Substantial theoretical and policy debate in the early 1990s led to an excessive focus on de-collectivisation
and individualisation of land rights through privatisation across the former communist bloc. The objective
of this paper is to examine “individualised” production systems more closely in order to understand better
how certain specific organisational approaches to production differ with respect to a set of indicators of
technical efficiency. In this paper we provide quantitative analysis of these new types of farming units and
provide a rationale for a deeper exploration into the nature of these groups. Overall we find that the total
factor productivity of small groups formed on familial and social ties is higher than that of individual
farms, given the uncertain rural environment in Kyrgyzstan and the resource constraints facing
landholders at this point in time. The explanation for this hinges primarily on understanding the assetpooling,
risk-sharing and labour specialisation functions of groups. In-depth qualitative fieldwork
performed in conjunction with this study confirms these explanations (see Sabates-Wheeler 2004). As
transition agriculture continues to adapt to land reform choices that were made ten years ago, a major
policy question facing the Kyrgyz government must be, what kind of agrarian structure should be
facilitated in order to promote agricultural growth? Despite the push for de-collectivisation there remains
a place for encouraging group farming, on grounds of both poverty alleviation and agricultural growth.
Keywords: Kyrgyzstan; agricultural restructuring; asset-pooling.
