How do we make sense of what voters have been doing in this year of elections? Too often we think of the results of elections and the fate of democracy as something determined by political elites and political parties. But it is centrally about what voters are doing and thinking, what determines their preferences, and why they end up choosing the parties and leaders that they do.
This is the third article in a collection of perspectives from former students at IDS, by drawing on findings from their MA dissertation research, who regularly ask and debate questions focused on the democratic trajectories and fortunes of countries around the world.
Read the other perspectives:
- What do voters want in this year of elections? Part 1
- What do voters want in this year of elections? Part 2
Another central impact on voting behaviour is the extent to which political dynasties can control state institutions, and reduce the option sets that shape voter preferences. Egi Primayogha Mardhika (MA Development Studies, class of 2023) was concerned with the extent to which oligarchic capture of state institutions is a significant factor in the ongoing democratic backsliding in Indonesia.
“The findings of my dissertation reveal that oligarchic state capture is a key driver behind the shrinking of civic space in Indonesia. This contraction is a deliberate strategy by political dynastic elites to maintain control over resources and, ultimately safeguard their wealth. Oligarchs start by hijacking democratic institutions, such as the executive and legislative power, to assert their influence. They further consolidate power by manipulating accountability institutions and controlling natural resources through legal revisions sanctioned by the executive and legislature. Moreover, they are in collusion with the dynastic political interests of President Joko Widodo to extend his power. For example, in the 2024 presidential election, Widodo manipulated the constitutional court to alter election rules, enabling his first son to secure the vice presidency, and then further attempted to change the law to facilitate his second son’s candidacy in the regional head election, although it ultimately failed. Widespread protests across Indonesia in response to these actions were met with violent repression against protesters and journalists.”
And yet, Ria Octavio (MA Governance, Development & Public Policy, class of 2023) points out, voters will continue to vote for authoritarian leaders and their dynasties.
“36 years after the deposition of Philippine dictator Ferdinand E. Marcos Sr., whose regime was rife with brutalities and corruption, his son was elected as the 17th President of the Philippines in 2022. I argued that Marcos Jr. won because the general population holds a positive perception of the period of authoritarian rule and is experiencing “authoritarian nostalgia”. This is because there is a portion of the population who perceive authoritarianism as beneficial. Feelings of cultural, social, or economic insecurity have created a preference for “strongmen” that can restore stability and security. Seeing concrete results takes precedence, even if it involves compromising democratic principles.
The election of Rodrigo Duterte ushered in the era of neo-authoritarianism, where the desire of the population for a secure and orderly society overtook concerns around the rights of individual citizens. Despite a brutal tenure marked by human rights abuses, Duterte’s daughter, Sara, garnered more votes than Marcos Jr. in 2022, becoming his vice president.”
Olumide Olorunfemi (MA Governance, Development & Public Policy, class of 2023) found yet another surprising aspect of voter preferences in Nigeria. He looked at accountability relations to find that it was voters, and not politicians, who seem to be driving relations of clientelism.
“My dissertation revealed that in Ekiti and Lagos states, voters commonly expect immediate, short-term benefits in exchange for their votes, and value transactional relationships with politicians rather than those based on the policy performance of politicians and governments. These exchanges cover a full spectrum, from the distribution of money at polling units in Ekiti state to the distribution of contracts and influential appointments among party members and associates in Lagos state. Though usually considered to be initiated by politicians, there is support in the literature (such as Nichter and Peress 2017) that suggests that clientelism is not always a top-down exchange controlled by political elites, but citizens can also initiate clientelistic relationship by demanding that party machines fulfil their requests for personalised benefits in exchange for their votes at election time. In fact, clients threaten candidates with votes for opposing parties if their demands are not fulfilled. This raises critical questions about what vertical accountability means in this case, with voters negatively assessing programmatic policies and rewarding politicians instead for clientelistic exchanges. Ineffective policy performance by governments, such as the current government’s efforts to address inflation, food scarcity, and unemployment, may strengthen such behaviour, and citizens may be even more compelled to demand quicker fixes to alleviate their suffering. While this may deliver in the short term, it reduces incentives for governments to develop and implement a longer-term vision for sustainable development.”
These are all excerpts from the dissertations of IDS students, who studied the Democracy and Public Policy module at IDS. They were curated by Shandana Khan Mohmand, who teaches this module.
