In 2013 the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) grouping agreed to undertake what will, when implemented, become its most concrete project yet: the BRICS Development Bank (BDB).
From the perspective of the Chinese government, which already leads a vast and far‐reaching cooperation programme, the bank will not represent a significant addition to its cooperation portfolio. What, then, motivates China’s participation in the initiative, and what can it bring to the table? This article analyses China’s interests in the BDB in the light of its past experiences with development, at home and abroad. I argue that China’s interests in backing the bank project are primarily political. In addition to offering a concrete opportunity to legitimise China’s multilateralism strategy – burnishing China’s image as a responsible yet pro‐reform global player – the bank project also allows China to influence international development norms. At the same time, the project also poses challenges for China, especially in terms of promoting poverty alleviation without resorting to trickle‐down assumptions about an infrastructure‐focused approach to development.
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This article comes from the IDS Bulletin 45.4 (2014) China and the BRICS Development Bank: Legitimacy and Multilateralism in South–South Cooperation
