Over the past two decades, Türkiye has undergone a significant transformation under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), led by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Following the failed 2016 coup attempt, the AKP’s orientation shifted away from the principles of European Union (EU) accession and toward a more Islamist, nationalist agenda (Ayata and Candaş 2019). Following the 2017 constitutional referendum, Erdoğan gained sweeping executive powers, transforming Türkiye from a parliamentary system to a presidential one, enabled also by the growing influence of the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). This inaugurated an era marked by mass purges, banning of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), suppression of media, and a clampdown on the Kurdish movement in particular, and opposition voices in general (ibid.). The sharp decline of the Turkish lira in August 2018 triggered a major economic crisis, contributing to the declining popularity of the AKP, forcing it to forge new political coalitions with ultra-religious groups (including the MHP and Kurdish Islamist Free Cause Party (Huda Par)) to secure votes in the 2023 elections, adopting their agenda of a further crackdown on the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex, and more (LGBTQI+) community (Abaday 2023; Sahin 2022). Türkiye already ranks 49 out of 50 countries on the ILGA-Europe Rainbow Index for LGBTQI+ rights (Yıldırım 2024).
Anti-feminist discourse has long been present among groups across the political spectrum in Türkiye. In June 2011, the government replaced the Ministry of Women and Family Affairs with the Ministry of Family and Social Policies, arguing that a woman’s identity is rooted in the family, with motherhood being her foremost responsibility (Şener 2024; Ayata and Candaş 2019). More recently, Erdoğan has explicitly stated that he is against gender equality, that abortion is murder, and that using contraception undermines the nation (Kandiyoti 2019; Altıok and Somersan 2015). This rhetoric influenced the official stance on reproductive rights, resulting in increasingly limited access to both contraception and preventive health measures such as the human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine, alongside repeated attempts to restrict or criminalise abortion (Karakas 2019). Erdoğan declared 2025 the ‘family year’, with an increased emphasis on declining birth rates. This focus on traditional family values led to abolishing the term ‘gender equality’ from official documents (Sahin 2022), and contributed to a permissive environment for violence clearly observed in the rising incidence of gender-based violence and impunity for the perpetrators (Kandiyoti 2019). During the 2023 election, the AKP’s homophobic rhetoric intensified, labelling ‘LGBT’ as a threat to national security and family values, and describing homosexuality as ‘perverse’ and incompatible with Islam.
Rollback extends to banning feminist marches, such as the annual International Women’s Day rallies in Istanbul, and the weekly silent vigil of the Saturday Mothers, which began in 1995 (ibid.). Pride marches, which once attracted large crowds in Istanbul, have been banned since 2015, for reasons of ‘security threats and public order’ (Human Rights Watch 2017). Meanwhile, rallies by anti-LGBTQI+ actors – who only recently started to organise as a public movement under the umbrella platform PLATFORMU (Great Family Platform) – are allowed and even endorsed by AKP Members of Parliament (MPs) and local party officials, creating a counter-Pride tradition (Abaday 2023; Atay 2024). The crackdown on civil society organisations has been accompanied by the state’s co-optation of the women’s rights movement and the marginalisation of secular feminist activism, by establishing and funding organisations – often co-founded by relatives of the party’s leaders – that are compliant with the party’s agenda (Ertürk 2019).
A spate of retrogressive legislation has accompanied the repression of civil society. Türkiye’s ‘censorship law’ was enacted in 2022, granting authorities broad powers to remove online content and block websites that are deemed to disseminate disinformation or threaten public order and national security. With AKP officials pushing for the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention as early as two years after its ratification (Ayata and Candaş 2019), Türkiye finally withdrew from the convention in 2021 (Stanimirova 2021). Since Türkiye’s withdrawal, there has been a spike in gender-based violence, including femicide, and particularly in the number of suspicious deaths of women. Currently, activists fear proposed amendments to Law 6284 on violence against women and children (which was enacted after the signing of the Istanbul Convention) that were promised to ultra-right groups to get their backing in the 2023 elections (Williams 2023).
Landscape of anti-rollback actors
Although there are a range of individuals and collectives countering rollback at different levels and by different means, this brief focuses on 14 groups, most of which operate at the national level, with two extending their operations to the Turkish diaspora. Gender-based violence, and particularly domestic violence and femicides, represent a significant focus of these organisations’ work. Other issues include sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI), political participation, equality and non-discrimination, and child marriage. Whereas much of the recent rollback relates to increased hurdles to access to abortion, we did not find as much information on work countering rollback on sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR). Some organisations focus specifically on intersectional issues, including Kurdish women’s rights and refugee women’s rights. Although there is scant information on funding sources, those organisations that do disclose details have indicated that they receive funding from institutions such as the Türkiye Mozaik Foundation, the Sigrid Rausing Trust, the EU, and Heinrich Böll Stiftung.
Counter-rollback strategies
Feminist organisations in Türkiye have a history of building issue-based coalitions, such as the CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women) Civil Society Executive Committee in Türkiye (CEDAW STYK), the Women’s Platform for Equality (EŞİK), the Women’s Labor and Employment Initiative Platform (KEİG), the Gender Equality Solidarity Network (AĞ-DA), and the Rainbow Association Against Discrimination (AKGD), among others. Many organisations that work on gender-based violence and SOGI undertake forms of service provision, stepping in where the state is absent or has withdrawn, by offering shelters, social, legal and psychological counselling, workshops to inform women about their rights, and 24/7 helplines.
Groups also seek to effect legislative and policy change – for instance, organisations working on gender-based violence have been lobbying legislators to include the term ‘femicide’ in the Turkish Penal Code (SK 2023). Groups organise with victims–survivors and their families to visit and lobby parliamentarians for change, while also engaging media outlets. Other important and effective strategies include the Social Policy, Gender Identity and Sexual Orientation Studies Association’s efforts in relation to an LGBTQI+ Friendly Municipality Protocol and an LGBTI+ Rights Treaty. Whereas the protocol targets municipalities to develop inclusive policies with regards to health, housing, social works, employment, and transportation, the treaty targets parliamentary candidates to pledge to bring LGBTI+ rights to parliament if they get elected.
Several collectives also engage in data gathering, evidence building and advocacy in relation to gender-based violence, SOGI, SRHR, and women’s public participation. Their activities include monitoring rates of violence, media and trial monitoring, monitoring the implementation of existing policies and provisions, as well as drafting reports for international monitoring mechanisms such as the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR), CEDAW, and the Council of Europe’s Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO). Some organisations also generate material on Islamic feminism, existing rights and remedies and how to access them, and also endeavour to engage men and boys for norm change (for example, the Mother Child Education Foundation, AÇEV).
Relatedly, groups undertake capacity building to spread awareness on rights, conduct anti-discrimination courses, produce and circulate material including a ‘guide on girls’ access to justice and legal aid mechanisms’, train women candidates to participate in electoral politics and local administration, and provide support to individuals and civil society organisations on collectivisation and organising.
Marches, protests, and solidarity events are another key strategy, especially in relation to gender-based violence and SOGI, as a key mechanism for awareness-raising and norm change. Initiatives include QueerFest (the first LGBTQI+ film festival in Türkiye), the Queer Artists Solidarity Network, Trans Camp, the annual Feminist Forum, and an annual Artist Residency Programme.
Gaps and areas for future research/work
Linguistic barriers are significant, as most organisations have their website in Turkish only, or have limited sections in English. There is scant knowledge about collectives operating at grass-roots or sub-national levels. As organisations face significant resource constraints, few are able to systematically document and publish data on their challenges, activities, and advances, making a systematic evaluation of counter-rollback strategies and their effectiveness somewhat challenging. Grass-roots organisations in particular need support to archive, translate, and digitise their efforts.
Credits
This Country Brief was written by Manal Hassan. It was supported by the project Rapid Scoping Review – The Nature of Feminist and LGBT+ Movements in a Range of Selected Countries, funded by UK International Development from the UK government. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of IDS or the UK government’s official policies.
First published April 2025.
Suggested citation: Hassan, M. (2025) ‘Rapid Scoping Review 2025: Türkiye’, Countering Rollback Country Brief, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, DOI: 10.19088/IDS.2025.034
© Institute of Development Studies 2025.
This is an Open Access brief distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence (CC BY), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original authors and source are credited and any modifications or adaptations are indicated.
