Policy Processes in Livestock Health and Marketing

Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

In collaboration with
Institute of Development Studies UK
AU-IBAR Institutional Policy Support Team
UNOCHA Pastoralist Communication Initiative
# Table of Contents

## Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 3

1. Pro-Poor Livestock Programmes and Policies in East Africa ......................................... 4  
   i) Poor Results of Livestock Technology Initiatives ....................................................... 4  
   ii) The Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Study .......................................................................... 5  
   iii) Investments for the Future ........................................................................................... 6

2. An Introduction to Policy Processes................................................................................ 7  
   i) What is Policy? ............................................................................................................ 7  
   ii) Conventional Views of Policy ..................................................................................... 7  
   iii) What are Policy Processes? ......................................................................................... 8  
   iv) Policy Narratives ........................................................................................................ 10  
   v) Actors, Networks and Coalitions ............................................................................... 11  
   vi) Political Interests ........................................................................................................ 12

3. An Analysis of the 2001 Foot and Mouth Outbreak in UK........................................... 15

4. A Brief History of Ethiopian Pastoral Livestock Projects............................................. 17  
   ii) Third Livestock Development Project - 1985 ............................................................ 17  
   iii) Southern Rangelands Project – 1989/90 .................................................................... 17  
   iv) Pastoral Development Strategy 2002/03.................................................................... 18  
   
   Discussion of Policy Options................................................................................................. 18

5. Animal Health Policy in Ethiopia.................................................................................. 20  
   i) The History of Animal Health Services ..................................................................... 20  
   ii) Actors in the Animal Health Sector ........................................................................... 22  
   iii) The Veterinary Policy Process ................................................................................... 25  
   iv) Policy Options for 2005: Private or Public Service Delivery?................................. 25

6. Livestock Production and Marketing Policy in Ethiopia............................................... 28  
   i) History ..................................................................................................................... 28  
   ii) Actors and Activities in the Livestock Marketing Sector .......................................... 31  
   iii) Policy Options ............................................................................................................ 33


Annex I - Participants ................................................................................................................. 38

## Figures

- Figure 1: Ethiopia’s Animal Health Service, Key Actor Relationships ............................... 24
- Figure 2: Livestock Marketing in Ethiopia, Key Actor Relationships ................................. 32

Produced by the UNOCHA Pastoralist Communication Initiative  
P.O. Box 20768, Addis Ababa 1000, Ethiopia  
Tel: 251 (1) 444196  
© UNOCHA, April 2005
Introduction

This report looks at the policy process in the livestock health and marketing sector in Ethiopia. The material is drawn from a three-day training event organised by the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources in April 2005. Developed in collaboration with the African Union International Bureau of Animal Resources (AU-IBAR)\(^1\), the event was led by the UK Institute of Development Studies (IDS) and supported by the UNOCHA Pastoralist Communication Initiative.

An analysis of the history of livestock policy in Ethiopia and East Africa shows that key policy narratives have been very consistent over time: the aim has long been to increase exports of livestock and to provide veterinary care to support the export trade. Documenting the history of livestock programmes and policies in Ethiopia, this report notes that projects that were exclusively ‘technical’ tended to be unsuccessful, and the discussion goes on to consider the challenges of making policy that promotes service delivery and well-balanced regulatory organisations. The policy process is shown to involve numerous actors each with political, professional and other interests, who influence decisions to a greater or lesser extent. The analysis suggests that better understanding of the policy process itself, the actors, narratives and politics within the sector, can lead to better approaches to effective decision making.

The report aims to develop a conceptual understanding of policy, policy change and policy processes by considering practical and straightforward approaches and methods. It goes on to apply these methods to policies and programmes, looking at two major areas of concern in the livestock sector in Ethiopia: animal health services and livestock marketing.

---

1. The Africa Union-International Bureau of Animal Resources (IBAR) Institutional Policy Support Team (IPST), mandated by the AU to strengthen African partner institutions, is working with member countries on building policy-making capacity. IPST, in collaboration with IDS, has been running policy process training for mid-level animal production policy makers in Eastern and Southern Africa. Starting in September 2004 with an event for policy makers from ten countries in the region including Ethiopia, it was followed by a period in which participants investigated case studies in their home countries. A second follow-up event was held for the same group in February 2005, involving discussions of strategies for policy formulation and change. The next stage has been to support training and analysis sessions with animal health policy makers in each country. This report covers the continuation event for policy makers in Ethiopia.
1. Pro-Poor Livestock Programmes and Policies in East Africa
Dr. Berhanu Admassu, AU IBAR IPST

It is estimated that 1.2 billion people in the world live below a poverty line defined by $1 per day. Around 630 million rural poor rely on livestock for their livelihoods, of whom some 75% are African. A key feature of livestock keeping is the variety of ways it supports the livelihood strategies of the poor. Livestock are assets that provide a steady stream of food and revenue. Livestock are one of the few means of asset accumulation and risk reduction that can prevent the rural poor sliding into abject poverty.

**Livestock revolution**

Human population growth, increasing urbanization and rising incomes are predicted to double the demand for and production of livestock and livestock products in developing countries over the next 20 years. Yet experience shows that most technology-oriented projects in Africa and elsewhere in the livestock and related sectors have been unsuccessful. The few that have succeeded in reducing poverty had a distinctly enabling institutional and policy environment.

Millions of dollars have been spent on technical projects including disease control, disease surveillance, new control technologies, vaccination campaigns, new production resources such as fodder plants, genetically improved breeds, improved animal feed processing, storage and production, better management of communal grazing, improved storage of livestock commodities, marketing corporations, abattoirs and marketing infrastructure. Projects have also tackled training for state veterinary services, laboratories, animal research and extension. Some used decentralised planning techniques and farmer participatory approaches, and introduced new extension systems, such as “training and visit” and others introduced new disease surveillance, epidemiology and economic techniques to improve disease control planning.

i) Poor Results of Livestock Technology Initiatives

A review of over 800 livestock projects reveals significant problems. In many cases the technology, goods or services were developed but never reached the target farmers. Ordinary farmers did not adopt the technology or service because it was inappropriate to their needs or circumstances, while wealthy farmers or traders often captured benefits to the detriment of poor farmers.

Failure in the technology projects was primarily due to weak implementing organisations: Staff were unable to handle new technologies, there was insufficient competition in the private sector, parastatal organisations were mismanaged, and the public sector suffered from chronic under-funding and lack of role clarity. Meanwhile livestock owners were not well organised for managing resources, achieving economies of scale and increasing their scope for input supplies and marketing activities. In many cases para-professional private-sector groups were outlawed, while NGOs proved to be financially unsustainable.

Failure in the organizational-type projects was primarily due to poor follow-up. Services such as veterinary laboratories proved economically unviable or demand for the service fell away once project support ended. Staff were often trained in new techniques but their organizations then did not utilize the new skills. New approaches to decentralized planning and

“In Ethiopia there have been many projects, from the first livestock development project to the fourth, but none of them achieved their goals. The main problems were with the institutional arrangements and the absence of policy. It is the same in other East African countries. However in Sudan, where in the past the government had focused on cotton and sugar cane, there is now acceptance of livestock as an asset in food production. Sudan is now the top livestock production utiliser in Africa with enabling policy for livestock production. Botswana is also often mentioned as a positive example, but the sector is highly subsidized. There are some good examples, but they are very few.” Workshop participant
participatory methods were rejected because they conflicted with the professional attitudes and values of the top decision makers and newly-trained staff left for better paid work elsewhere.

The process of development is strongly influenced by policies (goals) and institutions (rules, laws and enforcement mechanisms), as well as by information constraints and unwritten norms. To make changes it is important to learn from the past and improve methodologies, using for example, interactive participation and a livelihoods approach.

ii) The Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Study

The experience of previous project failures prompted a five-country study into policies institutions and poverty in Eastern Africa, covering Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. It researched the status of policy and institutional issues and asked whether these issues justified additional funding in the livestock sector and of what type.

Lack of Data

The research emphasized that recognition of the livestock sector has been very limited; its contribution to the overall economy has been massively underplayed as a result of past emphasis on crop production. In Ethiopia, for example, only the contribution of hides and skins is quantified, the rest of the sector is under-reported and thus undermined – neither meat, capital assets, social assets nor draft power are included in national statistics. The research recommends funding for studies on contribution of livestock to national economies and human development and its contribution to GDP. It also notes the need for forums to advocate, network and share information on the importance of livestock.

Looking in particular at the process and results of the national poverty reduction strategy paper exercise (PRSP), the study found that the livestock sector was only included in consultative processes as an afterthought, often after agitation from small pastoral lobbies. The papers did not adequately capture the key concerns, further emphasizing the need to invest in improving the information base on the livestock sector. The study also looked at ‘poverty mapping’ and concluded that although some work had been done to identify the poor in the livestock sector there remains a strong need for relevant detailed poverty data. The apparent lack of data is a perennial problem whose underlying causes include lack of funds and lack of focus on poverty.

Policy Formulation

In all the five countries studied there is a strong top-down orientation in policy formulation with heavy government influence and inadequate participation of the poor in policy making. This stems from an inherent top-down approach to policy making, the high cost of adequate grassroots consultations and lack of tools, experience and knowledge to facilitate participation. Many government functionaries say that they need knowledge of policy-making and policy processes. Policy-makers are not always able to respond frequent changes in the environment that require policies to be updated or renewed. As a result the majority of policies are either completely absent, or are outdated. Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms also remain grossly inadequate.
iii) Investments for the Future

If countries are willing to invest, IBAR as an international technical and policy organ of the AU is willing to work and collaborate at a regional level to support pro-poor policy and institutional development for Africa’s livestock sub-sector based on the following conclusions:

1. There is a need for adequate grassroots consultations to create awareness of the need for pro-poor policies and ensure proper participation of the poor in policy-making. To do this, governments would need to help build capacity of grassroots organizations to advocate for poor livestock keepers and disseminate relevant information.

2. Governments need to improve the way they make policy, by understanding their policy process and seeking improvements that lead to more timely and appropriate policies.

3. East African countries need a pro-poor institutional framework that will enable policy review, formulation, harmonization and implementation. Institutional arrangements for pro-poor policy are weak and poorly coordinated, as a result of political creation of government ministries without due consideration of manageability and definition of core functions. Governments do not tend to have a pro-poor focus and suffer from a lack of adequate skills or motivation to affect change.

4. Partners should consider utilizing a livelihoods approach to identify key policy and institutional constraints affecting the use of livestock in poverty reduction.

5. An institutional analysis of key partners (looking at structures and core functions) would help to affect necessary institutional and policy changes.

6. There is need to study and promote the establishment of government/private sector linkages as well as broader stakeholder participation in implementation of livestock programmes and projects.
2. An Introduction to Policy Processes
Dr. Will Wolmer, Institute of Development Studies

i) What is Policy?

Policy-making must be understood as a political process as much as a process of analysis or problem-solving. Policy-making is by no means the purely technical rational activity that it is often held up to be. The usual starting point is that “policy comprises decisions taken by those with responsibility for a given policy area, and these decisions usually take the form of statements or formal positions on an issue, which are then executed by the bureaucracy (from Keeley, 2003).

Policy also has a wide range of broader definitions including, “the allocation of values and resources - politics” or "whatever governments choose to do or not to do” (Dye, 1984).

Dye’s definition implicitly includes written or stated declarations of intent or plans, and actions, which may turn out to be very different to what was intended in the plans, or may, in fact happen without any explicit declaration or plan. A very general definition is “a purposive course of action followed by an actor or set of actors” (ODI, RAPID website).

But other commentators have observed that “defining policy is rather like the elephant – you know it when you see it but you cannot easily define it” (Cunningham, 1963, cited in Keeley and Scoones, 1999:4).

‘The whole life of policy is a chaos of purposes and accidents. It is not at all a matter of the rational implementation of the so-called decisions through selected strategies’ (Clay and Schaffer, 1984: 192).

Policy is complex and dynamic, and the term embraces a range of different aspects. Policy statements (e.g. white papers) are what one might think of firstly as policy. But what led to their formulation (e.g. broader strategies and plans), and are they always put into practice? The processes by which policy is informed and formulated are highly significant. Understanding processes also highlights particular measures for policy implementation (such as laws, regulations, or institutions/organisations/programmes). These are necessary to ensure that policy can be put into practice, and need to be seen together. Furthermore, policy and policy-making is conditioned and shaped by the political, social and economic context, as well as by historical factors.

ii) Conventional Views of Policy

The conventional view envisages a series of stages - from agenda setting, through policy formulation to implementation and evaluation. This model of policy-making views it as a linear process in which rational decisions taken by those with authority and responsibility for a particular policy area. This approach views policy-making as involving a number of stages that lead to a decision:

- Understanding the policy issue or problem [agenda setting];
- Exploring possible options for resolving the problem;
- Weighing up the costs an benefits of each; and
- Making a rational choice about the best option [decision-making].

Implementing the policy
- Possibly evaluating outcome
Conventional Understandings

Agenda setting

Decision Making

Implementation

Within this model, policy implementation is viewed as a separate activity that begins once policy decisions have been made. Policy implementation should lead to a resolution of the original problem.

This model assumes that policy makers approach the issues rationally, going through each logical stage of the process, and carefully considering all relevant information. If policies do not achieve what they are intended to achieve, blame is often not laid on the policy itself, but rather on political or managerial failure in implementing it (Juma and Clarke 1995). Failure can be blamed on a lack of political will, poor management or shortage of resources, for example. There is a separation of fact (a rational policy approach, based on evidence, science and objective knowledge) and value (seen as a separate issue dealt with in the political process):

- Policy-making is considered to be bureaucratic or administrative. Where politics is considered it is seen as a split between policy making and implementation – politics surrounds decision-making (realm of value –above) but implementation is purely technical or administrative (realm of facts).

- Expertise is considered as independent, objective and scientific, i.e. delivery of judgements based on ‘sound science’ or ‘evidence-based policy’ [a familiar refrain].

The traditional approach to the policy process has, however, proven to be an inadequate reflection of reality. Several alternative views have been proposed, highlighting a whole range of other factors that impact on and influence policy-making.

iii) What are Policy Processes?

If we shift the focus from policy analysis to policy process analysis a range of questions come to the fore:

- How do policies get created, and by whom?
- How do ideas about what makes a ‘good’ policy evolve and change?
- Whose voices and views are taken into account in the policy process?
- How are boundaries drawn around problems and policy storylines elaborated?

These processes include some perspectives at the expense of others – and it is the perspectives of the poor and marginalised that are often excluded.

A study of policy process should look at the complex and messy processes by which policy is understood, formulated and implemented, and the range of actors involved. Contrary to traditional views of policy making as linear and rational, with decisions being taken by those with authority and responsibility for a particular policy area, the policy process is now more commonly recognised as being having the following characteristics:
• Policy-making is **incremental, complex** and **messy**: a process “of disjoined incrementalism or muddling through” (Lindblom, 1980). It is iterative, and is often based on experimentation, learning from mistakes, and taking corrective measures. Hence, there is no single optimal policy decision or outcome. It ‘departs from the standard assumption that policymaking happens in neat step-by-step fashion, tidily informed by problem-free technical knowledge. It is argued instead that policy processes are frequently distinctly non-linear; political, incremental and haphazard’ (Keeley, 2003)

• There are always **overlapping and competing agendas** – there may not be complete agreement among stakeholders over what the really important policy problem is.

• **Decisions are not discrete and technical**: facts and values are intertwined.

• Implementation involves discretion and **negotiation** by front-line workers (giving staff more scope for innovation than they are often credited with).

• Technical experts and policymakers ‘**mutually construct**’ policy – i.e. jointly negotiating what questions need to be answered and what knowledge can be provided to answer them [experts contribute to setting the agenda for policy by defining what evidence they can produce and by making claims about its significance for policy-makers. The negotiation process works both ways, however, and policymakers also delimit areas for scientific enquiry in the process of effectively cutting off certain avenues of research, and the very possibility of the creation of certain facts].

The study of policy processes therefore involves understanding the mechanics of decision-making and implementation pathways – and just as importantly it requires an understanding of more complex underlying practices of policy framing [**framing** = the way boundaries are drawn around problems; how policy problems are defined and what is included and excluded from consideration], the policy storylines elaborated and the networks associated with them.

Three key concepts/tools help clarify our understanding of policy processes and allow us put some order on the ‘chaos of purposes and accidents’ that is policy:

- **Knowledge/Narratives**
- **Actors/Networks**
- **Politics/Interests**

Understanding these three influences on policy enables us to start to answer the question: Why are some of the ideas that circulate in the research/policy networks picked up and acted on, while others are ignored and disappear? This is a more complex question than the standard question: how can knowledge be transported from the research to the policy sphere?

Similarly a shift in focus from policy analysis to **policy process** analysis implies a different response to ‘bad’ policy. The technical approach would be to explain why it is misguided and suggest how it might be improved. However, if there is something intrinsic to the policy process that means that policies invariably take a particular shape, then technical policy analysis may have limited utility, and what may be needed is a more wide ranging examination of policy-making itself.
iv) Policy Narratives

Policy narratives [often dominant ‘received wisdoms’] are stories with a beginning, middle and end that describe events, or define the world in certain ways, and that shape policy decisions. These ‘cause and effect’ story lines define a problem, explain how it comes about and show what needs to be done to avert disaster or bring about a happy ending: what is wrong and how it must be put right. They often gain validity despite (or even because of) the fact that they frequently simplify complex issues and processes. This simplification is seductive in that it sidesteps fuzziness and suggests a programme of action. This is what makes simple narratives appealing to politicians or managers – sweeping people along. Some narratives tend to gain more authority, and persist at the expense of others, and hence have more bearing on policy decisions.

A good example of an influential and persistent narrative is the one that has shaped perspectives on natural resources in Africa from colonial times. The storyline goes that because people are poor they don’t know how to look after the environment and natural resources around them, or can’t afford the luxury of doing so. The poor will exert a disastrous impact on precarious environments and this is exacerbated by relentless population growth. Other well-known narratives include: the ‘tragedy of the commons’, desertification, soil erosion, biodiversity loss etc. Many are narratives of crisis, demanding attention and urgent solutions. Narratives such as these have provided the rationale for an array of colonial and post-colonial state policies that ‘protect’ environments from people and avert the dire predictions associated with the narrative. Yet in the process these policies have dispossessed communities of their resources (e.g. denying farming in wetlands, attempting to ‘improve’ and modernise farming or evicting people from protected areas). Research has found that many of these narratives were untrue, (communities were often protecting the environment) and that the solutions have caused further problems.

Narratives are sometimes criticised because it is believed they cause ‘blueprint’ policy, that is, a prescribed set of solutions to an issue used at times and in places where it may not be applicable.

Received wisdoms/narratives can stick with great tenacity, despite contrary perspectives and practices. Why?

- Most obviously – they suit certain political interests.
- Such messages are easily communicated, they make for good sound-bite political marketing, and they fit well with the demands for clarity and measurable manageability of large-scale bureaucratic organisation.
- The storylines and metaphors are so taken for granted that they limit thinking about particular areas – this becomes the way things are thought about over time. Narratives reduce the ‘room for manoeuvre’ or ‘policy space’ of policy makers, that is, their ability to think about new alternatives or different approaches (below).
- The narratives become embedded in particular institutional structures or actor-network groups.

**BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalitis) in the UK**

The importance of narratives was well illustrated during the UK’s BSE crisis in the 1990’s. A number of narratives interacted, and together they acted to suppress debate, making the crisis worse. For example, the responsible ministry in the UK government, MAFF (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food) had the dual task of promoting commercial interests of farming and the food industry while at the same time ensuring food safety and consumer protection. But a core economic and political agenda dominated: that of keeping the market stable and maintaining UK beef sales domestically and internationally, so shoring up the economic viability of food
industry. This was underpinned by a reassuring technocratic narrative: the knowledge/science surrounding BSE/CJD was certain (and not clouded by uncertainty) – and science was the sole determining factor in policy making; and the priority concern of the authorities (MAFF) was public health rather than commercial interests. This last was a misrepresentation. MAFF argued that the risk to public health was zero or negligible and policy was robust, science-based and consumer-oriented.

Being locked into this narrative made MAFF unable to revise its views. It could not cope with new evidence that undermined the reassuring narrative. So they became deaf and were unable to learn until things became “catastrophically bad.” Challenging advice was removed from reports, and scientific investigations that had the possibility of provoking controversy were scrapped. “[L]ow cost steps … were avoided, partly to avoid damaging the competitiveness of the meat trade, but also to sustain the illusion of zero risk” (van Zwanenberg and Millstone, 2003: 34).

When the UK government finally acknowledged the dangers of BSE to human health in 1996, they appeared to have been intentionally misleading the public with disastrous consequences for public trust in government and science. This had major ramifications for the foot and mouth disease outbreak in 2001 (see below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Narratives Research Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>What is the narrative?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the basic problem being addressed – how is it framed?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What sources of information or experience helped share this view?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Whose interests and perspectives are included and excluded?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who does the narrative bring to centre stage?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who gets more power, who gets more resources from this narrative?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whose perspectives and interests are ignored?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>How could this be reframed?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the problem is set up like this, where will we end up concentrating our energies?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Which groups need to be repositioned in the narrative?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are there any other ways of looking at the problem?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are there issues being left off the map?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How can we make coherent links between these excluded issues, perspectives and groups?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What might be a counter-narrative?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the story clear and simple?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does it suggest a course of action?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does it acknowledge complexity and uncertainty?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

v) Actors, Networks and Coalitions

Networks, coalitions and alliances of actors (individuals or institutions) with a shared vision (i.e. similar belief systems, codes of conduct and established patterns of behaviour) are important in spreading and maintaining narratives through chains of persuasion and influence, which can include journals, conferences, being taught by the same person or informal introductions.
Through these networks “norms of good and bad practice are reinforced, research agendas are set, and orthodoxies or conventional wisdoms are reiterated and, very often, dissenting opinions or unconventional views are suppressed” (Keeley and Scoones, 2000: 20).

In the BSE case above, MAFF, together with politically well-connected farmers and the food industry formed a strong, core actor network. They built a strategic alliance with certain ‘on-side’ scientists, while “dissident experts who publicly articulated their interpretations … were discounted, disparaged or ridiculed” (van Zwanenberg and Millstone, 2003).

In any given policy domain actor networks are not exclusively confined to state institutions but link up parts of the bureaucracy and government with the private sector, donors and actors in civil society such as journalists, researchers and NGOs. This means that the existence of actor-networks can make for pluralist policy-making involving a range of different stakeholders or actors. Processes of negotiating and bargaining between competing interest groups are central to policy making. And networks can also gradually change narratives as well as reinforcing them – as they bring people together who strategise and catch the attention of the right people.

Actor networks occur across different scales and national borders. Networks and connections link global and local sites – particularly in settings where national science capacity is weak or under-confident. This is certainly the case in African veterinary policy.

### Policy Networks and Coalitions: Some Questions

- Who is inside and outside a policy network?
- Are there alternative networks outside the mainstream?
- How do people and institutions become enrolled into networks?
- How do ideas circulate through a network? (Role of connectors, policy entrepreneurs, salesmen)
- What core beliefs define a network?
- Where is the mainstream network strong and weak?
- What new coalitions might form outside the mainstream?

### vi) Political Interests

Perhaps it seems obvious that policy is inherently political and contested. But the conventional view of policy in which fact and value are separated denies this. Politics shape policy processes in several important ways:

a) The political context includes factors such as the interests of particular regime authorities to remain in power. Competition also exists between groups in society, based on their differing interests with regard to, for example, allocation of resources, or social interests.

b) A range of interest groups that exert power and authority over policy-making influence the policy process. These influences affect each stage of the process from agenda setting, to the identification of alternatives, weighing up the options, choosing the most favourable and implementing it. The vested interests of various actors in policy - government agents, officials of donor organisations, and independent ‘experts’ – might be served by the perpetuation of certain narratives.

c) Policy is set out as objective, neutral, value-free, and is often termed in legal or scientific language, which emphasises its rationality. In this way, the political nature of the policy is
Politics/Interests: some questions:

- Who is engaged in the policy process?
- How many stakeholders are there?
- Is there political interest in change?
- What is the macro-political context (democracy, governance, media freedom, academic freedom)? + external environment: ‘war on terror’, EU accession, PRSP processes (i.e. big incentives); impact of key donors?
- Are there clear vested interests in this policy area?
- Is the process essentially inside a bureaucracy or outside?
- How much capacity exists within the bureaucracy to reflect on policy aims and management?
- What types of informal relationships occur within a bureaucracy? Are certain ministries or departments dominated by people from one geographical area, disciplinary background, political party or academic institution?
- What is the room for manoeuvre for pushing different ways of doing things (what ‘policy spaces’ exist)?

The concept of ‘policy space’ relates to the extent to which a policy maker is restricted in decision making by forces such as the opinions of a dominant actor network or narrative. If there are strong pressures to adopt a particular strategy a decision maker may not have much room to consider a wider set of options. There may be times, on the other hand, when an individual has a

hidden by the use of technical language, which emphasises rationality and objectivity. But the technical is always in some way political.

d) Bureaucrats are not just neutral executors of policy, but have their own personal and political agendas to negotiate. **Bureaucratic politics**, such as battles within ministries for control over policy arenas, are relevant.

Where do we draw the boundaries between political and technical/administrative issues? For example, land management is often framed purely as a matter of good technical practice. But as southern African experience shows, framing the issue in this way obscures more political and power laden controversial issues such as land tenure and land reform.

To return to the extreme BSE example above, the UK government of the time portrayed policy as purely technically-driven with consumer protection and food safety as priority. It made repeated claims that government policy was rooted in sound science. Yet as we have seen, UK BSE policy was aimed at maintaining British beef sales domestically and abroad. Consumer protection and public health were subordinated to an economic and political agenda. Ministers were reluctant to intervene for fear that regulation would undermine confidence in exports.

Thus policy-makers made important policy decisions, prior to soliciting expert advice, and then sought to obtain a spuriously scientific endorsement for those decisions. Recommendations that were represented as based on objective science were in fact tempered by political pressure. In other words, there were strong vested issues in playing down uncertainty and portraying risk as zero or negligible (even deliberate concealment and denial as private veterinarians were intentionally kept ignorant). The supposedly sound science driven policy masked the political agenda (van Zwanenberg and Millstone 2003).
substantial amount of leverage over the process, is able to assert his or her own preferences and mould the way policy choices are considered fairly considerably.

The politics/interests frame allows a view behind policy consensus, making networks and trajectories apparent. If the agendas behind that consensus are so disparate that they cannot be held together, they will not last. A genuinely negotiated consensus will have better prospects. In coming to a consensus it is seldom possible to please all parties as there are inevitably trade-offs and disagreements.

**Policy Space**
Understanding policy processes through an examination of knowledge/narratives, actors/networks and politics/interests can help with identifying policy spaces. For example, the articulation of alternative narratives is possible where there is a weakness in the articulation of a dominant narrative. This in turn requires identification of spaces within networks [spaces to join networks or key actors in networks that can be enrolled into and alternative network].

A deeper examination of strategies for changing and influencing policy can be achieved looking at ‘policy space’. Depending on the policy issue, there may be important interactions between such spaces, including across scales from the very local to the national to the regional to the global. Six types have been identified:

- Invited spaces [e.g. consultations on policy led by government agencies involving selective participation of stakeholders]
- Popular spaces [e.g. protests, demonstrations led by social movements put pressure on formal policymaking]
- Practical spaces [e.g. pilot field based projects initiated by NGOs/fieldworkers, providing opportunities for ‘witnessing’ by policymakers]
- Bureaucratic spaces [e.g. formal policymaking spaces within the government bureaucracy/legal system, led by government civil servants with selected input from external experts]
- Electoral/political spaces [e.g. formal participation in electoral system allows voting on policy position of competing candidates]
- Conceptual spaces [or discursive spaces, e.g. where new ideas are introduced into debate, and circulated through various media]

**Conclusions**
While certainly nonlinear, the policy process is not simply chaotic and down to chance and accident. A combination of these different tools highlights both the complex interplay of narratives underpinning the policy, the actor networks promoting or resisting it and political interests driving the process and open up potential strategies and tactics for shifting and changing policy.
3. An Analysis of the 2001 Foot and Mouth Outbreak in UK

In Britain in 2001, an outbreak of foot and mouth disease (FMD) caused a major economic, social and policy crisis. It caused a major upset to the UK livestock industry and sparked extensive political and scientific debate. The crisis allows students of policy processes to identify distinct policy narratives, networks of actors and a variety of interests, some of which were political and some commercial. This particularly intense crisis policy-making highlights processes that in more normal times would happen across longer time frames and often out of the public view.

Britain had not seen Foot and Mouth Disease since the 1960’s and staff of the UK Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) had no direct experience to draw on. The long-established procedure for dealing with the disease was mass slaughter of stock on infected farms and it was this policy that was put into action once the outbreak was confirmed. In the end more than half a million animals were slaughtered and buried in mass pits over the four month period of the outbreak. Farmers, though they received financial compensation, suffered a huge blow.

Policy Narratives and Actors

Over the four months of the crisis period three policy narratives were brought forward, utilized or rejected in favour of another:

1. The default policy: when a case of FMD is found on a farm, all the livestock on that farm must be slaughtered within 24 hours. This policy was first instituted in the mid 19th century in UK. A government veterinarian is called in; he/she sends samples to the laboratory to confirm the diagnosis. Meanwhile the animals are counted in order to assess the compensation that will be provided by the government to the farmer. During the recent outbreak this policy was supported by the Chief Veterinary Officer, MAFF and field veterinarians. It was a bureaucratic approach, which proved impractical – the bureaucratic requirements took too long and the 24 hour deadline was seldom reached. In most cases early on in the outbreak slaughtering took from 3 days to a week, and the disease spread inexorably.

2. The 24/48 hour slaughter policy was suggested by a set of outside experts based at the University of London. Initially ignored by MAFF, they eventually went public on the TV with their policy suggestion. Their detailed computer modeling of the spread of the disease suggested that in order to stop the disease animals on the infected farms should be slaughtered within 24 hours and also animals on all contiguous farms (in a circle around the infected farms), whether infected or not, should also be slaughtered, within 48 hours. The Prime Minister, who was very concerned about the imminent election, was immediately impressed with this “common sense approach”. The army was brought in to cut red tape and get the job done. The PM’s Chief Scientific Officer was backing this approach and moved to override the arguments of the Chief Veterinary Officer of MAFF.

3. Vaccination – Prince Charles, a high profile member of the UK monarchy, was approached by a local scientist with a report that argued persuasively for a policy of vaccinating all animals in contiguous areas to stop the spread of the disease. This would mean that slaughtering could be limited only to infected animals. This policy was supported by continental European scientists and by the large and vociferous animal welfare movement in the UK. The Prime Minister temporarily supported the idea, but retreated when faced with counter arguments from the 24/48 hour lobby. Other supporters included the pharmaceutical industry, and sheep farmers. The National Farmers Union disagreed. Working to support the livelihoods of members, their leaders lobbied for a rapid eradication of the disease to safeguard meat and milk sales. They were absolutely against the idea of vaccinating animals, because
European supermarkets would not accept milk from dairy animals with FMD antibodies.

**Interests**

Government’s interests took priority. Elections were upcoming and for government the most important thing was to be seen to be getting the job done and cutting the red tape, regardless of cost. The interests of farmers to maintain their livelihoods were playing an important role, as represented by their organized lobby the NFU. The media were in full cry, exposing the weaknesses of government and selling their product as a result. In this manner public accountability was being maintained.

Bureaucratic interests were to protect the controlling position of MAFF, yet their approach was ineffective. In the science sector there was no uniformity: the computer modelers, the field vets and the vaccine scientists were all arguing with strong credibility for opposing policy approaches. All were respectable scientists publishing in peer-reviewed journals. While the computer modelers’ 24/48 hour policy was finally the policy that prevailed, it was subsequently proved to be at least partially wrong. The spread of the disease could have been even more carefully predicted and as many as a quarter of a million animals might have been saved. The computer modeler scientists had a strong connection through the Chief Scientist to the Cabinet. Their argument also met with the interests of the government’s electoral planners and those of the National Farmers Union. The field vets were a weak group, their arguments for more local understanding and action were not heard. The vaccination scientists were also weak; their connections with European scientists were inadequate to counter the powerful arguments of the market lobby.
4. A Brief History of Ethiopian Pastoral Livestock Projects

Ethiopia has a rich history of livestock development in pastoral areas. An analysis of the dominant narratives and overarching policy objectives that defined livestock development in pastoralist areas shows a consistency of approach stretching back 40 years: export revenues have always been of primary importance, based on available surpluses are and achieved through modernizing technical interventions. Strategic options have included delivery systems through the government, local associations and/or the private sector and production systems based on a choice between settlement or mobility.


**Narrative:** A technical set of solutions were to be applied to transform and modernize an unproductive and backward pastoral system which nonetheless had a surplus available for the export market.

**Assumptions:** Transformation towards beef and ranching would deliver an export market and tax revenue.

**Interventions:** Increased herd production would be achieved by setting up ranch feedlots organized for export purposes. Other technical interventions included water points, soil and water conservation, veterinary service delivery and range management. Economic interventions included credit schemes and provision of inputs such as small stock, vaccines and pesticides. To improve organization and management the key intervention was sedentarisation and reorganization of small agricultural or pastoral communities.

ii) Third Livestock Development Project - 1985

**Narrative:** Improvement of animal production and marketing of livestock was expected to increase foreign exchange earnings while providing food security and cash income that would enable pastoralists themselves to sustain development activities.

**Assumptions:** Development activities would be absorbed by co-operatives and associations.

**Interventions:** The technical and organizational interventions were similar to those of previous projects: co-operative and association development, animal production, animal health, infrastructure development, land use and land management, marketing and management and administration. The expected role of the state was to be reduced as co-operatives and associations would take over. However in practice many of the actual interventions were not within the scope of the co-operatives, (including animal production, health and range management), and were done by government.

iii) Southern Rangelands Project – 1989/90

**Narrative:** Integration of the pastoral economy, consisting of productive livestock and cropping, would produce raised living standards of the population, which would be achieved with co-operative associations.

**Assumptions:** Pastoralists would become drought resistant through a focus on cropping and settlement, because drought impacts would be reduced through the grain produced.

**Interventions:** Technically the project proposed veterinary services and extension, and infrastructure including stock routes, roads and ponds. Extension for land use and rangeland management was also included. The focus was on livestock marketing and interventions involved development of co-operative associations. The role of the public sector continued to grow: the project employed 3,000 people and established offices at different levels and provided in service training, seminars, workshops and country training visits.
iv) Pastoral Development Strategy 2002/03

**Narrative:** Transformation of the pastoral system to an agro-pastoral system will result in the improvement of livelihoods.

**Assumptions:** Lack of infrastructure, illegal cross border trade and problems of mobile systems can be addressed by settlement. Natural resources are abundantly available for agro-pastoralism and are less affected by recurrent drought. Settlement is already occurring – significant numbers of pastoralists have already settled on the banks of the major rivers and further settlement is possible and will lead to urbanization and development.

**Interventions:** Organizational interventions include phased voluntary sedentarisation of the pastoralist population along the banks of major rivers, capacity building and mobile education and health. Economic interventions include support to micro and small enterprise development and technical interventions involve enhancing crop-livestock production, supporting the crop marketing system, enterprise development, roads, water points and providing telephone services involving NGOs and the private sector.

**Discussion of Policy Options**

For at least the last 40 years, the assumption has been that the pastoralist mode of production is primitive and uneconomical. To solve this there are two competing options: one is to increase productivity of livestock and the other is settlement.

**Livestock production**

Improving the system of production is expected to increase national income from livestock. The focus has been mainly on beef production, while camels and shoats, lowland users of scattered resources, are not given so much consideration. There is a push by government to capture the revenue base of the livestock economy and with that to transform it to a beef production mode. Part of the failure of the investments may have been that none of the projects mentioned that livestock production in the lowlands requires freedom of movement. In addition, the projects tended to involve high costs and high technology that could not be sustained by the community. When the project phased out everything collapsed.

The projects focused on the inclusion of pastoral areas to the national economy, but they did not consider the human element. There is no mention of the rights of the pastoral community to human development.

**Settlement**

There are various arguments for and against settlement as a policy option:

- “The pastoralists are going to be sedentarised, but it may be impossible to sedentarise them all along rivers, even though some may have started along some rivers.”
- “In the Somali lowlands, although there are four rivers running through the region, the land area is limited compared to the rest of the region and there is little grass by the rivers. Bringing in different groups will create conflict. It is best to invest in them where they are.”
- “One of the stated reasons for the failure of the 3rd LDP was the lack of participation of pastoralists themselves in the formulation of the projects. Have the pastoralists themselves participated regarding the notion of sedentarisation? If not, the goals may not be achieved, just like the other projects. If the pastoralists know of sedentarisation, it is good, but if we are imposing this notion from top down it will still be controversial.”
- “If you take Somali and Afar regions, almost 40% of Somali and 20-30% of Afar have already settled by themselves. The policy aims to strengthen that which is already there. This is about voluntary sedentarisation along the big rivers step by step with the participation of the pastoralists. The government is giving development and allowing
those already settled to have social services, education and so on. It is better to go about
those that are already settled and those who want to remain mobile can be given mobile
education and health services. It is an option.”

• “There are two schools of thought: the first is to let the pastoralist live their own mode of
life, the other is sedentarisation step by step to improve their livelihood. The government
chooses the second one. After the government reform of 2001, there was the launch of
the rural development policy and as part of that, the representatives from the pastoral
areas from Somali and Afar discussed in Dire Dawa and they came to consensus that the
voluntary sedentarisation will have good impact on the pastoral economy. Let it be
implemented step by step in the form of pilot projects.”

• “Pastoralism is not a matter of lifestyle choice, it is a question of which is the most secure
form of production for the entire community. These sedentarisation ideas come from
professional theories and biases. There are highland areas that are food insecure even
though they are cropping. Pastoralists are food insecure, but the reason is not the
production system itself but elements of its management. We don’t aim for the
pastoralists to settle, but instead avail infrastructure in packages, and then the
transformation comes by itself. It is not a declaration. In Libya the government built
huge buildings to settle pastoralists – they immediately evacuated. Sedentarisation cannot
bring food security to all pastoralists.”

• “The Somalis could be 100% settled or not. Their movement is not because they don’t
like to stay in one place – it is an economic movement to maximize the use of scarce
resources such as fodder, water and security. When these are available nobody moves.
These movements are a coping mechanism for uncertainties. General percentages will
not lead us to anywhere.”

• “Pastoralism is not a static way of life, it is dynamic, they are changing, all the settled
people in the villages are making a diversity of livelihood, in every drought a certain
percentage of pastoralists go out of the system, they are now internally displaced people
(IDPs) and they have nothing. If they need an alternative way of life, then they should
have one. Has there been a study in every district how many people want to settle? There
are a number of people who need settlement but nobody looks at them. Settlement is not
a taboo among pastoralists, but it is not for everyone. What about healthy pastoralists
who produce healthy livestock which could benefit the economy and government?
Settlement itself must bring benefit. In other countries such as Tunisia and Mali, there is
demarcation of rangeland; grazing land and routes to water and grazing is designated as
pastoral land.”

**Conclusion**

Despite the lack of success of previous policies, it is interesting to note that new policy documents
look remarkably similar to what went before. Technicians have a certain set of ideas about what
to do, such as vaccination, disease free zones or rotational grazing and similar technical packages
are promoted repeatedly. This comes from professional biases that are carried by all
professionals, which stem from training and association. These biases do not necessarily fit with
an evolving dynamic livelihood system. The role of livestock in high or lowlands is always
changing and professionals need to change too.

It is important to note that the programmes and policies analyzed above were done in good faith
and were a genuine effort to improve livelihoods of pastoralists. However, biases, interests and
different actor interests affect the understanding of appropriate policy.
5. Animal Health Policy in Ethiopia

i) The History of Animal Health Services

Two disease outbreaks in the late 19th century were the stimulus to the formation of today’s modern veterinary service. In Asmara in the 1890’s, the Italians started vaccination against African horse sickness. Then a massive rinderpest outbreak, a disease imported unwittingly by the Italians, wiped out much of the cattle population in the affected areas, causing losses of as many as 90% of cattle. The resulting famine led to the deaths of some 30% of Ethiopia’s human population. In 1903, the first veterinary institute was established in Asmara for controlling disease outbreaks, particularly rinderpest, horse sickness, trypanosomiasis and anthrax. The institute trained Ethiopian technicians in vaccine production and administration.

In the early 20th century, Menelik II established the Ministry of Agriculture, and by the 1920’s veterinary extension services were starting up with the assistance of a French veterinary mission. Two Ethiopian veterinarians returned from overseas. These professionals endeavoured to establish and introduce animal health and husbandry extension services in Ethiopia.

By the 1940s the imperial veterinary service was well established as an autonomous and powerful unit staffed by Ethiopian and French vets. Support also came from American funds promoting veterinary extension and vaccination. In late 1940’s the first field vaccinators were trained and deployed to regions where they worked under their own guidance. These vaccinators were the pioneers of the animal health services and are credited for playing a major role in the development of animal husbandry extension work and disease prevention.

In the 1960s the imperial veterinary service, staffed by Ethiopian vets, split into technical and administrative departments, in Debrezeit and Kazanchis respectively, and the service lost its full autonomy. The first disease control proclamation was ratified by the Ethiopian government at this time and the National Veterinarian Institute (1964) and the School for Animal Health Assistants (1963) opened. The Institute produced vaccines and rendered diagnostic services, with financial support from the US and French governments. A School of Animal Health was also opened, to train middle level personnel with support from the UK and FAO.

With the accession to power of the Derg Regime, the 1970s heralded a new era for the veterinary service, with new organizations and offices being set up, under strong central control. The provincial animal health service started operations under the provincial offices of agriculture. At the same time regional veterinary laboratories were established, with support of the Chinese, and the National Trypanosomiasis Investigation and Control Centre was established with FAO help. However government demoted the Department of Animal Health to the level of a team, to the consternation of the veterinarians. The Ethiopian Veterinary Association was established at this time by committed professionals. Meanwhile the Joint Project 15 (JP15) to vaccinate against rinderpest commenced, funded by the US, French, UK, Italian and Ethiopian governments. The first meat inspection proclamation was issued; transferring responsibility for meat inspection from Ministry of Health to the Ministry of Agriculture.

During the 1980s there was a further expansion of activities and resources. The Faculty of Veterinary Medicine was established and in 1984, the first batch of veterinarians graduated which continued to produce about 20 undergraduates every year. Cuban expatriates were working with the government, meaning that veterinarians could now be fully trained within Ethiopia. The Pan African Rinderpest Campaign (PARC) started, and money was made available by EU, IBAR and FAO. The World Bank funded 4th Livestock Development Project undertook extensive capacity building at the time, developing manpower and installing new infrastructure.
The 1990s marked a change in approach, which accompanied the change in government. Decentralization of veterinary services, veterinary privatization, and the rise of community animal health services together highlighted the recognition that animal health needed closer co-operation with communities and private sector service providers. A new disease control proclamation produced by the Ministry of Agriculture’s Veterinary team provided a background to the development of a new, well-coordinated veterinary research system led by the Ethiopian Agricultural Research Organization (EARO) and supported by various faculties of veterinary medicine. This was complemented by the start of the AU-IBAR Pan African Control of Epizootics (PACE) programme and the Sterilised Insect Technology and Farming in Tsetse controlled areas projects.

The emergence of the community based animal health worker approach was due to a mix of factors: community demand for vet services had risen, NGOs had been experimenting with different approaches, PARC, in order to achieve vaccination coverage in the remote areas and in the light of the development of thermo-stable vaccines and vet drugs, had promoted the concept of a community animal health worker who could reach the most distant locations. Meanwhile the EVA, whose counterparts in other countries had often strongly rejected the inclusion of non-professional vets into the service system, discussed among its own ranks the pros and cons of the idea. With support from CAPE IBAR and its participatory epidemiology section PACE, EVA members were persuaded and they worked to persuade government that this was a way forward.

In the last four years a number of new faculties of veterinary medicine and animal health assistant training colleges have been opened by the Ministry of Education. A new animal health system has been introduced including reorganizing manpower and management and investment in new infrastructure. The veterinary service has once more been promoted to department level in the Ministry of Agriculture and the Drug Administration Control Authority has been mandated through collaboration between the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Health.

**Organizational Narratives**

There has been consistent restructuring over time, with changes to the organizational set up shifting from the centre to the regions and with greater or lesser degrees of private involvement. Two different narratives speak to how to respond to veterinary service delivery challenges, with periods in which a centrally organized public system which has significant capacity of people and technology are followed by periods in which decisions are decentralized and private sector actors are included in providing the required coverage.

An important trend from 1990s is the emergence of the community based animal health worker as a response to declining public funds and to the challenges of getting out to remote pastoral areas. For a century, from the 1890’s up to 1990’s the system had been a classic professional veterinary health service. At that point, policy change occurred, not by design, but as a result of push and pull factors. Support from donors was getting scarce, technology was being developed that simplified delivery of basic services, demand from livestock owners was increasing, NGOs were experimenting, and broader political change together made it conducive at that time but not before. This was also accompanied by a change of attitude on the part of veterinarians themselves. While the Ethiopian Veterinary Association was discussing change, there was a new cohort of veterinarians going through training with PARC who were also receptive to change.

**Political/bureaucratic Perspectives**

Major changes in veterinary policy have also been closely attached to changes of government and political attitudes, as well as to geo-political processes. During the Imperial era services were given by a paternal government. During the communist regime the service was highly centralized and organized.
Disease Crises

Particular disease events also played a large part in shaping policy. Rinderpest created the initial policy in the late 19th century. The huge investment in PARC and PACE was a response to continuing efforts to eradicate the disease. Since it was not possible to cover remote areas, community animal health workers came into the picture, to control the disease in remote inaccessible areas. This was supported by the development of thermo-stable vaccines. Rinderpest was the priority from the 1890s up to recent times, and although now it is no longer a substantial threat, it remains a driver of policy as a result of bans on importation of stock exposed to the disease.

Trans-boundary disease (TBD) issues can be used any time to stop the export of animals, and the new cross border diseases now included on the list maintained by the World Animal Health Organization (OIE) such as foot and mouth (FMD), contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (CBPP) and rift valley fever (RVF) have expanded the focus on preventative efforts. There are many questions about how outbreaks are confirmed and questions about the powers of the actors. Some question the powers of the OIE, the world animal health organization, which sets standards for exports and imposes export restrictions.

The history of the veterinary service is dominated by the history of rinderpest eradication campaigns and since the OIE does not recognize Ethiopia as free from infection, the policy environment is still under its influence. Saudi still requires Ethiopian exporters to show freedom from rinderpest or a serological test. The entire African veterinary system has been designed to combat rinderpest: its training, infrastructure, and organizational structure. Even the national veterinary institute and laboratories were established as a response and Ethiopia now exports rinderpest vaccine to other countries. Numerous personnel are linked to this history through the training they received from PARC and PACE and there is still a lot of money for Africa for rinderpest-linked activities.

There is little room to think of other diseases, even though in recent years some, like RVF, have become of critical importance. RVF, CBPP and FMD are not now on the agenda and despite the enormous economic effect of RVF on Ethiopia, technical knowledge is seriously lacking. Considering that there are 15 ‘List A’ diseases on the OIE list, none of which are yet eradicated in Ethiopia, AU-IBAR is proposing that a different policy narrative be considered: ‘commodity-based trade’. This is trade in animal products, such as specific cuts of meat, exported chilled.

Strongly influenced by the interests of those with whom Ethiopia trades or from whom it receives development donations, these varying competing narratives (the different versions of organization, the changing ideas on delivery systems at the grassroots, the political perspectives of government, the particular narrative about disease control) have all helped to create policy and also to exclude other alternative policies.

ii) Actors in the Animal Health Sector

Government Links

The Animal Health Service (AHSD) is a department of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MOARD). In the Ministry there are also departments of Livestock Marketing and Livestock Resource and Fisheries and there is considerable interaction on the links between animal health, breeding and marketing in delivering a stronger livestock sector. Through MOARD, the animal health service is connected to regional governments and under them the regional Bureaus of Agriculture which work with livestock producers, both pastoralists and crop-livestock farmers. These regional staff complain of being poorly linked across regions, so peers don’t have opportunities to discuss common issues and learn from one another.

The MOARD departments generate policy issues and seek support and assistance to turn these into action. They share information on issues and proposals so that their policy recommendations
are harmonized, for example, if the livestock marketing department is looking for different international markets and those markets set requirements for animal health, it will ask AHSD to make proposals to address the matter. The Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development will then forward the proposals to the Council of Ministers. If they are approved, they will then be endorsed by the parliament. MOARD is thus strongly connected with the Council of Ministers and the two standing committees in the parliament, the Pastoralist Affairs Standing Committee and the Rural Development Standing Committee. It is through these bodies that policies are promoted and discussed.

The Ministry of Federal Affairs is responsible for development in the main pastoralist regions and links strongly with the Bureaus of Agriculture in these regions. However there is little interaction with MOARD at the federal level. Although MOFA chairs the ministerial board on pastoralism and convenes the technical committee, both of which include MOARD, more could be done to co-ordinate activities in the sector.

Research and Professional Development Links
AHSD has a strong connection with the research scientists and professionals in the National Veterinary Institute, the Animal Health Resource Centre and the two Veterinary Associations. This engagement is not the result of an official structure, but due to numerous personal and professional relationships between the department and the research bodies. Links to those who are developing the skilled manpower in the veterinary training institutions are weak, despite the need for these institutions to keep up to date and produce professionals with the new skills demanded by today’s animal health requirements.

International and Non-Governmental Agencies
MOARD seeks additional funding from international agencies such as the IMF, ADB, EU, USAID, & DFID, but there is a weak relationship with international organizations that deal directly with livestock such as AU IBAR and FAO, and also with NGOs who implement their own veterinary programmes, despite their importance to the sector. NGOs are not well regulated, although their destocking, restocking and emergency interventions may conflict with government efforts. Government is trying to promote privatization, but while some NGOs are training community animal health workers, others are engaged in free emergency drug distribution which can undermine private animal health workers.

Private Sector
Policy is now shifting towards greater reliance on a private sector role in veterinary coverage and investment. However links to the private sector and marketing offices such as the Livestock and Livestock Products Marketing Enterprises, the Standards Authority, the Drug Administration and Control Authority, the different pharmaceutical companies and the media are scattered and weak. It is clear that if this policy is to be successful then there will need to be new efforts to link the Animal Health Service with the private pharmaceutical companies, drug suppliers, private practitioners (professional and para-professional) and investors in livestock and livestock enterprises. Clarification of the roles of the public and private sectors and their interaction will be consistently required. Further, there are important links to be made with international bodies: the regional partnerships such as COMESA and IGAD and the international bodies, such as FAO and the OIE, which are policy players, regulators and potential sources of finance, knowledge and support.
Livestock Marketing in Ethiopia - Key Actor Relationships 2005

Facilitators/Regulators
Financers
Economic Operators

Strong link
Weak link
iii) The Veterinary Policy Process

For different elements of the animal health policy process different interests emerge. An analysis of the actors, their activities and relationships can indicate policy areas that have not been thought about, which would otherwise be gaps in the policy debate. The section above depicts the uncoordinated and weak role of the private sector, which may prove to be an important factor in taking the privatization policy forward. It also points to the role of NGOs in undermining the cost recovery in private drug supply. Further it notes some weaknesses in the co-ordination between ministries and between regions.

Some bodies initiate policy, such as the Livestock Resource Development Department and the Livestock Marketing Department. A wide range of actors have less direct involvement, at least in the conventional, narrower view of how policy is made. In the past the Ministry would invite a few people from a small circle to sit down and develop a policy, which would then be forwarded to the Council of Ministers. Today it has been recognized that the chain is more complex and if policies are to be successful they need to take into account the interests, behaviours, contributions and resistances of a variety of groups. Each group has its own thinking, whether formally or informally, actively or passively. If these actor networks are ignored, it is possible that policy will be defective, either in its assumptions or its implementation.

It would be impossible for everybody who has a stake in the veterinary sector to have a direct voice in policy idea generation, formulation, approval and implementation. Policy is an instrument for the ruling party to put into practice its agenda. The Animal Health Services Department generates the strategic idea within the umbrella of the ruling party policy. The Ministry then decides whether to forward it to the Council of Ministers and if it is accepted by the Council, the party will endorse it. If a proclamation is required, then it will go to parliament for endorsement. While NGOs and private sector groups cannot forward policy ideas for the Ethiopian Government, they can play a role in consultation and implementation. The Ministry may generate a new policy idea or request an enrichment of the existing policy and they may call upon other parties in the sector to comment, but they can accept or reject their advice. In reality there are only a few actors who could request an improvement of existing policies or for the making of a new one, although it is possible, in theory, for people to generate an idea and even lobby the government for policy change.

iv) Policy Options for 2005: Private or Public Service Delivery?

1. Private Service

There are a number of strong arguments for promoting increased private sector involvement in veterinary service delivery. At present the government service does not cover even 40% of livestock. With more private companies and individuals involved, service coverage will increase and government expenditure will be reduced. If appropriately organized, disease reporting in remote areas will also be enhanced, whereas at present there is no coverage of remote areas. Job opportunities will increase for professionals and service quality may be enhanced due to competition between private practitioners. Services should become more accessible as practitioners would not be limited to the working hours and restricted office locations of government. This could result in enhanced pastoralist and trader mobility. Community animal health workers (CAHWs) can charge in kind as well as cash. As the livestock trade improves and enlarges it is expected that the size of the animal health market itself will increase, along with associated access to credit and finance. Favourable policies already exist to allow a shift to a partly privatized veterinary service. The free market economic policy, the rural development policy and the education policy all favour private practice.

On the other hand there are significant risks. Despite the effect of competition, it is likely that there will be abuse if there is no regulation; private practitioners may get away with charging...
excessively while giving ineffective drugs for example. If privatization is to be successful the government will have to ensure regulation, as well as making credit available to new practitioners. Keeping their businesses going may present difficulties to new practitioners, particularly in areas where livestock owners are too poor to pay the service charges. It is probable that a majority of professional practitioners will all be attracted to working in urban centres rather than providing the extensive coverage hoped for. However, it is hoped that a CAHW working in his or her own community will counteract this probably trend. An important concern is to maintain the ability of the government service to provide its part of the service. The AHS would need the facilities to be able to launch large vaccination programmes, and to regulate effectively, for example following up on contraband drugs and illegal practitioners. Supervision of animal health workers in distant locations may actually required increased investment by the service. Finally competition with free or subsidized public or NGO services, particularly in times of emergency, needs to be carefully managed.

2. **A Centralised Public Service**

The centralized public service has high official and political support. For the animal producer the lower costs of a public service are attractive, if he or she can get access to the service. The public service is also committed to strong disease investigation and surveillance back up making use of its laboratories and facilities. While a private system may provide better coverage, it may not generate adequate information exchange, while the public system obliges its membership to send regular reports to zonal, regional and federal levels. Government, in theory, would be less affected by the attraction of urban centres. The current emphasis on expanding the livestock market does provide opportunities for developing the capacity of the government regulatory system.

However in practice there are a number of drawbacks to an exclusively public animal health service. It has been a stationary service, serving only the settled community, with service limited to government working hours and insufficient capacity to cover demand. There have been budgetary constraints, for example the annual budget allocated to a clinic may last for only five or six months. Charges in kind are not possible and other forms of cost recovery have proved costly to administer. The bureaucratic chain is long and can create delays in operations. There is high staff turnover, especially in remote areas, where public officials feel that they do not get respect for their work. The regular restructuring of government offices means staff are often transferred and may not be replaced for a time.

**Discussion**

The question is not whether or not there should be a private component to the veterinary service delivery in Ethiopia, but what should be the respective roles of the private and public actors. The service needs to meet the needs of producers, traders and exporters while ensuring a suitable level of coverage and quality of service.

There are distinct public roles for quality control, regulation and assisting the private sector. To move towards a greater role for the private sector in providing services in remote communities on the one hand and in urban centres on the other, a number of different groups need to be assessed. There is a solid body of government organizations whose perspectives and interests must be accounted for, as must the interests and capabilities of others such as private practitioners, NGOs, pharmaceutical companies and traders.

The new emphasis on a market approach, privatization and public sector reform all indicate that there is policy space for clarifying the role of the private sector in the veterinary field. It represents an opportunity to widen the debate and the analysis before narrowing down on policy proposals. Experience in the past has shown that policy spaces have opened and powerful players such as the World Bank have forced a certain direction on to governments. In many cases of liberalization in Africa, the private sector has failed to jump into the space made by the retreat of the public sector, because of obstacles such as poor finance or a lack of confidence. Ethiopia has
a well structured public service, whose members need to use the current policy space to make a sensible decision on roles rather than rushing to extremes.

To avoid overlap with the new clinical service being performed by the private practitioners, and avoid unfair subsidized competition, the public veterinary service would move over to a cost recovery approach. Some areas will not attract private actors and here the government should provide clinical services. Starting with the policy principle – of controlled privatization, the policy process will need to begin to define roles, and then discuss them in relation to particular settings. For example in remote pastoralist areas there will be particular tradeoffs that do not affect high potential areas.

Privatisation started around 10-15 years ago in Ethiopia, but it has not yet moved far, as the enabling environment is not strong. In Zambia there is an effective public-private partnership, Sudan has its own very powerful animal resources ministry largely dealing with animal health. In Ethiopia, neither parliament, the ministries nor the vets are working in close collaboration, yet the complaint is against the producers. It is also usual to put blame for inaction on the producer cooperatives or on lower levels of government. Those who are supposed to take action do not take it because they fear to be criticized or to lose their position. This has promoted an attitude of blaming those who take initiative. While leaders tend to call for change and set the policy principles to allow this, middle levels of the bureaucracy tend to live in old paradigms and are slow to change.

Bureaucrats try to represent the interests of peasants and pastoralists, but in reality they have to represent the ideas of their superiors. Higher levels of policy are also influenced by the availability of external finance for particular animal health solutions. For a successful policy, implementation needs to take the broad principles and then interpret and transform them to allow them to function in each specific context. Unthinking implementation often leads to failure.

**Conclusion**

The principle of working incrementally and adapting principles to context sounds inappropriate and chaotic, but it is relevant to Ethiopia. Once the broad principles are set and approval has been gained from the higher political levels, the next stage is to interpret in the various contexts. The principles are set by the Council of Ministers and the proclamation will be in very broad terms, but the policy practice is done by departments, bureaus and technicians. There should be latitude and flexibility for the people on the ground to interact with users and pastoralists to design versions of the policy framework that fits with local needs. Policy fails when there is an attempt to have a one-size fits all approach. Lower levels need flexibility to learn and make some errors and corrections. The broad policy objective is to deliver animal health services to all animal producers across the nations and privatization is an approach. The policy maker should not confuse the broader policy objective (delivering on animal health) with the means of doing it (private-public approach).
6. Livestock Production and Marketing Policy in Ethiopia

i) History

Early interventions focused on the dairy industry and its potential to improve the dietary intake of school children. After World War II, the Ministry of Agriculture through the first Livestock Development Project, introduced exotic dairy cattle breeds and established milk processing plants with funds from USA, UNICEF and the UN postwar Rehabilitation Fund.

Between 1950 and 1962 foreign investors were encouraged to set up private industrial abattoirs in Dire Dawa, Kombolcha and Debre Zeit to export meat to the Middle East and Europe, partly for pet food. The industrial abattoirs were share companies, some of whose shareholders were members of the imperial family. Apart from the export of meat, some of the companies were also engaged in the export of hides and skins. During this period, the Dairy Development Authority was established.

In 1963 the 2nd Livestock Development Project started operations and included the setting up of the Livestock Marketing Board under the Ministry of Agriculture. The project was supported by the World Bank and the Swedish and Finnish governments. The focus was on developing market infrastructure and building transport capacity and improving veterinary services. The objective was mainly extractive, to siphon off surplus livestock from the lowland pastoral areas for export and foreign exchange purposes. It was not related the improvement of the livelihoods of the pastoralists per se.

Between 1973 and 1975, the 3rd Livestock Development Project shifted focus, emphasizing rangeland development, water and other infrastructure, direct livestock marketing and co-operatives. Once again it was the Ministry of Agriculture, supported by the World Bank and the African Development Bank who took the lead. The focus continued to be on extraction of surplus to an export market.

There followed in the late 1980s the 4th Livestock Development Project funded by the World Bank and implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture. Its priorities were production of improved forage, animal health services, human capacity building (it was known as the Masters Programme project) and once more marketing. Towards the end of the Derg regime privatization was initiated under the ‘mixed economy’ policy. The purpose was once again inclined towards extracting of surplus from the lowland pastoral areas. The military government was strapped for foreign exchange and put strong emphasis on the export of hides and skins as well as meat. Because of its socialist leanings, the European and American markets were lost and the then USSR, Eastern European and Asian countries were the important markets during the period.

Meanwhile, between 1975 and 1993 the Ethiopian Livestock Marketing Corporation (ELMC) rose to prominence, a public enterprise dealing with marketing livestock under the Derg. It was accompanied by nationalisation of the industrial abattoirs which were then managed by the ELMC. New actors became involved as a result of nationalisation, including the Ministry of State Farms, the Ministry of Finance and Trade, the National Bank of Ethiopia, the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Development Bank and lastly the Ministry of Defence, who were consuming the canned meat products of abattoirs. Other projects included a dairy rehabilitation project: the Salalie highland dairy development project also managed by the Ministry of Agriculture and funded by the African Development Bank and the Government of Finland. The Pan African Rinderpest Campaign started operations.

After the overthrow of the Derg, in the period between 1994 and 1998, the industrial abattoirs were once more given autonomy to run as individual enterprises, moving from ‘public corporations’ to ‘public enterprises’. These corporations were managed by a board of directors.
A Public Development Enterprise Control Authority was established to oversee the activities of
the enterprises. Private tanneries, private export abattoirs, leather industries were also allowed,
supported by the Ethiopian Privatisation Agency, the banks and the government investment
office. The Livestock Marketing Corporation was dissolved by proclamation and replaced by the
Control Agency

In 1998 the government of Saudi Arabia announced a ban on import of live animals from East
Africa, as a result of cases of Rift Valley Fever. This ban lasted for 4 years, if was finally lifted
for meat in 2002, having devastated the livelihoods of many in the livestock sector in south and
south east Ethiopia. It has not yet been lifted for live imports. Alternative markets were sought
and included RSA, UAE, Egypt and Yemen. In 2001, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development (MOARD) was restructured and the responsibility for marketing returned to
MOARD. A privatization drive was announced, to promote more private tanneries, export
abattoirs, leather industries and poultry farms.

Current policy and strategy is based on a two-pronged approach. The first is to boost or promote
export of live animals and meat through private enterprise. However the export industry is
riddled with red tape and over-burdened with numerous regulatory requirements. The second
approach is aimed at a combination of service provision in pastoral areas and political control of
the peripheral regions.

Factors Affecting Domestic and Export Markets
There is a very large livestock population in the highlands, although per household the numbers
are small and they largely provide for local consumption. The majority of live exports are from
the lowlands, but as there is no proper livestock marketing pastoralists have exported their most of
their livestock informally for 150 years. The lowlands have more potential for the beef export
market because cattle are not used for ploughing and foreign markets demand uncastrated bulls.
There is limited domestic demand for sheep and goats, and thus the only option for lowland small
stock is export. Productivity is low and off take rate is low. At the current off take rate against
production level, Ethiopia does not have any ‘surplus’ to export. However it is inaccurate to
suggest that a country will become an exporter only if it has a surplus. Since the link between
highland and lowland production systems is very weak, there is no option for lowland producers
and traders except for the informal, traditional or formal export market. From the point of view of
pastoralists, who need a market for their products, there is no illicit trade. The problem of “illicit
trade” comes from the government point of view and is defined as any export operation without
the permission of the customs. Essentially it is a market failure, due to lack of demand for certain
species in domestic market, and high cost of export through formal channels.

There has been a consistently strong policy narrative of surplus production in the pastoral areas
and consequent potential for an export market. The policy narrative today adds that there is
increasing demand for livestock products in the world. Over the last four decades there have been
a variety of different and changing strategies as to how to develop markets to produce the required
off take, with emphasis shifting from private to public to quasi-private approaches and which
largely ignored the informal side of the market. Reviewing the last 40 years of changing
responses to the export narrative, one can see considerable shifts in the mandates of responsible
organizations. One is established and another is dissolved, and the discontinuities created market
interruptions. Most of the interventions were project-centred, donor driven and all lacked
sustainability or continuity.

A key underpinning assumption of past and present policy is that demand for a certain quality and
quantity of exports can be met despite the effects of diseases such as Rift Valley Fever. The
policy that has been implemented has concentrated on meeting the international trade standards,
establishing quarantine stations, laboratories and checkpoints. Disease control has been regarded
as a trade measure since concerns over animal health have become a major factor in livestock
exports. During the period of ELIMOCOR Ethiopia exported meat and hides to Europe and the
Far East. Today, with RVF and other diseases becoming dominant concerns in importing nations, the market opportunities have shifted. There has been an enormous growth in the demand for live animals for the Middle East market, which Ethiopia began to fill, and then partially lost due to the RVF factor. Live animals fetch more value than meat exports, but disease control aspects are more difficult.

Ethiopia does not have comparative advantage for live animal export as this requires a sea port with special facilities and competitive port charges. Other commodities can be more easily handed over to handling agents, but livestock require appropriate holding and resting places, feed and water, appropriate inland transport and sea transport facilities. Currently Ethiopia is using the container port at Djibouti, which has no facilities for loading animals on to ships, so cranes are used to load individual animals, which is both cruel and inefficient. The most suitable port is Berbera, which the government is considering using for livestock and other outgoing and incoming commodities. Another constraint is inland transport. The cost of taking animals from Borana to Djibouti, Assab or Berbera is tremendously high. In the absence of double bed trucks which can transport up to 50 animals in both trailers, the cost of using small trucks which can transport a maximum of 30 animals is very high.

Other factors affecting markets include political concerns, as, for example, when Europe decided it did not want communist meat in the 1980s. More recently, Zimbabwe has lost its European market as a result of political disagreements. Namibia meanwhile is still exporting strongly. It could be argued that disease plays less of a role than politics, since many countries may have rinderpest, RVF or CBPP and yet still manage to agree bilateral export deals. The politics of the Nile Basin and those of relations with the Middle East play an important part in Ethiopia’s ability to negotiate bilateral trade agreements.

Another consideration is the rise of other competitors. Argentina, Brazil, Australia and New Zealand have all come up very strongly in the past decade and their abilities to supply large quantities of high quality certified meat have substantially changed the dynamics of the global meat market. Early in 2005, Brazil exported 40,000 MT to Saudi Arabia and the country has the capacity and potential to export over 2 million metric tonnes per year. There are only a few countries in Africa that are net exporters of meat (Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Botswana), but none reach the quantities achieved by Brazil. Ethiopia has just reached a total export volume of 6,000 MT a year. The continent as a whole is a net importer of livestock products.

What hinders Ethiopia in the competitive environment? There are markets in the developed world for very high value specialized meat cuts, which can reach as much as $10 per kilo in Europe. Botswana is able to supply beef to this market, but only does so by meeting the high standard and traceability requirements. These requirements affect penetration of developed markets and only Botswana, Namibia and South Africa have introduced traceability from farm to plate. Ethiopia does not have an identification and recording system and no one keeps a history of individual animals, when it was vaccinated and from which farm it came. Sudan, on the other hand, exports over 2 million heads of sheep, while over 1.5 million sheep pass through the port of Bossaso per annum, none of which are subject to traceability requirements. Ethiopia, meanwhile, tries to catch this with 10,000 head. (This does not account for the informal trade which makes up a good proportion of the exports from north Somali ports.) Neither Sudan nor Somalia has top quality quarantine systems, yet they are successful exporters. It is thus important to look at politics, enabling policies and to analyze both the formal and informal systems. It is also necessary to look at some of the policy tradeoffs – does it really make sense to follow the Botswana route where 80% of their herds have traceability?
ii) Actors and Activities in the Livestock Marketing Sector

There are three types of operator: the economic operator, the facilitator/regulator and the financial operator. The core economic group is the producer: pastoralists in the lowlands and farmers in the highlands and pastoralists provide the bulk of exports. The other major economic players are the abattoirs and meat processors which purchase animals, slaughter, process and export to the international market. There are complex links between the producers, the unions, the co-operatives, the transporters, the formal traders and the live animal exporters. International finance is sought from the African Development Bank and the World Bank whose loans can be repaid without putting down the foreign currency. For producers, only the microfinance and Co-operative Banks give loans, because they can accept particular types of collateral.

Regulation is often a hindrance to economic operations and as a result, in the pastoral areas there is a substantial informal operation, which forms the bulk of Ethiopian animal exports. The magnitude of the informal export in volume and value accounts for 80% of export trade and the formal sector accounts for 20% of exports made up of 15% meant and 5% live animals. The informal sector is much less bulky than the formal sector, yet the volume of export is higher. The volume of export is inversely proportional to the volume of regulation, taxation and currency exchange costs. The policy maker is faced with questions of maximizing trade, promoting a pro-poor livestock policy and promoting a well regulated, formal, yet efficient and cost effective system.

Facilitating/regulating institutions include the National Bank of Ethiopia, which is the regulatory body issuing internal trade permits. The animal health department has an export regulatory function to issue quarantine export certificates. The Livestock and Fisheries Department has a more facilitating than regulating role, so it tends to have stronger relations with traders and producers than do the regulatory bodies.

Regulation activities distort trade through numerous different tariff- and non-tariff trade barriers. Livestock in Ethiopia is more highly taxed than any other export commodity. There are three types of tax:

1) Market tax: sellers of grain are not taxed for market services, but livestock sellers are taxed per head.
2) Sales tax: varies with value.
3) Transition fees: Animals being transported from one point to another are taxed when they pass through checkpoints in a number of small towns. In some cases the truck may have to be unloaded to count the animals. This applies to all animals moving to the central markets to get to the formal international trade.

Animals moving in the informal system do not enter the markets or travel along the main roads, so there is no formal fee at the check points and no sales tax. However they do incur other costs, relating to the risks of confiscation of assets. Formal traders incur charges through currency transactions, losing around 3 cents in the dollar between buying and selling dollars. In addition there are permit and certification charges, including the Chamber of Commerce certificate of origin, the animal health quarantine charge, fees for shots (1 birr per animal), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs certificate of meat export, (160 birr) and the foreign embassy documentation (4-500 birr). The regulatory bodies, rather than facilitating, are a burden on the free movement and growth of animal trade. The OIE sets the standards for international trade in livestock, which defines some of the required documentation.

The Department of Livestock Marketing is against the high level of tax, because it only serves to encourage the informal trade. The federal government has told the regional government not to impose charges on exportable animals, but as yet, not all the operators on the ground have obeyed.
Ethiopia's Animal Health Service - Key Actor Relationships 2005

- Animal Health Dept
- Ministry of Agriculture
- Regional Governments
- Regional Veterinary Labs
- Community Animal Health Workers
- Council of Ministers
- Parliament
- Ministry of Livestock Marketing
- Livestock Production Dept
- Regional Bureaus
- Private Practitioners
- Media
- Livestock Marketing Enterprises
- Livestock Producers
- Crop-Livestock Mixed
- Pastoralists
- National Veterinary Institute
- Research Institution (NARC)
- East Africa Research Organisation
- NTTC
- Ethiopian Animal Health Association
- Ethiopian Veterinary Association
- Ministry of Finance
- Training Institutions
- Ministry of Education
- AHA Training Colleges
- Standards Authority
- Media
- Livestock Marketing Enterprises
- Livestock Producers
- Crop-Livestock Mixed
- Pastoralists
- National Veterinary Institute
- Research Institution (NARC)
- East Africa Research Organisation
- NTTC
- Ethiopian Animal Health Association
- Ethiopian Veterinary Association
- Ministry of Finance
- Training Institutions
- Ministry of Education
- AHA Training Colleges
- Standards Authority
- Ethiopia's Animal Health Service - Key Actor Relationships 2005

Strong relationship
Medium or weak relationship
Some services such as the animal health certificate cannot be centralized, so the Animal Health Department will put vets at each export abattoir and authorise them to sign the certificate. Certificates of origin are demanded by the importing countries signed by an authorized body. The process could be centralized, taking the right from the Chamber of Commerce and authorizing the customs authorities to issue the certificate at the point of export. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs certificate is also demanded by the importing countries and putting the ministry’s representative in each location is very costly. The entry visa for meat has to be given by the various importing country embassies in Addis Ababa, who generate income from these visas. The other certificate is the halal certificate which requires a sheikh at the slaughtering place who signs a certificate. Since most of the slaughtering places are in Oromia, the Islamic authority has agreed to have one central place for this.

Pastoralists have a direct link with neighbouring countries and the people living across the border are often their kin, so cross-border informal trade is easily facilitated. For Borans, Somalis and Afars the pastoralist production system is already linked through these neighbours to the seaports. The informal trade is a two way operation; traders export livestock and bring in other commodities using the same channel, increasing profits and local access to staples and essentials. The formal system is one way and the trader has to bring in foreign currency. Since the importing country likes to export their products, there is an interest in two-way trade, which is also more profitable and efficient for the export terminals (the seaports). Although the Saudi market is officially banned for African live animals (meat has been allowed in since 2002), there are still plenty of Ethiopian animals entering the market through Yemen. There are also numerous animals being traded through Kenya. The issue for pastoralist areas is that there is no formal market and yet many pastoralist livelihoods depend on livestock sales. For those who need to buy grain and other items, the sale of animals is a matter of life and death. The government cannot impose closure of borders in such a situation.

The informal trade has its own transportation system, financial system, and information system, similar to and possibly stronger than formal trade operations. The informal system has its own costs that are related to the risks involved. As health certificates cannot be issued from the point of origin, the exporter takes the animals at his own risk. The importing country then checks the animals on board ship and if they find disease the whole shipment will be rejected, so the trader will lose everything.

An agreement has been signed between Ethiopian exporting firms and Egyptian importing companies for 10-15,000 heads of cattle per month, starting by the end of May 2005 for the next five years. The government is now working on a strategy to link the exporters to marketing cooperatives including pastoralist trading associations. These organisations are not yet strong enough to supply the required quantity and will need considerable support. Egyptian law does not permit slaughtering of cows of less than 300 kilos in weight so it is necessary to buy and load at Djibouti animals which weigh between 330 and 340 kilos. To get such weight will be difficult in the short term, but there are plans to establish feedlots to address the issue in the longer term. At present animals of 250 kg are being bought, some up to 6 years old, although the ideal is 4 years old. The price is based on agreement between selling and trading partners. Coops, private businessmen and individuals in all regions are being contacted by the government and government is offering to facilitate their negotiations with the buying company, which will then establish collection points and transport the animals.

iii) Policy Options

The overall environment for livestock marketing, particularly exports, is improving. There is a large livestock resource in the pastoralist areas, and there is increasing demand for meat and livestock products in the African, Middle Eastern and global markets as a result of increasing
urban incomes. Demand for Ethiopian meat itself is increasing, at least in Africa and the Middle East, partly as a result of trust in Ethiopia’s capacity to provide halal meat.

As a result of demand, the price of animals is expected to rise, benefiting producers and traders alike. The government of Ethiopia is once again paying attention to the sub-sector as a way of reducing poverty, increasing foreign exchange and improving the economy. As a result there is increasing interest from private sector entrepreneurs in investing in the sector, particularly in export abattoirs, in response to growing demand for chilled meat from the Middle East and North Africa. Financing institutions are increasing in number and the quality of their service is growing. However it remains true that 80% of livestock exports move through “informal” routes and if both pro-poor and pro-market interests are to be served then a policy decision is needed as to how to deal with this question. Two policy options are considered below: to encourage gradual integration of the informal sector into the formal sector; or to continue to ignore or even crack down on the informal sector while trying to strengthen and make more attractive the formal system.

1. **Gradual Integration of the Informal into the Formal Market**

   The informal market, though it supports a very large number of poor pastoralist livelihoods, also causes a number of problems that need resolution. Government loses revenue from taxes and transactions, undermining its capacity to supply services. It loses the official foreign exchange, so it is unable to build up and use this currency strategically. There is no information on the volume or type of trade and as such no ability to plan. The country may be obliged to receive unnecessary commodities through the high prevalence of barter trade. This can affect Ethiopia’s formal trade relations, with an importing country refusing to trade with Ethiopia unless it sees efforts to reduce these informal flows. The unfettered movement of live animals may also result in uncontrolled disease transmission.

   The informal market has a number of advantages to the producer and trader whose value would need to be maintained in bringing it into the formal market. Prices in Somalia and Djibouti are attractive, transport costs are relatively low, the transaction costs are low, and traders are able to meet the import standards of the targeted markets. The market is well integrated, and there is a very valuable amount of trust between elements in the system, a trust which stretches across borders and covers finance and credit and protection of assets and relationships. Since social services in pastoralist areas are very scarce, many pastoralists seek these services across borders and thereby cement their cross-border ties, already strong because of social and kin relations that stretch across these somewhat “artificial” boundaries. How would these aspects be provided for by a formal system?

   There are some weaknesses that would need to be corrected if the informal sector is to be successfully integrated into the national economy. The federal government policy maker does not have a deep understanding of the local context, or the psychology and interests of people operating within these markets. There is no policy specific to livestock marketing and those policies that do affect the sector do not look into the questions of the pastoral system. Lack of participation of the pastoral community in deciding policies, whether pro-poor, pro-market or otherwise, has meant that policies tend not to recognize the very special nature of the situation in these regions. Only through improving the terms and access of the trade and the access to services and reasonably priced commodities will people be encouraged to shift from the informal to the formal sector.

2. **Enhancing the Efficiency of Formal Systems**

   The formal market is becoming stronger as a result of increased international demand and greater recognition by government. But it faces a number of significant constraints. The bureaucratic requirements are heavy; an exporter has to have contacts in a range of different offices, has to spend considerable amounts on certificates and permits and uses up considerable time on these
interactions. Civil service reform is under way and could be part of the solution to reducing bureaucratic chains and wastage.

Transport costs are very high and the infrastructure is inadequate, as are the financing and information systems that traders also need. For the meat trade there is only limited airfreight capacity as Ethiopian Airlines does not allow other airlines to participate in the trade. Neither the Executive nor Parliament can enforce the creation of transport companies or insist that they go to particular places, but it is possible for policy to support certain behaviours in the private sector, by reducing monopolies, tariffs and charges, and by promoting access and mobility; by creating an enabling environment. To do this, an analysis of the transport sector would be useful, looking at its pricing structures, its access to finance, the political factors that affect its decisions.

Finance is yet another bottleneck - an investor may be pushed to repay loans and interest before there has actually been any return on the investment. Exporters lack market information and some have difficulties in getting loans, while facing a high burden of transaction costs. The high transaction costs mean that the market cannot support a large number of brokers and mediators. High taxes are a substantial obstacle to formal trade, incentivising the informal despite its contingent risks. Small animals are taxed at the same rate as large ones, yet producers want to sell small stock and there are substantial markets for sheep and goats.

The stringent requirements of importing countries are difficult to change, so the country needs to find ways to control livestock diseases and meet sanitary requirements by increasing quarantine locations and improving the inspection capacity, while decreasing the costs. Meanwhile the pastoralist will not trust the system and it may be difficult to encourage his or her participation.

Formal exports, for example to Egypt, require specified live-weights, which are often higher than can be produced by Ethiopia’s local breeds, especially those from pastoralist areas. An intervention would be needed, based on Ethiopia’s experience with breeding to address this factor. On the other hand the weight of animals may not be considered as a requirement for all importing countries and those new markets should also be targeted.

**Conclusion**

There are some important openings for changing and improving livestock marketing policy. Government is showing considerable interest in livestock trade as a key economic driver, and the demand for livestock in the region is growing. The policy debate has reached the level of the Ministries of Trade, Finance and the Prime Minister’s Office, which brings the debate right to the heart of financial and economic policy. The analysis above shows that the constraints are less technical issues internal to the sector, than they are issues of finance, diplomacy, politics and regulation that are out of the sector. A policy dynamic that will transform livestock marketing needs to consider new types of coalitions and networks, incorporating a wider range of players.

One of the hindrances to active trade in livestock is the excessive burden of tax and regulation. The new civil service reform programme offers an opportunity, although there may be a question of how to engage the interest of those who are responsible for public management in questions of the bureaucracy of livestock marketing. Why is livestock the most highly taxed commodity in Ethiopia? The answer to this question lies in the historical and political environment, and its solution may have to be referred back to parliament and the Council of Ministers as well as being sought through engagement with the current process of tax and revenue reform in Ethiopia. Meanwhile the problem of transport is not just a matter of demand and supply; it is also caused by the structure of the transport industry and its lack of competition. Yet another ministry, the Ministry of Transport, has responsibility for this area.

The solution to formalising the informal trade is better regional, cross-border market integration. But these are broad political questions which are associated with the geopolitical context,
including relations within the Horn of Africa and wider global issues such as the war on terror, encompassing the area of responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Livestock policy is not just about livestock, it is about tax, foreign affairs, structure and ownership of industry and about bureaucratic reform. Thinking about ways forward at the centre or the region, in a technical capacity or a policy-oriented capacity means co-ordination across government and breaking across the normal sectoral divisions of the bureaucracy. It also means seeking finance from bodies that have a view of other sectors, such as those that finance public sector reform. This presents a challenge to people who are defined by their sectoral area. How can the necessary linkages be facilitated? Should they be made by the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Federal Affairs or the Prime Minister’s Office? Or is it more realistic to start with the informal linkages, by getting different people around the table to discuss the issues?

If the government, working with the private sector, manage to meet the challenges listed above, then the livestock producers will be integrated into the system: they will be consulted rather than instructed, and may even participate in deciding how to solve problems. People can be part of the solution rather than part of the problem, and they will see that money they pay in taxes will be reinvested in social services beneficial to them. People need markets in their own localities and as long as they think that whatever they are obtaining from the sale of animals is not going to be reduced too much by tax, they will automatically be very interested to sell on the formal market. The local market will serve the abattoirs and the export areas, and automatically the informal will integrate into the formal. Rather than by force, it will be the local traders that integrate into the system by choice.
7. A Summary of Observations on the Policy Process

1. Policy is political. It is affected by key moments in history, often crises or changes of regime. Disease eradication and boosting exports have been the constant “guiding narratives”, while ideas on how these two goals can be achieved have changed over the years.

2. The key actors who have been affecting these narratives over the years include government offices, private sector (livestock traders, vets), NGOs and international consultants. Actor network diagrams demonstrate how they interact in complex and subtle ways, and also where interaction has been lacking. The analysis shows that most livestock marketing happens where policy has been absent, indicating a need to adjust policy to meet reality.

3. Political interests, embedded assumptions and prior commitments all play important roles in choices of policy options. These include the interests of the powerful, the interests of those in the bureaucracy, and of those with commercial priorities. Thus the choices about whether the veterinary service should be primarily public or private or about whether marketing services should be increasingly regulated or deregulated are influenced by different voices in the policy process.

4. The options considered within the animal health sub-sector and the livestock marketing sub-sector also raise choices regarding the overall interaction of animal health and marketing. The choice between a bureaucratic system that captures revenue, versus a streamlined private or even illicit system implies a tradeoff between the benefits of veterinary control and those of free trade.

5. Policy is not simply a technical issue; its questions cannot be solved solely by scientific arguments, promoted only by consultant economists or epidemiologists. How might listening to unheard voices influence the weighing up of the tradeoffs inherent in each policy option? How might pastoral livestock producers perspectives differ with those of the technicians or politicians? The new level of interest in livestock by government and donors and the increasing demand for meat both nationally and internationally has opened a policy space for new networks and new narratives.

6. Policies are not operational manuals; they should not define activities on the ground, but lay out principles. They should allow latitude for interpretation, adaptation and negotiation in order to ensure their success. An understanding of the politics, bureaucracy and power/interests behind policies gives a sense of how their formulation and implementation are constantly open to interpretation and manoeuvre. This suggests that there should be improved consistent analysis of the narratives, actors and interests. All those who are interested in policy success should consider how to understand different interests and investigate means of aligning them towards commonly agreed goals.

☼☼☼☼☼☼☼☼☼
Annex I - Participants

Dr Seleshi Zewdie, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Head of Animal Health Department: “The policy process is dynamic and understanding the present requires examination of what has been done in the past. Policy should be live; it should have room to adapt to new situations, because the environment is dynamic and a policy should be able to accommodate change. The right policy will lead us on to the right track to development. The role of stakeholders should be considered carefully, because if we miss certain key stakeholders we may also miss important ideas which will affect implementation. Stakeholders should have their own voices during policy formulation.”

W/ro Mebrat Alem, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Head of Livestock and Fisheries Resource Development Department: “Policy is not something that should be made only once, it is a continuous process in a constantly changing local and global environment. A policy cannot address the diversity in detail, but should provide instead a general direction. The direction should take into account the needs of different regions and it is important to make provision for a continuous process that allows for changes that address the problems arising from region to region. Looking at the history of narratives and the array of actors provides a comprehensive view. It is possible to see the distinct flow of direction from private entrepreneurship during the imperial time, to nationalization and then returning to a new form of privatization in recent times. Looking at the actor networks, one sees how the bureaucracy has become top heavy and yet in the actual location of policy impact – the location of the livestock producer and trader - the policy is scant.”

Ato Belachew Hurissa, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Head of Livestock Marketing Department

Dr Mulualem Tarekegne, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Team Leader of Epidemiology and Disease Control: “We have tried to influence policy makers to develop a centralised veterinary system, restructuring the veterinary services to improve on previous systems. We have convinced higher level policy makers in different ways, by peer discussion, formally asking the policy makers such as the Deputy Prime Minister to focus on the new system of animal health service delivery. We have also contacted international organisations like AU-IBAR to give us support to influence policy makers from different directions, provide technical support and to show the different experiences of other countries through consultants funded by CAPE.”

Dr Awake Kidanemariam, Ethiopian Agricultural Research Organization, National Animal Health Research Centre: “As the secretary of the Ethiopian Veterinary Association, we have been developing policy arguments. EVA is an august professional association, which organises policy debates and dialogues. Currently EVA is engaged in convening dialogues with the Ministry of Agriculture on means of improving veterinary services with particular reference to privatisation. EVA is also promoting a better structure for veterinary professionals, particularly better pay and budget scales, which is a matter that has to be decided at a high level. As a member of the Ethiopian Agricultural Research Organisation, I am concerned that the Ethiopian animal health research system is not well organised and we are trying to look for a better set up and with interested stakeholders. I have been impressed by how much the livestock sub-sector has been affected by policy change. Initially policy concentrated on contributing to the national economy, but after nationalisation all infrastructure collapsed and now efforts are being made to come out of that, so enabling policies are very important. This training has shown how to design a consultative policy, but learning by itself is not an output, there should be an exercise of implementation.”
Dr Assegid Shiferaw, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources: “Policy process analysis is very complex. It takes considerable time and attention to understand it.”

The Honorable Abdel Karim Guleid, House of Peoples Representatives, Pastoralist Affairs Standing Committee Chairman: “The Pastoral Affairs Standing Committee is responsible for representation of citizens and oversight of ministries that are active relating to pastoralists. We check Ministerial programmes by requesting them to present their plans and strategies and concepts that they want to implement in the emerging regions. We follow up with visits to pastoralist areas, to listen to the problems and needs of the communities and then give our feedback to the concerned ministries. Ethiopia is large and diverse and it is very difficult to prepare a stereotyped and uniform policy for all, so a development plan is required which is specific to each of the different areas. Influencing policy should not mean injecting the wrong information, with everyone pulling in different directions according to their interest. The history of livestock policies shows that there have been mistakes in the past and these mistakes are still occurring. There is currently no comprehensive livestock policy, so it is not surprising that the institutions that were set up to deliver livestock policy have been less than successful. Each office has been going its own way, applying what it thought was applicable to the prevailing circumstance. Policy has to be made from the top, but people have to be consulted. For whom is the policy made? The policy must fit into the nature of the problems of all citizens.”

Dr Abayeneh Dagne, Ethiopian Agricultural Research Organization, Head of National Animal Health Research Centre: “We are working to streamline the animal health research system to conform to the government’s recent policy on research. We are focusing particularly on the identification of proven animal health technologies available outside the country, testing and adapting these technologies, working to shorten the time it takes to introduce these technologies to beneficiaries. Policy gives directions for every development activity. Whenever a policy issue is initiated and given out, every stakeholder in the development chain has a stake, and one has to involve all those stakeholders from high policy makers to lower beneficiaries. Policy has to be dynamic, so it requires mechanisms to get feedback on the actual implementation process.”

Dr Negussie Regassa, Agricultural and Rural Development Bureau, Oromia Regional National State, Epidemiologist: “We are planning to revise and improve our animal health delivery system and, regarding policy makers, we want to convince them of this. It has been important to understand the meaning of policy, the process, who will be involved, who will be consulted, what are the political interests, what are the influences, all taking policy to action.”

Ato Alemu Berhe, Pastoralist Rural Development Coordination Bureau, Afar Regional National State, Plan and Policy Preparation and Monitoring Department Head: “We have been involved in the formulation of the draft Afar land use and administration policy. It has been prepared with technical support of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development.”

Ato Adane Kitaba, Oromia Pastoralist Development Commission, Oromia National Regional State, Livestock Resource Development and Veterinary Service Department Head: “There are different modes of life in Oromia, yet we previously had to implement an agricultural development extension policy copied from highland formats. I was involved in the formation of the Oromia Pastoralist Development Commission, a separate institution for pastoralists, which is working to replace the agriculture structures in the pastoral districts of Oromia, administering and directing the pastoral development. Implementation activities have improved from year to year. In this event I understood policy processes, including ways of approaching a given policy by defining the key actors, debating and lobbying while understanding the economic driving forces behind it.”

Ato Abdi Mohammed, Pastoral Development Coordination Office, Somali Regional National State, Planning and Programming Policy Head and Acting Head of Pastoral Development Coordination Office: “Somali region has the largest livestock population in Ethiopia, yet there is
no regional livestock development policy. The region is very large and lacks infrastructure, making it very hard to cover all locations; even international NGOs are not effectively filling the gaps. The pastoral development programme has now been established, but it is not yet fully applied. A large number of livestock have died in last few weeks due to lack of water and pasture. We are hoping to change the lives of pastoralists – it is the only hope we have. The Ethiopian pastoralist headache is its lack of pastoral marketing. We must always remember our pastoralists.”

Dr. Mohamed Ali Farah, Pastoral Development Co-ordination Office, Somali Regional National State, Veterinary Section Head: “As a member of a technical team I have been working for a number of years to improve the privatisation of veterinary services in Somali, funded by SCF UK. We succeeded to set up 60-70 units, at the same time convincing policy makers to include privatisation because government was not able to provide coverage over the whole wide area. While doing this we had to convince livestock owners to take particular care over at the quality of veterinary drugs. It is generally thought that policy is the job only of a top group, but in reality it also touches the pastoralist. Actor networks are very complex and yet they have to work in harmony if the policy is to be successful. So there needs to be open discussion between different stakeholders which allows for their interests to be clarified. The policy situation is also dynamic, it changes all the time. If you look at livestock marketing, which is 20% formal and 80% informal, the burden of tax and bureaucracy on the formal is too heavy, holding it back. I call on the government to tackle the bureaucracy question in order to smooth the formal marketing. The obstacles to export and animal health are many and there are many stakeholders.”

Dr Tefera Alemu, Agricultural Development Bureau, Benishangul Gumuz National Regional State, Livestock and Fishery Resource Development Department Head: “Our office implements policy designed by government whose main aim is food security. Policy is everybody’s activity. It is complex. If it has defects, this will affect all the related activities, and whole production systems can be undermined. Imposing policy from the outside is inadequate, so participation of the grassroots in formulation is useful, yet the bottom up approach has not really been implemented in our country. The policy process is not the duty of one institution alone and success depends on open discussion with different stakeholders. The policy process is not static and requires reshaping depending on the existing conditions.”

Ato Gifewesen Tesema, Pastoralist Development Department, Ministry of Federal Affairs, Senior Livestock Expert: “I give inputs to policy makers and high officials on how to identify and characterize conservation for sustainable utilization of our indigenous herds. We provide coordination for the emerging regions, backstopping higher officials in Afar, Somali, Benishangul and Gambella, and we facilitate ways to improve the life and livelihoods of pastoralists. We participate in project planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation. We have a ministerial board at federal level, helping emerging regions on different development issues. Policy is the core issue. From bottom to top, all stakeholders should participate to find the solutions to policy issues.”

Ato Tesfaye Negash, SNNRPS, Agricultural and Natural Resources Development Bureau, Agricultural Development Department Head: “We are working on a number of activities relating to livestock in the farming areas. We are looking at the future involvement of private sector and advising policy makers on techniques for improving management and practice, solving problems around feed production and land use in overpopulated areas. We are also establishing and strengthening infrastructure for animal health, including clinics and posts. In order to understand policy matters, one needs to consider how events come up, who are the actors involved and how they together affect crucial policy questions.”

Ato Gebregzabher Hagos, Agricultural and Natural Resource Development Bureau, Tigray Regional National State, Livestock and Fishery Resource Development Department Head: “At regional level we focus on developing strategies and packages, including how animal owners can
get credit. We design the type of packages to be introduced to the smallholder. Ethiopia doesn’t yet have a comprehensive livestock development policy, but we are providing papers and policy suggestions to the federal level based on our requirements. I can see the limits of policies and the policy process. I expect the policy framework to come from federal level as the framework has to be national and I do not think that regions should prepare their own policies separately, but they should work within a national framework that they can regionalize.”

**Dr Bewket Seraw, Agricultural and Rural Development Bureau, Amhara National Regional State, Livestock and Fishery Resource Development Department Head**: “We have been designing a breeding plan for sheep, for which we have finished performance evaluation, and we are now drafting a plan for implementation in some areas. We are also developing a feeding strategy that could fit into different production systems of the region. We have already formulated the strategy and are conducting it in different parts of the region. Policies do deal very much with technical aspects and there are many actors that should be involved in addressing the policy process. Policy issues should be identified at every step throughout the implementation process too.”

**Girma Kebede Kassa, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Pastoralist Communication Initiative**: “We have been working with the Benishangul Gumuz Regional government on areas of food security, resettlement and villagisation to bring the authorities and the communities on the ground together to negotiate and reach an understanding; building knowledge on change management and environment. I am also engaged on researching institutions, policies and processes, looking at how PCI has been engaging with institutions in the last 3 years. I am trying to understanding where we should be going in the next stage of our project. When you look at the evolution of the livestock development sector in Ethiopia you note the influence of the donors in every epoch. At the same time, policy has been influenced by the ideology of the governments of the day. Overall though, the country has paid dearly for neglecting the livestock sector when compared to other countries. The project approach has meant an overemphasis on technical issues. For the future it would be useful to have a dialogue between technicians, Parliament, Council of Ministers, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development and the Prime Minister’s Office to expand policy perspectives.”

**Dr. Berhanu Admassu, AU IBAR Institutional Policy Support Team**: “IPST is engaged with widening discussions around the policy of commodity-based trade. Africa is the home of livestock producers and one of their interests is to sell livestock out of Africa, but because of standards set in the outside world we cannot sell easily. WTO and OIE standards say that Africa should get rid of some of the transboundary animal diseases. We have tried to eradicate one disease, rinderpest, for the last 50 years, but we haven’t yet. There are 14 more transboundary diseases prevalent in Africa. If we are required to eradicate all those diseases the situation is hopeless and Africa will not sell except by limited bilateral agreements. Commodity-based trade is another way of selling animals; an African-friendly policy. We are trying to get understanding initially by African states and then we are continuing debating at a higher level at OIE. Forget specific diseases, let us concentrate on a specific commodity, such as milk or meat, check that that it is risk free and sell it. It is an innovative idea that is good for Africa. We had the initial policy process workshop with 10 countries in East Africa. I have been involved in the livestock sector in Ethiopia for many years and this is the first time we have talked about policy. We were thinking that policy is made at high levels, but we have now realized that we ourselves, if we work hard, can make significant change.”

**Dr. William Wolmer, Institute of Development Studies, Fellow**: “We are conducting research on policy processes in the livestock sector, particularly in Southern Africa. As an outsider looking in, I am trying to understand how policy is made, why it is made and for whom is it made, so it has been important to learn more about the context and debates about Ethiopian livestock policy. I would like to come back in five years, to see how the actor networks and policy networks have changed – this is a time of real opportunities and challenge for the Ethiopian livestock sector.”
Prof. Ian Scoones, Institute of Development Studies, Fellow: “I have been involved in debates around pastoralism for some time and have worked in highland and southern pastoral areas of Ethiopia. I am researching and training on the questions of how ideas come to be adopted about ‘right policy’. How do you come to decide what a policy is? We make documents and statements and implement in a particular way, often with an assumption about policy. But how do policies come to be? What is their relationship between technical inputs and political interests? It occurs at local implementation levels and in high level arenas. In this training we bring probing questions to help you to think more about your own setting and the assumptions that you are carrying. It is apparent that Ethiopia is one of the most dynamic of all the countries in East Africa when it comes to livestock policy change. This is not to say that things have gone as far as they should, but there is an important thirst for change. The policy process tools provide a way of systematically piecing together the elements of the process, providing an understanding that can help to take policy forward. The challenge is now for people and departments to take action.”