Land Tenure Conflict and the REDD+ Paradox:

Emma.lord@uib.no

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How Value Grabbing Recentralized Forest Governance in West Tanzania

Introduction - Felli (2014) On Climate Rent

- Carbon markets are institutional responses to the threat to accumulation that environmental *regulations* pose.
- United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) adopted in 1992 and Kyoto Protocol in 1997 - *nationalization* not *privatization*
- Industrialized countries Annex I and developing countries non-Annex I
- Created legal rights to emit greenhouse gases (GHG) -states individually attempted to escape limitations
- Circulation of entitlements to emit through market based mechanisms – not *commodities* but rather a form of *rent*
- Sellers of emission rights can grab a share of total surplus value, but as a (low) barrier to capital's accumulation

Grabbing and Value grabbing

Value grabbing - "the appropriation of (surplus) value through rent" (Andreucci et al, 2017)
Extracting value through rent relations

Carbon markets are not new *sites of accumulation* but rather emissions allowances are both a *limitation* and a *right to access.* Entitlements to emit greenhouse gases are not commodities, but rent (Felli, 2014)

Green grabbing can be caused by comodifiaction of palm oil and biofuels (Fairhead, Leach & Scoones, 2012)


Photo:Catriona Moss, Forests News

Green Grabbing

- Commodification and new markets for nature

- Economy of repair – double valuation

- Cases:
  - Palm oil and other biofuels
  - Biodiversity conservation – fines and fences
  - Ecotourism
  - Biochar soils
  - Offsets

Fairhead, Leach & Scoones, 2012

Source: STEPS centre

Grabbing and Value grabbing

Grabbing in general (by contrast with value grabbing) is defined by Søreide & Williams (2013) as "*when someone seizes something that he or she is not entitled to, or takes <u>more</u> than what is his or hers formally, informally or tacitly allocated share.*"

Corruption can be understood as a form of grabbing, where laws have come into open contestation, broader term useful

Land tenure unclear and insecure, corruption in relation to a given law then difficult to define, assessments of legality become relativistic.

Photo:Catriona Moss, Forests News

Defining Land Tenure and Property Rights

- Land Tenure:

"the full set of institutions and policies that determine how the land and its resources are accessed, who can hold and use these resources, for how long, and under what conditions"

- Property Rights:

"the products of rules, as mediated by formal and informal institutions, which liberate and constrain human action"

-Naughton-Treves and Wendland, 2014

CUSTOMARY LAW

Behaviour and environment co-construct and regulate each other to create a local context

Co-constitutional and relational thinking and being

STATUTORY LAW

Behaviour is regulated through statutory contexts

Clear/unclear, secure/insecure land tenure

Defining Land Tenure and Property Rights

Figure 2: Land tenure as a "bundle" of rights
Source: Aggarwal and Elbow 2006, p.7.

Power inequities tie property rights to authority – (Forsyth & Sikor, 2013)
Absolute rent is the public appropriation of the land by the state (see Felli, 2014)
Property ideologies and languages of property perform the persuasive aspects of claim making (Ece, 2021)

Forest carbon: a new commodity – fictitious commodity, pseudo commodity or fricticious commodity?
(Polanyi, 1944; Andreucci et al, 2017; Huff, 2021)

# Forest Governance: Participation, Decentralization

Recognizing the formal land rights of villagers at the local scale, will install a sense of ownership and responsibility towards natural resources that can encourage their sustainable management

- Outcomes may be at the cost of loss of livelihoods for the poor, who otherwise created income from forest products

- Democratic decentralization

- Recentralization effects (Ribot, Agrawal & Larson, 2006)

- Institutional choice and

   recognition (Ece, Murombedzi,

    & Ribot, 2017)

Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+)

- Global forest carbon offsetting policy

- Reducing deforestation an economically viable target for mitigating climate change

- Envisioned as a market-based mechanism, building on the Payments for Ecosystem Service (PES) model – complicated monitoring reporting and verification (MRV)

- Copenhagen accord (2009) evaded binding commitment to reduce GHG emissions

- Over US$10 billion invested in REDD+ from bilateral, multilateral and private donors

- Form of REDD+ "light form of result-based aid", typically not PES (Angelsen et al. 2017)

Some key assumptions of REDD+

Figure 7. The stages and main drivers in the forest transition.

- **Source:** Angelsen, A. (2007).

  Forest cover change in space and time: combining the von Thünen and forest transition theories (Vol. 4117). World Bank Publications.

Complexity blinding – Kallis, Gómez-Baggethun & Zografos, (2013)

1) Forest transitions can be modelled
2) Carbon must be quantified
3) Forest boundaries must be demarcated

11

Selected Literature on forest carbon conflicts

- Alusiola, R. A., Schilling, J., & Klär, P. (2021). REDD+ Conflict: Understanding the Pathways between Forest Projects and Social Conflict. *Forests*, *12*(6), 748.

- Milne, S., Mahanty, S., To, P., Dressler, W., Kanowski, P. and Thavat, M., 2019. Learning from 'actually existing' REDD+ A synthesis of ethnographic findings. *Conservation & Society*, *17*(1), pp.84-95.

- Lord, E.J., 2018. Displacement, power and REDD+: a forest history of carbonized exclusion. In *Global Forest Governance and Climate Change* (pp. 115-143). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.

- Howson, P., 2018. Slippery violence in the REDD+ forests of Central Kalimantan, Indonesia. *Conservation and Society*, *16*(2), pp.136-146.

- Asiyanbi, A.P., 2016. A political ecology of redd+: Property rights, militarised protectionism, and carbonised exclusion in cross river. *Geoforum*, *77*, pp.146-156.

- Leach, M., & Scoones, I. (Eds.). (2015). *Carbon conflicts and forest landscapes in Africa* (p. 232). London: Routledge.

- Cavanagh, C. and Benjaminsen, T.A., 2014. Virtual nature, violent accumulation: The 'spectacular failure'of carbon offsetting at a Ugandan National Park. *Geoforum*, *56*, pp.55-65.

Policy Brief: Huff, 2015

- Inequitable property regimes increase potential for conflict

- research should identify risk of conflicts, inform protocols for avoiding or mediating conflict situations

- Equity mechanisms must be established for REDD+

- Involuntary resettlement, restricted livelihoods, limited decision making unacceptable

Understanding Relationships Between the Green Economy, Resource Financialization and Conflict

A key aspect of the United Nations' sustainable development approach centres on creating markets for financialized 'natural capital' products, particularly in resource-rich, lower-income countries. The appeal of this comes from a set of policy promises termed the 'triple-win': achieving environmental sustainability, socially inclusive economic growth and poverty alleviation. Yet, these policies are controversial for many reasons, including their potential to foster inequitable property regimes, leading to increased potential for conflict. There is a need to understand the context and relationships among the green economy, resource financialization and emerging areas of conflict within the Southern African region. This will be pivotal in achieving sustainable policy reform and coordinated action.

POLICY BRIEFING

The REDD+ Paradox debate

Forum

Carbon, forests and the REDD paradox

CHRIS SANDBROOK, FRED NELSON, WILLIAM M. ADAMS and ARUN AGRAWAL

Abstract The institutional arrangements governing forests will be a critical factor in reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) as part of the

Forest decentralization for REDD? A response to Sandbrook et al.

SVEN WUNDER

Sandbrook et al. (2010) discuss critical governance issues around implementation of programmes for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD). They claim that decentralization has had positive impacts on forest conservation and that REDD will probably reverse that process, with recentralization eventually hurting both people and forests. Here I argue that both causal suppositions are too hasty.

showed that communal self-governance is much more likely to succeed when forests are not too big to monitor, not too rich in resources to tempt rent-seekers, forest production is biophysically predictable, previous organizational experience is consolidated, and users share low time-discount rates and inherent forest values. In how many frontier forests with high deforestation rates are these conditions satisfied? I cannot think of many. Often the

Governance and REDD: a reply to Wunder

ARUN AGRAWAL, FRED NELSON, WILLIAM M. ADAMS and CHRIS SANDBROOK

We welcome Wunder's (2010) response to our article (Sandbrook et al., 2010). Both contributions agree that too little attention has been devoted in international negotiations and discussions to the design and governance

forest margin where both these pressures are often attenuated. The key point is that attempts to reverse deforestation on the extensive forest frontier need macro-policy reforms but that such reforms can be strengthened if policy

Decentralized Forest Management in Tanzania

- History of Participatory Forest Management (PFM)

- Land categories: Reserved land (National Parks, Game Reserves etc), Village Land and General Land

- Community based forest management on village land, Joint forest management on reserved land adjoining villages

- General village assembly

Administrative level	Central government		Local government	
National	President's Office Regional Administration and Local Government			
Regional	Regional Commisioner's Office			
District	District Commissioner's Office	District Executive Officer		District Council
Division	Divisional secretary			
Ward			Ward Secretary	Ward Development Committee
Village			Village Executive Officer	Village Council

Legend

——————— Administrative relations

········· Consultative and advisory relations

15

Figure 1: Structure of Tanzanian local government (Modified from Baker et al. 2002)

Empirical cases in Tanzania: REDD+ Pilot Projects

• Masito-Ugalla, Kigoma, Tanzania

→

Kigoma

- Wild chimpanzee habitat
- Lake Tanganyika
- REDD+ via NGOs in Tanzania

Methodology

- 70000 people in 7 REDD+ villages
- Among lowest socio-economic status in Tanzania
- Drivers of deforestation: cultivation, charcoal production, agro pastoralism

Data collection periods:
- 5 months during 2014
- 2 months during 2018
- 6 months during 2019

Study area visited

Methodology

- in-depth interviews with peasants, pastoralists, local politicians, implementers of REDD+, NGO staff and Academics
- Participant observation
- Analysis of, letters and local government records and project documents,

Data collection periods:
- 5 months during 2014
- 2 months during 2018
- 6 months during 2019

Study context: Land Tenure
## Land Use Planning for Participatory forest management, 2008 (prior to REDD+)

Figure 1 Land Use Planning (LUP) of Sunuka and Songambele Villages. S1 is situated to the East of Sunuka and Songambele just to the North-east.

Study site, REDD+ Pilot Project Implementation 2009 - 2012

- Project Area on general land, unique to this pilot project
- Community Based Organization (CBO) as in other pilot sites of REDD+
- Aggregating village environmental committees
- Forest Monitors from the 7 REDD+ villages
- Motivation money on the basis of forest patrols and engagement with REDD+
- Used for infrastructural development, schools and village offices
- Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) exercise – CBO discussed forest protections rules in village assemblies

Legend

- 🔴 REDD villages
- ⊙ Other settlements
- ▭ REDD Project area
- • FM patrols REDD project
- • FM patrols GMU project

Reference region for projecting:
- 🟩 rate of deforestation (RRD)
- 🟪 location of deforestation (RRL)
- 🟨 Leakage area
- — Major roads 1997
- — Major roads 2011
- — Mishamo roads 1997

Forest Monitors Patroling Effort Pie Chart - REDD Project

- 🟦 Ilagala
- 🟧 Lyabusende
- 🟨 Kirando
- 🟩 Karago
- 🟪 Sigunga
- 🟦 Sunuka
- 🟪 Songambele

Findings: forced evictions, insecure land tenure

KAMATI YA UZALISHAJI

KIJIJI CHA SUNUKA,

S. L. P 332,

UVINZA.

6 / 6 /1992

RE: THE FARMERS OF KASAKATI TO BE RECOGNIZED BY THE VILLAGE OF SUNUKA.

Whom have been mentioned above are the farmers of Kasakati who were given areas for cultivation by the village of Sunuka therefore they are recognized by this committee. They are 31 farmers as the list of their names has been attached.

Majina ya viongozi:

Jina la Mwenyekiti ...... MUSSA Z KADA ...... Sahihi ......

Jina la Katibu ...... KABUJANJA ...... Sahihi ......

Findings: boundary conflict, unclear land tenure

Songamabele village extended their boundaries in 2010 and received a letter from the District saying their request approved

However, no map was brought

Findings: lack of recognition of elected leaders

*"We clarified that Kasakati is our area for cultivation, and our forest, confusion started with the putting of beacons. The officers who were dealing with putting the beacons **went by their own decisions**. By that time, us and them, we agreed together that beacons would be taken to Kasakati, but when they reached up to the area where they wanted they put their beacon and said whoever has power, remove it."*

-Village Chairman of Sunuka, 10 August 2012.

"…many suspects claimed the Chairman of Sunuka Village was allowing farmers to cultivate with claims that the border of the village have moved into Masito-Ugalla."

-Wildlife Officer's report of 14 December 2010.

Findings: lack of recognition of elected leaders

- Process of letter writing from 2011 onwards, supported by village chairman of Sunuka and Songambele and sub village chairmen. Complaints about evictions
- Lack of recognition by district authorities who partner with NGO implementing REDD+ (Ece, Murombedzi & Ribot, 2017)
- Attempts at mediation via Division Officer and Ward Council, however conflict of interest since they are answerable to the district
- Institutional choice: elected leaders have membership to CBO but do not steer it, conservation goals overshadow democratic processes
- Resistance to conservation, attempts to overthrow project and no cooperation from the people: triple lose?

Findings: recentralization processes

- Songambele Village General Assembly Meeting

....the people decided to expel all the committees dealing with conservation of the environment, namely the CBO, forest monitors and environmental committee, without following the legal procedure and not knowing the consequences that could appear in the future."

-Minutes of the emergency public meeting held on 7 August 2011, VEO Songambele village

"Instead, all the citizens showed no remorse and threatened that if their decision was not implemented, the chairman and the members of the village council should resign; something that further jeopardized the security and forced the chairman of the village council to take those decisions immediately to the Jane Goodall Institute and the District Council."

-Minutes of the emergency public meeting held on 7 August 2011, VEO Songambele village

- Evictions resumed the following year: green financialization incentivizing conflict?

Discussion

- Blomley et al. (2017)

- ""One project (JGI) supported the emergence of new forms of forest management – where previously unreserved forests were managed under an intervillage community-based organisation. *The absence of any recognised legal framework for this arrangement* has, however, meant that by the end of the project, forest tenure for this area remains unresolved." (my italics) –p. 7

- " Has REDD resulted in a recentralisation of the commons as a means for powerful interests (such as the state) to capture dividends from carbon markets? Again, evidence gathered in the course of this study does not provide evidence for this either." –p. 17

Discussion

Effective decentralization requires the construction of accountable institutions at all levels of government and a secure domain of autonomous decision making at the local level

(Ribot, Agrawal & Larson, 2006)

Structures of accountability
Agrawal & Ribot, (1999)

- Drivers of recentralization and conflicts: instrumental vs ideological motivations

- Value grabbing, i.e. rent-seeking behaviour by district officials has led to land grabbing, whereas willing to extend village boundaries prior to REDD+. However, role of conservation ideologies must also be acknowledged

- How can equity mechanisms be established in such a case?

Discussion

- How can conflict prevention and mediation protocols be established?

- Interests of conserving chimpanzee habitat: trade-offs difficult to manage between cultivation and wildlife.

- Where do we draw the line, i.e. is compensated relocation acceptable?

- Why has no one divided the cake of wildlife tourism benefits? Wildlife sector remains centralized compared with forests

- Lastly but not least, political ecology and political geography: where do they intersect?

Thank you for your attention

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