed by the fact that they account for 14 percent of the world’s population, yet they represent approximately a third of all people surviving on less than US$1 a day. Older people and their households in particular are severely affected due to the scarcity of state provided and non state agency-based support systems which reduces their access to services. More over, there is the complex issue of transition from emergency relief programmes – which are unpredictable and susceptible to donor fatigue – to recovery and longer term development initiatives.

Since a significant proportion of the world’s most vulnerable and chronically poor people live in fragile states there is consensus to put in place or strengthen existing social protection mechanisms in order to reduce risk, vulnerability and chronic poverty in these states. Cash transfers as part of a wider social protection system also have the potential to strengthen state-citizen relationship and by extension the legitimacy of the state. However, the predominant and current debate on cash transfers focuses on the narrow objective of poverty reduction. In the context of fragility, it is imperative to move forward the debate on cash transfers not just as a vulnerability and poverty reduction instrument but also as a tool in addressing a central underline manifestation of fragility – the absence of a functioning state-citizen relationship. More over, the current debate on cash transfers assumes that poverty targeted ‘safety-nets’ are the only feasible option in fragile states. Yet, this pre-determines the nature and design of cash transfer programmes and tends to over look other options that could be more relevant in fragile contexts. Furthermore, as the findings of this report demonstrates, there is good evidence that poverty-targeted transfers are prone to corruption and they are extremely challenging to implement particularly in countries with weak administrative capacity and high levels of poverty. Therefore, their ability to positively contribute to two critical objectives in fragile situations – strengthened state citizen relationship and the legitimacy of the state – is extremely limited. In addition, the debate on cash transfer programme ownership as manifested in the balance of delivery between state and non-state actors also have longer term implications in fragile states. Suffice it to say however, that the findings presented in this paper should not be seen as definitive answers to the complex issues associated with state fragility and social protection/cash transfers but only as a contribution to the debate.

This paper presents the findings of two different fragile contexts. The research questions for each were as follows:

1. To what extent does Sierra Leone’s poverty targeted Social Safety Net (SSN) cash transfer programme strengthen state-citizen relationship at the local government level?

2. To what extent does the ‘Social Protection Rights Component’ of the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HNSP) in Northern Kenya strengthen state-citizen relationship at the local government level?

The choice of two different case studies is informed by the fact that there are different types of fragility with unique features and characteristics. By exploring the efficacy of two cash transfer programmes i.e. one delivered by the government in a post conflict situation and one delivered by NGOs in a fragile and food insecure environment, this paper aims to contribute to the debate on cash transfers and hopefully, the findings will be useful to governments, non-governmental organisations, academic and research institutes as well as international development agencies.

1.2 Methodology

This section describes the process and the method that was adopted to arrive at the findings. It also describes for each case study the sampling and data collection techniques used to arrive at the findings. It goes on to highlight the limitations of this approach.
For each case study, a logical structure and procedure was followed in order to answer the research questions. The model is illustrated in the diagram below:

Equal attention was paid to each step ensuring that the research is conducted properly and the findings are as valid as can be expected under unexpected research conditions. It is imperative to also note that the process is not a clear-cut sequence of procedures following a neat pattern but a messy interaction between the conceptual and empirical world, deduction and induction occurring at the same time.

1.2.1 Qualitative methods
The main methodology employed is primarily qualitative with documentary reviews to complement data gathered through semi structured interviews and focus group discussions. The choice of employing this method of research proved to be a better option to those associated with quantitative methods of data collection. Since the latter involves explaining things from the ‘outside’ it was not particularly suitable as a dominant tool for this research. In other words, formulae are not suitable for explaining actions in real life. Thus a reflective model best provided answers to the research questions because the model was more reliant on the people, policy processes and programmes being studied. It helped to capture explanations of their own actions, situations as well as factors constraining their behaviour. Thus, during the course of the study, efforts were made to bring to fore the subjective interpretations of the respective respondents. This approach suggested a course of action, which was less formalised and certainly more inductive.

1.2.2 Data collection techniques
Generally, a desk study literature review on the concepts of state fragility and social protection was carried out and relevant documents on social protection in each country were also reviewed. For example, Sierra Leone and Kenya’s draft policy documents on social protection including various reports on the Social Safety Net (SSN) programme and the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP). Semi structured interviews with key policy makers in Freetown and Nairobi were also conducted as well as field visits to existing cash transfer programmes targeting older people in Sierra Leone and northern Kenya. Both visits involved semi-structured interviews with local government officials including local chiefs. Focus group discussions were conducted with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in 12 Chiefdoms in the northern and southern regions of Sierra Leone and 3 districts in the Arid and Semi Arid Lands of northern Kenya. Finally a 2-day strategic study validation workshop which included key policy makers from Sierra Leone and Kenya was organised in Nairobi.

1.2.3 Sampling technique for focus group discussions
Selection of samples for the focus group discussions in Sierra Leone was based on the statistical data containing number of beneficiaries in each chiefdom, district and region. They were carried out in the 4 districts with the highest number of beneficiaries. These are 3 northern districts of Port Loko, Bombali and Tonkolili and 1 southern district, Bo. Within each district, the 3 chiefdoms with the highest number
of beneficiaries were selected as geographical areas to draw samples from making a total of 12 Chiefdoms i.e. 3 chiefdoms each in 4 districts. In each of the Chiefdoms, 4 beneficiaries (2 men and 2 women) and 4 non beneficiaries (2 men and 2 women) were randomly selected at the community 'Barre' where hundreds of beneficiaries and non beneficiaries were asked to gather.

In Northern Kenya, only 3 of the 4 districts where the HSNP is been implemented were sampled. These are Turkana, Wajir and Mandera. There were no available flights to Marsabit – the 4th district – as at the time the field trips took place. In each district 2 sub locations were randomly selected. These are a sub location where Social Pension methodology was piloted and a nearby sub location where the HSNP is yet to be implemented. For the former, focus group discussions were conducted with HSNP 'Rights Committee' members which comprises of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries (5 men and 4 women) and for the latter focus group discussions were conducted with socially active members of the community. In other words, 2 sub-locations each in Turkana, Wajir and Mandera comprising of 1 beneficiary sub-location and 1 non-beneficiary sub-location were where samples were drawn. The selection of a beneficiary sub location and a non-beneficiary sub location allows for comparisons to be made with regards to the impact of the HSNP Rights Component on state-citizen relationship.

1.2.4 Study Period
The study began in November 2009 and the field trips were completed in December 2010. The dates are:

- Sierra Leone 7 to 21 March 2010
- Kenya 20 June to 2 July 2010
- Sierra Leone 20 October to 10 November
- Kenya 28 November to 10 December 2010

1.3 Limitations of the Study
A major limitation using qualitative methods is the fact that only small numbers of people were involved in data collection. However, the samples were representative of the target groups. For instance, only relevant social protection policy makers, programme managers and heads of local government departments including local chiefs were selected for semi structured interviews. The focus group discussions also comprised of both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of cash transfer programmes in Sierra Leone and northern Kenya.

In Sierra Leone, due to time lag (over 2 years since implementation of the SSN), it was anticipated that there would be limitations such as tracking ex beneficiaries who may have moved or passed on. In addition, it was anticipated that many beneficiaries may not be willing to share their experiences of a project they benefited from 2 years ago. However, due to the small and manageable samples in each chiefdom (see sampling), tracking ex beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries did not prove too challenging. In northern Kenya, language barrier was an inhibiting factor as the researcher had to rely on local translators.
Fragility and social protection

2.1 State fragility
There is no consensus regarding the definition of fragile states. However, for the purpose of this study, they are defined as "states where the government cannot or will not deliver what citizens need to live decent, secure lives. They cannot or will not tackle poverty". Taking into account the definitions by various international development agencies and research institutes, the common feature in all fragile states is the lack of effective political processes to influence the state to meet societal expectations i.e. there is absence of a functioning state-citizen relationship. While the definition of fragile states remain fuzzy, it is important to note that state fragility is also a continuum. At one extreme end of the spectrum, a state can be fragile to the point where internal or external forces are able to challenge its authority in parts of its territory through violence. At the other end are states that are unable or unwilling to cater for the welfare of a particular group of citizens or certain regions within the country but have no significant challenges in form of violence to its authority. Therefore, categorisation of fragile states may be useful in drawing important distinctions between different attributes and characteristics but they should not be seen as absolutes but fluid phenomena. Suffice it to say however that most are also generally characterised by the following:

- High levels of poverty.
- Poor access to basic services.
- Infrastructural deficiency such as poor road networks and low telecommunication density.
- Lack of social trust underpinning the social contract between the state and its citizens.
- Fragmented and competing elites often manifested along ethnic, regional or religious lines.
- Prone to violent conflict, are currently in conflict or recovering from conflict.
- Most are "rentier states" or weak tax/fiscal states.

States can also be considered fragile when they are unable to perform their basic functions. These functions are captured in the literature on state-building and failing states. The 'functions of the state' is a framework which can be used to elucidate the complex concept of state fragility. In this context, the report focuses on 2 interrelated functions. These are service delivery to its citizens especially the poor and in return the state having some legitimacy in the eyes of its people. In many fragile contexts, weaknesses in state capacity or its failure to perform these functions as well as the weak nature of its relationship with its citizens are at the heart of fragility.

2.1.1 State-citizen relationship
State-citizen relationship in the context of this report refers to public expectations and to some degree the level of trust citizens have towards the state. This also includes the rights and responsibilities of citizens towards the state. In other words, a form of social contract that gives the state its legitimacy provided it serves the will of its citizens. State-citizen relationship is multidimensional in nature. They border on the political, economic, social and civil spheres. In the context of states affected by conflict or previously affected by conflict, or are prone to conflict in parts of its territory, rebuilding of public trust in state institutions and the management of public expectations is essential to engendering peace and stability.

2.2 Social protection
Social protection as a broad concept is generally understood as a set of public actions – provided by the state, civil society, or privately – that offer direct support to people to help them address risk, vulnerability, exclusion and poverty. Generally, social protection can be classified into the following types of projects: social assistance; social insurance; social services and social equity. However, like fragile states, the concept of social protection also faces conceptual fuzziness particularly when viewed through the lenses of chronic poverty and state fragility.
2.3. Current debates and trends in social protection

There are numerous debates and trends on social protection. Three of these debates are particularly relevant in fragile states and situations. These are the ideological perspectives advocates for social protection promote globally – *instrumentalist and activist* which in turn, this paper argues influences programme design – *targeting and universalism* – as well as the balance between programme delivery by *state and non-state actors*.

### 2.3.1 Instrumentalist and activist perspectives

A collaborative research finding from the Institute for Development Studies (IDS) on the debate on social protection from a global perspective suggests that advocates for social protection fall into two broad categories. These are *instrumentalists* and *activists*. The former argue that “extreme poverty, inequality and vulnerability are impediments to the achievement of development targets such as the MDGs. In this view social protection is about putting in place risk management mechanisms that will compensate for incomplete or weak insurance mechanisms until a time that private insurance can play a more prominent role in society”9. This approach is mainly associated with the World Bank’s ‘Social Risk Management’ (SRM) framework, which explores how societies manage risks, with the main idea being that all individuals, households and communities are exposed to multiple risks from different sources. As such, SRM aims to provide instruments that enable the poor (as well as the non-poor) to minimize the impact of exposure to risk and change their behaviour in a way that helps them exit poverty and lower their vulnerability. Within the SRM framework vulnerability is attributed to agency i.e. the individual or a group and the events affecting them at a point in their life cycle. The analysis classifies vulnerability according to a range of risks that may affect a variety of livelihood assets. This leads to policy proposals that lead to short term poverty targeted safety nets with the intention and objective to cushion the risks and the shock people often face.

Taking a much more transformative approach, the IDS report states that *Activist* basically argue that the persistence of extreme poverty, inequality and vulnerability are symptoms of social injustice and structural inequality and they see social protection as a right of citizenship. They extend the debate on social protection to arenas such as equity, empowerment and economic, social and cultural rights, rather than confining the scope of social protection to targeted income and consumption transfers.”10 The rationale for social protection is informed by the ideal of a ‘guaranteed social minimum’ where entitlement extends beyond cash or food transfers and is based on citizenship, not philanthropy. The focus here is on rights and social justice. They argue that rather than focusing on risk as an exogenously given factor to be managed, vulnerability should be seen as “emerging from and embedded in the socio-political context.” The focus of policy, they argue, should be directed at changing the structural context that make people vulnerable in the first place instead of focusing on designing policy instruments that protect people when they face short-run shocks and livelihood risk in a given context. The context itself should be the focus of policy. In other words, policies preventing such risks from occurring require changing the structural factors that are the defining characteristics of livelihood risks. In other words, there is the need to “pursue policies that relate to power imbalances in society that encourage, create and sustain vulnerabilities”.11 Linked to the debate regarding the philosophical approaches to social protection is the debate on programme design. Should social
protection programmes such as unconditional cash transfers be poverty targeted or universal? What are the arguments for and against each approach?

2.3.2 Poverty targeted safety-nets and universal approaches

The arguments supporting poverty targeting and universal approaches to cash transfer is often made within the confines of efficient allocation of resources which is subject to budgetary and resource constraints. Poverty targeted safety net programmes gained influence with the Washington Consensus in the late 1980s and 1990s. Their acceptance was and is still based on the notion that it is better to concentrate limited resources on schemes targeting the poorest and the most vulnerable in the society. They are seen to be more effective in transferring resources to the poor while simultaneously ensuring cost-efficiency, especially in situations where resources are extremely limited. Though the logic behind the approach seems tenable, there are numerous studies highlighting the main problems associated with this approach. For example, a study in some high and middle income countries in the Americas found that poverty targeting is a very costly and complicated exercise which involves high administrative cost. More so, such programmes were shown to have very high exclusion and inclusion errors whereby the non-poor ended up constituting majority of the beneficiaries while the majority of the poor were excluded.

Using cash transfer programmes in two low income countries in Africa – Zambia’s Kalomo pilot project and Malawi’s Mchinji pilot project as case studies – Rolf Künnemann and Ralf Leonhard’s illustrate the shortcomings in the design of both projects which are poverty targeted. They argue that

"In the hands of a corrupt or politicized implementing bureaucracy these programmes (poverty targeted) can otherwise turn into a tool for oppression. The best way to overcome such risks would be to get away from narrow and little transparent selective targeting and to strengthen the transfers to the recipients as human beings, rather than as being poor." 

The study strongly recommended a universal rights-based approach to transfers making the recipient a rights-holder independent of local elites in both the selection and distribution process. Generally, the argument in support of universal programmes is on the one hand premised on the problems associated with targeting and on the other hand supports the underpinning objectives of social policy which are based on the concepts of solidarity, citizenship and nation building. In line with the Activist ideological perspective, the argument for universalism is also based on equity and social justice. More over, universal cash transfer programmes for example are known to be administratively easier to implement because they do not require sophisticated and complex techniques in selecting beneficiaries. They may not be completely free from abuse and leakages but they are less prone to elite capture and manipulation. The main argument against adopting a universal approach as earlier mentioned is the fiscal implications in the mist of limited resources and other competing priorities that governments may choose to prioritize.
2.3.3 Government and non-government delivery

At the centre of another debate is the question of which actors should be involved in delivering social protection? Should it be strictly state-led and can short term relief intervention often implemented by external actors be financed on the long-term by donors in order for it to be classified as social protection? What about issues of ownership and sustainability?

From an external interventionist point of view, Paul Harvey succinctly illustrates the tensions between the principles in two key documents that guide international intervention in developing countries and by extension fragile states. On the one hand, the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative which is associated with humanitarian aid and its principles of neutrality and independence and on the other hand is the OECD principle of engagement in fragile states which focuses on building the capacity of state institutions and its relationship with the wider society. He rightly argues that the principles guiding these two instruments should not be seen as contradictory but mutually complementary. 

Figure 3: Pros and Cons of Poverty Targeting and Universal Approaches to Cash Transfers

- **Characteristics**
  - High levels of poverty.
  - Poor access to basic services.
  - Infrastructural deficiency i.e. poor road networks and low telecommunication coverage.
  - Lack of social trust in ethnic divided societies.
  - Fragmented and competing elites often manifested along ethnic or religious lines.
  - Weak state bureaucracies.
  - Prone to violent conflict or are currently in violent conflict.
  - Most are "rentier states" not tax/fiscal states

- **Pros**
  - Low fiscal cost
  - Based on rights, entitlements and citizenship
  - Strengthens the legitimacy of the state
  - Contributes to nation-building
  - Easy to scale-up
  - Creates the incentive to develop effective civil registration systems
  - Improve broad based access to basic services
  - Move fragile states from being ‘rentier states’ to tax/fiscal states
  - Strengthens state-citizen relationship

- **Cons**
  - Higher fiscal cost
  - Depends on political commitment

- **Universal Categorical Approach to Cash Transfer e.g. social pensions; child and disability grants**

- **Pros**
  - Prone to leakages and corruption
  - Patronage & clientelism
  - Compromised Integrity
  - Excludes vast majority of the poor
  - High levels of grievances
  - Exacerbate social mistrust in ethnic divided communities
  - Difficult to scale-up
  - Undermines state-citizen relationship

- **Cons**
  - Higher fiscal cost
  - Depends on political commitment

- **Fragile States**
  - Types: conflict; post conflict; and weak states
  - Common feature: They all lack effective political processes to influence the state to meet societal demands
Table 1: Principles of Engagement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Humanitarian principles</th>
<th>OECD principles for engagement in fragile states</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanity</td>
<td>Context-specificity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impartiality</td>
<td>Do no harm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutrality</td>
<td>State building as central objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence</td>
<td>Prioritise prevention/risk reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universality</td>
<td>Recognise political, security and development links</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promote non-discrimination</td>
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Sources: Based on GHD Good Humanitarian Donorship 2003, and OECD Principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations 2007

GHD provides a forum for donors to discuss good practice in Humanitarian Financing\(^{16}\) and other shared concerns. By defining principles and standards, it provides both a framework to guide official humanitarian aid and a mechanism for encouraging greater donor accountability. Its primary objectives focus on the immediate needs of people affected during and in the aftermath of man-made crises and natural disasters, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for the occurrence of such situations.

- **Humanity** – saving human lives and alleviating suffering wherever it is found;
- **Impartiality** - implementation of actions solely on the basis of need, without discrimination between or within affected populations;
- **Neutrality** - humanitarian action must not favour any side in an armed conflict or other dispute where such action is carried out; and
- **Independence** - autonomy of humanitarian objectives from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.

On the contrary, the **OECD** principle of engagement in fragile states focuses on a longer term vision for international engagement and its main objective is “to help national reformers to build effective, legitimate, and resilient state institutions”.\(^{17}\) The focus here is on building the capacity of the state to effectively interact and deliver basic services to its citizens. This is often referred to in the literature as a key element of state building.

In the context of delivering cash transfers in fragile states or fragile environments, the salient question here is how to go about delivering long-term predictable cash transfers. Is it best delivered by the state actors or non-state actors i.e. NGOs? Should donor financing be channelled through humanitarian agencies or through the state? Humanitarian actors rightly argue that non-state actors should not just focus on the delivery of immediate relief materials such as food and NFIs but also be involved in the delivery of cash transfers to the affected and vulnerable population. The main objectives are to save the lives of people at risk as well as ensure they are able to cope with future emergency situations. On the contrary, proponents of state-led programmes argue that the state should be the main provider of long term cash transfers. In the latter are actors who are bound by their objectives to build effective state institutions that are critical to fostering a meaningful state-citizen relationship. They argue that preventing the causes of vulnerability as well as improving the states capacity to deal with such vulnerabilities when they occur promotes local ownership and sustainability. The Grow up Free for Poverty Coalition (GUFp) – a network of NGOs working on social protection – also believe that for cash transfers to be sustainable and institutionalised the state should be the main actor financing, delivering and administering such programmes.\(^{18}\)
Table 2: Short and long term approaches to cash transfers in the context of fragility in Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Short Term Approaches</th>
<th>Long term Approaches</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Instrumentalist</td>
<td>• Activists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Poverty targeted safety nets</td>
<td>• Universal programmes</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Non-state delivery of services</td>
<td>• State led service delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Main arguments are based on resource constraints and inclusive growth</td>
<td>• Main arguments are based on citizenship, rights and social justice</td>
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2.4 Conceptual framework: The role of cash transfer in fragile states

Based on the above review on fragility and social protection, it can be argued that a well designed cash transfer programme can play a vital role in addressing not just chronic poverty in fragile states but more importantly strengthen the relationship between the state and its citizens. Regular cash transfer programmes such as universal non contributory social pensions in Nepal, Kosovo and Timor Leste are integral part of wider social policies that were put in place to foster social cohesion and re establish public trust in state institutions at the aftermath of crisis.

Generally, the inclusion of cash transfers as a broader social protection strategy is as a result of the evidence from a range of studies which indicate that such programmes act as effective incentives to increase poor people’s demand for services and improve their education and health outcomes thereby contributing to meeting the MDGs. In the African context, most of this evidence is based on findings in middle income and non fragile states particularly in Southern Africa where these programmes are more prominent. Countries such as Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and South Africa have put in place state funded cash transfer programmes. These include social pensions in form of unconditional cash transfers targeted at older people in Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and South Africa. There are other state owned programmes such as disability grants in South Africa and Namibia, poverty-targeted social assistance schemes in Botswana and Child Support Grant in South Africa.

In Kenya, Zambia and Uganda donors have played active roles in financially and technically supporting cash transfer pilot projects (HSNP, Kalomo and SAGE respectively). The small scale nature of these pilots allows for manageable monitoring and evaluation systems which have been very positive. However, there are also legitimate concerns with regards to the long term viability and sustainability of such projects especially when scaled up to the national level. More over, the governments in these countries have been reluctant to take over the financing and long term sustainability of these pilot programmes.

In spite of the above, what is still missing is substantive evidence on what works and doesn’t work in term of designing and delivering cash transfers in the context of fragility in African countries. As mentioned earlier, there is a considerable amount of knowledge that succinctly captures the social and economic impact of cash transfer programmes in low and middle income countries but there is a knowledge gap in fragile contexts in Africa. It is within this context that Section Three looks beyond economic impacts and the wellbeing of direct beneficiaries of cash transfer programmes but places emphasis on the potential role of cash transfer programmes in strengthening state-citizen relationship which is a critical imperative in most, if not all, fragile states. The main focus is on existing cash transfer programmes that include older people as beneficiaries.
3.0 Case Studies: Sierra Leone and Northern Kenya

3.1 Categories and attributes of fragility

The rationale for the two case studies is informed by the complex nature of state fragility. While there are striking differences between the case studies there are also revealing similarities.

Differences: Sierra Leone is a post conflict but peaceful developing state that is working towards delivering services to its citizens but the capacity of state institutions to deliver basic services still needs further strengthening. Public expectations of ‘peace dividends’ is still quite high as many are still rebuilding their lives at the aftermath of a devastating civil war which finally came to an end in 2002.

Kenya is the sub regional power in East Africa but a vast part of its Arid and Semi Arid Land (ASAL) lag behind in socio economic and infrastructural development compared to the rest of the country. This area is considered fragile due to its topography, food insecurity and its vulnerability to violent conflicts particularly in border areas in Turkana to the northwest bordering South Sudan and Northern Uganda while the border town of Mandera overlooking Somalia and Ethiopia to the north east also experience outbreaks of violent conflict from time to time.

There are also differences in levels of infrastructural development. While many areas in northern Kenya especially the town centres have electricity, Sierra Leone at the moment only provides the capital city Freetown with electricity with plans underway to supply other parts of the country. At the moment, the rest of the country rely on generators (for those that can afford one) to power their homes, offices and businesses. Compared with Northern Kenya, mobile phone coverage in rural communities in Sierra Leone is extremely low. Several communities are yet to be connected to mobile phone networks. Unlike Kenya where mobile phone technology is used to deliver cash transfers, the low coverage in Sierra Leone illustrates the difficulty in using this technology to deliver cash transfers in rural areas.

In terms of human displacement, conflicts and instability in the border areas joining northern Kenya with Somalia, Ethiopia, South Sudan and northern Uganda tend to generate a huge number of displaced persons. These are either refugees who have managed to cross borders or internally displaced persons (IDPs) who remain displaced within Kenya. For instance, there are a number of IDPs who were displaced during the 2008 post election violence. As a post conflict developing state, Sierra Leone no longer have serious crisis related to internal displacement of persons.

Similarities: Northern Kenya is lagging in both socio economic and infrastructural development in compared to other parts of the country. In Sierra Leone, poverty levels are higher in the eastern – where the civil war began and ended – and northern regions of the country compared to the western and southern regions. Based on these similarities, there appear to be a correlation between low levels of development and susceptibility to eruption of violent conflicts particularly in areas with the lowest economic and infrastructural development.

The two countries also depend on primary commodities and their natural resources for external revenue generation. Kenya relies on several primary goods (tea, coffee etc) whose prices remain low in the international commodity market and 75 percent of its labour force is in the agricultural sector. Sierra Leone relies on alluvial diamond and other mineral resources as the major source of hard currency earnings which accounts for nearly half of Sierra Leone's exports. 50 percent of the working-age population also engage in subsistence agriculture.

Service delivery in Northern Kenya and many rural areas in Sierra Leone are mainly carried out with the support of non governmental organisations. Another salient similarity pertaining to both case studies is the poor nature of record keeping such as civil registration systems particularly at the local governance levels. For instance, there is lack of reliable data and information on the number of older people at the Chiefdom level in Sierra Leone and remote communities in Northern Kenya.
3.2 Impact of fragility on citizens: The case of older people and their households

The impacts of fragility on citizens vary in degree according to the nature and context of fragility. This sub-section outlines some of the common challenges facing older people in both case studies. They are somewhat similar to those found in many other low income African countries.

Many older people, especially in rural areas, are responsible for their grandchildren because middle age family members tend to migrate to urban centres and in many cases the latter struggle to remit cash to the former. Though older people generally work to support their families but the prevalence of insecurity in fragile situations such as the border areas in Northern Kenya inhibits their ability to continue working as farmers and pastoralists. They do not have a regular source of income to support themselves and their grandchildren. As a vulnerable group, older people are also excluded from government run programmes providing free access to health services. For example, they are excluded from the free access to health care for pregnant women, lactating mothers and children under five years old in Sierra Leone.

More over, many older people suffer from poor eye sight and majority of the blind amongst them are homeless. They also lack productive assets which many have lost as a result of on going conflict or previous conflicts. Thus, poverty, ill health and food insecurity among older people greatly impede their role as care givers for their grandchildren.

3.3. Existing social protection measures targeting older people

3.3.1 Sierra Leone

Presently, a draft copy of the social protection policy framework prepared by a Technical Steering Committee is about to go to Cabinet for further deliberation. Within the draft policy framework, older people are prioritised as amongst the most vulnerable group next to children and the disabled. The document recognises social protection as an effective mechanism to address childhood poverty and breaking the intergenerational cycle of poverty within families.

<table>
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<tr>
<th><strong>NASSIT</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>Compulsory for all employees in the formal sector</td>
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<td>Covers approx 5% of the working population</td>
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**SSN (pilot phase 2007 to 2008)**

- Non contributory scheme
- 100% government funded
- Targeted over 16,291 beneficiaries
- Based on poverty targeting
- Age criteria 60 and above
- One off payment Le200,000 Leones approx. $50

"I have six grandchildren under my care because my 2 sons have abandoned us in the village. I have difficulties providing for them (grandchildren). 2 have dropped out of school because they need to support the rest of us. I am also not feeling too well and can’t afford to buy medicine because I don’t have money" Aishatu Bangura 80 year old woman in Sierra Leone

The system comprises of a social insurance system managed by the National Social Security Investment Trust (NASSIT). Membership of this scheme is compulsory for all formally employed workers. The Trust strives to extend the benefits of the scheme to a greater number of self-employed workers in order to increase the number of people and families protected from the consequences of loss of employment through death, injury or business failure. The Government of Sierra Leone is also committed to working with non-state actors in strengthening existing social assistance schemes to increase coverage and outcomes. The Social Safety Net (SSN) programme is an example of a social assistance scheme designed to target ‘the poorest of..."
the poor’ older people. Between 2007 and 2008, over 16,000 older people received a one-off or 2 cycle payment of Le200, 000 Leones approximately (US$50).

### 3.3.2 Kenya

In Kenya, social insurance schemes consist of the National Social Security Fund (NSSF), Civil Service Pension Scheme and the Occupational Pension Scheme. As a result of low coverage, the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development (MGCSD) is leading policy development that would cater for the protection of vulnerable groups excluded from the above schemes. The Orphan and Vulnerable Children cash Transfer OVC-CT and the Older Persons Cash Transfer (OP-CT) are programmes initiated and implemented by the Ministry.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>NSSF</th>
<th>OPCT</th>
<th>HSNP (phase I 2007-2011)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Approx. 800,000 members</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Civil Pension Scheme estimated approx. 125,000 persons (2003)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Occupational Pension Scheme covering approx. 1,352 persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>• 100% government funded</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Targets 32,250 poor and vulnerable older people</td>
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<td>• Covers 44 districts</td>
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<td>• 750 households per district</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Age criteria 65 and above</td>
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<tr>
<td>• KShs1,500 per month</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Donor funded/NGO implemented pilot project</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The 3 methodologies combined targeted 35,000 older people.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• 13 districts across northern Kenya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Age criteria 55 and above</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• KShs2,150 every two months</td>
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The latter specifically targeting older people was launched in 2009 and it is a 100 percent government funded programme which targets 32,250 poor and vulnerable older persons aged 65 years and above in 44 districts, covering 750 households per district. The beneficiaries receive KShs1, 500 Kenyan Shillings per month approximately (US$20). During the year 2009/2010, the Government allocated KShs550 million Kenyan Shillings to this programme, which was rolled out in all the targeted districts. Besides the OP-CT, there is the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) – a joint Government of Kenya/ DFID initiative which also includes a social pension targeting methodology. The HSNP is being implemented in two phases. The objective of Phase I (April 2007 - March 2011) is to design and pilot cost-effective mechanisms for beneficiary targeting, payment delivery and grievance management in 13 districts across northern Kenya targeting 60,000 beneficiaries. The focus of this activity will be a comparison of the cost-effectiveness of three different types of targeting methodology: a social pension (for people aged over 55 years), community-based targeting and targeting based on household ‘dependency ratio’. Phase II (2012-2017) is expected to select one or more of these targeting approaches (based on evidence of cost-effectiveness and impact) and roll it out, along with the processes for payments and grievance management to 300,000 households.

### 3.4 Coverage gaps

Within their wider social protection framework, both countries do have social insurance schemes which mainly cover workers in formal employment. However, majority of workers including older people operate in the informal sector, hence there is a huge gap in coverage. Kenya and Sierra Leone are piloting poverty targeted cash transfer social assistance programmes. The cash transfer programmes in Kenya (OPCT and HSNP) and Sierra Leone (SSN) are poverty targeted programmes that apply a form of means-testing to select beneficiaries. While the OPCT and SSN are 100 percent funded and implemented by the government, the HSNP is a donor funded and NGO implemented programme. The HSNP secretariat located in the Ministry of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands is responsible for the over all coordination of the programme but its participation in programme implementation and decision making during implementation is somewhat limited.

### 3.5 Cash transfers and state-citizen relations

Considering that cash transfer programmes can contribute to strengthening the relationship between the state and its citizens and in the process the legitimacy of the state, the following sub-sections explore the impact of the SSN and the HSNP programmes on state-citizen relations. What are the
factors that determine the direction of such relationships in the context of a cash transfer programme? What are the limitations and challenges?

3.5.1 Impact of the SSN on state-citizen relations in Sierra Leone

The SSN had no positive impact on state-citizen relationship. The main objective of the programme is “to assist the old and needy in such a way that it increases their sense of citizenship participation and reintegration into community life”\(^{22}\). Contrary to its objective, the design and implementation of the programme further undermined the relationship between the state and its citizens particularly at the local level. The program covered 65 chiefdoms out of 149 chiefdoms in the provinces with a total of 16,291 elderly beneficiaries i.e. 60 and above between 2007/2008. The concept paper for the formation of the Social Safety Net (SSN) scheme in Sierra Leone states that the programme is for the most vulnerable in society. The basic idea is thus, not to give handouts, but hands-ups. It goes further to define a social safety net for older people and the needy as a scheme for people who have no regular income and unable to work with no means of support. The scheme is described as non contributory and relies 100 percent on Government for funding/sustenance. The document stated that at the inception of the scheme, assistance was received from sale of Chinese rice donated to the government, sale of Italian Rice, French Commodity Aid and the dividends paid to government by the Rokel Commercial Bank Sierra Leone Limited. Thus, the money accrued from the sale of the above was used to implement the cash transfer targeting vulnerable older people in 65 chiefdoms in Sierra Leone.

In terms of implementation modalities, the local community was seen to be best placed to identify those meeting the criteria for eligibility which are as follows:

- Have no regular income
- Have no other means of support
- Unable to work
- Must be 60 years and above.

**Delivery Mechanism**

![Delivery Mechanism Diagram]

It was believed that those living in particular local government unit i.e. chiefdom should collectively know the circumstances of persons in the community appreciably well. Thus, while acknowledging the lack of viable organisational structure in the community as a major constraint on the effective implementation of the assistance programme “the establishment of a committee in each community became an absolute necessity”\(^{23}\). Each committee was headed by the Paramount Chief or his
designated representative and they were to carry out their duties (identifying beneficiaries) voluntarily and free of cost.

With the above background information in relation to programme design and implementation modalities, the study proceeded to assess the impact of the programme on state-citizen relations through focus group discussions with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries and semi-structured interviews with paramount chiefs and their designated representatives, including section chiefs. Findings from the focus group discussions held in 12 chiefdoms showed that practically everyone who participated in the focus groups believed the way the actual selection process was done was very unfair. There was consensus in 7 Chiefdoms that the members of the local committee including the Paramount Chief selected most of the beneficiaries without recourse to the criteria for eligibility. In chiefdoms where the criteria was used some beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries did not understand the questions they were asked.

"During registration I was asked whether I had anyone supporting me in the house and I said yes. I was told later that I did not qualify to receive the money because I have someone supporting me. I say they are wrong. When I was asked the question, I thought they were referring to my grandchildren who I send on errands. I am the one looking after them and we can hardly afford to even eat a good meal every day. How can they say that because I have little children under my care that I don't deserve the money? It is very unfair but I will keep praying to God who is bigger than everyone" Amina Sesay 70 year old woman

In some instances, committee members were given money before putting names forward as beneficiaries. More over, in 10 chiefdoms beneficiaries said they did not receive the exact amount of money they were entitled to receive. In some chiefdom, committee members deducted between 2.5-25 percent from the principal sum each beneficiary was entitled to receive.24

"I believe I didn't benefit from the programme because the people that did the selection accused me of supporting the wrong political party. It was obvious that they were rewarding those who support their preferred candidate" Marie Conteh, 68 year old woman

In Kalangba Town, over 300 people were asked to pay a Le5, 000 for registration and not all of them received the money on the day of payment. Yet, they were not refunded. Youths believed to be representing some powerful local elites hijacked the process without the knowledge of programme staff from Freetown.

The focus group discussants alluded to the fact that the government had very good intentions introducing the programme but unfortunately local political elites hijacked the programme during implementation. Beneficiary and non-beneficiaries alike all agreed that the selection process was fraught with irregularities as many of the beneficiaries believed that selection was not based on the vulnerability criteria set by the government. Rather it was based on favouritism. A few people below the age criteria 60 and above also benefitted from the programme. However, there was consensus among discussants that extremely few under age persons received the money. Some non-beneficiaries also believed that there exclusion from the programme were as a result of bad luck and lack of timely information regarding the programme. Many said they were not aware of the registration process with several hoping that they would be able to benefit from the programme when next it comes to their community. Many section chiefs were blamed

"Those who got the money were lucky and we that didn't get the money were unlucky". Mohammed Bangura 65 year old man non-beneficiary

"The chiefs were responsible because they influenced the people that came from Freetown in order to favour some people who are related to them or people they like but they are still our brothers and sisters. I hope next time I will be lucky to receive the money. I will keep praying." Musa Sesay 67 year old man
for not informing their constituencies despite the fact that officials from Freetown sent forerunners to inform the communities about the programme.

In terms of social cohesion, the programme rarely caused conflict in many of the places where it was implemented because the ethnic configuration in many of the chiefdoms is somewhat homogenous. For example, they are all either Temnes in several chiefdoms in the north and all Mendes in several southern chiefdoms. However, there was a particular chiefdom in the North West (Biriwa chiefdom) which has two ethnic groups where the Paramount Chief is from the minority Mandingo tribe. He was never accepted as the legitimate leader by the Limbas who constitute the majority in chiefdom. The programme was severely disrupted because the majority Limba tribe refused to accept the Chief as the head of the local committee. As a result of the dispute, only 77 older people benefited instead of 450 allocated to Biriwa. Several vulnerable Limbas refused to turn up for registration because they couldn’t trust the Mandingo Chief. The lesson here is that it is possible to get away with a targeted programme in an ethnically homogenous community but probably not the case in a heterogeneous community.

In terms of design, the programme had no grievance mechanisms in place where individuals could register complaints. Many felt powerless and frustrated. They could only voice their frustrations to their local chiefs whom many believed were responsible for their exclusion. In response to these allegations, many of the chiefs mentioned during interviews that were put in a very difficult position because the local committees found it extremely difficult to select the most vulnerable in a situation where they believed practically everyone is vulnerable and deserved to receive the money.

"When I went to plead with my section chief to add my name as a beneficiary he asked me to bring 2 chickens. I asked him where he expected me to get them from considering that I am very poor and blind for that matter"
Hassani, a 65 year old blind man in Bumpe Town, Bumpe Ngao Chiefdom

"As the head of the Chiefdom the people always blame us (the paramount chief and the section chiefs) irrespective of what we do in such circumstances, those that didn’t receive the money hold us responsible for their exclusion. It will make life much easier for us if everyone benefits from the

The case of the SSN demonstrates that for programme integrity, it is better to avoid targeted programmes if it cannot be guaranteed to be transparent and fair. More so, it is very challenging to guarantee credible implementation in situations where members of the Local Committees are also poor and desperate to benefit from the cash transfer therefore subjecting the programme to local elite capture and patronage. Thus, a potentially good programme ended up loosing credibility and support from the wider community even though some of the beneficiaries of the programme experienced a change in their economic and material well being as a result of the transfer while the non-beneficiaries felt powerless and cheated. It is widely believed within the chiefdoms where the programmes were implemented that the previous government used it as a political tool so as to gather support from certain areas of the country i.e. the north which was the then opposition and now ruling party’s strong hold. The way the programme was implemented further undermined the already weak relationship between the local chiefs and the people at the chiefdom level. It reaffirmed many peoples belief that local leaders are only out to dispense favours to their family members, friends and cronies. This brings into question the programme’s credibility and legitimacy and over all its ability to have a positive impact on state-citizen relationship.
3.5.2 Limitations and challenges of the SSN

The SSN is 100 percent government funded pilot programme which demonstrates its commitment to tackling old age vulnerability and poverty. However, in its current form the programme does extremely little in strengthening the relationship between the state and its citizens. This is due to programme design and poor implementation. With limited availability of resources at their disposal, the designers of the programme decided in good faith to target extremely vulnerable older people but it did face significant challenges during implementation. The following factors limited the ability of the programme to contribute to strengthening state-citizen relationship.

First, a thorough research or feasibility study was not conducted to understand the social, political and economic dynamics in the chiefdoms prior to programme design. Little time was spent to ensure wider community participation during the design process which was done in a hurry in order to coincide with the general elections. More so, effective mechanisms to deliver the cash were not agreed and the country had no previous experience managing and delivering cash transfers.

Second, targeting the ‘most vulnerable’ in a context where poverty and vulnerability is wide spread limits coverage and the consequence is that the programme was prone to leakages and abuse. Paramount Chiefs and the Section Chiefs were also determined to benefit from the cash transfer. Le200, 000 Leones (Approx US$50) is quite a lot of money in many rural communities in Sierra Leone. Discretional and subjective determination of beneficiaries based on a form of means testing i.e. income levels in situations where no reliable or credible data exists in the informal sector creates room for manipulation and abuse of the process by local and political authorities.

Third, the absence of a functioning grievance and accountability mechanism disempowered the wider community with many feeling powerless and cheated. Instead of empowering communities, it actually disempowered them because programme objectives and criteria for selection of beneficiaries were not clear as there were absence of transparency and accountability mechanisms.

Fourth, in terms of implementation the weak institutional capacity to implement poverty targeted programmes on a national scale also had negative impact on state-citizen relationship. The human resource capacity of the implementing government agency proved to be a major challenge in implementing the programme. For instance the Monitoring and Evaluation unit rely on two motor bikes to cover the implementation of the programme in the entire northern region. Only one member of staff had received training on cash transfers programming.

Fifth, from an infrastructural point of view, Sierra Leone faces serious challenges such as poor road networks which inhibit access to the poor; zero telephone coverage in majority of the rural areas; and absence of pay points such as banks and post offices makes it difficult to deliver cash to beneficiaries in extremely remote areas. A 40 mile journey between Bumpe town and Serabu town can take up to 2 hours depending on the state of the road and of course the weather, if it rains. Many of the poorest communities are not accessible by road, only by foot. The country is about 95 percent rural and the magnitude of the challenges facing it, especially the poor is enormous. The poorest and most vulnerable older people tend to live in the most remote areas where government officials seldom come in close contact with.

Sixth, in terms of sustainability, budgetary allocation to the programme to deliver regular and predictable cash to the beneficiaries was not put in place. The SSN secretariat was only able to implement the programme for 1 year (2007-2008) since subsequent requests to continue the programme have received little support from the Ministry of Finance. For instance, the programme requested for 16billion Leones (US$4 million dollars) in 2009 to upscale from 16,000+ to 35,000 beneficiaries but were allocated 370million Leones (US$92,500) which is less than 2.5 percent of their request. However, for the 2011 fiscal year, Le2.5 Leones has been earmarked for the programme.

Suffice it to say however, that there are still concerns of dependency culture in a post conflict environment that has been used to hand-outs through emergency relief. The government is more
Concerned with ensuring that social assistance programmes do not create dependency so they tend to prioritise Cash for Work (CFW) programmes for productive activities. This is a tenable argument provided there is acknowledgement that older people and children should not be placed in the same category as those that are able to provide productive labour. The case for cash transfers targeting older people and their families is even more poignant in Sierra Leone if one takes into account the fact that majority of households in the rural areas are poor older people headed households with children between the ages of 0-14.

3.5.3 Impact of the HSNP on state-citizen relations in Northern Kenya

The HSNP has a positive impact on state-citizen relationship. This is as a result of the ‘rights component’ of the programme. The design of the programme with a ‘rights component’ contributed to empowering beneficiary communities. However, issues of ownership limits the long term impact of the programme on state-citizen relationship on a wider scale and sustainable basis. The main objective of phase I of the HSNP is to establish a National Social Protection system delivering long term guaranteed cash transfers to extremely poor and vulnerable members of the society using the most convenient and reliable methodology. Basically, it is concerned with technical issues bordering on inclusion and exclusion errors in relation to cost effectiveness of targeting, registration and enrolment, and their efficacy in tackling chronic poverty. The 3 targeting methodologies (a social pension for people aged over 55 years, community-based targeting and targeting based on household ‘dependency ratio’) used to implement the programme during Phase I created huge challenges for the ‘rights component’ as it was flooded with numerous complaints and grievances.

In similarity to the SSN, it demonstrates that poverty targeting can prove to be very difficult to implement in situations where the majority are poor and vulnerable.

However, in contrast to the SSN, the HSNP was designed with a grievance mechanism through the ‘rights component’ which established ‘Rights Committees’ (RCs) in each sub-location where implementation took place. This was to ensure that aspects of the programme (registration, enrolment, targeting and payments) are implemented in a transparent and accountable way. The RCs are charged with managing grievances, thus creating an avenue for anomalies to be investigated and resolved. Apart from the role they played within the parameters of the programme, there is evidence of spill-over effects in areas relating to citizen participation, empowerment and engagement with local authorities.

The work of the RCs also extends, not by design but by default, to educating the people about their rights to engage local authorities to demand for services. Findings in Turkana, Wajir and Mandera districts showed that communities with active ‘Rights Committee’ members were successful in securing services from their local government authorities. This never used to be the case prior to the introduction of a ‘rights discourse’ as a result of the HSNP programme.

For example, in Nawoitorong sub location in Turkana central district, RC members successfully got their local authority to construct a water borehole in Kalokol village which often has a very high incidence of Cholera. They demanded that part of the Community Development Fund (CDF) should be used to provide an alternative source of water. Picture to the left is Mariko Kamais (63 years old) a RC member at the borehole championed by the Committee in Kalokol village. (Photograph taken by: Author).
In contrast, a neighbouring sub-location Kanamkermer which is yet to benefit from the HSNP was unable to demand for provision of services as well as monitor implementation. For instance, the community was informed that a contractor had been given the contract from the CDF to sink a borehole in the community but nothing had been done to date and there is no collective action to follow up and monitor progress.

In Wajir district north east of the Arid and Semi Arid Lands (ASAL) in northern Kenya, membership of the HSNP Rights Committee overlap with membership of the Pastoralist Associations (PAs) which were in existence before the implementation of the HSNP. The PAs in Wajir are based at the locational and sub-locational levels. They were established in 1994 as an interface between the communities and the government, therefore demand for services from their local authorities predates the HSNP programme. However, the HSNP rights education further complements and strengthens the ability of the RCs/PAs to hold to account their representatives. For instance, prior to the implementation of the HSNP in Tarbaj town very few members of the PA had received any formal education on right based issues.

In Shashafey sub-location in Mandera district, RC members were active in mobilising the community village elders and local chiefs to demand for extension of electricity to their respective villages. The project is on-going and for the first time two villages now have electricity. The road leading to the village has also been expanded and graded. They also succeeded in getting the Water Ministry to repair their water generator which had been faulty for several years.

Apart from the RCs ability to demand for services through community mobilisation, the HSNP programme in general has also created other unintended positive impact on state-citizen interaction. One key area is the incentive the programme creates with regards to application for national ID cards. Prior to the programme, several community members especially older people in particular did not see the value of having a national identity card. The programme creates incentives for people to get national ID cards which are required in order for beneficiaries to directly receive cash. For example, records from the Mandera district Register of Persons showed that 342 older persons from Shafshafey Location applied for a national ID cards between 3rd and 11th November 2010 while the application within 2 days – 1st and 2nd November 2010 – from Bulla Jamhuria Location was 104.

“...” Benson Leparmorijo, District Commissioner Mandera.

In Turkana, Wajir and Mandera there has been a significant increase both in registration for national ID cards and also corrections on previous cards. In El Das Location for example, several older people lost their ID cards during the Wagalla massacre in 1984, tribal conflicts in 1994 and the Bagala massacre in 1998. Many did not see the need to replace them until the HSNP social pension methodology was introduced in El Das. Many now saw the need to have an ID card. Records from the local chief’s book showed that 505 people over 55 years old had applied for new ID cards and approximately 100 had received new cards while the others are expecting their cards. There are also cases whereby the dates of birth on older people’s ID cards were inaccurate. HSNP project staff encountered challenges as a result of several cards reflecting dates of birth in the 1980s and 1990s even though it is quite clear that the card holder is definitely over 60 years old. Prior to the HSNP, there was no incentive to return the cards for correction but the inability of many older people to access the programme has created the incentive to correct the errors on these cards. A key implication for state-citizen relationship is that older people with national ID cards can now participate in the electoral process. In Kenya, one must have an ID card in order to vote.

3.5.4 Limitations and challenges of the HSNP

There are certain limitations with regards to the programme’s ability to build longer term institutionalised state-citizen relationship.
A fundamental limitation is that the programme is a donor funded and NGO implemented programme with little involvement of state institutions. Although the HSNP secretariat is located in the Ministry of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands, it was not actively involved in designing the programme and is not directly involved in its implementation. More so, beneficiary communities are aware that the programme is donor owned even though it empowers them through the ‘rights component’ to challenge their own local authorities.

Second, in its current form it may prove extremely difficult to scale up to reach 300,000 households in northern Kenya. The design of Phase II should ensure that local governance structures are actively involved in both design and implementation.

Third, it is difficult to envisage the applicability and efficacy of the SPR model if replicated at a national scale provided it remains within the parameters of a poverty targeted programme. Apart from the cost of a targeting exercise on a national scale, the number of grievances would inevitably increase because a poverty targeted programme is more likely to generate discontentment in communities where majority of the people are poor and vulnerable.

Fourth, the poverty targeted methodologies do have unintended consequences in environments with entrenched group interest because of its ability to feed into existing patronage and kinship networks especially in communities with strong clan affiliations. For example, the social pension methodology which by design is meant to be universal was ‘poverty targeted’ in El Das sub location in Greater Wajir district. The administrative component led by a local NGO Arid Lands Development Focus (ALDEF) on behalf of OXFAM targeted the most ‘vulnerable’ in the sub location. It is not clear why this was the case but it appears the community leaders in El Das took the decision with ALDEF without informing the HSNP secretariat. In the case of community based targeting and dependency ratio methodologies, non-beneficiary communities tend to also question their exclusion. In Turkana this tends to create friction between beneficiary and non-beneficiaries.

Fifth, the HSNP also have a research component which is designed to show evidence that cash transfers are effective. There are non beneficiary sub-locations (control group) that were intentionally excluded from receiving cash while their neighbours with similar demographic and socio economic indicators are beneficiary communities (treatment group). Even though the former will be included in Phase II, questions and complaints are often raised by the excluded communities as to why they are not benefiting from Phase I of the programme. Local political representatives of these communities find themselves vulnerable to accusations of neglect even though the programme is not government funded. The HSNP secretariat in Nairobi has hosted a number of politicians demanding explanations for the exclusion of their communities.
4.0 Conclusions: Emerging issues and implications for state-citizen relationship: programme ownership and design

4.1 Programme Design:
It is an irony that a state-led programme such as the SSN in Sierra Leone demonstrates the severe limitations of a poorly designed poverty targeted programme in a context where institutional capacity is weak while a donor financed programme showed glimpses of the unintended impact a ‘Social Protection Rights’ component could have on state-citizen relationship. Nevertheless, poverty targeted cash transfers are a huge challenge to implement in fragile states and environments with high levels of poverty and low institutional capacity.

In the case of Sierra Leone, anomalies associated with programme design and poor implementation, including the institutional and infrastructural constraints did have adverse effect on state-citizen relations. Trust in public institutions was further eroded and state actors – in this case – local chiefs used the programme for clientelism and patronage purposes creating mistrust between the communities and the state.

In Northern Kenya, the rights based approach embedded into the programme showed spill-over effects on citizen voice and empowerment which were positive on state-citizen relationship at the local level. However, there was limited involvement of state institutions in both the design and implementation of the programme. More so, the poverty targeted nature of the HSNP highlights some inherent contradictions between a right based approach and targeting based on vulnerability criteria because of the rift it creates in communities.

Moving forward, it is imperative to adopt a multi stakeholder approach to programme design and implementation and should be based on evidence and understanding the context in which fragility occurs. Participatory consultations with all relevant stakeholders are necessary during programme design and implementation. Transparency in form of clear and widespread communication on whom and where the programmes are being implemented is also imperative. Local ownership and participation in programme design is critical in ensuring the credibility and acceptance of cash transfer programmes. The programme must be seen by the wider community to be fair. Specifically, in fragile contexts programme design should include simple and verifiable selection criteria identifying beneficiaries using very clear categories e.g. children, older persons, disabled, orphans or a simple life-cycle approach. Programme design should also include a rights based approach with effective grievance mechanisms embedded in either targeted or universal programmes. The mechanism should also be linked to existing accountability and ombudsman structures particularly at the local government level where implementation takes place. In terms of delivery, innovative ways of delivery cash through the private sector can play a role in fragile environments where functioning structures are in non existence.

4.2 Programme Ownership
Cash transfers can be used in the context of emergencies and as a tool for longer term development. For the latter, the state should be the lead actor in cash transfers. This is for the purpose of sustainability because government ownership is critical for state citizen relationships to develop on a longer term basis but also for sustainability of the programme. Donors and NGOs can play a complementary role in providing technical assistance in programme design including strengthening accountability and transparency mechanisms. Donors and NGOs could also assist in developing the institutional capacity of the state as well as build-in transparency and accountability mechanisms that strongly links relevant state institutions with the citizens i.e. national and local human rights bodies. The positive aspect in Sierra Leone is that the programme is 100% owned by the government while in Kenya the programme is practically owned by a donor with limited engagement of state institutions. More over, cash transfers should be part of the overall national development agenda and not an isolated programme even if NGOs are implementing short term relief programmes. Non governmental organisations should complement governments and not replace them.
4.3 Areas for future research
A number of areas of research are worth considering for future study. These are as follows:

- Strengthening state capacity at the local level through developing civil registration and record keeping systems is one area that needs further attention in fragile states and environments.
- Linking cash transfers to other complementary service provision particularly in the areas of access to health care services and education.
- Financing and mobilising domestic revenue through a fair and redistributive tax system incorporating the informal sector for sustainable funding of social protection/cash transfer programmes.
- Learning key lessons and experience from other fragile states such as e.g. Nepal, Kosovo and Timor-Leste.
Notes

1 The terms ‘fragile states’, ‘fragile environments’, ‘fragile situations’, ‘fragile contexts’ and ‘fragility’ are used interchangeably throughout the report depending on the context it is been used within the text.
3 Cash transfers aim to directly increase or protect the incomes of those living in poverty or at risk of falling into poverty. Typical cash transfer programmes include social pensions, child benefits and disability benefits.
4 A ‘Barre’ is a community centre which is often located at the Chiefdom headquarter town.
5 DFID, Why we need to work more effectively in Fragile State, London, DFID, 2005.
6 A ‘rentier state’ is a state that depends on unearned income, usually from a natural resource, for example oil while a ‘tax state’ or ‘fiscal state’ is one that raises the bulk of its revenue from taxes, and therefore is heavily dependent on its citizens.
12 The term Washington Consensus most commonly refers to an orientation towards Neoliberal policies that are market friendly. They are a set of economic reforms that were prescribed just for developing nations, which included advice to reduce government deficits, to liberalise and deregulate international trade and cross border investment, and to pursue export led growth.
14 Künnemann R and Leonhard R, ”A human rights view of social cash transfers for achieving the millennium development goals” In cooperation with the Working Group Social Cash Transfers, Brot für die Welt , Evangelischer Entwicklungsdiensst, FIAN International, medico international 2008.
16 A recent study by HelpAge International found that there is a significant disparity between the needs of older people as a vulnerable group and the humanitarian assistance funded to meet that need. In financial terms, the CAP and Flash appeals raised a total of US$4.2 billion in the 12 crises studied. Of this, US$8.2 million (0.2 per cent) was allocated to projects that included an activity that specifically targeted older people. For more information see “A Study of Humanitarian Financing for Older People” www.helapge.org.
18 GUF recommends the Social Protection Floor as the basis for engagement and support on social protection, as this approach supports nationally-owned social protection systems, and the clear advantages of universal and categorical approaches to social protection.
19 Chapman K "Using social transfers to scale up equitable access to education and health services", background paper, Scaling up Services team, DFID Policy Division, January 2006.
23 Ibid pp.5.
24 Beneficiaries were meant to receive Le200,000 Leones.