Advancing Accountability through *Conselhos Consultivos* in Mozambique: PROGOAS Case Study

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**Summary**

In recent years accountability has become a buzzword in the development agenda. Even though evidence of its impact remains weak, the underlying assumption is that accountability will result in empowerment, improved quality of democratic governance, and development effectiveness. It is therefore a crucial issue for Mozambique, where good governance is widely seen as one of the biggest challenges in the decentralisation process and poverty reduction strategies.

This case study explores the possible factors that enable or hinder accountability initiatives in Mozambique, focusing on the Governance, Water and Sanitation Programme (PROGOAS) implemented by Helvetas Swiss Intercoperation (HELVETAS) and co-financed by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). It examines how public and social accountability can be promoted in a fragile context in terms of institutional capacity and legitimacy, and looks at the constraints and opportunities encountered by *conselhos consultivos*, a recent and promising institution in Mozambique.

Based on a survey, several interviews, a power analysis and the authors’ personal observations, this study concludes that PROGOAS can advance public accountability at the local level, especially when different approaches, such as capacity building, radio programmes and local governance self-assessments, are combined and developed. However, public accountability is also influenced by other endogenous variables of local governance, such as functionality, representation, participation in decision making and power relations, which can be addressed only partially by programme activities.

No evidence was found that an external actor such as PROGOAS can contribute in the short run to the emergence of sustainable initiatives that manifest themselves through *conselhos consultivos*. The programme can sow seeds and create a fertile ground, especially through capacity development and dissemination of information. But local civil society is still too fragmented, weak and aid dependent to play an autonomous role. It is therefore likely that citizens will create new political spaces and adopt new forms of power only as a result of increasing decentralisation, public accountability and local development.

For this reason, it is suggested that INGOs and national NGOs should play a supporting role at all levels of the political system, creating an enabling environment for accountability from the bottom to the top. In particular, they should embody accountability throughout planning, implementation and monitoring processes by sharing information, knowledge and opinions with stakeholders, beneficiaries and the general public; they should strengthen local organisations and their capacity to hold local authorities more accountable; sensitise local authorities by emphasising incentives for accountability; they should provide an informational bridge between the district level and provincial and national levels; and they should promote institutional change at the centre towards more political, administrative and financial decentralisation.

**Keywords:** accountability, local governance, democratisation, decentralisation, civil society, participation, empowerment, clientelism
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Abbreviations

AMA  Associação para o Meio Ambiente
AWEPA  Association of European Parliamentarians with Africa
CDC  Community Development Council
CIP  Centre for Public Integrity
CSO  Civil Society Organisation
DFID  Department for International Development (UK)
FDD  District Development Fund
Frelimo  Mozambique Liberation Front (*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*)
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
GoM  Government of Mozambique
HELVETAS  Helvetas Swiss Intercooperation
IDS  Institute of Development Studies
INGO  International Non-Governmental Organisation
IPCC  Institutions for Community Participation and Consultation
CC  *Conselho Consultivo*
LOLE  Local State Organs Law
MAE  Ministry of Public Administration
MDGs  Millennium Development Goals
MDM  Democratic Movement of Mozambique (*Movimento Democrático de Moçambique*)
MPD  Ministry of Planning and Development
NGOs  Non-Governmental Organisations
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OLIPA-ODES  *Organização para o Desenvolvimento Sustentável*
PESOD  *Plano Económico, Social e Orçamento do Distrito*
PNPFD  *Programa Nacional de Planificação e Finanças Descentralizadas*
PROGOAS  Governance, Water and Sanitation Programme
PROL  *Programa de Reforma dos Órgãos Locais*
Citizen members of the District participatory conselho consultivo of Ancuabe (Cabo Delgado) during a local governance self-assessment meeting in May 2011, photo by Marco Faenhdrich
1 Introduction

Accountability has recently become a buzzword in international cooperation aiming to tackle issues such as aid ineffectiveness, poor service delivery, corruption and more general shortfalls in democracy. It has been pursued not only as a means to ‘development’ in a broad sense, but also as a goal for development actors in addressing the lives of poor and marginalised people. Several developing countries that are simultaneously – if unwillingly – in the ‘third wave’ of democratisation are in some way, at least formally, investing in accountability. National and international state and non-state development actors have implemented or supported accountability as one of the main attributes of democracy (McGee and Gaventa 2010; Diamond 2008; Newell and Wheeler 2006; Malena et al. 2004).

Accountability has also been associated with participation and decentralisation aimed at strengthening democratic governance and service provision.

While public accountability, in democratic contexts, focuses on ‘institutional checks on the power of elected officials, by an independent legislature, court system, and other autonomous agencies’ (Diamond 2008: 22), social accountability focuses more on direct citizens’ actions to hold state actors accountable through various schemes. Development actors advocate for and support social mechanisms of accountability because they believe poor and marginalised people will see their lives improved by state institutions, especially in fragile contexts or states, ‘those failing to provide basic service to poor people because they are unwilling or unable to do so’ (Newell and Wheeler 2006; Malena et al. 2004).

Even though evidence of its impact is mixed, the assumption about accountability in recent years is that it will result in empowerment, improved quality of democratic governance, and development effectiveness. Accountability is believed to be a powerful mechanism to improve both service delivery and people’s lives in general, by exposing and denouncing poor governmental behaviour, activating horizontal accountability and contributing to enforcement of the rule of law (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006; McGee and Gaventa 2010).

This empirical study focuses on the Governance, Water and Sanitation Programme (PROGOAS) implemented by Helvetas Swiss Intercoperation (henceforth HELVETAS), as well as on conselhos consultivos, which have resulted from the decentralisation process taking place in Mozambique. The study seeks to examine how accountability can be promoted in a fragile context in terms of institutional capacity and legitimacy; and under what circumstances can different mechanisms that aim to promote accountability – either as a goal or as a means to better service delivery, empowerment or democratic governance – achieve results.

The paper proceeds as follows: the first section surveys the advent of conselhos consultivos and the status of public and social accountability in Mozambique, distinguishing social accountability, understood as accountability initiatives undertaken by citizens acting relatively autonomously of government, from public accountability, understood as citizens participating, by invitation, in government-created spaces. It briefly presents the whole process of...

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1 A term coined by Samuel P. Huntington for the processes of democratisation started in 1974 with the Carnation Revolution in Portugal, which one year later led to the independence of Mozambique.


3 From the original Portuguese version Programa de Governação, Água e Saneamento.

4 After deliberation we have chosen to use the Portuguese name for these throughout the report. Using the term ‘council’ in an English translation seems likely to connote the most local level of decentralized government, albeit a form of this in which citizen members are included as well as local-level public servants. In fact, and as the following section explains, conselhos consultivos are composed of citizens.
decentralisation starting in the 1990s and ending with districts and conselhos consultivos. The second section provides a theoretical and conceptual framework of accountability at the local level in Mozambique. In the third section, PROGOAS experiences are scrutinised through a survey and interviews. The concluding section addresses some general considerations, focusing on the main findings related to the research question and accountability initiatives in fragile contexts.

2 Conselhos consultivos and the advent of accountability in Mozambique

2.1 Decentralisation or re-centralisation?

The justification for ‘Transparency and Accountability Initiatives’ (TAIs) among development actors is that they improve levels of corruption, democratic governance, development effectiveness, service provision, and empowerment. Confident of this, national and international state and non-state actors have been investing in accountability in general, and most recently in social accountability. Such TAIs take place especially in the global South where fragile undemocratic states or contexts predominate. In recent decades, some of these fragile contexts willingly or unwillingly have been experiencing the ‘third wave’ of democratisation. Some TAIs can be considered an integral part of this process. Mozambique is no exception and this section describes its context, which, for the purpose of this study, cannot be detached from the decentralisation process.

From the perspective of new-institutionalism\(^5\), the evolution of accountability at the local level in Mozambique is closely linked to national reforms. This does not mean that we shall neglect other processes, events and actors. Even though this study’s focus on institutions pays special attention to decentralisation, the evolution of accountability in the country should not be confused with the history of decentralisation. Thus, though this case study does not focus on all actors, it is important to mention that the media, civil society organisations (CSOs), political parties, trade unions, international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and bi- and multi-lateral donors are all relevant to both public and social accountability in Mozambique. All these actors influence accountability processes in socio-economic, political or development spheres within different roles and through diverse tools including voice, advocacy, lobbying, and financial resources.

CSOs mostly rely on donor funding. Despite their dependent financial status, national CSOs and movements, as well as international TAIs, appear to be responsible for holding the government accountable in the provision of public services and in ensuring the efficient management of public resources. However, these organisations lack capacity and resources, which can be illustrated by the approximately 50 per cent of state budget supported by donors. Watchdog media, which is vital for accountability although it has lower coverage than state-aligned media (DFID 2008), also faces economic and technical capacity limitations.

Looking at the democratisation process from a macro-perspective, in the last decade governance indicators in Mozambique have remained relatively stable in the bottom half of Worldwide Governance Indicators\(^6\). Political stability is perceived to have improved more than other dimensions such as voice and accountability. The Ibrahim Index of African Governance shows a similar situation of overall stability accompanied by deterioration in

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\(^5\) A key assumption is that ‘institutional arrangements can prescribe and proscribe, speed up and delay change: and a key to understanding the dynamics of change is a clarification of the role of institutions within standard processes of change’ (March and Olsen 2005: 13).

accountability\(^7\). Despite the democratisation and poverty reduction efforts of the past two
decades, Mozambique remains one of the most corrupt and poorest countries in the world,
with a rank of 120 in transparency\(^8\); a Human Development Index value of 0.3229 in 2011;
and a GDP rank of 172 (UNDP 2009).

The country has been experiencing several socio-political and economic transformations
under the umbrella of the ‘third wave’ of democratisation and poverty reduction strategies.
The first milestone that formally brought profound institutional reforms occurred in 1990 with
the liberal and democratic Constitution. The General Peace Agreement, which ended 16
years of armed conflict, was reached in 1992, followed by the first multiparty elections in
1994. In parallel to these transformations, national and international state and non-state
actors have been investing in poverty reduction strategies\(^10\), albeit with limited results evident
in Mozambique’s UNDP rank.

In addition to socio-political events, constitutional reforms in 1990 and 2004 have meant
changes in local governance structures. Before multiparty elections in 1994, the still one-
party Parliament passed Law 3/94 that defined 23 urban and 128 rural municipal districts.
This law\(^11\), however, and the Programa de Reforma dos Órgãos Locais (PROL)\(^12\) were never
implemented. These were replaced by Law 2/97, which has gradually established urban
municipalities only (Mangueira 2008). According to Do Rosário (2011), this change reflected
the results of the first general elections. Indeed, Frelimo, the ruling party, with a majority in
the Assembleia da República after the 1994 elections, had won in urban centres, while
Renamo, the main opposition party, had been greatly supported in rural areas. Frelimo could
not accept a decentralisation process that would lead to loss of power. As Buur (2007: 3)
argues, ‘more significant for the Frelimo government [was to ensure] that the Frelimo-state
and political regime [did] not lose their de facto but highly insecure hegemonic status’.

In practice, decentralisation started in 1991 when it became necessary at the district and
provincial levels to replace the moribund one-party Assembleias do Povo, that would
disappear in the spirit of plurality established in the 1990 Constitution and extended by the
1992 Peace Agreement. These power dynamics forced the government to draft the PROL in
1994, which, as mentioned above, would later be occluded by the results of the first
multiparty elections. However, Law 2/97 that followed was problematic in that it eliminated
rural municipal districts and introduced autarquias locais (essentially, municipalities) that
have gradually been established only in urban centres.

In response to these problematic legislative changes, the opposition, especially Renamo,
boycotted the first municipal elections that took place in 33 cities and small towns in 1998. In
2003, the second local multiparty elections took place and the opposition won 5 out of the 33
municipalities, in addition to some seats in the 33 municipal assemblies (Mangueira 2008).
The consolidation of democracy could at least formally be perceived at the local level, with
diverse forms of accountability taking place both at the national level and in the 33
municipalities. Furthermore, the rest of the territory started experiencing the impact of a two-
pronged decentralisation process: devolution in municipalities and deconcentration in
provinces and districts. The former refers to the ‘transfer of funds and powers – including
decision-making powers, and sometimes revenue-raising powers – from higher levels in

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\(^7\) See http://www.moiibrahimfoundation.org/mozambique/ (accessed on October 17, 2012).

\(^8\) Transparency International, accessed on 27 January 2012 from

\(^9\) United Nations Development Programme, accessed on 27 January 2012, from

\(^10\) These include the government Planos de Acção para a Redução da Pobreza Absoluta, namely, PARPA I (2001-2005),
PARP A II (2006-2009), PARPA (2010-2014), and policies aligned to these official plans.

\(^11\) Known as Lei dos distritos municipais.

\(^12\) Local state organs law in 2003 (Law 8/2003), which allocated more competencies to the sub-national levels (provinces and
districts) and created mechanisms for citizen participation in local governance, in the form of ‘conselhos consultivos’.
political systems to elected bodies at lower levels’, the latter to ‘the transfer of administrative powers, and sometimes administrative personnel, from higher to lower levels in political systems’ (Manor 2009).

Devolution, as Pereira\(^{13}\) argues, allows civil society actors limited engagement in TAs in municipalities. Initially the impacts were generally positive, particularly in relation to service provision and the capacity to generate revenue locally in the context of a highly centralised state and limited fiscal devolution (Linder 2009: 25). Formal elections also resulted in some victories for Renamo, which won the presidency in 5 municipalities (Beira, Angoche, Ilha de Moçambique, Nacala Porto and Marromeu) in the 2003 elections. More recently, the Democratic Movement of Mozambique\(^{14}\), an emerging opposition party, was successful and now holds the presidency in Beira and Quelimane.

Deconcentration, in which \textit{conselhos consultivos} were involved, also appeared to start opening some spaces for civil society, even though – contrary to the law – the process became more political than developmental. The ‘gradualist’ approach\(^{15}\) adopted affects deconcentration by tending to keep districts in the deconcentration process even if their progress suggests the prospect of devolution. In fact, while the Frelimo government alleges lack of capacity, implementation, sequencing, and immaturity of the electorate as the underlying arguments for the gradualist approach (Buur 2008), some authors, such as Do Rosário and Mangueira, see gradualism as a political tool used to consolidate the dominance of the ruling party.

2.2 Embryonic institutions and challenges at the local level

In the districts, often defined by president Armando Guebuza as the country’s ‘nubs of development’\(^{16}\), the high point of the decentralisation process was the establishment of \textit{Instituições de Participação e Consulta Comunitária} (IPCCs)\(^{17}\), commonly known as \textit{conselhos consultivos} (CCs), community development councils and local forums. Their creation started in Cabo Delgado, Manica, Nampula and Sofala, and was led by the GoM, donors and NGOs such as SNV. They were later institutionalised by the \textit{Lei dos Órgãos Locais} (LOLE) in 2003 and its regulation in 2005, Law 8/2003 (MOZ 2003) and Decree 11/2005 (MOZ 2005) (Mangueira 2008). The main objective with CCs is to establish a public administration for development. They are based on a process through which citizens participate in and influence decision making for development. While deconcentration focuses on provinces and districts, CCs were institutionalised only for the district and lower levels, namely \textit{posto administrativo}, \textit{localidade} and \textit{povoação}\(^{19}\). Each level must have its own CC, but lower levels must be represented in the subsequent higher layer in order to relay their interests and needs.

\(^{13}\) See interview in weekly ‘Savana’, 16 February, 2012, pages 16-19. João Pereira is the Director of the Civil Society Support Mechanism (\textit{Mecanismo de Apoio à Sociedade Civil}, or MASC), a large donor-funded programme which aims to improve governance and accountability to Mozambican citizens by strengthening civil society organisations.

\(^{14}\) MDM (Movimento Democrático de Moçambique).

\(^{15}\) Gradualism means a decentralisation process implemented step-by-step, with administrative reforms preceding political and financial transfers, and extending more and more to a larger geographical area, with an increasing number of urban municipalities (now 43). This led to a two-speed decentralization in Mozambique (see also Faehndrich 2012: 5).

\(^{16}\) Polo de desenvolvimento.

\(^{17}\) Institutions for Community Participation and Consultation.

\(^{18}\) Law for Local State Organs.

\(^{19}\) Administrative Post, Locality and Village. At this last layer, however, the institutionalisation of CCs is still only beginning.
According to guidelines published in the Diploma Ministerial No. 67/2009 (MOZ 2009), the highest state representative at the local level, the district administrator, ‘is responsible for the institutionalisation of the Conselho consultivo of the District and lower levels’ (art. 7.2) and CCs are guided by principles such as participation, diversity, equality, transparency, justice and representation. Some of these principles are discussed later in this paper as variables that can influence or be influenced by the PROGOAS intervention. In terms of accountability, the guidelines establish that CCs must regularly meet with local communities and inform them about the implementation of planned activities\(^\text{20}\) and other projects planned for each specific layer (MOZ 2009: art. 33). While it is the right of CC members to be informed about decisions taken at the higher level, it is also their duty to regularly inform communities about government plans and programmes and their degree of implementation. Another task of CCs is to collect and send opinions and community concerns about public service provision and the quality of governance to the relevant authorities (MOZ 2009: art. 35).

\(^{20}\) PESOD – Plano Econômico e Social do Distrito (District Economic and Social Plan) – is the official document for government activities at the district and lower levels.
As a component of the deconcentration process CCs bring challenges and opportunities, as well as some weaknesses and fragilities. For example, the ‘Seven Million Meticas’ development fund (FDD\textsuperscript{21}), which in some cases has been diverting the roles and tasks of CCs, can also be used as an entry point for accountability initiatives (DFID 2010; Nhantumbo 2011). Contrary to what would be expected from deconcentration processes and the principle of participation, however, CCs are not assigned any decision-making powers, except in the approval of FDD projects. The role of CCs is to give recommendations to government representatives, public officials and other local authorities (which are also members of the CC) regarding issues of interest to their communities; decisions are made by the district administrator and the chiefs of posto administrativo, localidade and povoação, taking into account the recommendations of the respective CC (MOZ 2009). In other words, IPCCs operate more consultatively than deliberatively, echoing the context of deconcentration. CCs are nonetheless granted powers to monitor local development plans, even though the related article\textsuperscript{22} is not very clear and formal supervision of local executives is the remit of the Ministry of State Administration and the Ministry of Finance. The vagueness of the legislation has been exploited by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and donors as an entry point for advancing accountability at the local level, despite the fact that the legislation is clear that the focus of CC activity should be to foster the participation of the citizens and interaction between communities and the state. For that purpose, citizens’ activities were also structured through local forums, community committees and community funds, although their role was similarly not clearly defined.

\textit{Conselhos consultivos} should be composed of civil society members\textsuperscript{23} chosen by local communities. The district administrator and posto administrativo, localidade and povoação chiefs can also suggest influential civil society members, although they have no right to vote. Community leaders, women and young people should represent 40, 30 and 20 per cent of CC members respectively, following the principle of diversity (MOZ 2009). Practice, however, contradicts this principle. While in some situations there is a trend towards increasing democracy with CC members being elected, in other cases the process is still blurred. Data collected reveal several complaints that members of CCs are not chosen by community members, but appointed by district administrators and chiefs at the lower levels. This political separation of citizens and public officials, especially in a political environment characterised by the ubiquity of Frelimo and its political interests, suggests that public and social accountability initiatives are ineffective. Moreover if CCs members represent the interests of higher-level public managers – where power and resources originate – the aim and tasks of CCs can easily be left unfulfilled.

Most recently Law 5/2007 was approved, establishing provincial assemblies, which operate between national and district levels. This law complements LOLE, which, in addition to setting up IPCCs, established the representation of other state organs, namely ministries, at the provincial level (Mangueira 2008) and sealed the hierarchy of the deconcentration scheme. This study, however, focuses on district and sub-district levels, reflecting the ‘comprehensive system of local government […] which has resulted in] institutional fragility and geographical gaps’ (Bratton 2010: 3).

As it has been argued, both devolution and deconcentration aim to bring elected and appointed power holders closer to citizens and to make them responsive to citizens’ needs and priorities. While power holders represent citizens, it is assumed that communities know and understand their problems, and so should participate in local governance. This includes monitoring both the implementation of public policies and the extent to which power holders

\textsuperscript{21} Fundo de Desenvolvimento Distrital.

\textsuperscript{22} MOZ 2009, Art 35 2d: ‘Participar no processo de preparação, implementação e controlo dos planos estratégicos provinciais e planos distritais de desenvolvimento, e apreciar relatórios sobre a planificação, destacando a qualidade de participação das comunidades locais e dos grupos de interesse do distrito no geral’. (italics by the authors).

\textsuperscript{23} Their size varies between a maximum of 50 members (District level) and minimum of 10 (Locality level) (art. 21, MOZ 2009).
are complying with their responsibilities, and redistributing public resources transparently and equally. Citizens should not only wait for the next election to express their satisfaction or disappointment with elected or even appointed power holders. Thus TAs, especially in fragile contexts, are to be examined and supported.

Although the institutional transformations that have taken place in Mozambique in the last two decades are deep-seated, both theoretically and legally, their impact seems insignificant. Forquilha and Orre (2011), for instance, call these ‘transformations without changes’ because they do not see substantial changes in the way the institutions function. Instead of the pre-1990 one-party state, the country is currently experiencing a dominant party system in which the state has been captured by the ruling party. The way local state organs work reflects this system. In addition, for Forquilha and Orre (2011: 51), ‘representation within Conselhos consultivos is filtered by the party relationship that is developed with the ruling party’. If Frelimo makes participation, inclusion and involvement in a decision-making process conditional on party affiliation and accentuates exclusion and intolerance, biases in accountability can be anticipated. Another concern is the clientelist relationships between members of the local administration and community leaders, who receive recognition, uniforms and subsidies from the state (Forquilha 2008): as a result, community leaders are often more interested in doing favours for their powerful allies than representing the interests of their communities, especially during electoral periods. This political and institutional scenario is aggravated by poor education, the absence of either a national decentralisation policy or law on access to information, and the bypass of local authorities by the ‘open and inclusive presidency’. These fragilities require examination of factors that shape the actions of civil society in accountability initiatives, such as those supported by PROGOAS.

This scenario depicts Mozambique as a fragile environment, in addition to the institutional fragility suggested by Bratton (2010: 6) and, to some extent, confirmed by Forquilha and Orre (2011). As seen above, the OECD categorises fragile states as ‘those failing to provide basic service to poor people because they are unwilling or unable to do so’. USAID brings additional components to distinguish between fragile states that are vulnerable and those that are already in crisis. Mozambique would fit into the first category, according to the criteria that a state is fragile and vulnerable if it is ‘unable or unwilling to adequately assure the provision of security and basic services to significant portions of their populations and where legitimacy of the government is in question’ (USAID 2005: 1). In Stewart and Brown’s definition of fragile states (2010: 6), Mozambique is characterised by service and legitimacy failures, but not by authority failures, since the state has a monopoly on power to protect its citizens from violence of various kinds.

2.3 Accountability for effective service delivery: PROGOAS in northern Mozambique

HELVETAS, engaged in the Mozambican political and socio-economic scenario, has been promoting the participation of rural communities in local governance and other development initiatives. Through an SDC mandate, HELVETAS and its partners implemented a four year programme, the Rural Development Programme (RDP) 2005-2008 in the northern provinces of Cabo Delgado and Nampula. Drawing on lessons learned from an external evaluation of this programme and HELVETAS’ long-standing experience of implementing water and sanitation programmes in Cabo Delgado, the Governance, Water and Sanitation Programme

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24 The right of citizens to information has been enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic since 1990, having been turned into a fundamental right in 2004, together with the freedom of expression and of the press (MOZ 2004: art. 48, 1). However, it has never been regulated in a specific law: The Press Law stipulates, in article 2, the free access of journalists to sources of information, but there are no regulations making explicit how this access is to be obtained. Furthermore, art. 29 mentions access to official sources of information, but prevents access to what it calls ‘state secrets’, or to other kinds of information for ‘imperatives of foreign policy and of national defence’ (AfriMAP 2009: 59-60).

25 The two-edged consequences on accountability of the visits of the Mozambican president in the districts have been studied in a research project from the German Development Institute (see http://www.die-gdi.de).
(PROGOAS) was designed. If larger portions of the rural population were to participate in the decision-making process and district development, it was recommended, the focus should be ‘on lower level[s], promoting capacity building at the community level, and enabling Community Development Committee members to join the conselhos consultivos’ (HELVETAS 2011). This approach would be combined with HELVETAS’ experiences in the water sector, as well as the new National Water Policy (Política Nacional da Água) and the Programa Nacional de Planificação e Finanças Descentralizadas (PNPFD), which in 1999 began working alongside conselhos consultivos in Nampula (Macuane et al 2010: 28).

As in some other interventions – such as those of SNV and ActionAid – HELVETAS aimed to build the capacity of civil society, ‘based on the assumption that low capacity leads to lack of participation’ (DFID 2008: ix). This lack of capacity was an argument for gradualism in the decentralisation process, as mentioned before. The SDC Cooperation Strategy for Mozambique therefore envisioned, among other objectives, supporting local administrations to develop technical and administrative capacities and improve social infrastructure, and supporting civil society to develop innovative capacities in social accountability and monitoring governance. PROGOAS I (2009-2011) expected two outcomes:

Rural citizens are organized and participate actively and in a well-informed manner in transparent consultation and decision-making processes which enhance, – on one hand self-reliant strategies at community level and, – on the other hand the effectiveness of the decentralized planning, implementation and financing of water and sanitation sector activities; (EMPOWERMENT) (HELVETAS 2008: 7)

And,

District governments, the local private sector and the communities provide and manage rural water and sanitation services assuming gradually their role and responsibilities in maintaining and extending service coverage, and – when required – seeking alternative solutions. (SERVICE DELIVERY) (Ibid)

PROGOAS has been implemented since 2009 in eight districts of Cabo Delgado (Ancuabe, Chiure, Macomia and Mecufi) and Nampula (Erati, Mecuburi, Muecate and Nacaroa) provinces, aiming to improve governance and service provision through their combination in rural areas where deconcentration has been taking place and where conselhos consultivos have been increasingly gaining space. Using a technical sector such as Water and Sanitation (WATSAN) as an entry point for a crosscutting issue such as governance was the programme’s main innovation. HELVETAS has implemented the programme – including a package of support strategies – directly, along with local partner organisations in some districts (AMA in Cabo Delgado province and OLIPA in Nampula province). On the one hand, institutional support to district departments and financial support to district water infrastructure budgets were intended to improve the ‘supply side’ of local governance; on the other, capacity development of partner organisations, communities and local civil society was intended to strengthen the ‘demand side’ in the development process.

In this context, CCs, even if not the focal point of the programme, played a central role as the institutionally legitimated space for representatives of the government and civil society to meet, discuss and interact. CCs became an entry point for promoting participation and accountability at the local level and to assess the impact of PROGOAS in supporting capacity development. This capacity development was mainly achieved through capacity building, radio programmes, and local governance self-assessments.
Capacity-building activities included six training modules and a trainer manual for each module\textsuperscript{26}. Their themes were: (1) leadership and conflict management; (2) decentralised planning; (3) monitoring and evaluation; (4) gender and local governance; (5) self-assessment on governance; and (6) management of natural resources. Capacity building was primarily addressed to community organisations known as Conselhos de Desenvolvimento Comunitário (CDCs) and their representatives in the 
\textit{conselhos consultivos}, as well as traditional local authorities. To increase the impact and sustainability of these modules, CDCs were grouped into micro-regions, consisting of a couple of CDCs, and a cascade training mode was adopted: PROGOAS staff trained \textit{animadores} who train CDCs. Local advisors or assessors were introduced in 2011 to support the \textit{animadores}. Assessors were members of a CDC with particular knowledge and skills, responsible for ensuring that CDCs functioned well once capacity building was completed (PROGOAS 2011: 11-12).

Radio programmes were connected to this capacity building and were used to disseminate information and best practices on governance as well as on water and sanitation. Programmes were developed in collaboration with CDCs, CCs and local or community radio stations. Radio programmes included debates, question and answer sessions with radio listeners and live community sessions. Feedback from radio listeners was used to improve programmes and their content (PROGOAS 2011:14).

Local governance self-assessments\textsuperscript{27} were introduced by HELVETAS in 2010 in six district CCs: Ancuabe, Chiure, Macomia, Mecufi, Muecate, and Nacaroa. During this exercise, district \textit{conselho consultivo} members assessed satisfaction with their performance in local governance (including functionality, participation and access to information) and service provision (especially in water and sanitation) with a scorecard that was discussed by two groups: civil society members and government representatives. These groups jointly presented and discussed their results, agreeing on an action plan to improve their performance. In Ancuabe and Macomia this exercise was also practiced at the community level.

3 The fertile ground for accountability initiatives

3.1 The different faces of accountability

Capacity building, radio programmes and local governance self-assessments are all activities linked to accountability, which is widely seen as a powerful instrument to improve democratic governance. This study seeks to deepen our understanding of the factors that enable accountability initiatives to be successful. Evidence of the effectiveness of initiatives in this field is still weak, leading donors to call increasingly for a more robust knowledge- and evidence-based agenda (McGee and Gaventa 2010: 49). This is also the case in Mozambique, where in the past decade increased support for democratic governance, especially from donors as the United Kingdom, Germany, the United States, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, has expanded space for accountability.

Before presenting the conceptual framework for the empirical work undertaken, this section will briefly review the theoretical discussion of the concept of accountability – a relatively recent development term with different faces, accompanied by other polysemic terms such as voice and transparency. Without a clear understanding of the concept, there is a risk that ‘the more talk there is of the importance of voice and accountability, the less these terms

\textsuperscript{26} Parallel literacy courses for adults were also organised.

\textsuperscript{27} This tool was originally introduced in Bangladesh. For an illustrative explanation of this methodology, see http://www.eldis.org/assets/Docs/44589.html (accessed the 17 October 2012).
seem to mean, and the less relevance they appear to have for disadvantaged people’ (Goetz and Jenkins 2005: 8).

A big push to the discourse of accountability came in 2001 when the World Development Report and the World Bank’s empowerment framework recognised ‘accountability’ as an integral component of ‘empowerment’ and hence poverty reduction, and thereafter integrated accountability in its Social Development Strategy (Malena et al. 2004). By then, the concept was not new. It was always somehow implicit in political-philosophical theories about the legitimation of power and established itself on the development agenda through the new democratic consensus after the fall of the Iron Curtain. However, distinct and often ambiguous translations in different languages demonstrate that the concept is not at all clear. It is even more important for research to clarify what is meant (or signified, as ‘the father of modern linguistics’, Ferdinand de Saussure, would say) by the word/signifier ‘accountability’.

Many research institutions and organisations such as HELVETAS define accountability as the obligation of power holders to take responsibility and to be answerable and liable with regard to their actions and choices. Power holders refer to those who hold political, financial or other forms of power, usually governments, CSOs and market actors. Two components are often quoted as essential: (1) answerability, the right of the people to get a response (such as an explanation or justification) and the duty of the power holders to provide it; and (2) enforceability, the capacity to ensure that an action is taken through access to mechanisms (including sanctions or incentives) for redress when accountability fails (Newell and Wheeler 2006).

Formal accountability is therefore a relationship where the less powerful ‘principal’ holds the more powerful ‘agent’ to account (Goetz and Jenkins 2005: 8). If a state actor is involved in these power relations, we are speaking of public accountability, which is specifically about the spending of public resources, the implementation of public duties and responsibilities that serve the public. It is thus governments that are accountable to citizens for all the actions and decisions taken.

Downward accountability obliges power holders (which includes NGOs) to be accountable to the people (for example, stakeholder communities or participants). If the power holder is a government agency or an organisation managing local public resources, then downward accountability overlaps with public accountability. Upward accountability refers to an inverse, bottom up accountability, where lower level government actors account for their responsibilities or duties to power holders higher in the hierarchy (for instance, from a district administrator to the provincial governor).

A distinction is often made between horizontal and vertical accountability. Horizontal accountability implies the existence of institutional or intrastate oversight and checks and balances. This can happen through: (1) political mechanisms (for example, constitutional constraints, separation of powers, the legislature and legislative investigative commissions); (2) fiscal mechanisms (for example, formal systems of auditing and financial accounting); (3) administrative mechanisms (for example, hierarchical reporting, norms of public sector probity, public service codes of conduct, rules and procedures regarding transparency and public oversight), and (4) legal mechanisms (for example, corruption control agencies, ombudsmen and the judiciary) (Goetz and Gaventa 2001: 7).

28 For example, ‘responsabilização’ and ‘prestação de contas’ in Portuguese, ‘redevabilité’ in French, ‘responsabilità’ in Italian or ‘Verantwortlichkeit und Rechenschaftspflicht’ in German.
Vertical accountability initiatives are external mechanisms used by non-state actors to hold power holders accountable. In liberal democracies this happens through elections in particular, which regularly allow for answerability (for instance during election campaigns, when voters can ask questions and politicians normally have to answer) and/or enforceability (such as when voters can sanction politicians by withdrawing their support). Besides elections, media and civil society can put pressure on power holders by monitoring and judging their activities, exposing government wrongdoing, and sometimes activating the operations of horizontal agencies (Malena et al. 2004, Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006, Goetz and Gaventa 2001).

This kind of demand-driven action is a form of social accountability, an approach towards building accountability that relies on civic engagement; in other words, a process in which ordinary citizens, civil society and/or media organisations participate directly or indirectly in exacting the accountability of and control over political authorities. In Mozambique, this was enacted recently when Luis Mondlane, the Chairperson of Mozambique’s Constitutional Council, the country’s highest body in matters of constitutional and electoral law, announced his resignation on 17 March 2011. Mondlane was under immense public pressure to stand down following accusations in the press of corrupt and illegal behaviour, including using the Constitutional Council budget to pay off personal bills.30

Theoretically, social accountability has three main impacts on development – although they have to be tested empirically in each context and case: (1) it can lead to empowerment by fostering the quality of citizen participation in politics; (2) it can improve the quality of democratic governance by including people’s demands in the political process and raising the symbolic and actual costs of improper political behaviour; and (3) it can contribute to development effectiveness by improving the provision of services (Malena et al. 2004: 5). In this case study we are not going to analyse these correlations. Instead, we assume that overall accountability has a positive impact on the life of citizens.

3.2 Conselhos consultivos in Mozambique: seeds for accountability?

As mentioned above, a challenging political space for accountability in Mozambique is the conselhos consultivos, established in the process of deconcentration as catalysts for the wellbeing of rural communities. CCs are supposed to propose, discuss and give opinions on government policies at the local level, and subsequently materialise popular participation on a wide range of issues, especially those related to the district development plans that district governments have to elaborate, submit to upper levels, and implement (AfriMAP 2009: 145).

CCs can be considered an embryonic system of public accountability, since they are enshrined in the legislation primarily as consultative bodies to exchange information and opinions. However, as we observe above, they also have the scope to monitor the implementation of local plans and to influence the (re)distribution of the FDD. Furthermore, CCs can, since they were established to improve community participation in decision making and to foster dialogue between local administrations and civil society representatives, be used as an institutional forum to give voice to incipient forms of social or vertical accountability.

There are doubts about the effectiveness of the conselhos consultivos members, however: specifically their ability to hold local administrations accountable. A lack of independence, of education, of the capacity to influence the dominant party and of access to information are factors that can – and do – hinder their effective monitoring of local governance. A DFID evaluation report identifies several underlying causes of members’ lack of effectiveness (2008: 9): their representativeness is disputable, they lack legitimacy from citizens and are

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not necessarily accountable to them; their positions are based on a top-down centralist model where there is considerable government influence; there are weak links between community-based organisations and government decision-making structures; there is a weak democratic culture due to the relative youth of the democratic system in Mozambique and to the legacy of the previous one-party regime. De facto, there is often only answerability in place and enforceability is very weak, since the local administrations are appointed top down, and feel accountable to the province and the central government. Moreover, the only local mechanism for sanctions is through district prosecutors and local media, which often have very few resources and little capacity.

Given their weak monitoring function and focus on consultation, conselhos consultivos could be seen as an invited political space31 (Gaventa 2006: 26) and a means by which the government can both capture and control civil society protest and avoid external criticism. As Goetz and Jenkins (2001: 379-380) put it, state-led accountability systems like these are unproductive because they fail to achieve most of the five conditions of effective state–citizen co-operation for improved accountability: legal standing for non-government participants, the regular presence of such outsiders, clear procedures for meetings, the right to information and the right for outsiders to issue a dissenting report to legislative bodies. In these cases,

They give the impression of a government willing to listen, and they inform officials about public perceptions of government behaviour, but they enforce neither an answer from officials, nor impose sanctions for poor performance. By virtue of working with NGOs, these state-initiated programmes give the appearance of blurring the vertical–horizontal distinction. And while the nature of these competing efforts, and the motivations that underlie them are different, their presence nevertheless constrains the ability of the more radical experiments…

(Goetz and Jenkins 2001: 380).

In the case of Mozambique, conselhos consultivos fulfil, at least partially, the first three criteria (legal standing for non-government participants, regular presence of these outsiders, and clear procedures for meetings), so that de jure there is a space for accountability. We analyse this space de facto in the empirical part of the paper. But first we consider the enabling conditions for successful accountability initiatives to prepare the ground for the discussion of PROGOAS interventions.

3.3 Enabling conditions for successful accountability initiatives

Until recently, donors, NGOs and governments working on accountability gave priority to the ‘supply side’ of the concept, in particular to institutional capacity. A recent DFID report underlines that ‘to counterbalance the negative elements of party control, more attention should be given to the strengthening of the ‘demand side’ of the accountability process, helping societal actors to hold political and state actors accountable’ (DFID 2010: 5).

Research has shown that it is important to consider several factors that contribute to the success of accountability initiatives. Peruzzotti and Smulovitz (2006) demonstrate that social accountability has a greater chance of being effective when judicialisation, social mobilisation and ‘mediatisation’ interact. Malena et al. (2004: 4, 12-14) consider political context and culture, access to information, the role of the media, civil society and state capacity, and state-civil society synergy to be critical factors for the success of accountability initiatives. The impact is greatest and most sustainable when social accountability mechanisms are ‘institutionalised’ or when the state’s own internal mechanisms of accountability are rendered more transparent and open to civic engagement. This, then, can lead to what some scholars have termed ‘transversal’, ‘hybrid’ or ‘diagonal’ accountability (Goetz and Jenkins: 2001).

31 Invited spaces are created by governments or other institutions to widen participation and consultation (Gaventa 2006: 26-7).
However, these complex and context-dependent relationships are not easy to generalise from. Transparency, for instance, turns out to be necessary but far from sufficient to produce accountability (McGee and Gaventa 2010). As Fox (2007: 665) explains, ‘if the power of transparency is based on the “power of shame”, then its influence over the really shameless could be quite limited. […] Opaque or fuzzy transparency involves the dissemination of information that does not reveal how institutions actually behave in practice, whether in terms of how they make decisions, or the results of their actions’. In his view, only the capacity to reveal, investigate and produce reliable information enables the right to accountability to be realised.

3.4 Research question and conceptual framework

Given the complexity of relationships between factors that determine the success and progress of accountability, the objective of this explorative study is to examine (i) under which circumstances can PROGOAS’ governance activities contribute to making legally-established spaces of accountability (conselhos consultivos) generate greater public accountability; and (ii) under what circumstances can PROGOAS positively contribute to the establishment of autonomous, citizen-led accountability initiatives inside and beyond these legally-established spaces?

‘Under what circumstances’ refers to several endogenous factors that could influence the outputs and outcomes of PROGOAS’ activities. We are going to look for several factors in our data analysis, but in particular we are going to assess the influence of three core characteristics that are legally anchored in the guidelines of CCs (MOZ 2009) and therefore constitute important normative variables in the CC framework.

1) **Functionality of the conselhos consultivos**: Without minimal infrastructure, it becomes almost impossible for members to work effectively and to hold local administrations accountable. At the same time, accountability could improve the organisation of conselhos consultivos. Articles 22 and 24 of the guidelines clearly define how conselhos consultivos should function and that the district government has to provide funds necessary for the organisation of the meetings, for example guaranteeing transportation, meals and accommodation.

2) **Representation**: If conselhos consultivos are not inclusive and their members are from the same political, geographical or social group, pluralism of voices and opinions as well as accountability will be more difficult. Accountability can also create incentives for broader participation of all interest groups. Articles 12, 13, 14 and 36 of the guidelines clearly define that conselhos consultivos have to be representative of the population and its diversity.

3) **Participation and influence of conselhos consultivos in the decision-making process**: If there are no meetings and the influence of civil society is low, it is difficult to promote accountability through conselhos consultivos. Similarly, better participation and greater influence of citizens can motivate champions of accountability. In the guidelines (Articles 38 and 39), participation of conselho consultivo members in meetings is a right as well as a duty. Articles 25 and 26 state that the opinion of the conselhos consultivos has to be taken into consideration by members of the local administration, although it is not binding.

The conceptual diagram below visualises correlations between the different variables. We assume that PROGOAS interventions have a direct impact both on accountability and on the endogenous factors of functionality, representation and participation. Capacity building, radio programmes and local governance self-assessment have a broad scope; the resulting empowerment aims to impact the overall performance of the CC.
At the same time, the accountability and functioning of CCs have an influence on the success of PROGOAS interventions, which would benefit from an enabling environment. As an example: capacity building will not be successful if CCs do not have the resources to meet regularly; it will be more difficult for radio programmes to monitor local governance where accountability is low. Finally, we suppose that accountability and the functioning of the CCs each help the other factor to improve independently from PROGOAS interventions. Better functioning CCs create their own incentives to be more accountable, or make it easier to hold the local administration accountable. Greater accountability also leads to the improved performance of CCs.

Figure 3.1 Visualisation of the conceptual framework

4 Assessing accountability in the *conselhos consultivos*

4.1 Sources of information and biases

In this section the research question and the conceptual framework are tested through an empirical analysis. This case study relied on a literature review as well as primary data from a standardised questionnaire with 57 members of *conselhos consultivos* at district, administrative post and locality level and from semi-structured interviews with five key informants. The literature review comprised academic texts about decentralisation and accountability in Mozambique as well as theoretical and empirical studies about accountability worldwide. The standardised questionnaire included quantitative as well qualitative data and the survey was conducted by six questioners under the supervision of the researchers and PROGOAS staff. Afterwards, the data analysis results were compared with qualitative viewpoints of selected key-informants, interviewed by the researchers.
These combined methods aim to address validity and reliability issues, which in this study are very important because of the applied research approach adopted. The survey and interviews were conducted in name of PROGOAS: this could raise serious confirmation bias, since the interviewed persons could have had an interest in a positive evaluation of the project. However, as the aim of the research was not to make an impact assessment of PROGOAS, but to explore factors enabling and hindering successful accountability initiatives, this bias has proven not to be very relevant. On the contrary, the relationship of trust between PROGOAS and target groups could have contributed to the very open – and also critical – answers the questioner received during the interviews. In any case, to limit the confirmation bias it was clearly stated before the interviews that the intention of the questions was not to evaluate the programme or individuals, and that the answers would be anonymised where possible. In the analysis of the data, we also bypassed the possibility of a confirmation bias by focusing on qualitative information regarding the interaction between the different variables.

Concerning reliability, the fact that questions have been posed by different people in different moments in different places could have raised some problems. The researchers tried to limit this risk by instructing questioners coherently and formulating the questions as clearly as possible, by conducting the survey in the same month and by considering cultural patterns during the data analysis. As in most surveys and interviews, however, the chance that the questioners and researchers had an influence on the respondents can not be excluded completely. Because of that, the findings also are based on a literature review and on personal observations.

4.1.1 Survey with conselho consultivo members

The survey was primarily prepared for a baseline study about the functioning of conselhos consultivos for the programme monitoring of PROGOAS. It was adapted to the research questions of this study in order to have a better understanding of PROGOAS interventions and their linkage with key factors affecting conselhos consultivos such as functionality, representation, participation and accountability. The survey took place in November 2011 in four districts, two (Erati and Nacaroa) in Nampula province and two (Ancuabe and Mecufi) in Cabo Delgado. For each province, the two districts were selected so to include one in which HELVETAS is implementing the programme directly (Nacaroa and Mecufi), and one in which HELVETAS is implementing through a local partner organisation (OLIPA in Erati and AMA in Ancuabe)\(^3\). For each province, a team of three questioners was recruited, instructed and supervised by PROGOAS staff.

In each districts, all members of the CCs who could be found on a specific day in the postos administrativos where PROGOAS is working were asked to participate in the survey. Each person available answered the questionnaire, orally and anonymously, about only one conselho consultivo layer (district, administrative post or locality). Participants who were representatives of the government were asked questions about the level at which they were responsible\(^3\), whereas civil society members (including community leaders) were asked about the highest level of which they were in charge.

Because of geographical, time and availability constraints, the two groups of questioners could speak only with 11-16 members of CCs in each district, equally distributed between members of government and civil society as well as among the three governance layers. Unfortunately the distribution was not gender balanced, mirroring the predominant situation in rural Mozambique (see Table 4.1). Since questioners asked primarily for an objective assessment of the situation, and not for personal opinions, it is possible to assume that the respondents gave a fairly realistic picture of the conselhos consultivos. Nevertheless, the

\(^3\) See Annex 1 for specific information about the four districts.

\(^3\) In each district, three public officials (Conselho Técnico Distrital) responded, each about one level.
sample is not statistically representative and it is therefore not possible to break down the results for an assessment of the functioning or accountability of a single *conselho consultivo*.

**Table 4.1 Overview of the survey, number of respondents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Layer/level of governance</th>
<th>Actor type</th>
<th>Sex</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nacarao</td>
<td>Districts 20</td>
<td>Government 26</td>
<td>Women 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erati</td>
<td>Administrative posts 16</td>
<td>Civil society 31</td>
<td>Men 44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mecufi</td>
<td>Localities 21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ancuabe</td>
<td>Districts 20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**4.1.2 Semi-structured interviews**

Semi-structured interviews assumed a vital role in addressing validity issues and in interpreting survey data. Thus, following the literature review and the analysis of data collected through the survey, the researchers organised and conducted semi-structured interviews with five respondents well informed about PROGOAS activities (two district administrators, one advisor, one project manager and one journalist). It was especially important to understand how PROGOAS interventions had an effect on the accountability of *conselhos consultivos*. Moreover, it had to be checked to what extent the information collected from the previous literature review and the survey represented a real picture and not isolated cases. Here again there was the risk of a confirmation bias. However, the relationship of trust between researchers and interviewees ensured that insider information was gathered and open responses obtained.

**4.2 Operationalisation and data analysis**

The data collection and analysis of this study reflects a theory of change approach built implicitly into the programme, which was sensitive to the individual and collective dimensions of change towards growing public and social accountability: on the individual level, personal transformation and transforming relationships; on the institutional level, transforming collective patterns of action and thinking and transforming structures and procedures (Retolaza 2011: 7). In order to assess individual perceptions about the change processes promoted by PROGOAS interventions, indicators based on the survey questions were created for each variable presented above (see Table 4.2).

Indicators for the endogenous factors of functionality, representation and participation were based on several practical questions regarding access to information, accommodation, transportation, meals and funds. For the accountability variable three indicators were created: one for the public accountability of the CC, assessing its transparency and performance; one for the public accountability of local government, used as a proxy to assess the answerability and enforceability of the relevant government layer; and one for social accountability, exploring citizen-led initiatives to improve local governance. Finally, for each activity of PROGOAS (capacity building, radio programmes and local governance self-assessments) an indicator was constructed to measure how many people participated and had a positive opinion of its effect on accountability. Here the risk of confirmation bias was particularly high, but the fact that respondents could choose between several positive effects contributed to a range of quite differentiated answers.
Table 4.2 Operationalisation of the variables for the survey with CCs members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Functionality</th>
<th>Representation</th>
<th>Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Index score (0-1) measuring if respondents are satisfied with information, transportation, accommodation, meals and funds provided by local administration</td>
<td>Index score (0-1) measuring the inclusion of different social, geographical and political groups (for example, women, people with disabilities, peripheral communities, members of opposition party)</td>
<td>a) days of meetings (survey general part)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b) Index score (0-1) measuring whether respondents see (or do not) a specific high influence of local administration members and community leaders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Remarks
Separate analysis for each district and governance layer, for government representatives and civil society representatives, women and men

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accountability</th>
<th>Accountability Local Government</th>
<th>Social Accountability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicators</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conselho consultivo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index scores (0-1) based on following questions:</td>
<td>Index scores (0-1) based on following questions:</td>
<td>Qualitative analysis of following open question:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3a Are the minutes of the CL finalized and made public to its members after the meetings?</td>
<td>3.5a Do you participate in the planning, implementation and monitoring of the district development plans? (only civil society respondents)</td>
<td>4.3 Which initiatives have been taken by the CC in order to improve local governance?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3b As a member of the CL, do you inform your community about the decisions taken?</td>
<td>3.5b Do you read and use the district plan (PESOD) in order to monitor the implementation of the decisions? (only civil society respondents)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7a Are there committees in the CL?</td>
<td>3.4 Do you implement and monitor the recommendations of the CL? (only government respondents)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7b If yes, do they meet regularly between the sessions?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7c Do the committees render an account of their activities to the CL?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 Do you implement and monitor the recommendations of the CL?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Remarks
Separate analysis for each district and governance layer, for government representatives and civil society representatives, women and men

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capacity Building</th>
<th>Radio</th>
<th>Self-Assessments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicators</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of respondents that participated to PROGOAS capacity building and have a positive opinion about its contribution to public accountability, access to information and monitoring</td>
<td>% of respondents that know about the radio programmes and have a positive opinion about its contribution to public accountability, access to information and monitoring</td>
<td>% of respondents that participated to a local governance self-assessment and have a positive opinion about its contribution to public accountability, access to information and monitoring</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Remarks
Separate analysis for each district and governance layer, for government representatives and civil society representatives, women and men

Index scores have been created in the following way\textsuperscript{34}: for each question, a score from 0 to 2 and a weighting from 1 to 2 was attributed. The score was multiplied by the weighting. Finally, for each variable the realised number of points was divided by the maximum number of points, giving a result between 0 and 1.

Table 4.3 Scoring methodology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scoring for each question</th>
<th>Weighting</th>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 point = legal requirement or PROGOAS objective not fulfilled</td>
<td>Scores for clear legal requirements or important PROGOAS objectives have been multiplied by 2 because of their relevance.</td>
<td>The total number of points for each variable has been divided by the maximal number of points (? answers were not considered), resulting in a score between 0 and 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 point = legal requirement or PROGOAS objective partially fulfilled</td>
<td>2 points = legal requirement or PROGOAS objective fulfilled</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>? = no answer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{34} See Annex 2 for the complete questionnaire (in Portuguese) with relative scores and weighting.
The data have been aggregated in order to have comparable indices for each variable in each district. The analysis first looks at the survey, identifies main findings and then interprets them through interviews with the key informants. Finally, the analysis is complemented with the authors' personal observations in Muecate, Mecufi and Ancuabe, where they had the opportunity to participate in at least one day of a conseilho consultivo meeting in 2011. To facilitate interpretation of the data, John Gaventa’s power cube (2006: 25, see Figure 4.1 below) was used, including the dimensions of level (global, national or local), spaces (closed, invited and claimed/created) and form (visible, hidden and invisible). The ‘levels’ dimension of the cube refers to differing layers of decision making and authority held on a vertical scale; the ‘forms’ dimension refers to the ways in which power manifests itself; the ‘spaces’ dimension refers to potential arenas for participation and action. The power cube was used to analyse the power relations inside conselhos consultivos and to interpret and systemise the data in order to make some general recommendations.

**Figure 4.1 The power cube**


5 Findings

This section presents the main findings of the empirical analysis, starting with the endogenous factors, followed by public and social accountability, and ending with PROGOAS’s contribution. For each component of the conceptual framework, the analysis consisted of a description of the survey data and an interpretation based on the interviews. This section concludes with a power analysis of conselhos consultivos based on the authors’ personal observations in the field.

5.1 Endogenous factors

In contrast to what was expected from the literature review, the effectiveness of the four CCs under examination seems quite good, except for functionality. All the districts score lower than 0.7 on the functionality indicator; most members, especially civil society representatives, complain about problems in transportation and access to information. The representation of different groups is not seen as a problem, and only in Mecufi did some members remark that people with disabilities are not represented. For this indicator, however, a selection bias has to be taken into account, since potentially excluded citizens have not been questioned. Concerning participation, there is a slight difference of half a day of meeting time between
districts in Nampula (Erati and Nacaroa) and Cabo Delgado (Ancuabe and Mecufi). This could be due to a later schedule of the second ordinary meeting of the year. If one looks at influence in decision making, there is no systematic difference between the two provinces. Mecufi appears to be the most influential CC of the sample.

Table 5.1 Survey data analysis for endogenous factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Nacaroa (n=15)</th>
<th>Erati (n=11)</th>
<th>Mecufi (n=16)</th>
<th>Ancuabe (n=15)</th>
<th>Average (n=57)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Functionality</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation</td>
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<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: the best scores for each indicator are in bold, the worst scores in italics.

Qualitative data appear to support quantitative data: CCs face financial limitations that, according to the interviewees, affect organisation. While transportation, food, accommodation, invitation of members, and the distribution of minutes are important issues for which the government is responsible, there is a generalised claim that the lack of resources affects the organisation of groups and creates a sense of frustration. For one respondent, the situation is worse during extraordinary meetings, which suggests that there is a difficulty in planning for associated unforeseen expenditures.

Another problem identified is that some members cannot participate in meetings because they do not receive invitations on time; sometimes they receive them at the last minute, so they attend the meetings but are not well prepared to discuss agenda items. Minutes are not shared on time and sometimes are just filed at the district level for technical teams. Thus, while technical teams can use them during the planning process, community members have no access to them. In some cases, ‘minutes are elaborated and then read, corrected and approved in the following meeting’, according to an interviewee.

According to one respondent, financial constraints are worsened by those members who expect additional financial benefits besides the regular support, such as fees that are not foreseen in the official plan: ‘district governments have been thinking and requesting the central government to establish a specific budget line for these activities, because currently they only benefit from resources of some other lines.’ As mentioned above, these limitations also affect participation by contributing to the weak circulation of information.

Representation conforms in the qualitative data to the same trend found in the quantitative data. The quotas for representation and the principle of diversity established in legislation are observed in almost all cases. One respondent finds the principle of diversity has been well observed, even though this representation, for him, does not mean participation of all represented groups. He finds that programmes make a positive contribution in promoting women, youth and other groups that have been marginalised in the decision making process. Another interviewee notes that youth and women are often absent or very passive in the process. During the selection process for new conselhos consultivos young members previously appointed were not reconfirmed. This has a negative effects on citizens’ participation and on accountability, since, as observed by a respondent, ‘young people could more easily recall issues or take notes, than the elderly’. From these answers, a mixed picture emerges; it could transpire to be worse if potentially excluded members of civil society were questioned.
5.2 Public accountability

Public accountability presents a lower score in the survey data than representation and participation, but a higher score than the functionality index in all the districts considered. The highest score is in Nacaroa (in bold), and the lowest in Mecufi (in italics). At aggregate level, there is no significant difference between government and civil society members, women and men, and between layers of governance.

Table 5.2 Survey data analysis for public accountability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Accountability</th>
<th>Nacaroa (n=15)</th>
<th>Erati (n=11)</th>
<th>Mecufi (n=16)</th>
<th>Ancuabe (n=15)</th>
<th>Average (n=57)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Index score 0-1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
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<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adm. Post</td>
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<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locality</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: the best scores for each indicator are in bold, the worst scores are in italics.

However, if one looks at the two separate indicators for public accountability (conselho consultivo on the one side, local government on the other), an interesting difference emerges (see Table 5.3). Generally, the conselho consultivo is perceived to be slightly more accountable. Examining the scores of government and civil society representatives, it is clear to note that civil society representatives consider the conselho consultivo to be more accountable, whereas government representatives consider local government more accountable. In the public accountability indicator, differing perceptions of accountability are evident: government representatives give a high score of 0.9 and civil society a relatively low one of 0.6. This could be a result of respondent bias, since the ‘accountability of local government’ could be seen as a performance rating of the district administration and its sub-layers. However, the critical answers that civil society members provide show that collected data provide fairly realistic information about the CCs and raise the question of whether accountability problems have been underestimated.

Table 5.3 Survey data analysis comparing public accountability of conselho consultivo and Local Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Nacaroa (n=15)</th>
<th>Erati (n=11)</th>
<th>Mecufi (n=16)</th>
<th>Ancuabe (n=15)</th>
<th>Average (n=57)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Publ. Accountability</td>
<td>index score 0-1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conselho consultivo</td>
<td>index score 0-1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government</td>
<td>index score 0-1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: the best scores for each indicator are in bold, the worst scores are in italics.

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35 Not available. In Erati, no women members of the conselho consultivo could be interviewed the day of the survey.
Qualitative data clearly challenge quantitative data from the survey. Interviewees report resistance in accountability, especially among district government officials. According to two respondents, district government officials see CC members or CCs in general as actors who do not have the legitimacy to hold them accountable since CCs are consultative and not deliberative or elected organs. This, according to a respondent, causes conflicts between some CC members and district administrations, but still, ‘conselhos consultivos have been the thermometers of governance at the local level’. Ambiguity over roles arises in specific instances in which CCs and district governments have the same competences or where the government depends on the opinions of CC members – as happens when common objectives or harmonised goals are needed in deliberating issues such as the approval of FDD projects.

Public accountability, according to qualitative data, seems to be influenced by history and context. Many people, especially government officials, were accustomed to top-down approaches in planning and upward accountability. The ‘top’ had the right to dictate the rules to the lowest levels. The current approach results in conflicts between CC members and the government.

Before the institutionalisation of the IPCCs, accountability was upwards, and account was only given by government actors from the locality to the district level. Now the process is the other way round, and it involves community representatives. Previously the plan was dictated from the province to the lowest level, but now it is dictated from the lowest to the highest level, that is the reason why accountability should follow the same cycle.

(An interviewee)

5.3 Social accountability

According to survey results, social accountability initiatives in the four districts appear to be very weak or non-existent. When asked what has been done by the conselho consultivo to improve governance at the local level, most interviewees respond by speaking of infrastructure projects, such as building schools and health centres or contributing to water points. In Nacaraoa, however, there appears to be an understanding that good governance is also about improving access to information and monitoring district plans. This could relate to this district’s better performance overall in local governance and accountability. Moreover, in all the districts except Ancuabe at least one person responds that the conselho consultivo is trying to improve communication between communities and state organs.

When asked about social accountability initiatives, key informants reveal that the approach is at an embryonic stage. Informants mention only two initiatives, one supported by SNV and one supported by PROGOAS. One respondent argues that HELVETAS’ direct intervention does not contribute positively to social accountability because it does not lead to autonomous governance where local citizens actively assume the roles they should play. On the other hand, accountability initiatives require capacity and maturity in the citizenry to lead to the improvement of public services. This is important because ‘it is good people that create a good government, not the inverse’, an interviewee says. Another respondent remarks that radio is gradually taking on more autonomous initiatives to monitor local governance: this could be seen as a form of emerging social accountability, even if some programmes are sponsored by external players such as PROGOAS. The presence of journalists who organise debates and interviews in the districts is increasingly welcomed, even by local administrators who are starting to invite journalists to conselho consultivo meetings. One respondent claims that, slowly, the fear of discussing public issues openly is disappearing.
5.4 PROGOAS’ contribution

According to the survey, in all districts the most positive contribution of PROGOAS activities to the accountability of the *conselho consultivo* is perceived to be capacity building. Radio programmes are considered to have a positive contribution only in the province of Nampula. This is likely to be related to the incomplete coverage of these radio programmes across the districts. This is especially the case in Cabo Delgado, where local governance self-assessments are perceived more positively than radio programmes. Ancuabe, which presents the highest score for local governance self-assessment (in bold), is the only district where self-assessment had already taken place twice at district level. This could also result from the substantial coverage of the first self-assessment, which incorporated the implementation of the action plan approved the year before. Erati, where no self-assessment has yet been done, as expected has the lowest score (in italics). Interestingly, Nacaraoa presents a lower score than Mecufi even though both had their first self-assessment last year. This outcome could be due to actions of the facilitators or to other factors that have influenced the exercise or sample.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Nacaraoa (n=15)</th>
<th>Erati (n=11)</th>
<th>Mecufi (n=16)</th>
<th>Ancuabe (n=15)</th>
<th>Average (n=57)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capacity building</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Programmes</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Assessment</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: the best scores for each indicator are in bold, the worst scores are in italics.

Qualitative data regarding PROGOAS’ contribution seems simultaneously to refute and support quantitative survey data. Capacity building is considered to make a significant contribution to accountability in all districts for CCs, and does so indirectly for government officials. One respondent says that, ‘radio programmes have a great contribution where there is radio coverage. In practice, radio programmes are even used, not only for accountability matters promoted by PROGOAS, but also for organisational mechanisms, such as invitations for CC members.’ This affirmation of the contribution of radio programmes is questionable: qualitative data also show that besides low coverage of radio programmes, there are many people without radios, which might affect the programmes’ impact. One interviewee mentions that Nacaraoa has no community radios, but that capacity building has been working. For this reason, as well as improvements in service provision in the water sector, Nacaraoa was a ‘cólera zero’ (cholera-free) district in 2011.

The interviewees consider local governance self-assessment to be a relevant tool. Even though it was at a pilot stage at the time of research, they find it makes a useful contribution to accountability. In Mecufi, for instance, specific positive cases were indicated, including the opportunities to identify and correct mistakes made by government officials, understand the relationship between government and CCs, and clarify their respective responsibilities. There was a case in which the district government ended up explaining to the community why a local road was always under re-construction but constantly having quality problems: ‘Through self-assessment we were able to clarify to the community that we were not responsible for the re-construction of the road that was always under re-construction. The road was under the National Roads Administration.’

5.5 Power cube analysis and triangulation of data

Our observations confirm many of the findings from the survey and interviews, and also give us additional insight about power dynamics inside the *conselhos consultivos*, which affects
their capacity to be spaces of accountability. Concerning powers and responsibilities, it is clear that, despite – or because of – deconcentration, responsibility for several issues still lies at the provincial or central level. The above-mentioned case of road construction in Mecufi is an example. In this instance, local governance self-assessment contributed to transparency and answerability. The local administration also promised to write a letter to the provincial level to ask for the reconstruction of the road. This case shows that there are incentives for the local administration to clarify responsibilities. A centralised context such as Mozambique, where there are no sanctions or social accountability initiatives from civil society, contains the risk that responsibility or blame always gets passed from the local to the central level without any improvements on the ground: a kind of governance ‘buck-passing’. In the end, from citizens’ standpoint it matters little who is responsible for what, since the local administration is the legitimate representative of the central state.

Another example shows how power – in particular, the power to legitimate - remains with the centre. In Ancuabe, the local administrator (a woman with a strong personality) was quite sceptical about the exercise at the beginning of the local governance self-assessment, and jeopardised it through her intimidating and defensive attitude. On the second day she suddenly assumed a more open attitude and participated with more 
élan, explaining that she had seen on television that a similar exercise (the African Peer Review) was taking place at the central level. In this case it is not a matter of responsibilities or competence, but of legitimating power; in either case, power comes from the centre.

The concentration of power is also manifest in the forms of power operating at the local level, where the local administrator represents the centre. In our observations, the power of the local administrator and his staff was evident from the beginning of the meeting, when all members had to stand as the local administrator enters the meeting room. Conselho consultivo members had to stand in front of him (and the image of the President of the Republic of Mozambique, Armando Guebuza, which is always present on the wall) and listen to the minutes of the last meeting read by a public official. According to both survey responses and our observations of meetings, there was seldom a written document available to conselho consultivo members and the agenda of the meeting was agreed upon orally at the beginning of the meeting. The main points were already known and were decided by the district administration, possibly in accordance with a partner organisation such as PROGOAS (as in the case of the local governance self-assessments). These partner organisations therefore have some form of hidden power, which also emerged during the discussion. Whenever partner representatives intervened, their opinions were always listened to very carefully. This was less the case for women and traditional authorities, who were in general quite silent and did not seem to influence the discussions very much, often displaying difficulties in speaking and reading Portuguese36. More influential, at least in Muecate, was the local prosecutor, who warned that ‘corruption is a crime’ during a meeting in which the conselho consultivo had to decide the allocation of FDD funds. As a consequence, some proposals that bypassed normal procedures were refused.

The ‘level’ and ‘form’ dimensions of power have direct implications for the ‘space’ dimension. We used the concept of invited space above when describing the role of conselhos consultivos as a consultative body of the local administrations. Our observations confirm the relevance of description, and illustrate that there are weak signals that civil society is creating new spaces of action, beyond radio and CDCs supported by international organisations. These alternative spaces can be very useful in counter the tendency to ‘pass the buck’ from the local to the national level, as demonstrated by a case observed in the administrative post of Metoro, in the district of Ancuabe. There, civil society members from different villages of the Salaue locality met in a local forum to monitor their performance, as well as that of the district government, through a local governance self-assessment organised by PROGOAS.

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36 The official language in Mozambique, even if conselho consultivo members have the right to express themself in a local language (see art. 30, MOZ 2009).
During the meeting, a member of the forum raised the case of a woman who gave birth outside the health facility and later was taken to the hospital. She didn’t receive appropriate and rapid care at the hospital, which resulted in the loss of her newborn baby. This problem was given priority in the local forum action plan. Two days later, performing the same exercise at the district conselho consultivo, the Salaue representative again raised this problem. Despite the opposition of some local administration members, who claimed that the problem was due to the central level not sending enough medicine, the issue was finally included as a priority in the district action plan. The proposed solution was the organisation of a meeting between the district administrator and health sector employees to discuss performance. This case demonstrates how important are links between political spaces inside and outside state institutions. If the Salaue local forum had not had a representative in at the district layer, the death of the newborn baby and health sector problems would not have become an issue.

Applying a power analysis to our findings makes it clear that the most prevalent levels and forms of power in this context are a big obstacle to the emergence of new spaces of political action. In the absence of a space where civil society can freely discuss as well as influence the decisions of local authorities, the traditional levels and forms of power that characterise the highly centralised political system of rural Mozambique remain intact.

Triangulating our findings from the survey, interviews and power analysis, our empirical analysis seems to confirm our conceptual framework and our thesis that endogenous factors, accountability and PROGOAS interventions interrelate and correlate with each other. For instance, it is striking that the highest scores for representation, participation, accountability and capacity building are from Nacaroa, whereas the lowest scores for organisation, representation, accountability, capacity building and radio programmes are from Mecufi. Due to the limited number of people interviewed and the absence of a control group, these findings should not be overstated. That PROGOAS involvement is implemented directly by HELVETAS in both districts suggests that the same intervention can have a different outcome depending on the context and people involved. Nonetheless, all PROGOAS interventions are largely considered to contribute positively to accountability, even when other endogenous factors present low scores, as in Mecufi. It is therefore likely that the PROGOAS contribution operates independently from the other factors to a greater extent.

A final finding is that public accountability in the districts is much more advanced than social accountability. There are not many autonomous initiatives taking place other than those promoted by external actors such as HELVETAS and SNV. A closer look into the activities of community-based organisations could provide a different picture of civil society advocacy work beyond the CCs. Nevertheless, it is clear that social change is a long-term process and that the impact of PROGOAS’ three year interventions on people’s behaviours can only be limited. In a context characterised by the dominance of one party and by limited education it would not be surprising if progress were made inside institutions first and only later reflected in a societal change. The power analysis clearly demonstrates that the levels and forms of power constitute a big obstacle to the emergence of social accountability initiatives. Only community radio actors and individual civil society members involved in local governance self-assessment seem to play an autonomous role.

6 Conselhos consultivos as a training ground for accountability

Advancing accountability at the local level is a relatively recent undertaking in Mozambique. This explorative case study was intended to better understanding of the circumstances under which civil society in rural areas can contribute to public and social accountability in the
districts. To this end, the theoretical section presented the decentralisation process, a specific governance programme (PROGOAS) and both the potential and problems of accountability in a fragile context characterised by institutional constraints, the dominant power of the ruling party, elite capture, political clientelism and low levels of education. In the empirical section, survey analysis, semi-structured interviews, a power analysis and personal observations were triangulated to identify the factors that hinder or enable the advance of accountability through conselhos consultivos.

The main finding of this case study is the apparent strong correlation between the PROGOAS intervention, accountability and several endogenous factors that characterise the institutional setting of the conselhos consultivos: functionality, representation and participation in decision making. The research design, including the number of respondents, did not aim to systematically analyse causalities and assess impact. There is, nonetheless, strong evidence that capacity building, radio programmes and local governance self-assessment all positively contribute to public accountability even when other governance factors are only present at low levels. Adopting a mix of the three measures seems to be a promising approach to advance accountability through conselhos consultivos. The proviso is that potential beneficiaries are reached by the intervention de facto; which, as demonstrated by PROGOAS radio programmes, is not always the case. An holistic approach of measures will put on the agenda – if not solve – other governance issues, such as organisational problems, that local actors often perceive as more problematic. The discussion of these problems can be a good exercise in accountability.

If social accountability is not still an embryo, it is at least a baby in an incubator in rural Mozambique. Social accountability initiatives supported by NGOs are channelled through new institutions, such as conselhos consultivos, that are created from the top down. This risks creating a hybrid form of accountability controlled by the state. Considering the weakness of civil society in the rural areas of Mozambique, this political space can be seen as a training ground where authorities and citizens practice dialogue and accountability for the first time. If combined with capacity development, this could lead in the long term to the empowerment of local civil society.

In the short term, this does not mean giving up on the creation of new spaces of accountability, ‘claimed by less powerful actors from or against the power holders, or created more autonomously by them’ (Gaventa 2006: 27). Such spaces could include the working committees of the conselhos consultivos – if claimed by civil society – local community radio, or a district network of civil society organisations. We must realistically consider the specific context, however. In the case of Mozambique the decentralisation process is still too government-led to stimulate the emergence of autonomous social accountability initiatives in the rural areas, without pressure and resources from external actors and organisations deemed independent and powerful enough to engage in dialogue with state authorities.

External interventions have the difficult task of supporting local civil society without suffocating it with power, competence and resources. International and national NGOs should assume a supporting role at different levels of the political system rather than acting as big political players at the local level. In particular, they should:

- Embody accountability throughout the planning, implementation and monitoring process by sharing information, knowledge and opinions with stakeholders, beneficiaries and the general public;
- Strengthen local organisations and their capacity to hold local authorities more accountable;
- Sensitise local authorities, emphasising the incentives they have for being more accountable;
• Provide an informational bridge between the district level on the one side and the provincial and national level on the other;
• Promote institutional change at the central level towards more political, administrative and financial decentralisation.

This last point is probably the most challenging and very important. As Ribot (2002: 54) puts it speaking of Africa in general, ‘without the appropriate institutional forms and powers, decentralisation will not deliver the theoretically expected benefits, such as efficiency, equity, service provision and development.’ There is therefore a great need in Mozambique for advocacy and accountability initiatives at the national level, so that civil society at the local level can nourish itself with increasing information, responsibilities and results.
References


HELVETAS. (2007) *Sharing Power for Development. Experiences in Local Governance and Decentralisation*, Best Practice Publications No 6, Zurich: HELVETAS


(accessed 17 October 2012)


Annex 1 Information about districts of the survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nampula Province</th>
<th>Cabo Delgado Province</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>Nacaroa</td>
<td>Erati</td>
</tr>
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<td>Population</td>
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<td>256,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Implementing agency</td>
<td>HELVETAS</td>
<td>OLIPA</td>
</tr>
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</table>

*Source: PROGOAS Programme Management Unit/District plans, 2010*
## Annex 2 Survey questionnaire and scoring matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questões</th>
<th>Criterio de avaliação (guião de funcionamento ou objectivo PROGOAS)</th>
<th>Pontuação (0-2)</th>
<th>Relevancia (0-2)</th>
<th>Pontos max</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Organização</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1.1a Os convites para as sessões dos CL têm sido produzidos e enviados com quanto tempo de antecedência?</td>
<td>Duas semanas (artigo 22.2.e guião)</td>
<td>2 ou mais semanas=2, 1 semana=1, não enviados=0</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.1b A agenda para as sessões dos CL têm sido produzidos e enviados com quanto tempo de antecedência?</td>
<td>Duas semanas</td>
<td>2 ou mais semanas=2, 1 semana=1, não enviados=0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.1c Os documentos para as sessões dos CL têm sido produzidos e enviados com quanto tempo de antecedência?</td>
<td>Nenhuma referencia na lei, objectivo PROGOAS: duas semanas</td>
<td>2 ou mais semanas=2, 1 semana=1, não enviados=0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.2a Como tem sido a organização do transporte nas sessões do CL?</td>
<td>Objectivo PROGOAS: suficiente</td>
<td>Boa=2, suficiente=1, maua=0</td>
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<td>1.2b Como tem sido a organização do alojamento nas sessões do CL?</td>
<td>Objectivo PROGOAS: suficiente</td>
<td>Boa=2, suficiente=1, maua=0</td>
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<td>1.2c Como tem sido a organização da alimentacao nas sessões do CL?</td>
<td>Objectivo PROGOAS: suficiente</td>
<td>Boa=2, suficiente=1, maua=0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.2d O Governo Distrital garante as despesas de funcionamento do CL?</td>
<td>sim, artigo 24 guião</td>
<td>Sim=2, nem sempre=1, não=0</td>
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<td><strong>Pontos em total</strong></td>
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<th>Relevancia (0-2)</th>
<th>Pontos max</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0=não relevante, 1=relevante, 2=muito relevante</td>
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<td><strong>Representatividade</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>2.1 Os membros do CL representam os vários segmentos da população numa base geográfica?</td>
<td>sim, artigo 18 guiaño</td>
<td>sim=2, em parte=1, não=0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.2 Os membros do CL representam os vários segmentos sociais da população (grupos de interesse, CDCs etc.?)</td>
<td>sim, artigo 18 guiaño</td>
<td>sim=2, em parte=1, não=0</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.3 Há pessoas que são excluídas do CL por causa de serem membros de um partido político?</td>
<td>não, artigo 14 guiaño</td>
<td>sim=2, em parte=1, não=0</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.5a Os representantes de grupos desfavorecidos no CL (deficientes físicos, visuais, pobres, etc...) participam (falam, contribuem) e as ideias são respeitadas?</td>
<td>sim, artigo 14 guiaño</td>
<td>sim=2, em parte=1, não=0</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.5b Que assuntos são levantados por eles?</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2.6a As mulheres participam (falam, contribuem) e as ideias são respeitadas?</td>
<td>sim, artigo 14 guiaño</td>
<td>sim=2, em parte=1, não=0</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>2.6b Que assuntos são levantados pelas mulheres?</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Pontos em total</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Participação na tomada de decisão</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>3.1a A tomada de decisão no CL é por consensos?</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.1b Que outro mecanismo é utilizado? (voto ou decisão do líder?)</td>
<td>Objectivo PROGOAS: decisão sem influência dominante dos membros do governo ou dos líderes comunitários</td>
<td>2=cada membro pode influenciar as decisões; 1=os líderes comunitários e os membros do governo tem mais influência; 0=os membros do governo tem mais influência</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.2a Existem membros do CL que as suas contribuições tem maior peso na tomada de decisão?</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.2b Quem são?</td>
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<td>Questões</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.7a Existem comissões de trabalho dentro do CL? Quais são?</td>
<td>artigo 31, guia (podem crear, nenhuma obrigação)</td>
<td>sim=2, em parte=1, não=0</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>nenhuma referencia, objectivo PROGOAS</td>
<td>sdp=2, em parte=1, não=0</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.7b Tem encontros regulares entre as sessões do CL?</td>
<td>nenhuma referencia, objectivo PROGOAS</td>
<td>sim=2, em parte=1, não=0</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.7c Estas comissões prestam contas das suas actividades no CL?</td>
<td>nenhuma referencia, objectivo PROGOAS</td>
<td>sim=2, em parte=1, não=0</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.3a. A acta do CL é elaborada e divulgada aos membros após sessão do CL?</td>
<td>artigo 32, guia</td>
<td>sdp=2, em parte=1, não=0</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.3b Você como membro do CL faz retorno da informação nas suas comunidades?</td>
<td>artigo 33 e 35 guia</td>
<td>sdp=2, em parte=1, não=0</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.4 Você implementa e monitora as recomendações do CL?</td>
<td>35.2.d guia</td>
<td>sdp=2, em parte=1, não=0</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.5a Você participa no processo de preparação, implementação e controlo dos planos de desenvolvimento distrital?</td>
<td>35.2.d guia</td>
<td>sdp=2, em parte=1, não=0</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.5b Você consulta e usa o PESOD para monitorar a implementação das decisões?</td>
<td>35.2.d guia</td>
<td>sdp=2, em parte=1, não=0</td>
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Pontos em total: 26

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<tr>
<th>Questões</th>
<th>Capacitaçõe</th>
<th>Programas radiofonicos</th>
<th>Autoavaliação Micro-região</th>
<th>Autoavaliação CCD</th>
<th>Comentarios / Exemplos</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1a Quais das seguintes actividades do PROGOAS conhece?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4.1b A quais das seguintes actividades do PROGOAS participou?</td>
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<td>4.1c A contribuição das actividades do PROGOAS pelo funcionamento do CL foi:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Muito positiva</td>
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<tr>
<td>Positiva</td>
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<td>Mediocre</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nula</td>
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<td>Negativa</td>
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<td>Não sei</td>
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Annex 3 Semi-structured questionnaire

Interviewees:
- Mário Bombi, District Administrator of Nacaroa
- Lade Buraimo, District Administrator of Mecufi
- Vicente Paulo, PNPFD Advisor
- Ferraz Fai Sufo, PROGOAS Manager
- Faizal Ibramugy, Radio Encontro Journalist (working with PROGOAS).

Estimated time: 45 minutes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name:</th>
<th>Institution/Organisation:</th>
<th>Position:</th>
<th>Identified:</th>
<th>Anonymous:</th>
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Introduction: A brief explanation of the study.

1. In the process of deconcentration that is taking place in Mozambique, what do you think is the contribution of Conselhos consultivos (IPCCs) to citizens’ participation, representation and public accountability at the local level?

2. In November 2011 we conducted a survey about the IPCCs and we are keen to discuss this with you.

   2.1 In your view, how well are the IPCCs working? Please consider organisational issues (logistics, transportation, info circulation, etc) more than issues of participation, representation and accountability.
   2.2 Are there additional (specific) issues regarding the organisation of Conselhos consultivos you would like to share?
   2.3 What do you think would be the impact of well-organized IPCCs in terms of accountability? (Follow-up question, dependent on 2.1 and 2.2)

3. IPCCs were instituted for participation and consultation at the local level, albeit their power to decide in few matter, such as the District Development Fund. Simultaneously, according to the regulation, ‘the District Administrator is responsible for the institutionalisation of the Conselho consultivo of the district and lower levels’ (2009:9).

   3.1.1. How do you see the principle of ‘diversity’ (gender, occupation, age, culture, social class) in the composition of the IPCCs? (Observed or not?)
   3.1.2. Do you think this diversity (representation) has an influence on accountability at this level?
   3.1.3. What is the role of the District Administrator in public accountability?
   3.1.4. And what is the role of the IPCCs in public accountability?
3.1.5. How do you see the relationship between the District Administrators and the IPCCs and their contribution to public accountability?

4. Various kinds of programs now exist to improve accountability. Which have you come across? Who was undertaking them and who is supporting them? What tools have you seen being used by those actors to improve accountability (public and social) at the local level? (Capacity building and radio programs?). What is your viewpoint regarding these two tools? Are there (viable) alternatives you would suggest to the Mozambican context?

5. Social accountability in Mozambique has currently been promoted by INGOs as well as by national NGOs supported by INGOs or external donors (Explanation about social accountability will be given to the interviewees).

5.1. What do you think could be the impact of these trends on the emergence of autonomous social accountability initiatives?

5.2. What do you think could trigger autonomous social accountability initiatives in Mozambique?

6. Are there additional thoughts you would like to share regarding the deconcentration process and accountability in Mozambique?

7. (For PROGOAS closer observers) Could you roughly evaluate the impact of PROGOAS in terms of accountability, compared to some other closer districts that are not, at least directly, benefiting from this intervention? (if possible, please give answers about the Districts included in the survey: Nacarao, Erati, Mecufi and Ancuabe)

8. (For PROGOAS closer observers) Could you roughly evaluate the impact of PROGOAS in terms of accountability, compared to the situation before the program started in 2009? (If possible, please give answers about the Districts included in the survey).

9. (For PROGOAS closer observers) Are there specific differences in terms of functioning and accountability between PROGOAS-Districts and Provinces?