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**Understanding the Political Economy of Low Carbon and  
Climate Resilient Development**

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**Planning exceptionalism?  
Political Economy of Climate Resilient  
Development in Bangladesh**

Khurshid Alam, Md. Shamsuddoha, Thomas Tanner,  
Moshahida Sultana, Muhammad Jahedul Huq and  
Sumaiya S Kabir



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## About the authors

With experience in 25 countries in the world, **Khurshid Alam** is a disaster and climate change specialist. He was ActionAid's Emergency Policy Advisor and managed a six-country tsunami response programme until becoming the Managing Director of ThinkAhead Limited in 2006. He has written widely on humanitarian issues. As consultant, he played a key role in drafting the national DRR framework of the Government of Malawi and the national community based DRR strategy of the Government of Cambodia. An anthropologist by training, he currently lives in Dhaka.

**Md Shamsuddoha** is one of the leading researchers on CC in Bangladesh. Former general secretary of Equity and Justice Working Group Bangladesh (EquityBd), currently the Chief Executive at Participatory Research and Development Initiates (PRDI). Shamsuddoha writes on core climate change politics and diplomacy and published a few high profile reports.

**Moshahida Sultana**, Lecturer of Economics at the Department of Accounting and Information System of Dhaka University and former lecturer at BRAC University.

Muhammad Jahedul Huq is a Research Officer in Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction, ActionAid Bangladesh. He has a Masters in Human Ecology from the Department of Human Ecology, Free University of Brussels, Belgium. He also did MSc in Geography and Environment from Jahangirnagar University, Bangladesh. (He can be reached by shovonju@yahoo.com)

Sumaiya Kabir, a Climate Champion of British Council, was trained in environmental management from North South University. He is an associate at ThinkAhead Limited engaged in research projects in climate change and disasters.

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## List of Acronyms

ADAB	Association of Development Agencies in Bangladesh
ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADP	Annual Development Plan
AL	Awami League
AR4	Fourth Assessment Report
BAPA	Bangladesh Poribesh Andoloan
BCAS	Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies
BCCSAP	Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan
BCRF	Bangladesh Climate Resilient Fund
BCCTF	Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund
BDF	Bangladesh Development Forum
BDT	Bangladesh Taka
BNP	Bangladesh Nationalist Party
CC	Climate Change
CCC	Climate Change Cell
CCDF	Climate Change Development Forum
CDMP	Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme
CEN	Coalition of Environmental NGOs
CIDA	Canadian Development Agency
COP	Conference of Parties
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
CSRL	Campaign on Sustainable Rural Livelihoods
DFID	Department For International Development
DoE	Department of Environment
ECNEC	Executive Committee for National Economic Council
ERD	Economic Relations Department
EU	European Union
GBP	Great Britain Pound
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GCCA	Global Climate Change Alliance
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GoB	Government of Bangladesh
HDI	Human Development Index
IFI	International Financial Institution
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LDC	Least Developed Countries
LDCF	Least Developed Countries Fund
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MDTF	Multi Donor Trust Fund
MoEF	Ministry of Environment and Forests
NAPA	National Adaptation Plan of Action
NCCB	Network on Climate Change, Bangladesh
NEC	National Economic Council
NGO	Nongovernmental Organizations
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

PM	Prime Minister
PPCR	Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience
RVCC	Reducing Vulnerability to Climate Change
SCCF	Special Climate Change Fund
SIDS	Small Islands Developing States
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
USA	United States of America
USD	United States Dollars
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organization

## Part 1: A brief account of the study

### 1.1 Introduction

It was not until 2007 when Bangladesh faced two devastating disasters, consecutive monsoon floods and a category four cyclone *Sidr*, climate change received significant political attention. Cyclone *Sidr* killed over 3,000 people causing an economic loss of US\$ 1.7 billion while the floods caused damage amounting to US\$ 1.1 billion. The occurrence of these major disasters and the subsequent debate about its link to climate change sparked an intensification of efforts to tackle long term climate change impacts in Bangladesh.

Underpinning the new approach was the recognition that climate change posed a serious threat to Bangladesh's desire to become a middle income country by 2021<sup>1</sup>. Central to the post 2007 efforts was the formulation by the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) of its *Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan* (BCCSAP) and a National Climate Change Trust Fund. An Act of Parliament passed in 2010 then established a donor funded Bangladesh Climate Resilient Fund (BCRF) formerly known as the Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), and the Climate Change Unit housed in the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF). This report refers to these planning efforts collectively as 'post *Sidr* planning'.

This planning process has received considerable national and international attention for two reasons. First, that the planning will determine the sustainability of development potential of the most climate vulnerable country. Second, that Bangladesh is linked to and plays a vital role in international climate change diplomacy and politics.

The process and content of post 2007 plans are considerably different in nature and scope from previous climate change related initiatives such as National Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA) that was formulated under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2005. While NAPA considered only urgent and immediate priorities for adaptation, the BCCSAP is more comprehensive and focused on medium and long-term actions through pillars which mirrored the areas set out in UNFCCC negotiations under the Bali Roadmap i.e. adaptation, mitigation, technology transfer and financing. This significant shift in planning was influenced by transformations in ideas, knowledge, actors and incentives in the post NAPA years which generated a domestic political economy. These include:

- i. increase in political commitment for climate change
- ii. rise of new ideas and knowledge on and their contestation in tackling climate change
- iii. emergence of new climate change actors joining with established environmentalists and their interplay in the decision making
- iv. influence of international climate change politics over national processes
- v. evolving estimation of huge sum of resources required to make the country resilient
- vi. increasing perception of huge inflow of funds as an incentive for change coupled with frustration over reality of too little.

The study explores the interplay between actors in the space that opened up for climate change planning in Bangladesh. This also examines relative importance of ideology and power configuration between actors in generating and deciding over the ideas for this planning. Finally this looks into how internationally defined ideas influence and get translated in national planning.

As part of an international project led by Institute of Development Studies to understand change processes required for delivery of climate resilient and low carbon development this case study illustrates how a

significant change process of a transnational problem depends on the interplay of actors, their ideas and power relations in a particular political circumstance influenced by international climate governance, initiatives, and actors. This shows the strength and weakness of Bangladesh's planning process especially in understanding whether existing power relations, interests and ideology of different actors can explain why some ideas win and some do not. The study findings are not only beneficial for Bangladeshi policy makers, researchers and public but also other climate vulnerable countries pursuing similar planning process.

## 1.2 Methodology and concepts

### 1.2.1 Concepts and definitions

Climate change has moved to the centre stage of public concern in a remarkable way and in a very short space of time (Giddens 2008), while growing policy and practices focus on development processes that are resilient to the impacts of climate change and can contribute to a low carbon global future. There is a reasonable understanding about the objectives of climate resilient and low carbon development; the change processes required for their delivery are less well understood. The study assumes that the changes processes are triggered by international politics of climate change (Dessler and Parsons, 2006; Luterbacher & Sprinz, 2001), the need for new global institutions (Yamin & Depledge, 2004) and the business strategy of global corporate actors (Levy & Kolk, 2002). Likelihood of significant resource inflow to national level influences institutional landscape, knowledge and ideas which eventually opened up space for debate and interplay of actors in shaping kind of policy and practices required for a climate resilient development. The study further assumed that due to transnational nature of the problem global politics of climate change would significantly influences the national policy and practices.

Public Policy making and national planning have distinct meaning in academic tradition especially in public policy studies. This study, however, adopted the planning process similar to public policy making, which can broadly be defined as: i). setting the agenda; ii). specification of alternatives from which a choice is to be made; iii). an authoritative choice among these specific alternatives; and iv). implementation of decision (Kingdon 2003). Both planning and policy making follow a similar path i.e. conceptualisation, negotiation and implementation, that Kingdon in his book *Agenda, Alternatives and Public Policy* further describes how separate streams of problem, solutions and politics converge to move an issue into the public policy agenda towards potential government action. While Kingdon's theoretical model provides useful analogy for analysing public policy or planning into a political context, studies (Sifayet 2008) which identify their shortcoming, examine policies in non-western countries where international actors and policies play a significant role in domestic policy making.

IDS's initial scoping study underscored that the political economic approach is essential to understand this complex and dynamic change processes at national level. Taking a political economy approach will improve understanding of the complexity of decision making and policy processes on climate change, differences in governance and planning systems, the power relations mediating competing claims over resources, and the wider enabling environment for adoption of technology. These political dimensions of international development has been increasingly recognised through the growing number of donor approaches to political economy (c.f. DFID, SIDA, World Bank, EC) designed to better understand the governance challenges in countries, sectors, and programs (Marquette & Scott, 2005). DFID's recent guidance on political economy analysis recognised the need to understand the impact of regional or global drivers on domestic change processes given the increasingly interdependent nature of current global system (DFID 2009).

The study used following key definitions:

- **Actors:** An actor refers to a person, group, organization, or system who played a role, influence and being influenced (by the plans) in the climate change planning.
- **Ideology:** The study adopted a neutral conception of ideology as described in the International Encyclopaedia of Social and Behavioural Science that refers to it as “a discrete belief system which animates social and political action”. The study finds five dominant ideologies which are described later.
- **Power and power configuration:** In terms of power configurations between actors, the study sought to understand the formal and informal power relations and structures. The analysis of actors, interest groups and structures will ideally show where real power in a society lies, how power is distributed and possible conflicts of interests. It may also point to what kind of power is being exercised and how it is understood and perceived.

## 1.2.2. Methodology

The study is conducted in two phases. The inception phase conducted in September and October 2010 in which the study questions have been formulated, literature review done, and key actors mapped out. The second phase involved extensive detailed interviews and literature reviews.

The study is based on 60 detailed interviews with the key actors concerned in the Bangladesh climate change planning process. At least one quarter of these actors were involved in the BCCSAP formulation, including key government officials, experts, and staff of donor agencies. The research team interviewed other key players including campaigners, academics, politicians, civil society members and researchers engaged in the debate and discussions that shaped the wider context. The research team provided all interviewees the guarantee of anonymity. These interviews were combined with a review of formal and informal documents, including government notifications, meeting minutes, formal publications, newspaper clippings and press releases.

## 1.2 Structure of the report

- The first part of the report provides a brief description of the introduction to the research, and the methodology followed.
- The second section gives the readers sufficient background information about climate vulnerabilities of Bangladesh with a historical overview of the institutional response up to the end of 2009. In addition, this briefly introduces general planning and policy making process in Bangladesh in relation to climate change planning.
- The third part gives an account of post-*Sidr* planning related to climate change in Bangladesh.
- The fourth part gives the actors and the ideologies in climate change planning identified through the study.
- The fifth section mapped out contested ideas.
- The sixth part gives the study’s analysis of power relations between actors in post-*Sidr* climate change planning.
- The final part discusses the reflections of the study team about the implications of the study findings on the future of climate change planning and its implementation.

## Part 2: Context of the post Sidr planning

This part of the report illustrates the immediate and historic factors - domestic and international - that shaped the planning context for post *Sidr* climate change plans in Bangladesh.

### 2.1 Bangladesh’s vulnerability to climate change

While in the early 1980s, Bangladesh ranked as the world’s second poorest country, with an average per capita income of US\$ 130, now with a population of 162 million in 2010, Bangladesh has made significant progress in human development in recent years with its HDI rank incremented to 129 in 2010 from 145 in 2002 (UNDP, 2010 and 2002). Per capita income crossed US\$ 700 in 2010 (Daily Star, 28 May 2010). Since its independence in 1971, Bangladesh’s GDP has grown more than three times and food production increased three fold (BCCSAP 2009). Since the 80s, Bangladesh has been able to reduce its poverty level from 59 to 40 per cent during 1991 and 2005. Yet more than 50 million people live in poverty which Bangladesh plans to halve through its commitment to Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and its 6th Five Year Plan underway.

However, Bangladesh’s ongoing progress in human development is seriously threatened by the impacts of climate change. GermanWatch, a non profit organization, ranked Bangladesh as the most vulnerable country from climate change in its Global Climate Risk Index 2010. Numerous studies suggest all sectors of Bangladesh’s economy, population groups, and settlements are vulnerable to changes in the precipitation pattern, increase in temperature, increase in frequency and intensity of weather related disasters, and sea level rise.

Plenty of studies<sup>ii</sup> conducted over last two decades indicated serious threats of climate change on Bangladesh’s human security. In summary, the country is on top of the list of the countries with high disaster mortality rate in the world (UNDP Vulnerability Index). More than half a million people have died between 1970 and 2005 in 171 disaster events (Alam 2010). While the average number of people killed and affected by disasters has fallen in long run, this figure still remains more than 50 million for every five years from 1986 to 2007 (Alam 2009). Disaster also poses serious threat to the country’s effort to alleviate poverty and achieving MDGs. While disasters affect all parts of material, social and spiritual aspects of life, damage in housing is a regular feature affecting households’ economy and wellbeing. Since 1970, the country lost an average 0.3 million houses fully and 0.5 million partially per year as a result of flood and cyclone (Alam 2010). While the country is cited widely for its effort in increasing primary education situation, since the devastating cyclone of 1970, an estimated average of 900 education institutions are completely damaged each year by cyclone, flood and river erosion (Alam 2009). The country has spent more than US\$ 10 billion to manage disaster since independence in 1971. The following table presents a summary of major climatic risk presented in BCCSAP.

**Table 1: Likely impacts of global warming and required investments (Source BCCSAP 2009)**

	Immediate Impacts	Result	Investments Needed	
Global warming	Cyclones – increased frequency and severity	Higher storm surges Higher wind speed	○ Early warning systems ○ Cyclone shelters and <i>killas</i>	Social protection
	Heaver and more erratic rainfall in monsoon	Higher river flows Drainage congestion Flooding in rural/urban	○ Early warning systems ○ Improved O&M of embankments ○ Upgrading of flood protection	

	areas	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Raising some roads and railway tracks</li> <li>○ Flood proofing</li> <li>○ Improved crops and cropping systems</li> </ul>
Lower and more erratic rainfall in other seasons	Droughts and scarcity of drinking water	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Improved irrigation and water management</li> <li>○ Provision of drinking water</li> <li>○ Improved crops and cropping systems</li> </ul>
Melting of Himalayan glaciers	Higher river flows in short to medium term and then reduced flows and increased saline intrusion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Exacerbates impacts of 2 and 5</li> </ul>
Sea level rise	Coastal embankments overtopped Saline intrusions into rivers and groundwater	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Improved O&amp;M and upgrading of coastal embankments and polders</li> <li>○ Improved crops and cropping systems</li> <li>○ Provision of portable drinking water</li> <li>○ Possible industrial relocation</li> </ul>
Warmer and more humid weather	Increased prevalence of disease and disease vectors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Health education/awareness</li> <li>○ Immunisation</li> <li>○ Other prevention programmes</li> <li>○ Drinking water and sanitation</li> </ul>

## 2.2 Discourse and political commitment

In Bangladesh over the last ten years, international climate change discourse has been largely translated, advanced and shaped through a number of shifts. First, this started with a sceptical view of it as ‘another international agenda’ to a broad based development concern with high political attention in recent years. Second, although the issue has been raised and nurtured by the environmental circle the discourse continues to be shifted as a development issue and should be dealt with through regular development planning process in which both climatic and non-climatic issues should be addressed.

Third, this can be characterized as a justice discourse based on the principle of compensation, right to access funding, equity and the national control over adaptation resources. This discourse is largely shaped by the campaign groups, media, NGO and the current ruling government. Two important discourses shaped this agenda: (i) national government should decide how they are going to plan and spend adaptation resources; (ii) people’s vulnerability to climate change is constructed by socioeconomic inequity which should be addressed as part of the adaptation process. But the policy agenda of the campaigning groups covered wider context of equity which called on the Northern countries to compensate the loss caused by the climate crisis.

Climate change is beginning to play ‘an important role’ in domestic politics which arguably started in 2009 with a press conference by the main opposition party, Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), stating

that Bangladesh failed to reflect its national interest as a least developed country (LDC) in COP15. There have been several responses from the ruling party, Awami League (AL), including the Prime Minister herself who mentioned climate change negotiation in COP15 as major achievement in a speech.

## 2.3 Political and governance structure with reference to special political circumstances in 2006-2008

Bangladesh is a country with multi-party parliamentary system in which the Prime Minister heads the government. The cabinet is composed of ministers selected by the prime minister and appointed by the president. Ministry is a self-contained administrative unit responsible for the conduct of business of the Government in a distinct and specified sphere. The minister is responsible for policy matters concerning his ministry and for implementation thereof. He is also responsible for conducting the business of his ministry in the Parliament. The Secretary is the official head of the Ministry. He is responsible for the administration and discipline and for the proper conduct of the assigned business. He is also the principal accounting officer of the ministry, its attached departments and sub-ordinate offices. He keeps the minister in charge informed of the working of the Ministry (Aminuzzaman 2002).

Bangladesh has a unique system of transfer of power at the end of the tenure of each government. In this system the legislature elects the president every five years to control the transition to a new government. The President has limited powers that are substantially expanded during the tenure of a caretaker government, to create an environment in which an election can be held in a free and fair manner without any political influence of the outgoing government.

In October 2006, as the election was nearing, the political tension and chaos intensified between the political parties. In the wake of the chaos, series of protests, and dysfunctional system on 11 January 2007, President Iajuddin relinquished the post of Chief Adviser followed by imposition of state of emergency, curtailing political activities, media coverage and popular gatherings. The Caretaker Government has established itself as an exceptional caretaker government because it transformed itself into an interim government and sought to go beyond the constitutionally restricted role of organizing free and fair elections. It has not only extended its life span period and holding election on 29 December 2008, after more than 23 months of Chief Adviser's appointment, it has also functioned largely as an interim government taking key decisions concerning the domestic, military, economic, and foreign policies of the country. The substantial part of post Sidr climate change planning was formulated during this period of time.

## 2.4 Administrative structure related to climate change

### 2.4.1 Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF)

This is the focal ministry for maintaining direct coordination with the UNFCCC and its related activities at global and national levels. The MoEF has several agencies and institutional mechanisms to implement its mandate of environmental and natural resource management including climate change that include:

- i) Climate Change Unit (CCU)
- iii) Department of Forest (FD)
- iv) Department of Environment (DoE) which houses the Climate Change Cell
- v) Bangladesh Forestry Research Institute (BFRI)

Department of Environment that was created in 1989 under the Ministry of Environment and Forest is mandated to implement the policies to ensure sustainable development, conserve and manage the environment of Bangladesh. Therefore, to focus solely on the issues of climate change the Climate Change Cell (CCC) was established in 2004 under a DFID and UNDP-funded project and housed in the DoE. CCC is tasked with integrating climate change considerations into various aspects of national planning. They lobby the Planning Commission to include climate change directives in the national development plan to be implemented by professionals and funded by the line ministries.

In January 2010, the MoEF established a 'Climate Change Unit' under its own setup to facilitate the financial and institutional mechanism for implementation of the Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund, what the Government endowed to the Ministry through creating a Trustee for the implementation of BCCSAP 2009.

### **2.4.2 Economic Relations Division (ERD)**

ERD under the Ministry of Finance is one of the important Divisions of the GoB which mobilizes external resources for socio-economic development of the country. ERD leads as the focal point of the Government for interfacing with the development partners as well as for co-ordination of all external assistance inflows into the country. It assesses the needs of external assistance, devises strategy for negotiations and mobilizes foreign assistance, formalizes and enables aid mobilization through signing of loans and grant agreements, determines and executes external economic policy. (Source: <http://www.erd.gov.bd/index.php>)

Normally, requests for financing projects are made by implementing agencies to the donor agencies through ERD. Sometimes donor agencies which are willing to assist a project approach ERD. The ERD headed by a secretary is responsible for aid negotiation and programming. It was separated from the Planning Commission in 1978 and given the status of a Division of the Ministry of Finance with powers to decide development priorities and negotiate foreign aid programmes with donor countries. In August 1990, the Bangladesh government made an important change in the approval procedures of different projects to make them consistent with the principles of sound project management. Previously, the Planning Commission was primarily responsible for scrutiny and approval of development projects. Under the current arrangement, administrative ministries and executing agencies are responsible for examining a project before it is finally approved by the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council (ECNEC). After the approval of the projects, the relevant department or agency appoints a project director with the prior consent of the administrative ministry.

### **2.4.3 Planning Commission**

The commission is the central planning body of Bangladesh. It is a body of professionals and sector specialists engaged in the formulation of macro as well as micro economic plans and policies of the government.

Through the formulation of the five-year Plans and the Annual Development Plans, the Planning Commission in effect translates the ideas, aspirations and the commitment of the party in power. The Planning Commission is entrusted with functions of preparing national plans and programmes according to the directives of the National Economic Council (NEC).

The Commission, through multi-sectoral input-output models, makes macro economic projections and sets output targets for the sectoral activity at different time frames such as long term perspective plans

like Five Year Plans and Two Year Plans etc. Although responsibilities from planning to execution are shared between the administrative ministries and planning commission the planning process starts with the mapping of economic trends and identification of alternative possibilities by the Commission, leading to formulation of the technical framework of a plan. Ministries and agencies participate indirectly in these technical works as source of information. Planning Commission launches detailed economic, financial and technical appraisal of projects and mobilizes resources for their implementation in consultation with the Finance Division and the ERD.

## 2.5 General policy and strategy making process in Bangladesh

As per the clause of the Rules of Business 1996 clause 4 (ii) “no important policy decision shall be taken except with the approval of the cabinet”. Cabinet is the ultimate authority of approving a policy. There are inadequate debate on policy and legislation in Parliament. Many important matters including the Five-Year Plan are not discussed in the Parliament at all (Aminuzzaman, 2000). Most policy is formulated in the ministry level are not even announced in the parliament, so it is not surprising that such policies have little public understanding and are often implemented half-heartedly (Aminuzzaman, 2000).

For example, the policy on Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord was made by a handful of senior Awami League and tribal leaders with little or no actual consultation with the party, or in the parliament, or the public in general that denotes the elite domination in the process.

Flood Action Plan is an example of how supposed beneficiaries of flood control in Bangladesh - the country's poor majority - have been virtually excluded from the decision-making process. The World Bank (1989b, pp. 7-8) concedes that past embankment projects have been undermined by deliberate cutting of embankments by disgruntled farmers and fishermen, and hence calls for "closer involvement of the beneficiaries" and "more cooperation among farmers". It provides no inkling, however, of how these are to be achieved in a context of military based rule and a highly inequitable land ownership pattern. (Boyce 1990).

Health policy, for example, is shaped not only by certain acts but also by a stream of administrative rules and decisions interpreting, elaborating, and applying the act to particular situations (Aminuzzaman 2002). A study on health policy formulation shows that donors and bureaucrats are the dominant forces in health policy making; this causes lack of representation of people for whom the policy is nominally made (Osman 2004).

Over the last four decades, Bangladesh has created a space for pluralistic institutions to function and take active role in influencing the policies in Bangladesh. Besides having government, political organizations, business community, and donors to take part in the policy making process, another type of institution - NGOs - evolved and established themselves as a prominent actor influencing the policy implementation. Bangladesh's slow transition from using interventionist approach towards adopting neoliberal approach has created scopes for civil society to form NGOs and actively participate in the development process. In this whole process a network of elite having access to all different kinds of institutions have gradually constellated and made these institutions to function based on trust and mutual dependency.

In summary, the two decades of policy making suggests the following trends:

- Most policies are driven by expert and bureaucrats following a top-down process. While participation of stakeholders increased, quality of participation of poor people remained weak.

- Often policy agendas are set through external requirement as oppose to domestic demand that created limited ownership by the society at large. Externally driven process created limited political ownership and often created parallel process to already existing planning process.
- Participation of political parties and debate in the parliament on major policy issues remained weak.

## 2.6 Shifting institutional landscape in climate change

Over the last 10 years, there has been significant change in the institutional landscape in Bangladesh is centred on and around climate change. Newer institutions within government, political system<sup>iii</sup> and non-government research, academic, NGOs, network and campaign have been established. GoB established CCC in 2004 with the financial help of DFID and housed in DoE under MOEF. Besides, individuals such as independent researchers and experts; and institutions traditional development NGOs and research organizations<sup>iv</sup>, adopted climate change as an issue to work with. After the national election of 2008, All Party Parliamentary Group on climate change and parliamentary committee of costal MPs were also formed.

Policies of the major bilateral and multilateral donors went through a shift to include climate change concern into their development assistance. Climate change moved from a peripheral issue to a central issue to the discussion and action of donor agencies although the change process was not generated from the country but by the changes in international policy of the donors.

- Invested in studies to understand climate change implication (for internal purpose) as well as influence broader policy initiatives.
- Some donors such as DFID and Danida commissioned screening of their programme portfolio.
- The World Bank and Asian Development Bank included climate change in their lending portfolio and country assistance strategy.

## 2.7 Key historical milestone of climate change in Bangladesh

There is no exclusive national policy that deals with the climate change in Bangladesh. A few policies developed in recent years i.e. agriculture policy 2009, national agriculture policy 1999, new agriculture extension policy 1996, coastal zone policy 2005, land use policy 2001, forest policy 1995, national water policy 1999, renewable energy policy 2008, national health policy 2010 and draft industrial policy 2010 already included climate change concerns.

Prior to BCCSAP formulation, GoB formulated a number of national and sectoral strategies and action plans: i). national water management plan, ii) national biodiversity strategy and action plan for Bangladesh; and iii) national environmental management plan including climate viabilities.

Bangladesh produced NAPA in 2005 as a requirement of UNFCCC. The document set out 15 urgent and immediate priorities only for climate change adaptation. The document was produced through a project led by a steering committee, headed by MoEF and members of other key ministries. The process involved selected vulnerable communities while conducted consultation in the capital and other divisional cities. However, the document has been seen as external requirement thus did not receive sufficient political attention and include into national planning process.

In 2005 and 2006 Bangladesh selected as a leader of LDCs<sup>5</sup>. From COP1 to COP12, Bangladesh had a strong present in international climate change negotiation.

A detailed list of climate change milestones is attached in Annex-1.

## 2.8 International drivers in the planning

The international climate change governance in 2007 and 2008 had an influence over post-*Sidr* planning in Bangladesh. COP13 in 2007 created a sharp divide between developed and developing countries about the financing mechanism; whether it should be bilateral or/and multilateral through existing mechanism of UNFCCC. The developed countries preferred bilateral mechanism through existing financial institutions (Shamsuddoha 2008) while developed countries voiced concern about bureaucracy of such mechanism. The COP13 also decided, for the first time, mitigation for the developing countries under long-term cooperative action together with adaptation supported by financing, capacity building and technology, which should be in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner (Bali Action Plan 2007).

Meanwhile the ‘the Finance Minister’s meeting’ of the G8 countries, held in Osaka in June 2008, agreed to the ‘G8 Action Plan for Climate Change to Enhance the Engagement of Private and Public Financial Institutions’. They also supported the launch of new Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) by the World Bank, which will complement existing bilateral and multilateral efforts, until a post-2012 framework under the UNFCCC is implemented (Shamsuddoha 2008). The financing will be in the form of credit enhancement and risk management tools, such as loans, grants, equity stakes, guarantees and other support mobilized through donor contributions to the respective trust funds, which will be implemented in collaboration with the regional development banks (RDBs).

The Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR) was approved by the SCF Trust Fund Committee of the WB in 2009. The WB later named three countries, Bangladesh, Niger and Tajikistan to receive support with US\$ 270 million from PPRC. The WB has also approved US\$ 110 million for PPCR in Bangladesh, of which US\$ 50 million is in the form of grant and US\$ 60 million in the form of credit (Daily Star December 2010).

## 2.9 Putting the post Sidr planning into the context

**Table 2: Chronology of key climate change milestones 2005 to 2010 within international and national context**

International Political and climate change related events	Bangladesh National Events	Bangladesh climate change related events
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IPCC AR4 (2005)</li> <li>• COP13 at Bali (2007)</li> <li>• IPCC got noble prize (2007)</li> <li>• UK domestic politics Gordon Brown assumes office of PM (2007)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• State of emergency imposed (2007)</li> <li>• Occurrence of two national scale flood and one category five cyclone Sidr (2007)</li> <li>• Top leaders of two big political parties arrested</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NAPA prepared (2005)</li> <li>• UK pledges 75 m GBP (2007)</li> <li>• Caretaker Government allocated BDT 300 Corer for climate change (2007)</li> <li>• BCCSAP process launched(2008)</li> <li>• 1<sup>st</sup> UK-Bangladesh Climate change conference held in Dhaka (2008)</li> <li>• MDTF design (2008)</li> </ul>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UK development minister issued a written statement on dispute over Bangladesh MDTF ()</li> <li>• Launched climate investment fund (2008)</li> <li>• COP 14 at Poznan, Poland (2008)</li> <li>• COP 15 at Copenhagen (2009)</li> </ul>	<p>(2007)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CSRL formed with 200 national and international NGOs (2007)</li> <li>• Equity BD adopted climate change (2007)</li> <li>• Bangladesh encountered severe food crisis (2007)</li> <li>• National election held (2008)</li> <li>• Awamileague led coalition with left parties formed government (2009)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• BCCSAP launched in UK-Bangladesh climate conference in London (2008)</li> <li>• Finance advisor of Caretaker government declared World Bank to manage MDTF in 2<sup>nd</sup> UK-Bangladesh conference (2009)</li> <li>• Campaign in progress on demand of BCCSAP revision nationally and the UK (September 2008 – March 2009)</li> <li>• New government make a total of BDT700Croer equivalent to \$100million annually under national climate change fund</li> <li>• Cabinet committee formed to review the BCCSAP; and cabinet formed to on expert committee to revise the BCCSAP (2009)</li> <li>• Cabinet approved revised BCCSAP (2009)</li> <li>• The climate change act passed in the parliament (2010)</li> <li>• Bangladesh signs loan from PPCR fund (2010). Climate Change Unit established in MOEF (2010)</li> </ul>
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## Part 3: Post Sidr Planning and BCCSAP

### 3.1 The BCCSAP

The BCCSAP was first developed during a state of emergency in Bangladesh in 2007 and 2008. The first version of the document which is referred to as BCCSAP 2008 (GoB 2008) was launched at the “UK Bangladesh Climate Conference” in London in September 2008. Following the general election in 2009, the newly formed coalition government led by the Awami League (AL) revised and approved the current version of the document referred to as the BCCSAP 2009 (GoB 2009).

The objective of the BCCSAP is to integrate climate change constraints and opportunities into the overall plan and programmes involving all sectors and processes for economic and social development. The document is prepared for only 10 years (2009-2018) and estimated US\$ 5bn for first five years for the implementation of selected adaptation activities. The document selected 28 cost effective priority programmes to be implemented in first five years (BCCSAP 2009). The document pursues an action plan with six following pillars:

- i. food security, social protection and health,
- ii. comprehensive disaster management,
- iii. infrastructure development,
- iv. research and knowledge management,
- v. mitigation and low carbon development,
- vi. capacity building and institutional development.

Putting finance and technology as means to achieve adaptation and mitigation the documented adopted a broad principle that ‘present day climate change is the result mainly of historical Green house gas

emission by the western and other industrialised countries and finance has to come from them'. Thus the document adopted a principle for adaptation funds that should be 'purely grant basis'.

## 3.2 Funds and funding mechanism

Post Sidr planning includes two funds and funding mechanisms.

### 3.2.1. Climate Change Trust Fund (CCTF)

The *CCTF* is the Government's own trust fund generated from the national budget. The fund of Tk. 300 crores was initially declared by the Interim government in 2008 that was later increased to Tk. 700 crores (USD100m) by the AL government. In early 2009, the Climate Change Trust Fund Policy was approved by the cabinet, and in May 2010, the Climate Change Trust Fund Act 2010 was passed to back-up the fund.

The MoEF formed three committees to facilitate the implementation of the fund; and established: (i) Interministerial Climate Change Steering Committee, (ii) Climate Change Technical Committee and (iii) the Trust Fund Board.

The MoEF called for proposals in November 2009 from GoB institutions and national NGOs to be funded by the CCTF. By January 2010, several projects were chosen; 17 were from government bodies and institutions and 7 by NGOs. Of the total amount of the fund, 66% is allowed to be spent on activities and the remaining amount, 34%, will be invested. This is according to the name of the Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund; the word "Trust" was specifically included for the purpose of keeping a certain amount of the annual allocation made in the budget towards the Fund for "investment".

### 3.2.2. Bangladesh Climate Resilience Fund (BCCRF)

Until recently the BCRF was called the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF). The origin of the MDTF was in the latter half of 2008 when the UK government pledged a grant amounting to 75 million GBP over the next five years to implement BCCSAP.

GoB signed communiqué with the UK in 2008 putting forward 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness through which UK support would be disbursed. Since UK's aid policy does not allow direct transfer to GoB's account, the MDTF was pursued as an alternative mechanism. Since creation of new institutions takes time, according to DFID, the WB came into the picture as a fund manager. Since then, the WB's role in the MDTF created significant national and international campaign and dispute between GoB and donors.

At the end of 2010, the utilisation of funds held in MDTF did not start while the final mechanism for the management and governance await approval from the Prime Minister of GoB. Until end of 2010, the EU, Sweden, Denmark and DFID joined in BCCRF.

## 3.3 Implementation mechanism

BCCSAP establishes an organisational chart for coordination and facilitation of national actions on climate change:

- i. National environment committee, headed by the prime minister that is responsible for strategic guidance and oversight.
- ii. National steering committee on climate change, headed by Minister of Environment and Forest, responsible for overall coordination and facilitation.
- iii. Climate Change Unit, housed in MoEF, responsible for coordination and management.
- iv. Climate change focal points in all ministries, reasonable for planning and implementing activities within their remit.

The government set up a Climate Change Unit in MoEF along with focal points in several ministries for coordination of all climate change activities (Bangladesh Development Forum Meeting 15-16 February 2010).

## 3.4 Process of the BCCSAP planning

The formal process of BCCSAP formulation began in March 2008 and went through three distinct but connected phases until the current version was approved in March 2009. Each phase had distinct leadership, actors and dynamics.

### 3.4.1. Phase one

This phase formally began in November 2007 when the Department of Environment (DoE) signed a Terms of Reference with the UK Department for International Development (DFID) for a policy support grant to develop the BCCSAP.

Crucially, this phase established the character of the formulation process by locating it within the environmental arena. According to DFID Bangladesh staff, the DoE was chosen because it was the main nodal point for climate change activities; the DFID and UNDP-funded Comprehensive Disaster Management Program had previously established a Climate Change Cell<sup>v</sup> within the DoE. DFID did not have contacts within the MoEF at that time (DFID pers. com 2010) although they kept MoEF informed about the process (DFID pers. com 2010). A staff member of the Climate Change Cell was assigned to design the programming aspect (CCC pers. Com 2010) while the Economic Relations Division (ERD) of the GoB was asked to produce a financing mechanism for implementation of the BCCSAP. A document was produced to be shared with stakeholders by March 2008.

The MoEF and a few influential climate change experts not involved in this process questioned whether the DoE had the “mandate” and “capacity to formulate a strategy of a multi-sectoral nature”. MoEF then assigned a group of experts to formulate the Strategy (DFID and DoE pers. Com 2010).

### 3.4.2 Phase two

This is the core BCCSAP formulation process, which began in March 2008 and marked the launch of the first version of the BCCSAP in London at the “UK-Bangladesh Climate Conference” in September 2008. The key character of this phase was the involvement of a broader range of stakeholders. GoB announced an allocation of Taka 300 crore (USD 100 million) per annum from the national budget to implement the BCCSAP. UK’s pledge of GBP 75 million over five years came together with the idea of a World Bank (WB) led MDTF to govern, manage and mobilize the finance.

This phase saw a growth in debates and campaigns nationally and internationally over the process and content of BCCSAP, as well as the increasing involvement of the WB in the MDTF.

### 3.4.3. The final phase

This phase began when the AL led coalition government took notice to and engaged in the debate over the BCCSAP and MDTF in the beginning of 2009. The government set up a ministerial committee led by the Planning Minister to redevelop the BCCSAP (GoB 2009 b) which highlighted key gaps in the document. The Cabinet put together a review committee comprised two previous members involved in phase two and a few new experts<sup>vi</sup>. The committee recommended a draft BCCSAP in August which the cabinet approved and renamed as the BCCSAP 2009 in October. Meanwhile, the proposed role of the WB in the MDTF governance and management sharply divided the actors and created a dispute between GoB and donors, most notably the EU and DFID. The centre of the dispute was on the management of the MDTF. While GoB states that it had capacity to manage fund and donors insisted for WB to manage the fund that they thought would help mobilising more funds. This dispute was later declared to be resolved in the Bangladesh Development Forum (BDF) meeting in 2010<sup>vii</sup>.

**Table 3: Major changes BCCSAP2008 and BCCSAP 2009**

Version	BCCSAP 2008	BCCSAP 2009
<b>Key drivers</b>	Previous technical studies including NAPA 2005	Political commitment of the AL government
<b>Key principles</b>	(i) Wide range of funding sources (ii) Linking adaptation and mitigation: Low carbon development as part of climate resilient development	(i) funding should be grant only (ii) low carbon development without compromising economic growth (iii) recognising the historical responsibility of developed countries
<b>Programme of action</b>	120 programmes proposed. Predominantly techno-managerial actions including physical infrastructure, technical research and development, technology development, and institutional capacity. Only 9 programmes for human capacity development	No significant change in the distribution of actions but additional programmes including planned migration, investment in women’s capacity building, and river dredging.

## Part 4: Actors and their ideology in post Sidr planning

### 4.1 Actors in the BCCSAP

A range of groups were involved in the different phases of the BCCSAP formulation process and subsequent debates.

#### 4.1.1. Political parties

The participation of the political parties in climate change issues remained almost nonexistent at the beginning of the BCCSAP formulation process, with no visible party positions expressed<sup>viii</sup>. This was partly because of the state of emergency that set a limit to political activities and partly because they were not invited in various formal consultations workshops organised for the BCCSAP. The leading role of political party-only the ruling party in the process began in the phase three discussed in earlier section.

Like regular policy making process in normal (contrast to state of emergency) circumstance, role of opposition political parties were negligible in the BCCSAP building process in phase three. Professor Rehman Sobhan explains this as a pattern - ‘power configuration in Bangladesh is such that opposition political parties often fail to influence the policies in Bangladesh’ (Sobhan 2007). Clearly, there was no

major political debate raised by the political parties in all phases and climate change is still at the periphery of the domestic politics. While the main opposition party, Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), was less visible in pursuing agenda or alternatives, some of the key party leaders expressed their opinion on BCCSAP in the press and seminars organised by civil society groups, even in the state of emergency. This was perhaps due to limited party-wide ‘consensus’ on the key climate change issues with an exception to AL that included climate change in their manifesto for 2009 general election.

***Box 1: Climate change text from Awami League 2009 election manifesto***

“All measures will be taken to protect Bangladesh - including planned migration abroad - from the adverse effects of climate change and global warming”.

“An integrated policy and plan will be formulated to protect the country from the adverse effects of global warming ... Projects will be undertaken for river dredging, water conservation, flood control, prevention of river erosion and protection of forestry. Attempts will also be made for restoring and maintaining ecological balance. Initiatives will be taken to implement the Ganges barrage project to expand irrigation facilities, prevent salinity and to solve the problem of scarcity of sweet water in the Sundarban region”.

#### 4.1.2. Civil bureaucrats

The civil bureaucrats were a consistent powerful actor over the entire period of formulation. This is not unusual in policy making processes as they bear the sole responsibility in the preparation of major policies (Aminuzzaman 2002). During phase one and two, they assigned experts and approved their inputs for the BCCSAP. Such role was assumed by the cabinet<sup>ix</sup>, which is ultimate authority of approving a policy (ibid 2002), once AL came into power.

Bureaucrats within the government do not necessarily share common ideology and policy position; often reflect the ideology of ruling government. There was a change in the civil bureaucracy, especially in MoEF once AL came into power. The new bureaucrats played a visible role in the negotiations with donors on the governance and management of the MDTF. Bureaucrats were also divided over key policy issues that was reflected when Ministry of Finance signed a loan agreement with the WB while MoEF was clearly not favour of loan (NewAge July 2010).

#### 4.1.3. Community of experts

The community of experts in the BCCSAP process was comprised of the country’s senior economists, engineers and environmentalists. The individuals in this actor group formed a community through their historic engagement in the technical issues of environment, water management and poverty. Although fairly small in number and based in the capital, most of them played important roles in past environment related policy and strategy making process. They have strong views about what to do, as well as sharp differences over some policy issues, such as whether infrastructural solutions are the best option for flood management<sup>x</sup>.

This actor group is closely linked to international institutions and share a common incentive structure. Almost all of them had strong desire to retain their position and leadership over climate change issues. Many of them saw a ‘window of opportunity’ to engage themselves in this historic process as well as wanted to see their ideas reflected in the document.

Experts from different sectors, engaged by the government, play important role in the policy and planning process of Bangladesh. Partisan preference over selection of experts for policy making by different regime is an important feature in recent policy making effort in Bangladesh.

#### 4.1.4. Campaigns

The third influential set of actors is the **internationally connected campaign groups**.

Political parties led major campaigns in the recent past to influence policy agenda and pursuing alternatives in Bangladesh. This trend has been alerted, arguably since 1990s, when NGOs and civil society (both externally funded and home grown) started to play an important role in influencing policy agenda. The NGOs led campaigns and advocacy initiatives emerged in the context of wider adoption of right based and governance approach adopted by major donors and international NGOs. On the other hand, a number of citizens based environmental campaigns, exception to NGO model, emerged as powerful actor in the general environmental issues, especially in the area of conservation. Bangladesh Poribesh Andolon (BAPA) and Poribesh Bachao Andolon (POBA) influenced public opinion and pursued conservation at the centre of policy discourse. Climate change was not the central agenda of the campaigns although activities BAPA organised number of events on climate change at the beginning of 2000. This space was later filled through emergence of two campaigns in the context of global climate justice movement, international climate negotiation and politics.

Two major groups that have played an influential role in the second and third phase of the BCCSAP process are the *Equity and Justice Working Group*<sup>xi</sup> (EquityBd), which is a coalition of national NGOs, and the Oxfam-led *Campaign for Sustainable Rural Livelihood* (CSRL). Networked with global climate justice campaigns<sup>xii</sup>, they mobilized significant public opinion around climate change issues by organizing national and international events involving influential politicians inside and outside the government in the UK and Bangladesh. With change of communication technology, both the campaigning traditions engaged Bangladeshi Diaspora in the Europe.

#### 4.1.5. Bilateral and multilateral donors

The fourth group is the community of bilateral and multilateral donors. The donors have historically played a significant and noticeable role in injecting ideas in public policy (Aminuzzaman 2002) and increased significantly in the recent years (Quibria 2010) although flow and importance<sup>xiii</sup> of aid as a proportion of GDP continue to decline in recent years<sup>xiv</sup> (Duncan et al. 2002; Quibria 2010). Among the multilateral lending agencies, the WB as the largest lender to Bangladesh has a significant influence over the policies in Bangladesh and promoted two decades of economic reforms (Sobhan 2002; Quibria 2010). Among the bilateral agencies, DFID is the largest donor to Bangladesh, and provided financial assistance to GoB to formulate the BCCSAP<sup>xv</sup> (House of Commons International Development Committee 2010). DFID played the lead role in shaping and negotiating the role of MDTF (GoB and UK communiqué on Climate Change 2008).

#### 4.1.6. Media

Bangladesh has a reasonably well developed and free media that played a significant role in shaping the public opinion and debate over climate change issues, especially in promoting the idea that MDTF to be managed by the government. Although the media did not assume an independent policy position themselves, they publicized the policy positions of the campaign groups. Surprisingly and unlike any other policy making process (Aminuzzaman 2002), the role of national and international NGOs was less visible in the BCCSAP planning process than is usual for major policy and planning ventures in Bangladesh.

## 4.1.7. Vulnerable communities

The direct involvement of the **most vulnerable people** was largely absent involved in the process of BCCSAP formulation (Khaled 2008; New Age 2008). Many of the key members of the drafting committee believed that the communities' views have been reflected in the BCCSAP as it took note of the learning from the NAPA which was written after consultation meetings were held in key regions. During the second phase, a group of invited NGOs and members from the civil society, academia, local and national government, and donors participated in three consultative meetings organized in Dhaka; but their role was limited in raising issues and commenting on the draft.

**Table 4: How actors influenced post Sidr planning**

Major actors	Role in post Sidr climate change planning	Major tools used to influence the planning	Geographical influence	Relationship and configuration
Political parties in Phase III	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Shifting the planning to political stream.</li> <li>Setup cabinet review and select experts for BCCSAP 2009.</li> <li>Include AL's election commitment.</li> <li>Negotiated with donors to secure power over and shaped to MDTF management and governance.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Administrative and political procedure</li> <li>Issuing formal statements nationally and internationally.</li> </ul>	National and international.	Maintained formal and critical engagement with all actors. The campaign groups had access to key leaders AL.
Civil bureaucrats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Selecting experts in phase I and II</li> <li>Led negotiation with donors and WB on MDTF and loan agreement in phase III.</li> </ul>	Administrative procedures.	High national influence.	Civil bureaucrats worked fairly independently with donors and experts in phase I and II and politicians in phase III.
Experts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Formulating and deciding on BCCSAP content and programmes in phase I and II; and shaped BCCSAP 2009 in Phase III.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Maintenance of relationship with MoEF officials through regular knowledge support.</li> <li>Connection with top government ministers, including PM in phase III.</li> </ul>	High national influence in all phases. Connected to the donor communities.	Civil bureaucrats and donors in phase I and II. The campaign groups had access to some experts in phase III selected by AL government as they share common ideology.
Campaigns	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Pursuing climate justice discourse and raising criticism on the process and content of climate change planning.</li> <li>Demanding revision in BCCSAP process and content</li> <li>Criticised and pursued WB role in MDTF governance.</li> <li>Pursuing an agenda of no-loan for climate change.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Publishing policy briefing.</li> <li>Writing letters to UK and GoB officials.</li> <li>Use of national and international media.</li> <li>Engage international campaign groups and Diaspora community.</li> <li>Street activism</li> </ul>	Moderate at international and national level.	Access to and influence over key experts, minister and top planners in government. Worked closely with media and politicians in all phases.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Personal persuasion.</li> </ul>		
Donors and lending agencies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DFID provided financial assistance and support launching of BCCSAP</li> <li>• Pursued and negotiated with GoB on WB role in MDTF.</li> <li>• Pursuing and signing loan agreement from PPCR with GoB.</li> <li>• Some influence over selection of experts in phase I and II.</li> </ul>	Formal communication with GoB, donor coordination and diplomacy.	High at international and national.	Worked closely with bureaucrats in all phases and experts in phases I and II.
Media	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Publishing views of all actors.</li> <li>• Some media published independent items on BCCSAP, WB role in MDTF and loan issues.</li> </ul>	Part from regular news items, published editorials and special issues.	Domestic high.	Worked closely with campaign groups.

#### 4.2 What role did ideology play in shaping the positions of actors?

The study does not provide conclusions about the relative importance of ideology and material interests in shaping actors’ policy positions and raising ideas and alternatives. But the presence of a number of ideologies is clearly visible in the BCCSAP as well as its building process.

The **pluralists** include part of the bureaucrats and expert community. They assume that the liberal planning process creates an environment for all interest groups in the society to influence the planning process. As a consequence, specific measures may not be necessary to involve the most vulnerable section of the community. As a result involvement of local NGOs was seen as a substitute for the direct involvement of the vulnerable people in the planning.

The **modern climate justice** is a descendent of the trade justice ideology and is the most influential ideology shared by individuals and institutional actors within governments, campaigns, media, some of the community of experts and donors. The key interpretation of the ideology is of Bangladesh’s right to new and additional resources from international sources to help tackle the causes and effects of climate change with those for adaptation in particular regarded as ‘compensation’ for damages caused by emissions largely generated elsewhere. Visible at international nature of mobilisation and management of resources the ideology was less translated how resources to be distributed to various vulnerable groups in the country.

The **left ideology**, although less visible but influential in debates and discussions in BCCSAP process, has a historical root in opposing the role of international financial institutions in domestic policy making. Journalists in Bangladesh who raised issues on the BCCSAP process and content in the second phase are known as left-leaning. Bangladesh has a historical presence of strong left political parties until the fall of the Soviet Union. The socialist character of AL and the ruling coalition is shaped by the joining of influential leftists in AL as well as left parties in the coalition. Many experts interviewed by the research team believed that the coalition government’s opposition to the WB role in MDTF and refusal of loans for climate change until 2009 was a reflection of both the left and climate justice ideologies. Some of the biggest contemporary campaigns especially in relation to natural resources and energy are organised by left political parties and intellectuals.

The **faith based ideology** found especially within the Islamic and Christian traditions. Christian ethics have heavily underpinned notions of climate justice both international and in Bangladesh, particularly through the NGO movement and its advocacy. While Islamist ideology has been influential in translating major policy ideas such as education policy, land rights and women's issues in Bangladesh, they played a very limited role in the BCCSAP process.

**Market liberalists** have been crucial in promoting the idea that a mix of grants and loans is an essential element to finance efforts to tackle climate change. This ideology is shared by the multi lateral development banks, a part of government bureaucrats and part of community of experts. These groups also believe that aid effectiveness as a global standard is the most important component of the management and governance of climate change grants.

The combination of the pluralist, market liberalist, climate justice and left ideologies had an influence in raising debates throughout the BCCSAP process. As an outcome, the climate justice ideology resulted in a prolonged campaign in Bangladesh and Europe. The influence of market liberals translated into GoB's acceptance of the WB role in MDTF and signing of a concessional loan agreement between GoB and WB.

## Part 5: Contested Ideas in the climate change planning

This section first presents a list of key ideas generated in the climate change planning process. Then it provides an analysis of how ideologies and shifting discourses coupled in producing contested ideas that shaped BCCSAP process.

- i. CC planning is more effective if pursued within general development planning vs. special planning within climate change arena and MoEF.
- ii. Specialists driven top down vs. a bottom-up process involving the most vulnerable communities.
- iii. Techno-managerial approach vs. programme for human capacity building.
- iv. The climate change fund as compensation vs. concessional loan.
- v. Creation of special financing mechanism i.e. MDTF managed by the WB vs. Bangladesh's control over the fund management.

### 5.1 Specialised vs. general development planning

The Planning Commission is the central planning body of Bangladesh responsible for macro and micro economic plans and policies i.e. National Five Year Plan and Annual Development Plans. According to the GoB's Rules of Business, the ministries are responsible for the sectoral policy formulation, planning, evaluation and execution (Aminuzzaman 2002). Unlike policy making, Bangladesh does not have any formal process for strategy development (Chowdhury 2003).

Planning experts interviewed raised the question whether a faster and sustained mainstreaming of climate change into the country's central planning process can be achieved if it was done through the national planning process and its institutions. The root of this question rests on the analysis that development can increase vulnerability thus both climatic and non climatic factors are to be included into the climate change planning for it to be effective (UNDP 2009). BCCSAP acknowledges mainstreaming as a means to address multi-sectoral nature of climate change problem. However, the ownership as prerequisite for mainstreaming has been weakened due to BCCSAP's location within a sectoral ministry. For example,

the Finance Ministry signed a loan agreement<sup>xvi</sup> with the WB under PPRC while BCCSAP stated against taking loans.

Interviewed experts concern about likelihood of creation of planning exceptionalism since the implementation of BCCSAP may not go through regular national planning appraisal, approval and financing process. For example, two different governance and management infrastructures have been created for appraisal, approval and monitoring of projects under the BCCSAP. The first is for projects which will be financed by the National Trust Fund, and managed by the Climate Change Unit in the MoEF. The second is for projects to be financed by the MDTF, and governed and managed by an evolving new system with the involvement of GoB, participating donors and the World Bank as administrators.

## 5.2 Top down vs. bottom up process

The BCCSAP by design is a specialist driven process and did not involve the most vulnerable communities affected by climate change (Raihan M 2010; Khaled 2009). Moreover, the DFID funding for the development of BCCSAP did not include any activity and spend for involving these groups.

Many involved experts provided a number of explanations on why community involvement was non-existent in the BCCSAP process. They all univocally said that they had limited time to produce such a massive document in six months to be launched in London in September 2008. An expert commented that “the document could have been much nuanced and effective had there been more time for consultation”. A second reasoning is an assumption that there is a limit to climate change knowledge that experts are aware of which community consultation would not substantially alter the content that reflects the pluralist ideology of policy making. The third point was related to the justification that the community consultation was substituted by the inclusion of analysis and studies done during the NAPA preparation. The BCCSAP was finalized with three day-long workshops separately with government ministries, civil society members and donors respectively. Such process was heavily criticised by the campaign groups, media and politicians. For example the current Finance Minister stated that “the representation of the people who are vulnerable to climate change should be included in fund management and developing the climate change strategy paper” (The Daily Star, 2008).

## 5.3 Techno-managerial vs. human capacity building

The country’s wealth of development knowledge especially in disaster, water and environment arena was transformed not only as evidence of climate change but also to narrate what should be done to adapt to its impacts. For example, the post Hyogo disaster analysis put social and political aspect of vulnerability at the centre of policy and practice of disaster risk reduction (Alam 2007). Although engineering solutions to the disaster problem has always been controversial in Bangladesh, informed interviewees argued that the BCCSAP should have been built on the past lessons from infrastructural projects on disaster management especially from Flood Action Plan in 1990s (Lewis 2010).

The second debate was centred on the inclusion of mitigation in the BCCSAP. The donor community hailed the inclusion of low carbon development as a pillar in the BCCSAP which caused debate among the campaigning groups in Bangladesh. The UK Bangladesh communiqué declared in London states that UK is committed to Bangladesh to switch to a low carbon development path and reduce its dependence on ever more expensive fossil fuel. The New Age daily published an editorial urging that low carbon technology must not be obligatory which will necessarily thwart and impede the progress of the poor countries (NewAge 2008 b). The ruling AL government later adopted two principles: (i) mitigation

measures should be supported by finance and technology by the developed countries, (ii) this mitigation activities should not affect the country’s sustainable development growth.

## 5.4 The climate change fund as compensation vs. concessional loan

There was considerable frustration<sup>xvii</sup> among actors about too little fund Bangladesh received till 2007.<sup>xviii</sup> This frustration promoted the idea that Bangladesh could accept concessional loans from lending agencies fearing that Bangladesh would not receive adequate amount of grants (GoB 2009 b). Following the huge economic loss resulting from the 2007 disasters, the GoB and Bangladesh’s campaign groups shaped the idea of claiming compensation. The Prime Minister and Foreign Minister expressed similar positions in the past. In 2009 before COP15, the Foreign Minister Dipu Moni said “Copenhagen conference must agree on funding grants and not loans” (Daily Star November 2009). At the same time Bangladesh’s newspapers ran another story saying “the ERD is pursuing for loan based MDTF sponsored by the WB while the MoEF was opposing the division’s plan on the grounds that it contradicts Bangladesh’s stance with the LDCs and G77 in the global climate negotiations” (NewAge 2008c).

## 5.5 Creation of special funding mechanism i.e. MDTF managed by the WB vs. Bangladesh’s control over the fund management

The communiqué signed between the GoB and UK states that “the UK support will come with 2005 Paris declaration of aid effectiveness aligning it to government owned plan through a Bangladesh Multi Donor Trust Fund ... and the UK will continue to work with GoB and other development partners to make MDTF operational”. During the conference the then Finance Advisor made a comment that the WB may be given the responsibility to manage the fund which was opposed by the Special Assistant to the Chief Advisor of Environment (NewAge 2009).

### Box 2: Dispute over MDTF

Following are the major disputes over MDTF:

a) GoB views that it has the capacity to manage the fund and wanted donors to transfer the fund directly to the government. The donors wanted WB to provide the administration of fiduciary part of the MDTF while government thought WB can only provide technical backstopping and skill transfer role. GoB stated it can ensure robust fiduciary risk oversight mechanism. GoB and campaign groups stated WB role in MDTF as an idea opposing the national ownership enshrined in the UNFCCC.

*Civil society groups argued against WB management - High fees of consultants:* Civil society groups, both in Bangladesh and the UK argued that WB hired international consultants that charged high fees. The costs of the WB management would amount to 10-15 % of the funds (which would be over 4 million GBP of the initial offer of 50 GBP). That amount of the fund would not trickle down to the most vulnerable people for which it was intended.

b) GoB proposed to establish its independent governance and authority, and a three-tier governance structure, while the donors wanted to appoint the WB as an independent trustee to the fund. The WB wanted the MDTF to be governed by the terms of the legal agreement between the Bank and the donors.

c) The third dispute was about the sources of finance. The major concern was whether the bilateral fund pledges from the “Annex 1 countries” (UNFCCC) to the MDTF is new and additional to the existing ODA commitments or not. It was campaigned by the CSOs that the donor’s commitment to the MDTF is from their existing aid budget to Bangladesh, instead of being additional money, which is a breach of the financing commitment made under the UNFCCC.


The idea of WB's involvement in the MDTF can be traced back to DFID's assessment over the risk of transferring the responsibility of the financial trust fund directly to the government (House of Commons International Development Committee 2010). Direct Budget Support remains off limits for the EC, in view of continuing governance challenges and weak Public Finance Management (Global Climate Change Alliance). DFID told the study team that creating a new institution for managing the MDTF could have been time consuming and expensive. However, the idea of WB's involvement as administrator created a significant campaign in Bangladesh and Europe, and a huge dispute between the government and sponsoring donors. The Minister of Environment pointed out at the Bangladesh Development Forum (BDF) meeting that "the fund would be administered by the government while ensuring robust fiduciary risk oversight mechanism satisfactory to the development partners". (GoB 2010) The three year long dispute resulted in a number of changes in the management and governance of the MDTF.

WB's role in MDTF overshadowed the discussion on the content and process of BCCSAP during the second and third phases.

## **Part 6: Power configuration of Actors**

An understanding of the power configuration between the actors helps finding an explanation on why contested ideas emerged and how they were acknowledged and considered in decision making process. Which idea, among all the contested ideas, will be taken notice of or acknowledged is a combination of the reflection of the ideological character of the ruling class and the accessibility of the contested actor to the ruling class.

The politicians, donors, community of experts and campaigns played influential roles although the degree of influence varies over the phases of planning. At the end of the study, the research team scored the relative influence of actors in different phases on a scale of 10 (Box 3) to give the reader a graphical interpretation of power configuration between the actors. This analysis may not reflect a general policy making process in Bangladesh as it shows negligible power of the politicians in phase one and two which resulted due to the state of emergency during the tenure of the caretaker government. The politicians later became the most influential player in phase three. The government officials also had a consistent influence in varying political context through their executive authorities. The donors consistently remained as powerful actors in all phases. The chart also indicates that the vulnerable people remained as the least influential player in all three phases.



The influence of campaigns at any point of time was conditioned by significance of the issue raised by campaigns within the national policy context, and whether the policy position of the campaigns are aligned with the position of the ruling government. This coupling of policy positioning was random in case of the BCCSAP. For example the idea of WB role and “no loan” promoted by the campaigns received the attention of the decision makers within the ruling government. This occurred because there were influential individuals within the government who shared similar ideologies. The leadership, institutional capacity and access to resources are important determinants to explain why some campaigns in recent years became influential, and why the traditional environmental campaign in Bangladesh failed to generate ideas and maintain their relevance in the climate change debate and discussion.

The community of experts as a group is an influential player in all the phases. Even though each individual in this actor group have tested knowledge on climate change, and national and international profiles, how each individual gained and exercised their power follows no specific pattern. Partisan preference often determines who among the policy elites would be powerful and who will be included within the policy circle.

Unlike the western policy making process<sup>xix</sup> (and some non-western countries like India<sup>xx</sup>), the absence of various interest groups is the key characteristic of the BCCSAP process. Many key individuals believe that the systematic inclusion of local NGOs from different parts of the country substituted for the direct involvement of the vulnerable people or their organized and unorganized groups.

### Part 7: Further Reflections

Bangladesh’s experience demonstrates a number of key lessons in the political economy of climate change planning. Understanding these patterns has important implications on the future climate change planning and their implementation in Bangladesh and other vulnerable countries.

The first lesson is related to the planning approach that can foster and sustain the mainstreaming of climate change into the central development planning. There is always a risk of creating special planning

and implementation process referred as planning exceptionalism parallel to existing planning and approval process. A number of challenges emerged from Bangladesh Case Study.

- The first of the key challenges remains with the application of aid effectiveness by the donor countries. Donors often adopt short-term approaches to achieve aid effectiveness by creating alternative mechanisms of planning and implementation risking sustainable mainstreaming of climate change with the overall development planning and implementation.
- The second challenge is domestic in which specialization of climate change arena merits further reflection. The key question to be asked is whether climate change should remain in a specialized sphere led by technical experts or opened up to include actors from all different sectors, population groups and settlements.

The second lesson is related to a wider question of how a society should solve a transnational problem of a significant nature considering the unequal power relations between various actors in which planning and implementation takes place. While there has been a shift from state monopoly over the planning towards a participatory approach, the assumption of equal power of various actors and interest groups continue to persist among the policy elites in Bangladesh. As a result, NGO participation is often assumed to be a substitute for the involvement of vulnerable communities. Specific measures to empower the vulnerable people are a precondition of equitable policy making process and a just outcome.

The third lesson is related to application of climate justice idea and ideology. BCCSAP did not adopt a justice-based framework how various groups of vulnerable people would be benefited from the climate change planning, which the study team believes an unimplemented priority for Bangladesh. To address this shortcoming, study team recommends immediate development of a framework that must outline how resources would benefit not only existing various vulnerable groups but also the people who have already been affected by climate change.

The fourth batch of lessons is related to the design of policy, plans and programmes to tackle climate change. Experts often pursue solutions ignoring the past lessons especially in relation to upscale of existing interventions. Clearly inadequate time for building a long term strategy was a challenge for the actors involved in the BCCSAP. The lack of domestic politics in climate change and limited involvement of parliament resulted in limited debate and accountability of the planning process. Whether Bangladesh should take loans for climate change should have been debated in the parliament. The challenges that need to be addressed are the following:

- A political ownership of all parties is a necessary precondition to protect the country from climate change impact. Government should provide leadership to create such a precondition. Parliament's role should be made mandatory to formulating vital policy and plans.
- Institutional ownership on the planning process is also a precondition for mainstreaming BCCSAP into the national sectoral and planning process. The role of inter-ministerial body is vital for understanding of barriers for mainstreaming and creating enabling environment for promoting ownership over change processes required for climate resilient development.
- Local government must play a vital role in implementing climate resilient development, which is an overlooked area of the BCCSAP that needs to be considered.
- The mega infrastructural projects included in the BCCSAP should be critically examined in light of past lessons especially Flood Action Plan (FAP) and Coastal Environmental Project (CEP) of 1960s and future trends before they are implemented.

- GoB should establish a robust accountability mechanism that has ownership and trust of all actors for the utilisation both national and international resources.

The final lesson is the reflection on the methodology of the study. The political economic approach no doubt is well suited to understanding the dynamics and complexity of the climate change processes. The research team encountered a number of challenges that are more related to the nature of the issue that is unfolding quickly. The first challenge was to distinguish between facts and popular perceptions especially when too little formal documentation is available. As a result, final analysis at that stage is merely based on an understanding on the trends and events. Therefore caution should be taken to take the findings as firm conclusions. Further studies and dialogue are needed in two areas: first, is the role and influence of business and corporate in the planning; and second, is the influence of inclusion of specific programmes in the BCCSAP.

## Annex 1:

### *Major Milestones of Events related to the Climate Change issues in the International and National arena (Bangladesh)*

Year	International	Bangladesh
1972	United Nations conference on the Human Environment (aka Stockholm Conference): the main aim of the conference was atmospheric, oceanographic, i.e., common property pollution.	<i>Environment was an issue to the post-independence government.</i>
1973		Bangladesh sets up a department within the government to work on environmental pollution.
...		
1984		1984-1986: The start of four major NGOs/research organizations: BUP, BCAS, BELA, FEJB.
1985		
1986		
1987	Publication Brundtland Report (aka “Our Common Future”) on sustainable development. Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute (WHOI) of MIT published papers on SLR. They tried to relate the incidences of flooding to the changing climate in Bangladesh.	Major flood in Bangladesh affected 57,300 km <sup>2</sup> of land.
1988	Establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).	Major flood in Bangladesh inundated 82,000 km <sup>2</sup> of land.
1989		Dr Fasihuddin Mahtab publishes paper on Sea Level Rise and Bangladesh.
1990	Establishment of Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) by UN General Assembly for a Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC). Publication of First Assessment Report (FAR) by IPCC.	Intergovernmental Negotiations Committee (INC): MoFA, MoEF, and few from NGO community of Bangladesh actively participated.
1991		Major cyclone hits the eastern coast.
1992	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), (aka Rio Conference, The Earth Summit) where the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted. Publication Supplemental Report of FAR by the IPCC.	50 Bangladeshi delegates from government, ministries (MoFA, MoEF), member of parliament, researchers and academics, NGO community, journalists participated at the Earth Summit. This initiative was funded by DFID and CIDA. The government prepared a participatory report where CC was a major issue. Studies was carried out by ADB where Dr. Asad was the consultant
1993		BUP publishes “Socio-Economic Implications of Climate Change for Bangladesh” jointly with the CRU, University of East Anglia Norwich (UK) and CEARS, University of Waikato Hamilton (New Zealand), supported by the Ford Foundation and the

		British Overseas Development Administration.
1994	UNFCCC enters into force.	Completion of “Assessment of Vulnerability to Climate Change and Sea Level Rise for Bangladesh” by BCAS as one of the early adoption of the seven-step universal methodology for assessment of vulnerability to climate change and sea level rise developed by the IPCC.
1995	First ever UNFCCC Conference of Parties, COP-1, held in Berlin, and INC dissolved. Publication of Second Assessment Report (SAR) by IPCC.	First ever Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) project registered with the UNFCCC in Bangladesh, prepared by Waste Concern.
1996		“Bangladesh Climate Change Country Study: Emission Inventory” done by the DoE and published by BCAS. This is the first country study done based on secondary data under the US Country Studies Program.
1997	COP-3: Kyoto Protocol (KP).	
1998	Bonn: Talks of starting a Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) begins.	Major flood in Bangladesh affects over two thirds of the country. First emission inventory, Asian Least-Cost Greenhouse Gas Abatement Strategy (ALGAS) executed by ADB and jointly undertaken by BCAS, BIDS, BUET, BUP.
1999		
2000		
2001	Publication of Third Assessment Report (TAR) by IPCC. COP-7 in Marrakech: Parties agree for establishment of The Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund, and GEF requested to operate two new funds. Every country in LDC asked to do a NAPA.	
2002	World Summit on Sustainable Development (Earth Summit 2002). COP-8: GEF makes Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) and Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) operational.	
2003	COP-9 in Milan: Parties agree to use Adaptation Fund.	
2004		Establishment of the Climate Change Cell within the DoE. First adaptation project Reducing Vulnerability to Climate Change (RVCC) by CARE Bangladesh and CARE Canada.
2005	COP-11 and first Meeting of Parties (MOP-1) to the Kyoto Protocol in Montreal: Montreal Action Plan to extend the life of the KP beyond 2012.	Bangladesh National Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA) published under the MoEF.
2006		
2007	Nobel Peace Prize awarded to IPCC and Al Gore. Publication of Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) by IPCC. COP-13: Bali Action Plan.	Cyclone Sidr hits the western coast.
2008	UK government to give 50 m GBP to Bangladesh as	Cyclone Aila hits the western coast.

	<p>first largest pledge by a rich nation to tackle the effects of climate change. Denmark and Netherlands contribute towards Bangladesh climate change fund.</p> <p>Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP) presented at “UK-Bangladesh Climate Change Conference: Bangladesh Facing the Challenge” in London.</p>	<p>Government to put forward 30 m GBP (300 crore BDT) each year towards climate change fund.</p> <p>Interim Government presents the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP).</p> <p>Establishment of a Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) to implement projects as per pillars stated in BCCSAP.</p>
2009	<p>COP-15 in Copenhagen.</p> <p>Bangladesh tops list of most vulnerable nation to extreme weather events by number of deaths and destruction of property according to the Global Climate Risk Index.</p>	<p>Revised BCCSAP presented by the democratically elected Awami League government.</p> <p>Allocation of yearly 700 crore BDT within the national budget for the implementation of the BCCSAP.</p> <p>Bangladesh government calls for proposals for projects in accordance with the BCCSAP.</p>
2010		<p>Cabinet approves draft Climate Change Trust Fund Act.</p> <p>World Bank only to give technical assistance to the MDTF, renamed as the Climate Change Resilience Fund (CCRF)</p>

## Endnotes

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<sup>i</sup> The Bangladesh Vision 2021 was accessed on 24 December 2010 from <http://boi.gov.bd/about-bangladesh/government-and-policies/government-vision-2021?format=pdf>

<sup>ii</sup> Interested reader can read Annotated Bibliography on Climate Change in Bangladesh for a list of all research completed (found at <http://www.climatechange-cell-bd.org/>)

<sup>iii</sup> All party parliamentary committee on climate change, Parliamentary committee of coastal MPs

<sup>iv</sup> Many of the researchers in Bangladesh conducted studies, either to supply evidence of climate change, for international or supporting various campaigns or attract funds.

<sup>v</sup> Climate Change Cell was established in 2004 in the DoE under the Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (CDMP) of GoB, UNDP and DFID. The purpose of the CCC was to enable the management of long term climate risks and uncertainties as an integral part of national development.

<sup>vi</sup> A six member committee comprised of both GoB and experts.

<sup>vii</sup> See Ed Milliband's statement to the UK Parliament

<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmhansrd/cm100302/wmstext/100302m0002.htm>

<sup>viii</sup> Based on the analysis of the participants list of the consultation workshop and confirmed by personal communication with a number of national political leaders.

<sup>ix</sup> As per the clause of the Rules of Business 1996 clause 4, no important policy decision shall be taken except with the approval of the cabinet" (Aminuzaman 2002).

<sup>x</sup> At least two of the key members of BCCSAP formulation in phase two and three had strong differences in view about the effectiveness of infrastructural solution to disaster problem in Bangladesh.

<sup>xi</sup> [www.equitybd.org](http://www.equitybd.org)

<sup>xii</sup> Including through Christian Aid, World Development Movement, Friends of the Earth, Jubilee Debt Campaign.

<sup>xiii</sup> Quibria 2010 views that although annual flow of aid has ranged from USD 1 billion to USD 1.5 billion its importance has declined due to increase in foreign exports and inward workers remittance. For example 1970 to early 1990s the aid was about 6 per cent of GDP while it stood to 2 per cent in 2005.

<sup>xiv</sup> Aid flows constitute less than 2% of GDP, less than one-half of the annual development budget, and less than 20% of total GoB expenditure. The comparable figures for the early 1990s were around 10%, 100% and 50% respectively (source: B.Sundstrom, DFID). Thus, today aid disbursements are around 60% of remittances to Bangladesh by our overseas migrant workers (Sobhan 2002).

<sup>xv</sup> DFID's programme there in the current financial year is £125 million and will rise to £150 million in 2010-11, making the UK the largest bilateral donor.

<sup>xvi</sup> World Bank approved a 110 million PPCR project on November 10 2010. In the presence of WB and DFID, ERD on behalf of the GoB signed the agreement in which USD 50 million is grant while USD 60 million is concessional loan.

<sup>xvii</sup> GoB and the national and international civil society expressed such frustration reported in national and international newspapers. Prime Minister of Bangladesh also expressed such concern in many occasion including GCC meeting in Dhaka.

<sup>xviii</sup> Till 2007, Bangladesh only received two hundred fifty million USD through GEF for implementing the NAPA.

<sup>xix</sup> Kingdon shows the presence and influence of interest groups in American policy making process in his book *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies*

<sup>xx</sup> The *Dalit* lobby always has an influence over the policy and planning process as described in a report exploring political economy of agricultural reform in India.

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