Since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, social protection in Syria has undergone rapid and profound changes. These are examined in a Briefing Paper based on background reports by researchers for Proximity International as part of the BASIC Research Programme. Ten researchers across nine governorates have documented key changes.
The immediate removal of subsidies on essentials like bread, cooking and heating fuel, and fuel for vehicles has been the most significant shift. Researchers also noted pension payment delays due to investigations into ghost beneficiaries and Assad-linked beneficiaries. A temporary freeze on bank transactions further strained finances, and ongoing liquidity shortages continue to hinder cash withdrawals.
Even government workers face problems, with some spending more than their wage for transportation. Although some respondents expressed delight as queues at bakeries disappeared and it became possible to buy a full tank of petrol, there is broad anxiety over growing prices, especially for bread, and associated problems like decreasing electricity supplies.
Beyond humanitarian assistance, what might make a difference to impoverished and vulnerable households in the short and medium term? The ending of subsidies suggests a significant cost saving for the transitional government. In the 2025 budget (as planned under Assad), the share of spending on public subsidies and other public support programmes is listed as 15.8% of the government budget, equivalent to 8.3 trillion Syrian Pounds (SYP), or approximately USD 0.6 billion. SYP 4 trillion was projected to be spent on oil and oil products, and SYP 3.85 trillion on bread flour. (Exchange rates are difficult to translate into meaningful comparisons, not least due to disparities between official and private (black market) rates, and restrictions on transactions due to sanctions, but in February SPY 8.3tn amounted to some USD0.6bn according to XE.com).
Whether the 2025 Assad budget was funded is unclear, but ending subsidies raises important questions: Without subsidies, what social protection will exist or emerge? How will the transitional government prioritise social protection alongside housing, jobs, public infrastructure, health, and education? It is critical to investigate numerous unknowns to understand the options for social protection in post-Assad Syria.
Looking within Syria (rather than at other simultaneous international shifts in the aid sector following the changing administration in the USA –see for example, commentary from Valentina Barca), three things seem to be urgent priorities for international stakeholders seeking to support the transition in Syria:
First, international actors need to understand the social contract in Syria – both the contract that existed and shifted under the Assad regime, and the emerging contract in Syria following the fall of Assad. Social contracts can be described as the agreements by which citizens accept the rule of a government or state in return for the provision of something (perhaps security and rule of law, or healthcare and other public services, or social protection). Subsidies are part of social contracts across the Middle East region, and, alongside state-provided jobs, were central to Baathist social contracts in both Syria under Assad and his father, and in Iraq under Saddam Hussein. The ending of subsidies in Syria suggests a radical rewriting of the social contract and, irrespective of donors and IFIs concerns about affordability and cost-efficiency, subsidies may remain a cornerstone of public expectations in Syria. Understanding the social contract will help international actors work out which of their investments are likely to underpin a peaceful and lasting transition in Syria, and which may undermine it.
Second, it is important to track the shifting resourcing landscape. As noted above, it’s not clear if the resources existed in the planned 2025 budget to deliver subsidies as planned or they would have required further drawdowns of state reserves. Pre-2011, subsidies were provided predominantly using domestic resources – notably state-owned oil extraction and refining, and Syria’s substantial wheat production. Following 2011, wheat production declined significantly and the Assad regime lost control of major oil reserves to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which then established the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North East Syria (DAANES). As domestic resources shrank, procurement internationally was severely hampered by sanctions, and Russia’s war in Ukraine limited the extent to which Russia was able, or willing, to supply wheat to Syria. Since 27 November 2024, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has taken some territory in North East Syria, suggesting that control of domestic resources is key to the viability of programmes that may replace subsidies.
Third and finally, the transitional government’s willingness to pursue changes already set in motion by the previous government is unclear. The Assad regime had gradually modified the subsidy structure as costs rose and domestic resources dwindled. In November 2021, eligibility criteria were tightened to exclude wealthier households, shifting subsidies from a demand-led, near-universal system to a more targeted approach. In June 2024, the Assad government announced (but did not implement) the replacement of the subsidy card used at bakeries, fuel stations, and other subsidized goods sellers with direct cash payments into bank accounts.
Both the transitional administration and the former Assad regime have recognised the need for subsidy reform but appear to have different rationales for reform. The transitional administration has already eliminated subsidies without introducing a replacement program, making it unlikely to follow Assad’s approach, but its view on long term social protection is not clear. A dialogue about what will replace the subsidies, and how this could be supported by international actors, should be a priority for those seeking to support the rebuilding of social protection in post-Assad Syria.
