This working paper explores the contemporary politics of social assistance (and social protection more broadly) in Lebanon, filling multiple gaps in existing academic and policy literature on Lebanon’s ongoing financial crisis.
First, it tests common but hitherto unevidenced assumptions that the country’s worsening protracted crisis would either discredit or, conversely, expand Lebanon’s underlying socio-political system, which is characterised by sectarian-clientelism and fractured sub-state loyalties. We show that, in fact, both assumptions are false and instead the status quo is largely being maintained.
Second, by drawing on evidence from focus groups with economically vulnerable Lebanese citizens, we demonstrate that one of the means by which this has been achieved has been through Lebanon’s splintered social protection regimes, which both reflect and uphold the country’s broken social contract.
Third, we focus on both formal (internationally supported) assistance and informal politically motivated responses alike, whereas previous research has explored these modalities in isolation. The informal, we argue, hinges on relational dynamics, meaning that even if assistance might have slowed, an expectation of future support remains. By contrast, even where formal social protection responses have assisted vulnerable people, they have not altered those informal relational dynamics that bind individuals to local actors rather than the national government.
Finally, we conclude the paper by exploring the implications of the government’s National Social Protection Strategy (adopted in February 2024). The strategy, if implemented fully, represents the first potential policy avenue that might begin to strengthen Lebanon’s social contract through cohesive rights-based social protection reform.
Read the accompanying Policy Briefing: The Politics of Social Assistance in Lebanon.
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